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ABSTRACT 
 
Why and how do ordinary citizens lacking previous activist experience, come, at certain 
times, to stage protests, block roads, close public administrations, or occupy public 
spaces, in order to reclaim what they consider is their right? In Egypt, ordinary people 
have increasingly, albeit occasionally, endorsed protest as a means to press demands, as 
shown by a continuous frequency of popular mobilisations despite a very repressive 
context since July 2013. However, despite the persistence of serious grievances and 
limited results, most of these collective actions have not exceeded the local scale, 
remaining dispersed, discontinuous and ephemeral. This thesis argues that beyond 
repression and other authoritarian constraints, which only provide a partial explanation, 
most popular mobilisations are also prevented from expanding by the vicissitudes of 
leadership on the one hand, and a set of local sociocultural features on the other.  
 
Beyond traditional social movement studies, which mainly focused on urban and 
organised movements, this thesis analyses ordinary people’s isolated protests 
characterised by a basic organisation and a strong local anchorage. Based on fieldwork in 
southern Upper Egypt between January 2014 and April 2015, it provides an account of 
recent local dynamics of (de)mobilisation. Focusing on these discontinuous, dispersed 
and ephemeral forms of activism, it sheds light on the factors that interact in preventing 
a widening of local collective action. These factors include leaders’ limited ambitions, 
experience, and difficulties in coordinating in a highly authoritarian environment; 
activists’ co-optation; local logics of patronage and loyalties; gender, generational and 
other social divisions; and perceptions of cultural identity. The thesis also establishes that 
current national campaigns, mainly revolutionary change, labour protests and the pro-
Muslim Brotherhood protest movement, do not appeal to the majority due to their lack of 
alternative political projects and perceived exclusionary character. This ultimately 
suggests why the beginning of a revolution was suspended. 
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Introduction: examining the local dynamics of contestation 
 
1. Popular mobilisations in Upper Egyptian cities and villages since 2011 
 
On 28 January 2011, I woke up alone in my parents’ flat in the neighbourhood of 
Mohandessin in western Cairo. My mother was out. She had not mentioned going out, so 
I completely ignored where she was. Later, I wanted to call her and realised that I had no 
network on my mobile phone. Internet was also cut. I turned on the TV, and saw what 
had been happening. From my window, it looked like a normal Friday. On TV, it was all 
about violence, but also hope. As many analysts of Egyptian politics, I knew that popular 
discontent had been increasing. I knew that something would soon have to change, that 
something would happen. However, I could not tell what, how or when it would happen. 
A few days earlier, Tunisian President Ben Ali’s flight changed that. That day, I 
remember telling an old friend who was going abroad for a long period that he would find 
a revolution in Egypt on his return. I could not have put it better. On 28 January, as I was 
watching live on TV demonstrators being watered, tear-gassed, and soon shot by 
policemen and Central Security forces, I was mesmerised. Despite the huge violence, 
numbers kept growing. By the end of the day, the army took over the streets while the 
police, completely surpassed, suddenly disappeared. Thousands of protesters were now 
gathered in Cairo’s central Tahrir Square, chanting the famous slogan taken from the 
Tunisian revolutionaries, “the people want the fall of the regime”. I understood that this 
was a solemn, unique, historical moment, a moment that would affect my life and that of 
millions of people. 
 
Billions of people across the world live on the fringe of societies structured by 
exclusionary socioeconomic, political, and even cultural orders which maintain them in 
poverty, or deteriorate their living conditions. Yet, only a few raise their voices in rather 
rare circumstances to denounce their marginality and demand a recognition of their 
existence and rights. Particularly in authoritarian contexts, ordinary citizens face immense 
risks when engaging in open contention vis-à-vis the authorities. They generally lack the 
mobilising structures used by more experienced political and social activists. Long 
internalised inequalities largely prevent them from challenging “the beliefs and rituals 
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laid down by their rulers”1 which reproduce the conditions of their exclusion (Piven and 
Cloward 1978, Gooptu and Bandyopadhyay 2007). When they rise against the authorities, 
it is often when their immediate interests are perceivably threatened (Bayat 1997, 2010; 
Posusney 1994; Sadiki 2000).  
 
The Arab uprisings constituted one of the latest instances of such exceptional mobilisation 
of the ordinary and the poor (Chalcraft 2012). However, the popular mobilisations that 
have agitated the Arab world since early 2011 differ from previous occurrences of 
ordinary people’s contentious politics in their forms, scopes and modes of organisation. 
Despite a significant degree of spontaneity in the eruption of many protests, they have 
constituted neither momentary local rebellions in reaction to political decisions directly 
affecting poor people’s livelihoods, nor mass “bread riots” (Walton and Seddon 1994, 
Sadiki 2000). They have not been extensions of poor people’s everyday resistance, or 
survival strategies such as “quiet encroachments” (Bayat 1997, 2010). The latter 
designate forms of grassroots activism aiming at winning new spaces, which include 
“noncollective, but prolonged, direct actions by individuals and families to acquire the 
basic necessities of life (land for shelter, urban collective consumption, informal work, 
business opportunities, and public space) in a quiet and unassuming, yet illegal, fashion”2.  
 
Characterised by a recurrent occurrence of protests directly targeting the authorities and 
advancing demands which often exceed local, communal or particular interests, a new 
kind of popular contentious politics has emerged in 2011 in Egypt. The post-uprising era 
was characterised by a continuous participation in protests of many ordinary people. 
Driven by a new sense of possibility and agency, by the high expectations and the 
subsequent frustrations that the successful removal of presidents generated, the 
disenfranchised sought to keep the pressure on the authorities. Not only did they 
growingly mobilise in their villages and neighbourhoods, but they also increasingly 
extended, and sometimes radicalised, their “repertoires of contention”3 (Tilly 2006, 
                                                          
1 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. Why They Succeed, How They 
Fail, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). 
2 Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997).  
See also Asef Bayat, Life as Politics. How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2010). 
3 According to Charles Tilly, the notion of “repertoire of contention” refers to the historically changing 
assortment of means available to a given population to raise contentious claims. See Charles Tilly, 
Contentious Performances, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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2008). These repertoires have ranged from mass street demonstrations to sit-ins and 
occupations of public spaces, road and transportation blockades, and labour strikes. In the 
countryside, many people have, for the first time, mobilised to demand a decent life and 
basic services from the state. Poor workers such as garbage collectors have demanded 
pay raises and better working conditions. Corrupt local officials have been targeted. The 
increasing resort to disruptive protests and open confrontation seemed to signal 
evolutions in the political culture of ordinary people. Animated by “a new sense of 
efficacy”4, people seemed to believe that they could achieve much more through public 
protests than via formal political channels remaining inaccessible to them. As reflected 
by the apparent spontaneity of many protests, as well as by their coordinated rather than 
organised forms, ordinary people’s mobilisations have not necessarily been led or 
controlled by political actors. Regardless of “people power”5’s impact on Egypt’s future, 
this relative trivialisation of protest as a legitimate and efficient means to obtain 
significant changes from the authorities suggests deep implications for the nature of 
ordinary citizens’ political participation. It points at an increased popular awareness of 
the ability to positively influence change rather than passively watching it. It reflects a 
new common sense of citizenry, of belonging to the polity, to the sha‛b. 
 
This renewed contentious politics has experienced a slowdown since the army removed 
President Morsi in July 2013. When I travelled to Egypt in December 2013, the context 
was very tense. Almost daily protests by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
were resulting in many casualties and arrests. The Brotherhood had been demonised and 
labelled a terrorist organisation. Militant attacks targeting security forces had become 
very frequent, and the security situation had been globally deteriorating, especially in 
Sinai, but also in Cairo and some areas in the Delta. On the political front, the military-
backed interim authorities had been intensifying their efforts to eliminate all kinds of 
political dissent. The media propaganda in support for the government, including for a 
“yes” vote at the January 2014 constitutional referendum, was at its peak. The polarisation 
between MB supporters and those hoping to achieve stability and security through the 
                                                          
4 Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. Why They Succeed, How They Fail. 
5 McAdam and Sewell describe “people power” movements as “relatively nonviolent demonstrations in 
which hundreds of thousands simply show(ed) their disgust, lack of fear, and unwillingness to cooperate 
with the old regime in massive demonstrations in urban public spaces”. Doug McAdam and W.H. Sewell, 
“It’s about time: temporality in the study of social movements and revolutions”, in Ronald R. Aminzade, 
Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Sidney Tarrow and Charles 
Tilly, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
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election of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as president appeared deep. Supporters of the new interim 
authorities had largely demobilised, having obtained President Morsi’s ouster and the 
MB’s political isolation. With a majority of ordinary Egyptians, they were waiting for the 
election of a new president. On the contrary, supporters of President Morsi were not 
abandoning their mobilisation against what they called a military coup, despite the violent 
repression of their protests. Three months after the bloody dispersal of two sit-ins in Cairo 
on 14 August 2013, despite violence and the detention of many MB leaders, supporters 
of the Muslim Brotherhood continued to stage weekly protests across Egypt. However, 
these unsurprisingly gathered lower numbers and covered less spaces. 
 
Although the revolutionary ideals contained in the famous slogan “bread, freedom and 
social justice” remained essential among ordinary people, there was an obvious fatigue 
and even a rejection of what was called the “25 January revolution”6. Particularly in 
regions over-relying on tourism revenues such as Luxor and Aswan, many people said 
they regretted the Mubarak era, for understandable reasons. The tourism industry had 
been dramatically affected by political and security events, leaving thousands of people 
jobless or surviving through small activities. After three years of political turmoil and 
deteriorating economy and security, people’s overwhelming aspirations were for the 
return of security. The hope for stability was in everyone’s mouth, and the idea of taking 
to the streets to protest was increasingly denigrated as a move against it. Now was the 
time to work, build, and give a chance to existing politicians to reform the country’s 
economy and restore safety and security. The main exception to this general trend was 
the Islamist, mainly pro-MB current. For these people, ousted President Morsi had 
represented a real hope to see the country reformed on religious, moral bases. The military 
“junta” had become their enemy since it had simply seized their dream. It had “thrown 
their votes into the dustbin”, in the words of a then regular participant in protests 
supporting President Morsi7. Another exception was a fringe of the population, mainly 
young supporters of the “revolution”, who felt ihbāt, meaning disappointment, frustration 
or defeat.  
                                                          
6 Throughout the thesis, I put in inverted commas the terms “revolution”, “revolutionary” and 
“revolutionaries” to use them in the same way informants and the media generally do, without having to 
discuss their appropriateness. I personally prefer the term “uprising” when referring to the events of 
January- February 2011 and, to some extent, those of June-July 2013. Yet, I consider that some kind of 
revolutionary process has started with President Mubarak’s departure, and suffered a major setback since 
President Morsi’s ouster by the army in July 2013. After largely analysing throughout the thesis the impact 
of both uprisings, I come back to this discussion in conclusion. 
7 Interview with Khadija, 43, school teacher, Abul Rish (Aswan), March 2014. 
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In summer 2016, the situation in the Egypt of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi remained 
predominantly repressive and dangerous for protesters, political opponents, government 
critics, activists, journalists and researchers alike. Nevertheless, all sorts of popular 
mobilisations remained frequent, proving that the harshest repression could not 
completely silence urgent grievances. This work is about the contentious politics under 
authoritarian conditions of ordinary people residing in marginalised spaces. In Dynamics 
of Contention (2001), McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly define contentious politics as the 
“episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when 
(a) at least one government is a claimant, and object of claims, or a party to the claims 
and (b) the claims would, if realised, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants”8. 
Throughout the thesis, I also use a broad definition of the term “mobilisation”, referring 
at the same time to people’s participation in contentious (but not necessarily 
transgressive) collective actions to raise claims, and to the efforts deployed by movement 
leaders and activists to convince others to join their cause. Mobilisation can imply the 
resort to street protests or to less transgressive forms of contention such as filing lawsuits 
or reporting on violations.   
 
A heterogeneous group constituting the majority of the citizenry (Bermeo 2003), ordinary 
people are ordinary simply because they usually “have no extraordinary powers vis-à-vis 
the states in which they live”9, “are neither politicians nor military officers”10, and “spend 
most of their lives in personal endeavours – earning money, supporting families, and 
pursuing whatever leisure activities their social status allows”11. Among numerous 
politically, socially and economically marginalised populations, it is generally understood 
that the ordinary are those people who, under authoritarian settings, lack access to the 
formal political arena. They constitute a distinct category from the “professional”, more 
or less experienced activists, and are “the non-activist citizens of a polity, who tend to be 
disengaged from politics, other than when they vote in elections”12. Contrary to many 
political activists, ordinary people generally engage in wide-scale, open contention in 
                                                          
8 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
9 Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times. The Citizenry and the Breakdown of 
Democracy, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Olga Onuch, “Why did they join en masse? Understanding ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians’ participation in mass-
mobilisation in 2004”, Political Science, 2011. 
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very specific and rather rare circumstances, while possibly displaying an everyday 
resistance and defiance vis-à-vis the authorities and the dominant order through rather 
discrete and diffuse practices. Additionally, contrary to “polity members” defined as 
“constituted political actors enjoying routine access to government agents and 
resources”13, most of the ordinary citizens present throughout this research are not 
established, organised political actors, and lack such access to the authorities. This is a 
component of their marginal condition that they have been increasingly denouncing. In 
sum, following Nancy Bermeo (2003) and Olga Onuch (2011, 2014), I interchangeably 
use the terms “ordinary citizens” and “ordinary people” to designate populations whose 
mobilisation remains relatively exceptional. In the Egyptian context, such ordinary people 
rarely had any protest experience before the 2011 uprising. Thus, I oppose ordinary 
people to experienced political activists. I deliberately use this general category to 
encompass diverse socioeconomic profiles. That said, most of the ordinary citizens I 
interviewed in Upper Egypt belonged to the middle and lower classes, and generally had 
either a secondary level of education or a vocational or technical diploma.  
 
This research often refers to the role in mobilisation of ordinary local networks, 
understood as the “microstructural forms that socialise and connect activists, facilitate 
information flows, help to create solidarity and shared identities, influence decision-
making processes, and that, importantly, can limit membership if they fail to create 
brokerage opportunities to (potentially) new participants”14. Therefore, I mean those 
proximity social networks, including solidarity and problem-solving networks, religious 
associations or sites, family associations, popular committees, and neighbourhood public 
places (markets, cafés, gardens), which may drive and sustain participation in protests. I 
also explore political culture, defined as the general set of beliefs, ideas and practices that 
shape people’s political perceptions and subsequent behaviour or participation. 
Marginalised spaces or areas of the “periphery” here refer to places that have been 
enduring a state policy of neglect for a very long time. What generally distinguishes these 
areas is a high level of poverty, an elevated portion of residents surviving thanks to the 
informal sector, a lack of and poor condition of public infrastructure and services, and an 
absence of significant development projects. 
                                                          
13 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 
14 Joseph Pierce, Deborah G. Martin and James T. Murphy, “Relational place-making: the networked 
politics of place”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2010. 
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2. Research questions 
 
Why and how do ordinary citizens devoid of previous activist experience, come, at certain 
times, to stage protests, block roads, close public administrations, or occupy public 
spaces, in order to reclaim what they consider is their right? Even though many images 
of popular protests may come to one’s mind, such a question cannot entail a monolithic 
answer. If poverty, injustice, corrupt rulers and violated freedoms are all reasons 
potentially invoked by protesters, they have never constituted sufficient motive for 
rebellion, and “even under the most extreme conditions of human misery and exploitation, 
the emergence of collective protest is not assured”15. Everywhere, people have found 
ways to cope with the most intolerable living conditions and injustices, without 
systematically expressing discontent. Yet, on relatively rare instances, some people 
decide to take action. This research aims at providing a better understanding of the 
rationale behind common people’s decision to take their demands to the public sphere 
through staging protests. Noting that a significant number of protests do not exceed the 
local scale, do not last, do not intersect, are disseminated and sporadic, a more specific 
research question emerged: Why do certain popular mobilisations remain discontinuous, 
ephemeral and dispersed? 
 
This question is inspired by a number of findings in Egypt since the 25 January 2011 
uprising. Firstly, Ordinary people have increasingly, albeit occasionally, endorsed protest 
as a means to press demands, as shown by a continuing frequency of popular 
mobilisations despite a very repressive context since July 2013. However, despite the 
persistence of serious grievances and limited results, most of these collective actions have 
not exceeded the local scale. In most of the local protest movements I mention throughout 
this thesis, there was no “attribution of similarity”, referring to “the mutual identification 
of actors in different sites as being sufficiently similar to justify common action”16. Such 
local movements have essentially remained dispersed, since protesters have not tried to 
build connections with others sharing the same grievances elsewhere. They have been 
discontinuous and sporadic, with ordinary people’s participation remaining occasional. 
Finally, they have been ephemeral, with actions generally not lasting in time and quickly 
                                                          
15 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
16 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 
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losing momentum. Secondly, the grievances raised during these local popular 
mobilisations have not really been addressed by the nationwide protest campaigns that 
currently remain on offer in Egypt. Whether the labour movement, the “revolution”, or 
the protest movement led by the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, none has 
convincingly spoken about the issues prompting such popular mobilisations. None has 
significantly attempted to coordinate national campaigns raising such issues mattering to 
ordinary people. This may partly explain the essential unattractiveness of such nationwide 
movements to a majority of ordinary Egyptians. 
 
This thesis finds that beyond repression and other authoritarian constraints, which only 
provide a partial explanation to the failure to expand of most local protest movements, 
most popular mobilisations are constrained by the vicissitudes of leadership on the one 
hand, and by a set of local sociocultural constructions, beliefs and practices on the other. 
In other words, heavy repression and other potential threats (and opportunities) do not 
entirely explain mobilisation dynamics and processes. Mobilisation is a complex and 
lively process embedded not only in a particular historical and economic context, but also 
in a sociocultural environment that differs from a place to another. Therefore, analysing 
the local patterns and dynamics of mobilisation and demobilisation from the perspective 
of protest organisers and occasional participants is the only way to identify these factors 
preventing activism from embarking to the regional or national level. A thorough analysis 
of (de)mobilisation locally unveils the power struggles, class divisions, communal 
concerns, and social constructions that may influence protagonists’ behaviours.  
 
This study of instances of dispersed, discontinuous and ephemeral activism hopes to 
provide a unique insight into participants’ motivations and choices in relation to their 
environment, resources and immediate preoccupations. In Upper Egypt17, factors that 
have prevented these forms of activism from becoming wider include leaders’ apparently 
limited ambitions; activists’ occasional co-optation; clanship, local logics of patronage 
and subsequent loyalties; patriarchal constraints, tensions between generations, gender 
and other social divisions; and ordinary people’s perception of their Upper Egyptian 
identity. At the same time, currently available national campaigns have essentially failed 
                                                          
17 Upper Egypt generally refers to all the regions situated south of Cairo, particularly starting from Beni 
Suef. Throughout this study, I mainly talk about southern Upper Egypt, encompassing the governorates of 
Qena, Luxor and Aswan, where I conducted fieldwork (see maps above).  
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to attract a majority due to their lacking alternative political project and their perceived 
exclusionary character. 
 
3. Literature review and location of the thesis 
 
Traditional approaches have often considered ordinary people’s participation in protests 
the outcome of efforts by organised political actors (Auyero 2001, Schneider 1995). For 
Sidney Tarrow, “contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with 
more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in confrontation 
with elites, authorities, and opponents”18. This thesis challenges the traditional 
domination in the contentious politics literature of large, urban-based and relatively well 
organised social movements. It analyses these small protests isolated from other 
movements, characterised by a basic organisation and a strong local anchorage, which 
exceed Asef Bayat’s “nonmovements”19 and are more audible than “quiet 
encroachments” and other forms of everyday resistance. Indeed, studies focusing on 
dispersed, ephemeral and discontinuous forms of activism to explain the varying 
dynamics and processes of mobilisation and demobilisation are lacking. Yet, despite their 
generally limited resources and coordination, such popular mobilisations including 
strikes, blockades and sit-ins, have the potential, if they last, to durably disturb whole 
sectors of the economy, public infrastructure, road traffic and transportation. Indeed, 
ordinary people’s power is their ability to occupy, disrupt, shut things down (Piven and 
Cloward 1978, Piven 2012). Therefore, this work pays attention to the ways ordinary 
people accommodate with the hegemony of the state and its local representatives. A 
process more than a condition, hegemony designates “a form of domination in which 
coercion is outweighed by consent, or coercion is armoured by consent”20.  
 
This study attempts to shed light on some of the factors influencing mobilisation through 
emphasising the perspective of the occasional, not-so-committed participant in protest 
movements. It also tackles processes of individual disengagement and collective 
                                                          
18 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
19 “The non-deliberate and dispersed but contentious practices of individuals and families to enhance their 
life chances”. Asef Bayat, “The Arab Spring and its Surprises”, Development and Change 44(3), 2013. 
20 Paulo Drinot, “Hegemony from Below: Print Workers, the State and the Communist Party in Peru, 1920-
40”, in John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani, eds., Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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demobilisation, less explored in the literature. Indeed, the risk of demobilisation is 
omnipresent, whether as a result of the lack of organisation (Schneider 1995), harsh 
repression, divisions among participants, or the institutionalisation of ordinary people’s 
protest movements into formal organisations having lesser options to pressure the 
authorities (Piven and Cloward 1978). While demobilisation and defection have been the 
object of interesting studies (McAdam 1988, Fillieule 2005 and 2015, Hipsher 1996), 
they were often neglected to the benefit of individuals’ mobilisation. This thesis is full of 
testimonies by ordinary people who have demobilised or never mobilised. Additionally, 
it does not exclusively focus on transgressive forms of contention and pays attention to 
the ways agents adapt their strategies to changing contexts. 
 
A number of scholars have noted the emergence of ordinary people as political actors in 
their own right: “these movements of marginalised and thus hard-to-mobilise sectors have 
become crucial political actors challenging the existing polities”21. “To be subaltern is not 
to be powerless. The most submissive peasantry is capable not only of ‘working the 
system’ to its advantage – or rather to its minimum disadvantage – but also of resisting 
and, where appropriate, of counterattack”22. There are precious contributions to studies 
of subalterns and ordinary contention (Schneider 1995, Hobsbawm 1998, O’Brien 2003, 
Schock 2005, Onuch 2011 and 2014), including poor people’s movements (Piven and 
Cloward 1978, Bayat 1997). While some scholars focused on ordinary citizens’ everyday 
resistance and discrete survival strategies (Bayat 1997, 2007, 2010; Scott 1985, 1990, 
2009; Tripp 2013), others have studied the occurrence of “bread riots” (Sadiki 2000, 
Walton and Seddon 1994). Before the 2011 uprising, studies of contention in the Middle 
East, including applications of the social movement theory23, remained mainly focused 
on Islamist movements and activism (Wickham 2002, Clark 2004, Wiktorowicz 2004). 
Egyptian subalterns’ contentious politics have been studied from the perspective of 
workers (Lockman 1994; Beinin 1989, 2007, 2015; Toth 1999; Hopkins 2009; El-Mahdi 
2011; Duboc 2012) and peasants or farmers (Brown 1990, Kazemi and Waterbury 1991, 
Ayeb 2010, Ayeb and Bush 2014, El Nour 2015) as homogeneous classes or 
socioeconomic categories, but not so often from the perspective of the more 
                                                          
21 Jonas Wolff, “(De-)Mobilising the Marginalised. A Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros and 
Ecuador's Indigenous Movement”, Journal of Latin American Studies 39:1, 1-29, 2007. 
22 Eric Hobsbawm, Uncommon People: resistance, rebellion and jazz, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 
1998). 
23 See, for example, Rabab El-Mahdi, “Enough!: Egypt’s Quest for Democracy”, Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol.42, N°8, August 2009. 
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heterogeneous group constituted by ordinary people. There were yet some studies of local 
popular mobilisations before the uprising(s) in Egypt (Sowers 2012, Abul Magd 2013) 
and the Middle East in general (Cronin 2008, Chalcraft 2016).  
 
Throughout the thesis, I particularly pay attention to the way ordinary people’s actual and 
self-perceived marginalisation influences their mobilisation. I thus aim to contribute to a 
body of literature studying marginality and exclusion in relation to contentious politics 
(Wolff 2007, Bush and Ayeb 2012). For De Certeau (1984), minority groups are not the 
only ones to be disregarded; instead, it is often the majority that is massively and 
pervasively marginalised. This study presupposes that most ordinary Egyptian citizens 
have been de facto marginalised from the political directions taken by their rulers at least 
since the beginning of the Infitāh or economic opening in Egypt under President Sadat in 
the seventies. As pointed by Gooptu and Bandyopadhyay, approaches focusing on poor 
people’s voices and perspectives “have been more concerned with practical, material and 
procedural aspects of empowerment and participation, rather than with change in 
mentality and the transformation of the subjectivity of the poor”24. Yet, political culture 
is important because it comprises “the possible alternative venues which different 
dispossessed groups (in different countries) often deploy to address (or not to address) 
their exclusion”25. This study aims to contribute to the literature focusing on the ways 
marginalised populations deal with, reconsider, challenge and sometimes overcome “their 
own sense of alienation”26 (Gooptu and Bandyopadhyay 2007). It explores how ordinary 
people contest their marginality, question the dominant cultural order’s elements which 
exclude them and keep them into poverty (Gooptu and Bandyopadhyay 2007), become 
“active subject agents”27, and finally reclaim their citizenship and belonging to a broader 
community, the nation, the sha‛b. 
 
The thesis also studies how instances of ephemeral, discontinuous and dispersed local 
popular mobilisation are partly structured by their geographical and cultural context, as 
well as spatial constraints (Sewell 2001), while paying attention to their interaction with 
                                                          
24 Nandini Gooptu and Nandinee Bandyopadhyay, “ ‘Rights to Stop the Wrong’: Cultural Change and 
Collective Mobilization – The Case of Kolkata Sex Workers”, Oxford Development Studies, 35:3, 251-272, 
2007. 
25 Asef Bayat, “Politics in the City-Inside-Out”, City and Society, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 110-128, 2012. 
26 Gooptu and Bandyopadhyay, “ ‘Rights to Stop the Wrong’: Cultural Change and Collective Mobilization 
– The Case of Kolkata Sex Workers”. 
27 Ibid. 
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the national level. Indeed, contentious politics are shaped and constrained by the spatial 
environments in which they take place (Sewell 2001), which affect choices of strategies 
and protest locations. This research aims to contribute to studies of mobilisation taking 
into account the role of space, networks and sociocultural features. It attempts to replace 
the individual at the core, in relation to her/his environment, her/his understanding of it 
and her/his reactions to changes affecting everyday life. For Salwa Ismail, “the 
infrastructure of mobilisation and protest lay in the microprocesses of everyday life at the 
quarter level, in their forms of governance and in the structure of feelings that developed 
in relation to state government”28. Such purpose implies paying attention to the 
sociocultural characteristics of Upper Egypt as a distinct geographical and cultural space. 
It also means exploring the resources available to contentious actors, which potentially 
affect (de)mobilisation. It also means assessing how national events have impacted 
mobilisation in provinces. 
 
As noted by Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow (2001), mobilisation is not isolated but interacts 
with other processes and mechanisms. This study offers insight in some of these 
intersections, especially repression and the diffusion of contention. At the same time, 
without strictly entering the debate about potential contentious actors’ perceptions of 
political opportunities and threats, it aims to show how these intermingling processes and 
mechanisms vary over time and evolve in different historical contexts. The initial 
postulate is that repression and the other restrictions to activism imposed by authoritarian 
conditions do not account for the full story. The thesis particularly explores the 
interactions, at the local level, between (de)mobilisation processes and, on the one hand, 
leadership issues, and social and cultural elements on the other.  
 
The role of informal, local networks, in contentious events, their premises and aftermath, 
has been well explored (Gould 1991, Denoeux 1993, Castells 2012, Hmed and Raillard 
2012, Beinin and Vairel 2013). Auyero (2001) studies the everyday relationships that 
make up the political culture(s) of the urban poor, the ways politics interacts with people’s 
daily lives, through an ethnography of clientelist networks. Other scholars have put into 
perspective the mobilising strengths of informal networks, as Beinin and Duboc (2013), 
who showed that the Egyptian labour movement’s strong reliance on local networks 
largely prevented it from expanding to the national level. I similarly establish that 
                                                          
28 Salwa Ismail, “The Egyptian revolution against the police.” Social Research 79, no.2 (2012), 435-464. 
 
28 
 
dispersed, ephemeral and discontinuous forms of activism such as small movements 
against deteriorating public services partly fail to expand because of the vulnerability of 
the local networks they strongly rely on. Indeed, these ordinary informal networks are 
quite exposed to internal divisions and external co-optation attempts, for example. 
Another approach has emphasised the interactions in the mobilisation process between 
ordinary local networks and formal political resources (Schneider 1995). Scholars have 
also studied the creation of new social ties and organisational networks during instances 
of mobilisation (Gould 199129), and the process by which informal networks of survival 
and political networks become overlapping (Auyero 2001). Such perspectives have 
highlighted the role of activists (Schneider 1995), other intermediaries or “brokers”30 
(Auyero 2001), focusing on networks’ structure (Gould 1991), or compensations given to 
populations in exchange for their loyalty (Auyero 2001, Schneider 1995, Blaydes 2013). 
These studies constitute precious contributions. However, they do not fully account for 
popular mobilisations occurring in areas lacking well-established political brokers and 
organisational networks. Overall, my research about discontinuous, dispersed and 
ephemeral forms of local activism is also in line with recently-initiated discussions on 
various aspects of contentious politics in post-2011 uprising Egypt, ranging from youth 
activism (Abdalla 2016), to organisation and leadership (Abdelrahman 2015). It pays 
close attention to leadership, not that explored in the contentious politics literature, and 
largely shows how leaders’ initiatives are also decisive in the course of local protest 
movements. 
 
A number of scholars of contentious politics have, in the wake of the work of Thompson 
(1971), explored the moral economy perspective to explain the eruption of protests by 
ordinary people or subalterns (Scott 2009), including in the Middle East (Aytekin 2012, 
Zemni and Ayeb 2015) and Egypt (Posusney 1993). Socioeconomic grievances have 
certainly constituted a significant factor in individual and collective decisions to protest, 
but the recent popular contentious politics in Egypt is resolutely driven by broader 
political incentives, perhaps by a long violated “moral polity” (Roberts 2002). While 
                                                          
29 Roger V. Gould, “Multiple Networks and Mobilisation in the Paris Commune, 1871”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 56, N°6, pp. 716-729, December 1991. Gould demonstrated how Parisians were 
mobilised for insurgency during the Commune through neighbourhood networks: “mobilisation typically 
creates organisational networks that overlay and interact with pre-existing informal networks”.  
30 “Brokerage” is defined as “the web of relations that some residents establish with local political brokers”. 
Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2001). 
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considering this approach to understand the rationale behind small, local, discontinuous, 
dispersed and ephemeral protest movements, I find that the ordinary participants in 
protests against poor public services are somewhat motivated by the memory of a strong 
state able to deliver (framed as the Nasserist state), and subsequently, perhaps, by the 
memory of an old moral economy. 
 
The thesis aims to add to an abundant literature about the “Arab Spring” in general 
(Dabashi 2012, Haddad, Bsheer and Abu-Rish 2012, Achcar 2013, Gerges 2013, Tripp 
2013), and Egypt’s uprising(s) in particular (Sowers and Toensing 2012, Korany and El-
Mahdi 2012, Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, Gunning and Zvi Baron 2014, Ketchley 
2016). It provides some insight about how the 2011 and 2013 uprisings were experienced 
in the less known provinces of southern Upper Egypt, and how both events have 
respectively affected the everyday lives and contentious practices of ordinary Upper 
Egyptians. While a number of studies have explored how ordinary people gradually 
radicalised until mobilising in the Arab uprisings (Allal and Cooper 2012, El Chazli and 
Cooper 2012), they have rarely emphasised the ordinary participation in protests in 
remote provinces and the countryside, to which this study partly gives the floor, generally 
studying urban subalterns instead (Ismail 2011, 2013). While media coverage was very 
limited during the “18 days” of the 2011 uprising in Egyptian provinces, academic 
research about the event and its consequences in remote regions has similarly remained 
scarce. One exception is Lila Abu-Lughod’s account of the 2011 uprising in a village in 
the region of Luxor (2012), in which she denounced journalists’ disinterest in what was 
happening in provinces31. While social movement studies have essentially prioritised 
large movements able to disrupt public order over small mobilisations or “self-limitation 
phenomena” (Vairel 2015), research on contentious politics in the Middle East since 2011 
has too often ignored local expressions of discontent, leaving aside regions of the 
“periphery” such as Upper Egypt. While “the local has long been stigmatised as the place 
of permanence, of resistance to change, of conservatism”32, Upper Egypt’s provinces 
have been traditionally described as unadventurous and therefore non-contentious33. 
Their remoteness from Cairo’s central government and their essentially rural character 
                                                          
31 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Living the ‘revolution’ in an Egyptian village: Moral action in a national space”, 
American Ethnologist, Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 21–25, February 2012. 
32 Jean-Louis Briquet and Frédéric Sawicki, « L'analyse localisée du politique : lieux de recherche ou 
recherche de lieux ? », Politix. Travaux de science politique, n°7/8, 1989, p. 6-16. 
33 On the common clichés about Upper Egypt, see, for instance, Nicholas Hopkins and Reem Saad, eds., 
Upper Egypt, Identity and Change, (Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004).  
 
30 
 
partly explain this isolation, real or perceived marginalisation, and their relative ignorance 
by the rest of Egypt. This thesis hopes to add to too rare studies of Upper Egyptian politics 
(Hopkins and Saad 2004, Abul-Magd 2013, Gamblin 1997 and 2007). 
 
Perhaps some readers will reproach me a certain distance vis-à-vis the social movement 
literature in its traditional and revised versions. It is not my intention to deny that, indeed, 
I found it relatively difficult to detect its models in the specific reality that I was 
observing, whether in Luxor, Aswan or Qena. I also sought to overcome the state-centric 
bias of McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow’s Dynamics of Contention. In addition, I deliberately 
avoided to systematically engage in some debates, such as the one about the role in 
(de)mobilisation of political opportunities and threats. Scholars such as Kurzman have 
shown, against the classic opportunity model, that repression sometimes encourages 
mobilisation. Others have sought to introduce the concept of threat (Goldstone and Tilly 
2001), defined as “the costs that a social group will incur from protest, or that it expects 
to suffer if it does not take action”34. Of course, there are circumstances that are more 
favourable to the organisation of protests than others, and situations that are more 
threatening than others. However, people’s motives and paths to mobilisation are so 
diverse and complex that it would be too reductive to exclusively explain their decisions 
in terms of opportunities and/or threats.  
 
Without engaging in the theoretical components of this debate, I still give, I think, the 
historical context and particularly the characteristics of the authoritarian conditions all 
the significance and attention they deserve. The history of ordinary contention in Egypt 
shows that collective actions take place despite the constraints of a continuously 
authoritarian environment, including a lack of resources and the prospect of repression. I 
define the period between the 2011 and 2013 uprisings as particularly encouraging for 
protests due to some political openings. Successful mobilisation fosters more 
mobilisation, renews the confidence in one’s ability to drive change (Gooptu and 
Bandyopadhyay 2007), eradicates fatalism, allows to raise new demands, and so on. This 
has been obviously the case in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. I suggest that the 
persistence of protests in a renewed hostile context since 3 July 2013 shows that an 
                                                          
34 Jack A. Goldstone and Charles Tilly, “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in 
the Dynamics of Contentious Action”, in Aminzade, Goldstone, McAdam, Perry, Sewell, Tarrow and Tilly, 
Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. 
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environment characterised by a lack of opportunities to mobilise does not necessarily 
prevent people from protesting. At the same time, the presence of threats to people’s 
livelihoods and achieved gains might explain the occurrence of some popular 
mobilisations (Beinin and Vairel 2013, Beinin and Duboc 2013). However, this is not a 
fatality, since people do not systematically react to political decisions having the potential 
to negatively affect their lives. Structural opportunities and those perceived by agents are 
also two different things (Schock 2005), meaning that people can perceive the context as 
favourable to act while it is objectively not for various reasons, or conversely.  
 
Moreover, the thesis establishes the importance of the cultural environment in shaping, 
fostering or constraining ordinary people’s protests. Briquet and Sawicki (1989) called 
for a more systematic focus on the local scale, the characteristics of the local political 
space, and its interactions with the national. This is key because the local space offers the 
resources and the organisational settings to protest organisers. Only a few scholars have 
considered the contribution of social and cultural constructions, traditions and beliefs to 
contentious actors’ options and strategic decisions (Polletta 2009) as at least equally 
important as political opportunities or threats. These reservations towards the social 
movement theory and its more recent versions do not mean that the thesis does not 
acknowledge the usefulness of some of the tools that were defined by McAdam, Tilly and 
Tarrow. On the contrary, these provided a significant source of inspiration to this research 
which, in turn, attempts to strengthen concepts such as “scale shift”, “certification” or 
“brokerage”, by demonstrating their empirical occurrence or explaining their absence in 
a number of situations.  
 
This research also wishes to get over with a post-orientalist, fatalist literature emphasising 
the “Arab exception”, the Middle East’s deep authoritarian nature, and the intrinsic 
incompatibility between Islam and Muslim cultures on the one hand, and prospects of 
democratic change on the other. The Arab uprisings have shown that even in the strongest 
and most resilient authoritarian regimes, popular dissent could occur and force the 
departure of rulers. Ordinary people’s increasing marginalisation and despair was never 
really seen as a time bomb whose potentially spectacular explosion could subvert 
everything. Yet, the mass participation in large-scale protests of ordinary people in 
Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab region shook previous attempts to demonstrate 
the persistence and omnipotence of authoritarianism (Schlumberger 2007, Posusney and 
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Penner Angrist 2005), the predominant role of political elites as agents for change 
(Perthes 2004), as well as weak democratic prospects. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, 
an essential part of the literature has continued to draw on previous traditions emphasising 
the “robustness of authoritarianism”35 (Bellin 2012, Stacher 2012) and wondering “how 
these regimes survived for so long”36. The Arab uprisings may indeed, in certain cases, 
further demonstrate the adaptability of authoritarian regimes (Kienle 2012, Dalmasso 
2012), as Egypt’s “counter-revolution” could perhaps suggest. Yet, the foundations of 
these regimes have been seriously shaken.   
 
Eventually, this research hopes to add some food for thought to a broader body of 
literature studying emerging forms of popular politics that have been observed mainly in 
Latin America under the label of “horizontalidad” or “horizontalism” (Sitrin 2006, Motta 
2011, Chalcraft 2012), “rhizomatic struggles” (Herrera 2011, Kienle 2012), or elsewhere 
the “multitude” (Hardt and Negri 2004). The Arab uprisings are part of a broader trend 
which saw popular movements developing worldwide in reaction to the excesses of 
neoliberalism and to political representatives’ inadequate responses to them. Ordinary, 
poor people across the world have been, in different ways, resisting policies increasingly 
resulting in their marginalisation. They have also been rejecting representational politics, 
amid a crisis of today’s globally leading economic and political models and an increasing 
“frustration with conventional politics”37 (Ross 2013). Egyptian subalterns, including in 
Upper Egypt, are no exception to this. Their mobilisations have reflected a crisis in 
representational politics, as well as their increasing intolerance of their enduring 
marginalisation and unfair living conditions.  
 
4. Research methodology  
 
I travelled to Egypt in December 2013 with the intention to conduct fieldwork. I had 
initially planned to be there by October. However, due to personal circumstances and a 
certain anxiety at ongoing tensions in Egypt, I had delayed my trip. I quickly realised 
once there that the situation would not improve any time soon. While preparing myself 
                                                          
35 Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: lessons of the Arab 
Spring”, Comparative Politics, 2012, 44, 2 pp. 127-149. 
36 Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer and Ziad Abu-Rish, Introduction to The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings, 
(London: Pluto Press, 2012). 
37 Carne Ross, The Leaderless Revolution: How Ordinary People Will Take Power and Change Politics in 
the 21st Century, (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011). 
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for this fieldwork, I had never imagined I would have to work in such tense circumstances. 
I started my PhD in October 2012 when, despite the election as president of Muhammad 
Morsi, the conservative Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, there was still hope for a 
revolutionary process to gradually suppress the authoritarian regime. The post-2011 
uprising period was a relatively open period in terms of freedoms, including the freedom 
of speech, and I thought I would conduct research in Egypt in this kind of context. In 
addition, Egyptians are among the most welcoming and friendly people. Therefore, I had 
imagined I would be rather welcomed as a researcher.  
 
In contrast, the context in December 2013 was highly authoritarian and repressive. I had 
not prepared myself to face suspicion in an environment characterised by the spread of 
eccentric conspiracy theories. In a context of high deterioration of freedoms, Egyptian 
and foreign journalists, activists and researchers, were described by the media as agents 
of enemy intelligence agencies allied to the Muslim Brotherhood and/or the United States 
and Israel, and seeking to destabilise Egypt. Intolerance was at its peak: claiming a non-
support for the military-backed interim government was assimilated with supporting the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and vice versa. Stories about denunciations of alleged pro-Muslim 
Brotherhood neighbours or the torching of cars displaying pictures of Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi or the Rāb‛a sign38 were widely circulating, poisoning the atmosphere. This made 
me quickly realise that fieldwork would be a particularly difficult challenge for the 
unexperienced and timorous researcher I was. Research in Egypt in the aftermath of the 
military coup would be much more complicated than initially planned. I had come to 
Egypt to study ordinary people’s contentious politics in a highly repressive context for 
protests and any kind of oppositional behaviour. A November 2013 law which was 
supposed to regulate protests soon appeared to aim at their complete suppression, while 
providing the authorities with a legal ground to arrest and imprison protesters. Such 
protest law had successfully discouraged street dissent. Consequently, I decided to be 
modest in both my research agenda and methods, and to accept the idea that my findings 
would be very different than what I would have expected when, long before the coup, I 
started to imagine what my PhD would look like. 
                                                          
38 From Rabaa al-Adawiyya, the name of the mosque and square in Cairo’s Nasr City area where a sit-in 
by thousands of Muslim Brotherhood supporters demanding President Morsi’s reinstatement was violently 
dispersed by security forces on 14 August 2013, leaving hundreds of civilian casualties. In Arabic, Rāb‛a 
means “fourth”, which prompted Muslim Brotherhood supporters after the massacre to raise four fingers 
(while bending the thumb) in a sign of support and identification.  
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My purpose was always to explore Egyptian provinces, outside Cairo and Alexandria. I 
wanted to get to know the Egypt that was generally absent from postcards, advertising 
films, and media reports, the one that had no voice and was often ignored, misunderstood, 
mocked, or despised. I wanted to see how ordinary Egyptians lived, their grievances, how 
they were affected by the ongoing political developments, how they responded to them, 
and how they got organised to defend their interests. The purpose was to reach rather 
silent voices in public records and go beyond official, mainstream narratives 
characteristic of authoritarian contexts. I initially intended to select a number of areas 
where levels of protests had been generally high since the 25 January “revolution”, as 
well as places where street dissent had been low. The idea was to make comparisons 
between locations characterised by similar socioeconomic and demographic figures, in 
order to identify recurring patterns of mobilisation. However, I was soon forced to admit 
that I would not be able to pick up places because they were convenient and simply go 
there. I subsequently gave up on the idea of conforming to a strict methodology, since it 
would have been unrealistic. Indeed, ordinary people’s protests had been so numerous 
since 25 January 2011 that it quickly appeared very tedious to map and typologise them. 
Additionally, as a half-foreign young woman, it would have been difficult to simply go 
and talk to people in the streets.  
 
Therefore, the easiest and safest way to get in touch with ordinary participants in past 
protests, especially in popular areas, was to get the help of local political or human rights 
activists, social workers or journalists. This strategy had the advantage of more easily 
getting the trust of respondents and reaching people of all kinds of social, educational and 
political backgrounds. However, this reliance on some people to get access to respondents 
put a limit to my research since the latter were selected by others on criteria not always 
scrupulously followed. Yet, I had determined rather simple criteria. I wanted to interview 
people who were ordinary in the sense that they had not been involved in any kind of 
formal political activism, and who were occasional protesters or had participated in at 
least one protest. I was not looking for a specific age, gender, social or educational 
background. On the contrary, I welcomed meetings with a diverse range of people, since 
ordinary citizens constitute a heterogeneous category. 
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I reviewed my fieldwork ambitions also because, I must admit it, I was a little intimidated 
and afraid by the then prevailing climate of violence and repression. I did not really know 
where to start, since I had no particular knowledge of a specific area. As a woman 
travelling alone in rather conservative regions where half-foreign researchers are not so 
common, my first concern and priority was my safety. How would I travel? Where would 
I stay? Who would I be able to contact should I have any problem? How would I reassure 
many of my family members, already worried about me while I was still home in Cairo? 
In addition, I was a self-funded student exclusively living from regular freelance work 
for a risk forecasting company based in London. This implied the need of further 
discretion regarding my activities, which could have also been assimilated with 
intelligence work since I used to write about Egypt. It also meant that I needed an Internet 
connection to be able to do my daily three to four hours of paid work in addition to the 
time spent researching the field. My financial resources were quite modest, which would 
affect my choices of accommodation and travel.  
 
These were some of my concerns in December 2013, while I was busy meeting, calling 
and writing to contacts, initially other researchers familiar with Egypt, who could be 
helpful either in putting me in touch with other people or in thinking of potential 
strategies. At the same time, as advised by my supervisor, I contacted many political 
activists based in provinces, sometimes via a common acquaintance, but most often 
directly via Facebook. Despite a certain suspicion expressed by a number of people, this 
proved to be a rather efficient way to get in touch with members of the activist community 
in various places. I still had to pick up a first location to begin my enquiry. A day trip to 
Zagazig, in Sharqiyya province, to meet a group of members of the April 6 Youth 
Movement, made me realise that it would be complicated to simply go and stay 
somewhere without almost immediately coming to the attention of people residing in the 
area and, more worrisome, local security agents.  
 
My aunt and uncle’s travel to their hometown Aswan for their usual annual winter holiday 
gave me the push I needed to make a decision and get started. My mother’s family is from 
Aswan, and even though almost all my aunts, uncles and cousins now live in Cairo, some 
of our relatives are still in Aswan, and they have kept many friends and acquaintances 
there. For me and for my family, this was somehow reassuring, and relatives could host 
me there, which meant that there would be no need to stay in a hotel. In addition, Aswan 
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did not seem that big, I had already been there many times, and it seemed more peaceful 
at the time than many troubled regions, including in Upper Egypt. Finally, I loved Aswan 
and was curious about the Upper Egyptian culture. At the time, I essentially knew the 
common clichés about Upper Egypt and the old stories of my parents, who had met and 
lived in Asyut before my birth. One could have objected that Upper Egypt was perhaps 
not the best choice to study popular dissent since its people had barely participated in the 
2011 uprising. However, after spending several months in the regions of Aswan, Luxor 
and Qena, I could guarantee that, in addition to being highly affected by political 
developments since the 2011 uprising, ordinary Upper Egyptians had been strongly 
mobilising to defend their rights and raise grievances. 
 
After a night in the sleeping train, I arrived in Aswan, where I was welcomed by my aunt 
and uncle, on 25 January 2014. I spent the first week meeting local activists I had 
contacted by email or via Facebook. Most of them promised to put me in touch with 
others, and I soon had a fair number of interviews scheduled. My aunt and uncle allowed 
me to stay in their flat after the end of their holiday for as long as I wanted. The flat was 
situated in a very convenient location next to a big bus stop in Abul Rish area, just at the 
outskirts of Aswan. Microbuses were available all day, and it took between five and ten 
minutes to be in Aswan’s city centre. There were also daily microbuses going everywhere 
in the province, to Kom Ombo, Nasr al-Nuba, Edfu… Furthermore, I had the advantage 
of the privacy of my own flat, which was in a building belonging to the family of my 
aunt’s husband. Therefore, my neighbours were his parents, brothers, sisters, their wives 
and husbands, whom I had known since my childhood. This made me feel safe, in addition 
to having the privilege of occasionally sharing with them delicious meals. Additionally, 
most of my uncle’s brothers and sisters and their partners were Salafi followers and fierce 
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. While it was difficult to find Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters for interviews for obvious reasons, I had the unexpected opportunity to 
actually get access to the intimate environment of such people who, in addition to being 
well-at-ease in their homes, knew they could trust me and talk freely in front of me. This 
gave me a unique insight in how Muslim Brotherhood supporters then lived and adapted 
to the hostility towards them. 
 
Indeed, when I arrived in Egypt, the overwhelming protest movement was the pro-MB or 
anti-coup movement. But despite being only a semi-organised movement (most political 
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leaders and prominent sheikhs were now in jail), it was partly led by the National Alliance 
to Support Legitimacy and university students. I wanted to study the participation in 
protests from the point of view of the ordinary, occasional protester, and not from the one 
of the experienced activist. Therefore, I decided to put aside the pro-MB movement, while 
welcoming meetings with MB supporters when possible. In any case, when I asked, I was 
rarely put in touch with people identified as MB supporters, probably because they were 
too scared to talk to a stranger. However, I sometimes found out during an interview that 
my respondent was sympathetic to their cause and had participated in a number of pro-
MB protests following the 3 July 2013 ousting of President Morsi and the 14 August 
bloody dispersal of pro-MB sit-ins in Cairo. These almost casual occurrences gave me an 
idea of how people perceived the MB and more generally the ongoing conflict between 
them and the interim authorities. I also spoke with many ordinary people and local 
activists happy to declare their support for then future President Sisi, as well as with 
people sceptical about politicians, the transition, and the “revolution” alike.   
 
I often spent hours explaining to my local contacts what I was looking for, and still, I was 
not always successful. Many people did not understand why, as a researcher, I would be 
so interested in meeting people who had no specific knowledge of politics or a low level 
of education. They often led me to the contrary of what I was looking for, namely 
experienced activists (which yet allowed me to have very interesting and useful 
conversations) or people who had never taken part in any kind of protest (which was also 
helpful to try to understand why they did not mobilise). Sometimes I succeeded in getting 
in touch with the public I was more specifically looking for and, when I did not, I still 
collected interesting material from people either refusing the idea of protesting in the 
streets or raising their demands in other ways. I also met many activists from all kinds of 
political backgrounds, and learnt a lot about their strategies of mobilisation, their political 
cultures and their hopes. However, I got the most interesting material from the ordinary 
participants I met during six months in Upper Egypt, who always welcomed me and 
shared their stories and experiences despite fears to talk.  
 
As already mentioned, informants were selected and approached though various means, 
mainly with the help of activists I got in touch with via online social networks. Samples 
were diversified as much as possible in order to include people from different generations, 
genders and education levels. However, the large majority of my informants were men 
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aged between 20 and 50 (the average age was 37), who had a vocational or technical 
education. One-to-one, in-depth interviews were my most frequent and preferred method. 
Narratives are crucial in capturing people’s “contentious memories”39 and self-
understandings of events in which they participated, as well as to recreate the meanings 
of these events (Auyero 2002) and understand subsequent evolutions in individual and 
collective identities (Polletta 2006). As argued by Auyero, “the interview not only 
facilitates the emergence of meanings that would otherwise be lost but also provides a 
window into the type of identity work performed by stories”40. Additionally, the 
ethnographic interview constitutes “a space where some displaced meanings can be 
recognised, and some interpretations can be challenged”41, and a source of “valuable 
evidence about the ongoing shaping and reshaping of local political culture”42. 
 
In addition, focus groups discussions on collective experiences, and limited participant-
observation in protest events and their prior organisation, also enabled to collect data 
shedding light on participants’ motivations, demands and opinions about the existing 
protest movements, political institutions, groups and representatives, ideologies, and so 
on. I sometimes decided to conduct group interviews when respondents were too 
numerous and I feared to lose some of them by making them wait for too long, or when I 
felt that male respondents were too ill-at-ease to sit alone with a woman, something they 
were not accustomed to. Group interviews presented the inconvenient of all collective 
discussions: some people had more self-confidence and louder voices, while more 
discrete or shy people remained silent unless I gave them the floor. My questions aimed 
at understanding why ordinary people mobilised, demobilised, or stayed away from 
contentious activities; assessing the place of protests in their political culture; and 
determining whether rather established political actors, local networks, and other social 
and cultural factors, potentially played a role in fostering their mobilisations, or, on the 
contrary, in discouraging them or encouraging demobilisation. In addition to interviews, 
I largely used social media sources and newspaper reports to corroborate and supplement 
informants’ testimonies. 
 
                                                          
39 Javier Auyero, “The judge, the cop, and the queen of carnival: ethnography, storytelling, and the 
(contested) meanings of protest”, Theory and Society, 31: 151-187, 2002. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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After spending some time exploring Aswan province, I decided to go to Luxor, only three 
hours in train from there, and a tourist place where it would be easy to find cheap 
accommodation. I found a reasonable hotel in a central location, a ten-minute walk from 
the train station, where buses were also available to go everywhere in the province. From 
Luxor, I would also go a couple of times to Qena province. This helped me diversifying 
my samples, while remaining in Upper Egypt and therefore being able to acquire more 
knowledge about the local culture. In total, I spent almost six months in southern Upper 
Egypt, between the first half of 2014 and then in March and April 2015. I spoke with 
more than 150 people and formally interviewed about 110 among them. I partly 
succeeded in keeping my focus on discontinuous activism from the perspective of 
occasional protesters, as well as political and social activists, in their local context. This 
approach enabled me to produce case studies of popular mobilisations in Upper Egypt 
including analyses of how people saw protests, viewed, justified and created meaning to 
their participation.  
 
Yet, the relatively repressive context prevailing while I was in the field significantly 
affected my research purposes and methods, since it was not easy to gain people’s trust, 
make them talk about their participation in protests and their general political views. Fear 
likely made some people in Aswan cancel meetings with me. Similarly, some people, 
especially tourism workers and opponents to military rule in Luxor, did not approve my 
request to record them, or even refused to respond to my questions. While somehow 
limiting the extent of my empirical research, these difficulties made me further pay 
attention to people’s perceptions of threats and opportunities43 and to their ways to deal 
with a changing political environment. Suspicion was not absent when it came to talk 
about politics and other issues deemed sensitive at the time. I was perceived as a stranger 
by ordinary followers of conspiracy theories. When I could not convince people of my 
innocent intentions, I simply did not insist. Some people, including activists, made me 
feel concerned about being potentially monitored by security services. They sometimes 
accused each others of spying on me and warned me against talking to specific people. 
Some people seemed to deliberately attempt to scare me, as this informant who told me a 
security state officer was sitting next to us in the coffee place where I had just interviewed 
him. Others were asking me too many personal questions to appear completely innocent. 
                                                          
43 See, for instance, Aminzade, Goldstone, McAdam, Perry, Sewell, Tarrow and Tilly, Silence and Voice 
in the Study of Contentious Politics. 
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It took me time to admit that a number of informants could be lying to me, and it is 
sometimes only when I listened to our recorded meetings later that I realised the 
vagueness or incoherence of things they were saying. But at the time of my fieldwork, I 
did not know who to believe. Thus I did my best not to trust anyone, except two or three 
activists who, with time, became real friends. It would have been easy to become 
paranoid, and I sometimes felt very depressed, discouraged, and a little scared by what 
were unsubstantiated rumours. To protect respondents and myself, I tried to remain as 
discrete as possible while playing transparency. I was always honest about my intentions, 
showed that I had nothing to hide, but refrained from giving unnecessary details.  
 
Sometimes, suspicion was not the main difficulty. Convincing people to give me some of 
their time and respond to a few questions without being offered anything in exchange was 
probably the toughest challenge, especially in rather poor areas. It even made me question 
the whole point of my PhD, because I was not sure how this kind of research could do 
anything to help my informants. In Luxor in particular, the difficult economic situation 
of many people made it hard to justify that I needed some of their time without offering 
any compensation. This was a constant difficulty since I always remained honest and took 
the time to explain what I was doing. But I could often see how disappointed some people 
were not to meet a social worker, someone with political connections, a journalist, or 
basically anyone who could help them or at least write or talk about their problems. As a 
young, often walking alone, half-Egyptian, but also half-French woman, dressed in decent 
western style and unveiled, I did not go unnoticed. I also had to be patient with people 
trying to sell me tours, or young people mistaking meetings for interviews with romantic 
dates.  
 
Being a half-Western female researcher in Upper Egypt had obvious constraints, but also 
a number of benefits. My double nationality turned out to be an advantage. While my 
French side likely gave me some credibility and attention, my Egyptian side and 
knowledge of the culture, traditions and the local Arabic dialect considerably helped me 
gain the trust of respondents. As a Western woman, I was admitted in popular cafés and 
other settings almost exclusively frequented by men. And as an Egyptian girl aware of 
the local female obligations and the expected behaviour to be seen as a respectable 
woman, I had access to the world of women. In Aswan, it was even easier because of my 
family origins. I also frequently wore a ‛abāya, a traditional black dress imported form 
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the Gulf countries and very widespread in the countryside in Upper Egypt, and sometimes 
a veil, to show respect for the local traditions.  
 
When I returned to Luxor and Aswan in March and April 2015, I found an even worse 
context. I travelled to Egypt a few days after the investment conference that President 
Sisi’s administration had presented as the beginning of a new era in Egypt. The Sisi mania 
was probably at its climax, before the first disillusionments. Yet, explosions targeting 
security forces remained frequent, not only in North Sinai but also in Cairo, other cities 
in the north and, increasingly, the south. Power cuts and drinking water shortages were 
restarting in many places. Repression had partly succeeded in suppressing protests, now 
less frequent, numerically and spatially constrained. In Luxor and Aswan, tourists were 
scarce. My experience and a number of reliable contacts in the region made me feel more 
confident than at the beginning of my first trip. Yet, I would stay shorter than I would 
have ideally liked, and avoid taking any risky moves, in a context of intensified repression 
against potential opponents, now increasingly encompassing researchers.  
 
Overall, despite obvious frustrations and mainly the renouncement to my initial 
ambitions, the fieldwork was a positive experience. It generated significant data on 
mobilisation processes from decision-making at the household and neighbourhood levels, 
to the role of informal networks, existing movement organisations, and various types of 
structures potentially serving as springboards for people’s participation in protests. 
Moreover, the access to ordinary people’s intimate environments enabled me to gather 
some information on gender specific forms of contention and on potentially changing 
gender roles in relation to protests. Indeed, women have had an increasingly visible 
presence in protests since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. Therefore, it was important 
to pay attention to the rationale and meaning of their increasing numerical participation 
in potentially dangerous contentious activities that have been traditionally dominated by 
men, especially in the conservative regions of Upper Egypt. An analysis of ordinary 
people’s contentious politics would have been incomplete without an assessment of 
women’s potential role in, and contribution to, the organisation of protests.  
 
5. Thesis outline  
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Focusing on ephemeral, dispersed, discontinuous and partly spontaneous forms of 
activism, the thesis has six chapters. Each chapter explores a distinct aspect of 
(de)mobilisation dynamics and processes illustrated by case studies in the regions of 
Aswan, Luxor and Qena. After a first chapter aiming at historically and geographically 
contextualising the research, and a second chapter demonstrating how mobilisation 
usually takes place at the local level, chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 attempt to explain why the 
persisting frequency of local popular mobilisations despite a very repressive context since 
the July 2013 military coup has not led to their expansion in scope and scale. While 
suggesting that repression is not sufficient to explain the occurrence and fluctuating levels 
of protests, each of the four chapters analyses a particular parameter interacting with and 
therefore potentially affecting (de)mobilisation processes and dynamics: the state’s 
strategies of repression, the vicissitudes of leadership, the social and cultural 
characteristics of a given place, and the availability of social or protest movements 
transcending the local level. 
 
Chapter 1 consists in a historical background chapter exploring the trajectories and 
patterns of Egyptians’ contentious politics since President Nasser’s time. It explains that 
authoritarian conditions combined with lacking support organisations and dispersed 
contentious agents essentially limited the expansion of yet recurrent popular 
mobilisations mainly against changing economic policies since 1967. It poses the 2011 
uprising as an important moment in the contentious politics of ordinary Egyptians who 
have, since then, continuously, yet intermittently, endorsed protest as a means to press 
demands.  
 
Chapter 2 studies two local protest movements against deteriorating public services that 
erupted in the months following the 2011 uprising in two villages: al-Hebeil, near Luxor, 
and Abul Rish, near Aswan. It explains how mobilisation is typically achieved thanks to 
the leadership, initiative and coordinating role of local activists and/or influential 
members of the community able to rely on ordinary informal networks and communal 
solidarities. It also sketches some of the constraints and limits to these local mobilisations 
that remain essentially short-lived, disseminated and irregular. 
  
Chapter 3 explains how state strategies are partly efficient in locally containing popular 
mobilisations, demobilising or impeding people from mobilising. It argues that media 
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strategies of manipulation of emotions and beliefs, including a discourse marginalising 
the “revolution” to restore stability, as well as mechanisms of local co-optation, are not 
less important than national repression in containing local protests. Both strategies are 
illustrated by two case studies: the intervention of local pro-government political activists 
to contain a strike by garbage collectors in Kom Ombo, Aswan province; and the apparent 
co-optation of village elders refusing to confront the authorities about drinking water 
shortages in Nagaa Abdel Qader, Qena province.    
 
Chapter 4 explains how the vicissitudes of leadership potentially prevent local protests 
from expanding. It argues that protests do not become wider because leaders rarely 
attempt to coordinate with others sharing similar grievances elsewhere. This lack of 
motivation may come from divisions within the activist community, a lack of experience 
in coordinating at a higher scale, a priority given to local matters, personal political 
ambitions or co-optation by local authorities. However, activists have been exploring 
various ways to get involved in politics despite extremely constraining conditions. This 
is illustrated in a case study of the Lamm al-shaml initiative, which appears as an 
imperfect but useful laboratory for activists to conceive new ways of doing politics 
locally, pursue their political socialisation, and perhaps acquire some leadership skills.  
 
Chapter 5 identifies three kinds of sociocultural determinants that have the potential to 
influence (de)mobilisation in the Upper Egyptian context: people’s perceptions of their 
Upper Egyptian identity, including matters of masculinity and honour, as well as feelings 
of remoteness and marginalisation; clanship and tribalism, which generally entail 
loyalties; and patriarchal constraints often hindering young people and women’s 
mobilisation.  
 
After analysing the rare example of successful national coordination provided by the 
Tamarrod campaign, chapter 6 explains why the three currently available protest or social 
movements in Egypt – the “revolution”, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protest movement, 
and the labour movement – have remained largely unattractive to a majority of ordinary 
Egyptians. This stems, the chapter argues, from their failure to articulate alternative 
political projects addressing the wide population’s everyday grievances. 
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Chapter 1: Egyptians’ contentious politics: patterns and trajectories 
(1967 – 2013) 
 
1. Introduction: a long protest tradition 
 
Many ordinary Egyptians did not discover in January 2011 the various types of protests 
allowing them to express their grievances, “show their disgust”44 with institutions 
oppressing them, defend their interests, or demand rights they had long been denied. In a 
rare historical account of protests in Upper Egypt, Zeinab Abul-Magd (2013) documents 
five centuries of “subaltern revolts championed by peasants, women, labourers and ever-
ruthless bandits” in the Upper Egyptian province of Qena45 against five world 
“empires”46: the Ottoman (1500-1800), the French (1798-1801), Muhammad Ali’s 
empire (1805-48), the informal British empire (1848-82), and the formal British empire 
(1882-1950). She analyses mass popular revolts such as those which occurred in 1820 
and 1864, labour strikes, petitions, as well as forms of daily-life resistance, including the 
refusal to pay land taxes, peasants’ escape from plantations and corvée, workers’ 
stoppages at production lines, attacks on village leaders, mayors, state officials and 
properties, sabotages of public works, blockades of irrigation water, rejections of army 
conscription, and many other kinds of protests against perceived unfair rulers and local 
landlords. 
 
The history of contemporary Egypt since the 1952 revolution was marked by diverse 
resounding episodes of contention, including the 1967 protests following the military 
defeat, the 1977 “bread riots”, the 1986 conscripts’ revolt, and the Islamist insurgency in 
the nineties. Starting from 1967, labour actions became relatively more frequent, while a 
renewed opposition activism was primarily displayed in universities through a leftist 
student movement until the mid-seventies, before the ascension of Islamist groups. Since 
                                                          
44 Doug McAdam and W.H. Sewell, “It’s about time: temporality in the study of social movements and 
revolutions”, in Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. 
Sewell, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
45 The governorate of Qena previously included the region of Luxor, which now has its own governorate. 
The Qena governorate was restricted to the regions between Abu Tisht and Higaza. Located about 60 km 
north of Luxor and 577 km south of Cairo, Qena City is the capital of the governorate. See maps 2 and 3.  
46 Defined as “an all-encompassing political entity capable of penetrating places big and small, near and 
far, and establishing full hegemony”, the empire’s “semidivine omnipotence” is a myth, an imagined entity 
which failed in its conquest, submission and assimilation mission. Zeinab Abul-Magd, Imagined Empires: 
A History of Revolt in Egypt, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2013). 
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the decline of Nasserism starting from 1967, Egyptians have never ceased to mobilise in 
response to variations in state policies. Far from passively watching events, ordinary 
people occasionally took part in protests. Yet, publicly protesting may have not been their 
preferred or perceived most appropriate means to raise demands, especially in the 
enduring authoritarian context. Instead, defiance and contestation by largely 
economically and politically marginalised populations essentially took discrete forms 
aimed at securing livelihoods, rather than direct encounters with the authorities. Still, 
ordinary people occasionally took part in open confrontations mainly when they felt that 
their immediate interests and achievements were threatened. These contentious episodes 
usually gravitated around specific demands and goals, and did not extend beyond a few 
days. Starting from the mid-2000s, some direct and louder challenges to the political 
status quo contrasting with ordinary people’s usual discontinuous activism, erupted, 
pointing at an increasing discontent. Indeed, in the years preceding the 2011 uprising, 
protests essentially driven by workers and pro-democracy activists became more frequent 
and involved increasingly political demands. In short, factors of rebellion have never been 
lacking in Egypt, especially starting the 1967 defeat against Israel, the subsequent 
aggravation of the economic recession, the gradual decline of the Nasserist model, and 
President Sadat’s decision to liberalise the economy. The effects of gradually 
implemented neoliberal policies, including widening disparities, declining standards of 
living, and increasing pauperisation of the popular strata, were particularly devastating. 
Yet, a mass popular uprising did not occur until January 2011.  
 
The study period of this thesis starts in 2011 with the uprising, but particularly focuses 
on the prevailing repressive context since the Egyptian army ousted President Morsi in 
July 2013. While the corresponding fieldwork was entirely undertaken in the post-coup 
era, this research largely refers to the period between January 2011 and July 2013 since 
it deals with several protest movements and patterns which began before the army’s 
removal of elected President Morsi. Indeed, the field research uncovered many memories 
of contentious events that took place between January 2011 and July 2013, while 
informants reported on movements that had their roots and first steps before July 2013, 
and sometimes before the 2011 uprising. In addition, current dynamics in many ways 
stand in continuity with long-lasting patterns of ordinary contention in Egypt, regardless 
of the exceptional parentheses of the 2011 and 2013 uprisings. This is the reason why it 
is useful to review the popular mobilisations that have shaken the country’s modern 
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history, before studying more recent forms and dynamics. In order to better contextualise 
the study that follows, this historical background chapter attempts to explain why 
ordinary Egyptians’ episodes of contention have traditionally remained limited in scope 
and time. It also sheds light on why the 25 January 2011 uprising was another important 
moment for Egyptians’ contentious politics. Provinces of Upper Egypt before 2011 were 
not exempt from episodes of contention. While being the main stronghold of a violent 
Jihadist insurrection that expanded from the late seventies, the region saw all kinds of 
discontinuous protests which rarely exceeded the local scale and were less visible than in 
Cairo and other big cities. After the 2011 uprising, less authoritarian conditions combined 
with multiple grievances fostered a greater number of ordinary Upper Egyptians to 
mobilise, thus definitively burying the cliché of a passive, apolitical region remaining 
distant from national, historical events.  
 
This first chapter hopefully helps answering the following questions: Why did recurrent 
contentious episodes prior to the 2011 uprising remain limited in time and scope? How 
did, however, ordinary people’s mainly discrete and diffuse contentious practices, as well 
as political activists’ experiences, slowly prepare the ground for bigger mobilisations? 
How did the 2011 and 2013 uprisings respectively affect mobilisation levels and 
processes in the remote Upper Egyptian provinces? I demonstrate how ordinary people 
have, in various ways, slowly challenged the political, economic, and ideological 
dominant, exclusionary order throughout the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak eras. I argue 
that not only authoritarian constraints such as the fear of repression and subsequent self-
restraint by activists, but also weak organisation and a lack of publicity prevented most 
instances of mobilisations from growing. The lack of organisations to support 
mobilisation efforts made it particularly difficult to gather dispersed contentious agents 
and geographically, numerically and durably expand protests. I also argue that the 2011 
uprising has partly shaken ordinary people’s traditional avoidance of the political sphere. 
Indeed, ordinary people have increasingly, albeit discontinuously, endorsed protest as a 
means to press demands, as shown by a persisting frequency of popular mobilisations 
despite a very repressive context since July 2013. While this was initially due to more 
favourable conditions in a changed political environment after the 2011 uprising, it 
appears less logical in the renewed context of repression and severe authoritarianism since 
the 2013 military coup. I argue, here and there, that ordinary people have increasingly got 
used to thoroughly take their grievances to the streets for three main reasons: firstly, 
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because it is often the only way to attract the attention of negligent authorities; secondly, 
because they have been increasingly and openly defending their rights; and thirdly, 
because they have realised through the withdrawal of two presidents that they could 
influence the destiny of their country. At the same time, I will attempt to establish in the 
rest of the thesis that the most recent context has not allowed for the expansion of local 
protest movements, partly due to the persistence of long existing patterns mentioned in 
this first chapter. 
 
Following a chronological outline, the chapter is divided into four parts corresponding to 
distinct historical sequences, and analysing contentious politics in Egypt since President 
Nasser’s era. It often refers to the way national dynamics and patterns were reflected in 
the provinces of Upper Egypt, in a move to contextualise the case studies exposed in the 
other chapters of the thesis. The first section is about ordinary Egyptians’ contentious 
politics from the gradual decline of the national mass politics embodied by Nasserism, 
which accelerated with the multifaceted crisis of 1967, to the 1977 uprising. A turning 
point in Egyptian politics, the 1967 defeat entailed a wide public disillusion and was 
followed by a resurgence of popular mobilisations, mainly driven by labour and 
opposition activists. Increasing discontent since 1967 was recurrently expressed through 
more or less loud episodes of contention essentially responding to state challenges of 
perceived rights and gains achieved under President Nasser. Ordinary people occasionally 
joined these movements, the most emblematic being the “bread riots” of January 1977. 
The second section deals with the two following decades and the acceleration of austerity 
measures. From the eighties, ordinary people have gradually resorted to more discrete 
and diffuse forms of activism, while disenchantment with an increasingly exclusionary 
dominant order continued to grow. Disillusionment with the state was partly expressed 
through the rapid expansion of political Islam. In Upper Egypt, these years were 
particularly marked by the emergence of an Islamist student movement which, in its most 
radical form, turned into an armed insurrection. The latter particularly affected the 
tourism sector, prompting sporadic protests in the nineties. In addition, peasants resisted 
in various ways the effects of a new tenant law adopted in 1992, in a context of 
accelerating pauperisation of the countryside. The chapter’s third section analyses the 
emergence in the past decade of relatively more organised forms of activism. Led by “pro-
democracy” activists and workers, including industrial workers, tax collectors and 
doctors, these responded to a new wave of impoverishment caused by neoliberal policies, 
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combined with the perspective of President Mubarak’s end of reign and succession crisis. 
Yet, open confrontations remained relatively marginal at least until the mid-2000s, and 
the observed predominant forms of contention at the time did not give birth to a mass 
protest movement for change. Still, they subtly prepared the ground for a mass uprising 
yet to come. While new movements mainly appeared in Cairo and other cities in Lower 
Egypt, many Upper Egyptians acquired activist experience at the time in the north before 
returning home. The fourth section of the chapter studies the 2011 uprising as an 
important step for ordinary Upper Egyptians’ politics. We will see that contrary to 
previously common clichés, the remote Upper Egyptian provinces took part in the 2011 
and 2013 uprisings, although to a lesser extent than Cairo and other Lower Egyptian 
regions. More importantly, from January 2011 to July 2013, Upper Egyptian cities and 
particularly governorate headquarters were regularly the scenes of protests over very 
diverse grievances, including old claims such as the Nubian cause and local issues, mainly 
related to the deterioration of public services.  
 
2. Contestation under authoritarian conditions (1967 – 1977) 
 
With the decline of Nasserism starting from 1967, weakened national mass politics 
gradually left space to the resumption of popular mobilisations. However, we will see that 
with the exception of important episodes of unrest such as in 1977, most protests were 
short in time and gathered small numbers. This was mainly due to the common constraints 
of authoritarian conditions, combining a fear of repression with contentious actors’ 
difficulties to get organised.  
 
2.1. Explaining the relative scarcity of protests under Nasserism   
 
The 1952 revolution, followed by the advent of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s presidency, 
initiated a period of relatively low protest activity in Egypt (Posusney 1994). However, 
starting from 1967, a noticeable renewal of protest actions and opposition activism 
pointed at an increasing discontent towards gradual changes in economic and political 
conditions. Why did this disillusionment with a system that had apparently secured a wide 
popular support emerge? How did ordinary people react to the first signs of a state 
henceforth in crisis? 
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The tacit social pact put in place under Nasser had successfully silenced most opposition 
activism and popular protests. Although resolutely authoritarian and repressive, the state 
had managed to secure a mass adherence thanks to the combination of a powerful 
ideology with a rather generous system of provision of benefits to the wide population, 
ranging from subsidies to basic commodities and free education, to increased job security 
and employment in state institutions and companies. The Nasserist social contract 
essentially consisted in the allocation of resources to the people in exchange for their 
implicit renunciation to political rights. The notion of dimuqratiyyat al-khubz or 
“democracy of bread” (Shalabi 1993)47 best illustrates this implicit pact between rulers 
and ruled, involving people’s political deference in exchange for the provision of public 
services. Thus, the right to strike had been prohibited since 1952, while an “unspoken 
bargain”48 implied the absence of strikes in exchange for employers’ renouncement to 
unfounded or unfair dismissals (Beinin 1989). Workers were granted a wide range of their 
previous demands, including security of employment and large benefits (Beinin 1989, 
Tripp 2013) in exchange for their loyalty. A state-sponsored trade unionism had emerged 
with, at its core, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF). Founded in 1957, it was 
mainly conceived as an instrument to monitor and control the working class, rather than 
to promote its interests (Achcar 2013). Price controls and increasing subsidies to food, 
energy and most basic commodities were implemented alongside a series of measures 
which directly improved workers’ standard of living and social status. Most notably, the 
‘socialist decrees’ of July 1961 included significant wage increases, a reduction of the 
workweek to six days of seven hours, higher pensions and a better access to health 
insurance. These corporatist policies, including significant benefits for the working class, 
resulted in a wide demobilisation of workers, who had a low interest in challenging their 
employer, namely the state for a majority. In addition, workers occupied a specific place 
in the Nasserist rhetoric, turning from “a despised underclass”49 to builders actively 
involved in the development of the Egyptian economy and state (Beinin 1989). 
 
At the same time, the access to free education, including higher education, increased 
chances of social mobility for the popular strata (Hoodfar 1997). By employing the 
                                                          
47 See Larbi Sadiki, “Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization”, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, Vol.32, 2000. 
48 Joel Beinin, “Labor, Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952-1961”, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 71-90. 
49 Ibid. 
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educated popular classes, the Nasserist state turned them into its most supportive 
constituency (Hoodfar 1997). In Upper Egypt as elsewhere, popular classes had access to 
a wider range of opportunities for education, employment and social mobility. The 
countryside benefited from more equalitarian policies, especially during the fifties, when 
rural poverty diminished thanks to the effects of the agrarian reform laws (El Nour 2015). 
Although not without a number of negative consequences50, infrastructure projects such 
as Aswan’s High Dam provided employment, while many Upper Egyptians were hired 
in the growing public sector. The potential of the youth to challenge the Nasserist state 
was also eliminated by its economic, political, and ideological incorporation to the 
system51. In addition to their improved position in the labour market (Hoodfar 1997), 
women enjoyed the same access to education as men, while their employment mainly in 
the public sector was encouraged through many specific, attractive gender-oriented 
benefits (advantageous maternity leave, nurseries at workplaces, and so on)52. This made 
them, with workers and youth, another pillar of the Nasserist state.  
 
Nasserism was immensely popular not only due to its redistributive policies and its 
promotion of social mobility, but also for what it had come to represent to the eyes of the 
wide population. In addition to their improved situation in terms of job security, living 
standards and social status, popular classes, including peasants and workers, broadly 
supported the Nasserist state because they strongly adhered to its revolutionary project 
and ideology in which they felt involved, occupied a specific place, and towards which 
they had roles and responsibilities (Mossallam 2012). As pointed by Alia Mossallam, 
“Nasser as a person embodied a collective dream”53, while providing “the opportunity for 
people to build a new nation”54, as well as “better futures for themselves”55.  
 
In sum, the immense popularity of Nasserism, the state’s tacit social contract, as well as 
the gradual improvement in living standards of large portions of the Egyptian population, 
                                                          
50 For instance, the construction of the High Dam in the sixties marginalised the Nubian community residing 
south of Aswan, in the region of the current Lake Nasser, who was forced to relocate in the largely desert 
area of Nasr al-Nuba, east of Kom Ombo (see map 5). 
51 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
52 See Homa Hoodfar, Between Marriage and the Market, Intimate Politics and Survival in Cairo, 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997). 
53 Alia Mossallam, Hikayat Sha‘b – Stories of Peoplehood: Nasserism, Popular Politics and Songs in Egypt, 
1956-1973, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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significantly contributed to preserving social control and to reducing the occurrence of 
protests during the fifties and the sixties. In addition, initially repressed, the opposition, 
of which leftist currents were the strongest at the time, was gradually co-opted by the 
patron-client state. The Islamist opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, was 
essentially repressed. Further opposition was also silenced thanks to a process of 
homogenisation of the population (Al-Khafaji 2004). Not only did this occur in the 
cultural and educational fields, but it also took place in politics with the instauration of a 
unique political party and trade unions, peasant organisations, student, youth and women 
unions, all supporting the new state system: “For the first time, the state began to produce 
and impose its own ‘politics’; i.e. an explicit political ideology which citizens were 
expected to adopt, and extend it to the remotest regions”56. In such conditions, opposition 
activism almost disappeared (Wickham 2002). However, Nasser’s era was not completely 
devoid of protests. In the sixties, the countryside experienced a crisis during which the 
cost of living jumped by more than 50% in four years57, seriously affecting the rural poor. 
In the Delta in particular, this prompted many protests (Mitchell 1991). Protests also took 
place in workplaces, but usually remained constrained and ended rapidly most often 
thanks to the state’ satisfaction of protesters’ main demands. For instance, in Spring 1962, 
poor working and living conditions on the construction site of Aswan’s High Dam 
prompted a number of labour protests and strikes (Toth 1999). While the army was sent 
to mitigate the crisis and avoid further disruptions of work, the decision was made to 
change unpopular managers58.  
 
2.2. The political and economic crisis and the resumption of popular protests 
 
The frequency of ordinary people’s protests gradually increased starting from the mid-
sixties with the first signs of an economic recession. However, it is the 1967 military 
defeat and the subsequent political crisis which really marked the resurgence of popular 
protests and opposition activism. Anouar al-Sadat’s implementation of Infitāh or “open-
door” policy from 1974 would also be followed by a critical wave of popular 
                                                          
56 Isam Al-Khafaji, Tormented Births. Passages to Modernity in Europe and the Middle East, (London, 
New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004). 
57 Timothy Mitchell, “The Representation of Rural Violence in Writings on Political Development in 
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East, (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991). 
58 See James Toth, Rural Labor Movements in Egypt and Their Impact on the State, 1961-1992, 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999). 
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mobilisations, including labour actions in response to ongoing changes, culminating with 
the 1977 uprising. Overall, people increasingly resisted economic policies and reforms 
potentially questioning their dreams and achievements since the 1952 revolution. 
 
Egypt constituted no exception to the spread of a debt crisis across the developing world 
in the sixties, in a context of increasing integration of world economies (Walton and 
Seddon 1994). The gradual implementation of austerity measures and structural 
adjustment programmes entailing price increases and public spending cuts (in subsidies, 
public sector wages, and so on), would soon affect large portions of the population, 
including the urban poor and working classes. The sustainability of the Nasserist state’s 
redistributive system and centrally-planned strategy of development highly depended on 
state income and resources. The latter gradually diminished in the sixties as a result of 
economic downturns and foreign military interventions. The state gradually became 
unable to carry out its developmental and welfare functions (Ayubi 1995). By the mid-
sixties, state capitalism and the Nasserist social contract had begun their slow decline. 
Aggravated by the cost of foreign interventions, the 1967 defeat against Israel and the 
subsequently widening external debt, the economic recession accelerated the erosion of a 
model that would increasingly appear untenable. The ensuing gradual transition from a 
centrally-planned to a market economy, from an economic development strategy of 
import substitution industrialisation to an accelerating economic liberalisation and open-
door, dramatically affected Egyptian lower and middle-classes. Unemployment started to 
rise among the educated. Accelerating urbanisation resulted in more pressure on 
subsidised goods, which cost increased, further burdening state budget (Hoodfar 1997). 
The government gradually attempted to reduce subsidies, facing recurrent resistance from 
low-income earners whose standard of living was immediately affected by such cuts.  
 
Starting from 1967, Nasserism began to face increasing criticism, including from its 
supporters. The crisis precipitated a split within the political leadership, between a pro-
Western faction who resolutely moved to the right and would gradually break with 
Nasserism, while a minority went further to the left (Halliday 2002). A previously 
relatively silenced political opposition, together with the worried and the disappointed 
with Nasserism, started to organise anti-government protests over deteriorating economic 
conditions and the political crisis entailed by the military defeat. A student movement 
from 1968 to 1973 embodied the end of young people’s alleged political quietism which 
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had prevailed during most of the Nasserist years. The leading role of the left in this 
movement marked the return of opposition activism. Many women were also involved in 
the student movement and in renewed leftist politics in general (Al-Ali 2000). In parallel, 
ordinary people increasingly expressed concern over ongoing changes in the streets and 
at work. Many supporters of Nasser’s state, including workers, students, the youth, and 
educated middle-classes, felt threatened by the effects of economic liberalisation, while 
seeing their expectations increasingly frustrated. These populations resisted the 
challenges to their perceived prerogatives and acquired standard of living, as well as the 
decline of the revolution’s achievements (Mossallam 2012).  
 
Throughout this period, essentially reactive popular protests responded to mainly 
economic changes potentially affecting ordinary people’s standards of living. People 
sought to resist the decline of the welfare state which, under Nasserism, acted as a 
reassuring safety net while providing opportunities to the popular classes in terms of 
education, employment, and social mobility. Ordinary people’s contentious politics in the 
seventies remained resolutely defensive, targeted specific goals and raised modest and 
limited demands, usually the reinstatement of benefits or privileges that the state had 
attempted to question. With economic downturns, “the gap between the citizen’s 
expectation of what a legitimate state should deliver and what the state actually delivers”59 
gradually widened. More concretely, mainly driven by the state’s increasing inability to 
deliver the incentives that the wide population had become accustomed to60, most protests 
erupted in response to the government’s attempts to diminish subsidies to basic 
commodities, decrease wages, increase taxes, or extend working hours without 
compensation. They targeted the authorities since the state was at the time the biggest 
employer, as well as the supplier of benefits to the population. However, protesters did 
not go as far as demanding a regime change. Instead, mostly short-lived contentious 
episodes reflected a popular resistance to changes carrying the risk of overthrowing a 
system which benefited the majority. They generally ended with the authorities’ consent 
to the main demands, at least in the short-term, to preserve social peace.  
 
Posusney refers to the moral economy view to explain this kind of “restorative” protest. 
According to this framework, collective actions usually respond to perceived violations 
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of rules and/or rights which people believe are their legitimate prerogatives and therefore 
expect the rulers to maintain. Consequently, the purpose of such protests is to re-establish 
the previous status quo, in order to regain what was taken away, rather than forward new 
claims61. In the same vein, Sadiki used the notion of “khubz-iste” (Sadiki 2000) to account 
for this system involving deferential political behaviour in exchange for state provision 
of benefits. Defined as a “quietist bread seeker”62, the “khubz-iste” loudly reacts when 
the state challenges his livelihood63. 
 
Among those who benefited from the Nasserist social contract and whose prosperity was 
henceforward threatened by its attrition, the working class was at the forefront of popular 
resistance to economic changes starting from the seventies. As argued by Posusney, a 
patron-client relationship between the working class and the state consisted in workers’ 
political support and contribution through their labour to national development. In 
exchange, the state committed to provide decent pay, various benefits and job security, 
while controlling the prices of basic commodities64. Workers were likely convinced of 
their role in national production, and believed they had rights, but also obligations towards 
the state (Posusney 1994). This relationship was likely internalised, as reflected by 
workers’ apparent self-imposition of limits on their protests. Indeed, labour protests rarely 
radicalised, and workers resorted to strike only as a last resort, preferring instead a wide 
range of repertoires of contention which did not result in work disruption. These included 
the then widespread in-plant sit-in (during which work continued while employees 
occupied the factory), petitions and telegrams to government officials, and the boycott of 
deemed insufficient checks (Posusney 1994).  
 
Labour protests responded to policies challenging the payroll’ standard of living, and 
sough to preserve workers’ rights and status, rather than renegotiating relations with the 
state or attempting to change the established order. They also targeted disparities in 
wages, particularly between industrial workers and civil servants or company managers, 
between public sector and private sector employees. Finally, there were protests over 
frustrated expectations due to unmet promises by the state or employers. These 
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“entitlement protests” (Posusney 1994) responded to “a sense of injustice among workers, 
a feeling that they were being denied something to which they were entitled”65. Thereby, 
cycles of workers’ actions followed price and tax increases, working hours’ increases 
without compensation or deductions from salaries. They took place in 1965-66 amid the 
economic recession, in 1967 after the military debacle, in February 1968, in 1971 after 
the advent of President Anouar al-Sadat. Labour protests became more frequent as a result 
of the implementation, starting from 1974, of the Infitāh or open-door policy aimed at 
reversing the economic recession through measures promoting the private sector, Arab 
and foreign investment (Owen and Pamuk 1998). However, workers’ protests remained 
sporadic and essentially localised in large public-sector companies in a few sectors and 
industrial areas66. They included labour actions at the Iron and Steel factory in 1968, 1977 
and 1989; Kafr al-Dawwar Weaving and Spinning in 1995; railway workers’ strike in 
1986; and a strike at Helwan Steel in 1989.  
 
After the formal adoption of the Infitāh as a result of pressures from “the state bourgeoisie 
opting for alliance with international capital”67, workers increasingly escalated protests. 
Industrial, public sector “workers were among the principal beneficiaries of Nasserism 
and potentially big losers from the open door policy”68, and were therefore among the 
first to protest against it (Beinin 2005). Protests sometimes exceeded the scope of working 
places, such as workers’ sit-in at Bab al-Luq railway station on 1 January 197569. Workers 
continuously protested from 1975 to 1977, culminating with the “bread riots” of January 
1977. The state’s frequent yielding to protesters’ demands, often involving the 
cancellation of price increases, wage reductions or subsidy cuts, tended to acknowledge 
people’ sense of injustice (Walton and Seddon 1994), even though the removal of such 
austerity measures was often temporary, aiming at ending unrest in the short-term. 
 
Political opponents and activists performed a limited role in workers’ protests. Posusney 
observed a relative coincidence between the occurrence of labour protests and the periods 
during which the Left had some leeway to operate, including the strike waves of 1974-76 
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and 1984-8770. The essential role of leftist activists consisted in spreading information 
about labour actions that were not covered in state media, thus allowing other workers to 
realise that they could achieve some gains by protesting71. Beinin considers that industrial 
workers’ mobilisation against the open-door policy was largely organised without support 
from trade unions or the political opposition (Beinin 2005). However, the Left had an 
active and even leading role in labour protests from 1984 to 198972. The government 
generally responded rapidly with a combination of repression and concessions, in order 
to avoid protests to extend in duration and spread to other sites. Overall, the authorities 
often ultimately preferred to meet most protesters’ demands rather than risking an 
expansion of labour actions potentially endangering order.  
  
Overall, beyond actual or feared material losses, ordinary people’s protests after 1967 
were largely motivated by the decline of their dreams associated with the 1952 revolution 
and Arab socialism, and embodied by Nasserism and its regime combining “Etatisme” 
and welfarism (Ayubi 1995). 1967 represented less an ideological turmoil than a crisis of 
the political leadership, blamed for the military defeat by the opposition and the popular 
strata. After fifteen years of political deference, people reminded the government that 
they had a say in the way political power was exercised (Shukrallah 1989).  
 
Despite disappointments, popular renunciation to Nasser’s era took time as the dreams 
entailed by the revolution largely survived the president’s death while resistance to 
changes persisted beyond the first disenchantments (Mossallam 2012). For example, pro-
Nasser slogans could be heard during the 1977 bread riots. Like other powerful state 
ideologies such as, for instance, Peronism, Nasserism has remained a reference model of 
the role and duties the state should perform vis-à-vis its population73. In chapter 2, I 
suggest how this is still present in Egyptians’ political culture. In the wake of President 
Morsi’s ouster by the army in July 2013, then Minister of Defence General Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi was largely compared to Nasser for allegedly saving the country from an Islamist 
dictatorship. 
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2.3. Ordinary people’s intensifying resistance: the turning point of the 1977 
uprising 
 
Egypt’s emblematic “IMF riot” or “austerity protest”74 (Walton and Seddon 1994), the 
1977 uprising shared many features with the first days of the 2011 uprising. State 
repression of initially rather peaceful workers and students’ protests led to a rapid 
escalation of violence. Tens of people are said to have died during the uprising, while 
hundreds were injured. But unlike the 2011 uprising, the “bread riots” erupted in reaction 
to a specific, identified threat, namely the government’s decision to partially cancel 
subsidies on many basic goods, which immediately increased the prices of bread, sugar, 
tea, gas, and other essential commodities. The uprising ended on 20 January 1977 when 
the government reversed its decision to decrease subsidies. It “did not open the way 
toward a coherent movement of militant opposition and a radical change in Egypt’s 
economic and political direction”75. Beinin attributed this failure to the dispersion of the 
masses gathered in spontaneous collective actions, and the inability to form sustainable 
coalitions including the diverse components of Egypt’s popular classes (Beinin 1994). 
The protesters did raise neither reformist nor revolutionary demands, and did not call for 
the fall of the state. Instead, the defensive nature of the uprising which erupted in reaction 
to a government decision threatening the standards of living of the ordinary was in line 
with most protests against neoliberal policies during this period. Nevertheless, several 
distinctive features made the 1977 “bread riots” exceptional and a turning point in the 
history of Egyptian politics. 
 
Firstly, the shift from the contestation of the removal of subsidies to the direct questioning 
of the state’s legitimacy in anti-government slogans made the uprising resolutely political. 
Beyond their rejection of increased food prices, the industrial workers who started to 
protest on 18 January 1977 were expressing their resistance to the “open door” policy 
(Beinin 1994), in continuation with the waves of labour strikes, sit-ins and street 
demonstrations of 1975-1976. The large crowds of ordinary people who joined the 
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protests reflected general concerns and popular discontent vis-à-vis the neoliberal 
economic policies being implemented since the beginning of the Infitāh. 
 
Secondly, as in January 2011, the authorities were quickly overwhelmed by the striking 
numbers in the streets, the assaults on properties and symbols of power and political elites, 
the rapid spread of protests to most major cities, and therefore the simultaneity of riots 
occurring in many different places. Protests started on 18 January 1977, when workers at 
the Misr Textile Company in Helwan marched to downtown Cairo. Urban poor, 
university students, trade unionists, unemployed, youth, recent migrants from the 
countryside, women (Walter and Seddon 1994) and other disenfranchised populations 
joined public sector workers. As a result of security forces’ indiscriminate repression, 
demonstrations quickly turned violent. Protesters stormed places symbolising the state, 
its institutions and recently-enriched elites, smashing windows of luxury shops, assaulting 
police stations and administration offices, and so on. Some roads and train lines were 
blocked. Steelworkers protested in the industrial city of Shubra al-Khayma. Protests also 
took place in Alexandria on the same day, and had expanded to seventeen cities 
nationwide by 19 January. Until today, the spectrum of the bread uprising recurrently 
makes the Egyptian authoritarian governments anxious.  
 
Thirdly, the 1977 bread uprising was the result of a rare, rather spontaneous, mass 
mobilisation of ordinary people along with workers and students. Marginalised from the 
political arena, with no access to formal channels of expression, ordinary citizens had no 
choice but to go to the streets to state their discontent vis-à-vis government policies. This 
“angry eruption of Egypt’s subaltern masses”76 shook the foundations of the regime and 
particularly surprised the authorities after decades of relative political quiescence. The 
“bread riots” symbolically marked the beginning of the end of the Nasserist social 
contract since people openly reversed their habitual political deference. As pointed by 
Walton and Seddon, the spontaneous character of the protests did not mean they were 
random or irrational, as shown by the attacks on properties symbolising the newly-
enriched, as well as state institutions and representatives77. Rather than sabotage, it was a 
revolution against symbols of an ostentatious luxury accessible to a very small minority 
(Shoukri 1979). 
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Fourthly, rather disconnected from the working class, especially industrial workers, leftist 
activists and (banned) political parties did not play any role in the organisation of the 
protests and had no influence over the course of the uprising78, despite accusations of the 
regime (Shoukri 1979). On the contrary, they were rather surprised by the wide numbers 
in the streets. 
 
Popular attempts, from 1967 to 1977, to resist economic liberalisation, as well as the 
demise of Arab socialism and Nasserism as a national ideology and state-led model of 
development, led to mixed results. On the material front, people’s mobilisations had 
obtained a relative deceleration of austerity reforms required by the Infitāh and the debt 
crisis, preserving the essential architecture of the Nasserist system of state redistribution 
of incentives. However, this relief would prove temporary. By the early eighties, it was 
clear that Arab socialism had been definitely abandoned. Increasing IMF pressure and the 
acceleration of structural adjustment measures confirmed the evolutions observed since 
the mid-seventies.  
 
3. The definitive marginalisation of the poor (1977 – 2000) 
 
Encouraged by “the relatively less repressive atmosphere of the early Mubarak era”79, 
labour protests continued to regularly erupt as a result of waves of neoliberal reforms and 
their consequences in 1982-1983, 1985-1986, and so on. They were responded to by a 
mix of state concessions and repression. They occasionally turned violent due to the 
involvement of police repression, as at Helwan Iron and Steel Works in October 1989, 
where clashes between protesting workers and security forces resulted in several 
casualties and 600 arrests80. Essentially defensive protests remained manifestations of the 
resistance of declining popular classes confronted to the cost of austerity policies (Sadiki 
2000). Indeed, the latter resulted in rising unemployment, including among the most 
educated, increasing social polarisation, growing inflation, decreasing public sector 
salaries, and so on. At the same time, the redistributive capacity of the state pursued its 
decline as a result of the global recession and the aggravation of the debt crisis, further 
burdened by an accelerating demographic growth and urbanisation. These international 
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and domestic changes made the tacit pact between the state and the people increasingly 
unaffordable (Sadiki 2000). 
 
The same trend prevailed in the nineties and beyond, with worsening socioeconomic 
conditions due to the acceleration of economic restructuring, including more and more 
privatisations of large portions of the economy. In the labour sector, pay and working 
conditions increasingly deteriorated with the acceleration of the privatisation of public 
sector companies. Popular classes suffered a decline of state transfers, as well as a 
deterioration of the subsidy system, which remained in place but affected less and lower 
quality goods (El-Meehy 2011). The gap between the rich and the poor widened, mainly 
affecting the standard of living of middle and lower-middle classes who suffered a 
degradation of their social status. As a result, labour protests doubled in the nineties 
compared to the eighties (El-Mahdi 2011), while essentially remaining isolated and 
limited in scope (Tripp 2013). 
 
In the sixties and the seventies, no particular competing ideology to the Nasserist 
nationalism or Arab socialism seems to have guided ordinary people’s participation in 
protests. Leftist movements, which until the mid-seventies represented the main current 
in the political opposition, remained largely separated from popular constituencies and 
the working class. By the late seventies, political Islam as an alternative ideology started 
its gradual ascension among popular constituencies, especially educated youth and the 
declining lower middle class. Additionally, mutations of the authoritarian state starting 
from the advent of President Mubarak gradually drove popular classes away from an 
increasingly coercive state.  
 
By the eighties, increasingly unable to rely on the state and a disintegrated Nasserist social 
contract, many ordinary people resorted to the informal sector to survive, while being 
progressively marginalised by a growing exclusionary political, economic, and social 
order. Their contentious politics increasingly took the form of subtler and less 
confrontational practices. Protests remained relatively exceptional and involved small 
numbers. Ordinary people’s collective actions essentially failed to organise beyond the 
local, communal level, while the political elites searched to avoid the repetition of such 
an episode as the 1977 riots potentially threatening the regime. Thus successive 
governments tried to gradually but discretely reduce subsidies on basic consumer 
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commodities. Why did ordinary people increasingly retreat into more diffuse forms of 
contention? How did they cope with ongoing changes directly affecting their livelihoods?  
 
3.1. From discrete resistance to open collective action  
 
In the eighties and nineties, workers continued to occasionally rise against economic 
reforms directly challenging their livelihoods, as previously mentioned. In February 
1986, thousands of Central Security Forces’ conscripts revolted against poor pay and 
working conditions. However, the majority of the outcasts of such an emerging 
exclusionary order had no choice but to get organised in order to acquire their own means 
of subsistence, resist ongoing changes, while subsequently redefining their relationship 
with the state. Indeed, not only due to the declining redistributive and welfare role of the 
state, but also because of its henceforward failure to secure an equitable access to 
educational and professional chances to everyone, the relationship between the state and 
the people dramatically changed. The latter’s dependence upon state resources declined 
as they increasingly got organised locally to ensure their survival. “Informality” became 
the norm for increasingly marginalised populations. The poor were now mainly 
established in “informal neighbourhoods” or ‛ashwāiyyat81, worked in the parallel 
economic sector, and avoided as much as possible direct encounters with authorities either 
denying their existence, or perceivably threatening their livelihoods and achievements.  
 
Forms of ordinary activism evolved concomitantly to these changes. The poorest 
managed to survive thanks to strategies of “quiet encroachment” (Bayat 1997, 2010). 
These practices include daily violations of property rights and urban rules in the pursuit 
of two main goals, according to Asef Bayat: an autonomy from the authorities and a 
redistribution of social goods. Indeed, ordinary people sought to fill the gap created by 
the state’s gradual retreat from its previous redistributive role. As the government 
seemingly sought to avoid dealing with their existence, lower middle classes increasingly 
survived thanks to quiet, silent illegal activities ranging from squatting private land and 
the piracy of urban utilities, to informal working. On the other hand, residents of informal 
neighbourhoods “tend to function as much as possible outside the boundaries of the 
                                                          
81 Slums and other residential areas that were not planned by the authorities and were, instead, haphazardly 
built by poor populations in need of shelters.  
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state”82 because they trust their community more than the authorities. This trend was 
confirmed with the gradual transformation of the authoritarian regime under President 
Mubarak into a police state increasingly perceived as a “racketeer government” (Tilly 
1985)83, a threat to people’ security rather than a protector (El-Meehy 2011). 
 
Overall, ordinary people’s increasing mistrust towards the government, combined with 
the henceforth inability to count on state redistribution of resources, gradually led them 
to rely on themselves. This trend was reinforced by an emerging order increasingly 
excluding those who could not afford the “costly condition” of modernity (Bayat and 
Denis 2000). Expanding state violence and abuses further diverted most people from the 
authorities. Bayat emphasised the non-ideological character of “quiet encroachment” 
strategies, since the dwellers of informal neighbourhoods relying on parallel sectors 
primarily intend to survive. At the same time, these everyday practices carry the 
possibility of defying the state and its institutions since informality “expresses a certain 
resistance to state control”84. Yet, Bayat rejected James Scott’s vision of resistance as an 
intentional act85, arguing that intentionality “leaves out many types of individual and 
collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond”86. 
Whether voluntarily or not, quiet encroachment strategies or other “clever tricks that 
people use in their daily life”87 to obtain something from the powerful challenge the 
state’s control upon space, order, public utilities and general regulations. Such diffuse 
forms of contention may be understood as signs of a mounting discontent (Tripp 2013), 
foundations upon which resistance in the form of collective action can be organised 
(Ismail 2006), and/or ways to generate social and political change (Bayat 2010), even 
though people are not necessarily aware of the consequences of their activism. In the 
Middle East and elsewhere, authoritarian regimes have adopted different attitudes 
                                                          
82 Asef Bayat and Eric Denis, “Who is afraid of ashwaiyyat? Urban change and politics in Egypt”, 
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83 See Asya El-Meehy, “Transcending Meta-Narratives: Unpacking the Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia”, 
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84 Nicholas S. Hopkins, cited in W.J. Dorman, The Politics of Neglect, The Egyptian State in Cairo, 1974-
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85 See, for instance, James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). 
86 Asef Bayat, “Globalization and the Politics of the Informals in the Global South”, in Ananya Roy and 
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towards such everyday survival practices, including ignorance, tolerance, co-optation and 
repression.  
 
The everyday silent encroachment of the ordinary becomes openly contentious when 
confronted to the state. The poor most commonly mobilise when their gains are exposed 
to state’s coercive policies (Bayat 1997) such as eviction from illegally-occupied lands, 
demolition of settlements or utilities’ removal. The street then becomes the ultimate field 
of contestation for those, marginalised by the dominant order, who lack other means of 
expressing discontent (Bayat 1997, 2010). Bayat also noted that “the street as a public 
space possesses this intrinsic feature, making it possible for people to mobilise without 
having an active network”88. Indeed, people did not necessarily rely on formal institutions 
to organise a struggle and engage in collective action. When “the instantaneous 
communication among atomised individuals”, “established by the tacit recognition of 
their common identity” and “mediated through space”89, a “passive networking” allows 
the emergence of collective action. And still according to Bayat, “what mediates between 
a passive network and action is a common threat”90.  
 
In Egypt, quiet encroachment and open acts of resistance in reaction to state intrusions 
have cumulatively coexisted since the seventies. In numerous cases, ordinary people’s 
mobilisation around common concerns successfully extracted state concessions, 
including the state’s renunciation to destroy many informal settlements or their de facto 
legalisation, or the provision of utilities. Yet, the scope of these open acts of resistance 
has remained limited due to their local, communal character preventing their connection 
to broader grievances shared by others. The lack of more structured organisations and 
networks did not allow for the development of solidarities extending beyond kinship or 
the neighbourhood level.  
 
By the turn of the century, ordinary open resistance and confrontational attitudes towards 
the authorities were not uncommon, despite a larger use of discrete, diffuse forms of 
protest. Open contention increasingly took the form of incidents involving state 
institutions, especially the police. Rather than ensuring people’ safety and security, police 
                                                          
88 Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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brutality and harassment was increasingly perceived as a threat by ordinary people (Ismail 
2012). Therefore, open contention by the ordinary intermittently took the form of violent 
manifestations of anger directed at the police, including assaults on police stations, and 
fights with officers. Furthermore, although limited in scope and time throughout the 
eighties and the nineties, labour protests persisted. For instance, strikes took place at 
cement and steel plants in Cairo’s Helwan suburban area in 1992 (Toth 1999).  
 
Peasants also resisted the new order in the countryside, including laws on property 
ownership, and were sometimes confronted to violent state repression (El Nour 2015, 
Tripp 2013). Indeed, Sadat and Mubarak’s policies gradually undermined the important 
gains achieved by small farmers with Nasser’s agrarian reform laws. In particular, Law 
96 of 1992 questioned their previous tenancy security, landholding rights, access to cheap 
seeds and pesticides and loans from the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank. Law 
96 made hundreds of thousands of poor small tenant farmers, who constituted the 
majority, lose the lands they had been cultivating (El Nour 2015). As a consequence, the 
countryside resisted the implementation of the new law and experienced various episodes 
of contention, particularly between 1996 and 1999. 49 peasants were killed and 949 others 
injured in clashes with landlords and security forces91. Tens of peasants and political 
activists seeking to support them were also arrested as a result of demonstrations. The law 
marked a decisive rupture between rulers and peasants increasingly seen by the first as 
obstacles to a modern, capitalist and liberal agriculture (Ayeb 2010). 
 
3.2. Islamist movements’ increasing popularity among the ordinary 
 
The erosion of the state Nasserist system starting from the seventies, combined with the 
broad decline of the left, left an ideological vacuum that could be exploited by newly-
emerging political actors. Similarly, the state’s gradual retreat from his providential role 
left a space where other actors could intervene in the provision of goods and welfare 
services to the needy, especially in popular quarters. Political Islam began to score within 
society in this context of weakening providential, caretaker state, while the effects of 
economic liberalisation became increasingly devastating for the most vulnerable 
populations. Indeed, prices continued to increase along with taxes, educated 
unemployment pursued its rise, and public sector workers saw a decline in their working 
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conditions, standards of living, and social status. More generally, ordinary people were 
increasingly impacted by deteriorating state services, including public health, education 
and housing. Particularly affected by ongoing changes, the working and urban educated 
middle-classes, students and unemployed graduates, who constituted the main supporters 
of the Nasserist state, were progressively abandoned. Increasingly discontented, they 
became a reservoir of constituencies and a prime target for Islamist political entrepreneurs 
(Wickham 2002). Islamist movements’ extensive welfare activities ensured them a steady 
popularity, if not loyalty, among many ordinary people.  
 
Political Islam emerged principally in universities in the early seventies, but truly 
developed starting from the eighties due to a combination of factors. Islamic activism 
benefited from the decline of the leftist opposition and the crisis of Nasserist nationalism 
and Arab socialism, the dominant ideologies since the 1952 revolution. Islamism revived 
thanks to a more favourable political environment under President Sadat who, in an 
attempt to weaken both Nasserism and the leftist opposition, released throughout the first 
half of the seventies many Muslim Brothers who had been jailed during Nasser’s era. 
Islamists came to dominate student politics by the end of the seventies. Disillusioned with 
the state’s decreasing capacity as an employer, the increasing number of unemployed 
graduates would become the main constituency of the Islamist movement in the eighties 
(Wickham 2002, Beinin 2005).  
 
Islamist activism emerged as a more organised and diffuse form of contention compared 
to the loud, rather spontaneous protests of the late sixties and seventies. In general, it did 
not seek to directly confront the state in street protests, preferring instead a strategy of 
islamisation from below, gradually advancing its pawns and expanding its constituencies. 
Thus, Islamist movements were essentially absent from the rather intense labour protests 
of the eighties (Beinin 2005). Instead, they discretely developed through the formation of 
institutions alimenting a parallel sector. Relying on informal networks92, they gained 
popularity through the provision of goods and services at the neighbourhood level, and 
gradually imposed themselves as the strongest organised opposition current in the 
Mubarak era. Except radical groups’ militancy, which remained marginal, Islamist 
                                                          
92 See Diane Singerman, “The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements”, in Quintan Wiktorowicz, 
eds., Islamic Activism. A Social Movement Theory Approach, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2004). 
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activism did not adopt a confrontational stance towards the state. Instead, it massively 
filled the gap left by the retreat of the providential state, gaining popularity through its 
welfare activities. It largely did so with the implicit consent of the authorities, if not their 
explicit approval (Denoeux 1993). 
 
Nevertheless, peaceful Islamist activism had its limits. Many ordinary people did not 
identify with Islamist leaders and activists who could be “associated with the most 
‘modern’ citizens in Arab societies”93. For Wickham, the typical Islamist was a young, 
educated student or professional, and not a poor peasant or worker94. Perhaps more 
important, the Islamist project did not seek to deconstruct prevailing relations of 
economic and political domination95, and did not fundamentally disagree with state 
policies, at least in their economic content. According to a number of scholars, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the strongest Islamist movement in Egypt, thus largely failed to expand 
beyond its core constituency of urban educated declining middle classes96. Up to now, it 
lacks ties to the rank-and-file, the poorest populations, and industrial workers97. Yet, 
according to Beinin, “the social base of political Islam extends well beyond the modern, 
middle class intelligentsia”98, not only encompassing the disappointed “lumpen 
intelligentsia” (Wickham 2002) now lacking prospects for a prosperous future, but also 
“the poor, the unemployed, and private sector craft and service workers”99. This is the 
case because, paradoxically, “Islamism appeals to both the losers and the winners of 
global neo-liberal economic restructuring”100.  
 
However, the wide-scale violence perpetrated during the nineties by some radicalised 
movements discredited various Islamist groups among the population. Indeed, the 
clandestine armed wing of al-Jama‛a al-Islamiyya101 waged a war against the state, 
                                                          
93 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Joel Beinin, “Political Islam and the New Global Economy: The Political Economy of an Egyptian Social 
Movement”. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 An Egyptian Islamist Movement, the “Islamic Group” fought in the nineties an armed insurgency against 
the government and perpetrated several attacks, including the massacre of tourists at Luxor’s Deir al-Bahari 
Temple in 1997, before officially renouncing violence in 2003. In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, several 
of its leaders were released and formed the Building and Development Party. The group joined the Anti-
Coup Alliance after President Morsi’s ouster by the army in 2013.  
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targeting government officials, state institutions and the Coptic Christian minority. It 
sought to undermine the economy through hitting tourists. The Egyptian state violently 
repressed the insurrection, including in Cairo’s Imbaba in December 1992, resulting in 
the gradual decline of militant Islamism starting from the mid-nineties. The Jihadist 
movement found a particularly fertile ground in the impoverishing south of the country. 
After the death of Nasser, Upper Egypt was increasingly neglected. The lack of 
employment accelerated migrations to the north, while those who stayed found 
themselves in a precarious situation. The economic crisis combined with a decline in 
public services would soon leave space for political Islam, first with the expansion of 
radical Islamism in Upper Egyptian universities such as Asyut under President Sadat.  
 
Later, a more radical Islamist insurgency would erupt, culminating in the region with the 
targeting of tourists in Luxor in 1997. These provoked spontaneous protests against 
violence and terrorism (Gamblin 2004). Radical Islamists also renewed sectarian tensions 
and subsequent clashes with security forces as in summer 1992, when Islamists attacked 
several police headquarters in Upper Egypt (Toth 1999). Saker El Nour (2015) linked the 
expansion of Islamist militant groups in the nineties in provinces such as Minya and Asyut 
to the state’s recent agricultural policies. According to him, resistance to the latter led to 
confrontations with the police and landowners, while farmers who had endured 
intimidation, detention and torture by the police, may have been encouraged to join the 
Islamist militancy. But as elsewhere in Egypt, Islamist militancy only attracted a 
minority, while theoretically nonviolent movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and, 
increasingly, Salafi groups, build their popularity through vast networks of charities. 
Overall, many ordinary people came to support movements which they increasingly 
valued for their perceived integrity and respectability, especially when opposed to corrupt 
state institutions and representatives. While they successfully islamised society, Islamist 
activists, however, essentially failed to formulate a real political alternative encompassing 
the interests and demands of the poor. As the strongest opponents to the state, they have 
only faintly attempted to question neoliberal policies threatening the most vulnerable, and 
failed to articulate development policies extending beyond direct charity.  
 
4. New dynamics of protest (2000 – 2010) 
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In the 2000s, social movements of a new kind emerged, demanding political reform and 
increasingly denouncing various injustices, the endemic corruption within state 
institutions, police brutality and torture. Cycles of protests began in 2000 with 
mobilisations supporting the Palestinians’ second Intifāḍa, followed by demonstrations 
against the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. These campaigns paved the way for further 
mobilisations by providing an available reservoir of mobilising structures (El-Mahdi 
2009), networks, and activists, as well as by habituating people to stage public protests in 
order to express complaints. At the same time, the accelerating implementation of a 
neoliberal agenda revived workers’ protests, especially in the second half of the decade. 
New movements appeared in the delicate context of a multidimensional crisis that was 
aggravating popular anger every day.  
 
A persisting socioeconomic imbalance between the rich and the poor remained the direct 
consequence of the government’s neglect and marginalisation of entire sections of the 
population. Thus, the urban poor, workers and peasants amongst other groups, were 
essentially left out of a Western-style modernisation decided by an exclusionary and 
elitist authoritarian order promoting the most fortunate populations. As a result of 
neoliberal policies, elevated inflation and high unemployment considerably weakened the 
most vulnerable populations. Inequalities widened with implemented neoliberal policies, 
which increased the poverty rate from 19.6% of the population in 2008 to 21.6% in 
2010102 and 26.3% in 2015103. Furthermore, much of the population depended on 
government subsidies on basic commodities that liberal policies were decreasing, further 
accelerating pauperisation. Finally, the situation was further aggravated starting from 
2008 with the global economic crisis. 
 
The grassroots’ impoverishment and the increasing socioeconomic imbalance were 
driving growing levels of popular resentment. The crisis of legitimacy of the Egyptian 
regime was not only derived from the state’s decreasing ability to perform its role as a 
welfare provider and to fulfil its part of the populist social contract. It was also the 
consequence of excessive authoritarianism increasingly angering the population. 
Moreover, people were gradually concerned with the regime’s flagrant manipulations of 
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the constitution and frequent violations of laws, as well as with increasingly unpopular 
foreign policy orientations, both eroding the state’s legitimacy.  
 
In addition, Egypt in the 2000s experienced important changes at the governmental level, 
while the spectre of a nearing political transition strengthened uncertainty. Mubarak’s 
generation, assuming power since three decades, had begun to retire. Important tensions 
existed regarding its future replacement, and the increasing popular “aversion to dynastic 
politics”104 intensified an unprecedented succession crisis. Many people rejected the 
perspective of Gamal Mubarak’s advent to power. However, this succession had 
increasingly appeared inexorable with the son of the president’s growing involvement in 
the state’s economic and political affairs as the secretary general of the Committee of 
Public Policies, a powerful organisation within the ruling National Democratic Party 
(NDP). Moreover, the regime’s repression of opponents to this scenario was institutional 
as the state endorsed modifications of the Constitution aiming at dissuading civilian 
challengers from entering electoral competitions (Zahid 2010).  
 
A relative novelty (El-Mahdi 2009), activists began to mobilise exclusively to demand 
political reform. A revisionary105 protest movement, Kifaya was established in 2004 by 
leftist, Islamist and liberal activists “as a loose, heterogeneous, and non-hierarchical 
movement that aimed to unite the different actors in the opposition behind a shared 
democratic agenda”106. A unique form of dissent at the time, Kifaya illustrated a new 
phase in Egyptian contentious politics as its demands exceeded the scope of past 
mobilisations around often immediate concerns. Of course, collective struggles for basic 
amenities such as bread, decent wages or electricity did not disappear in Egypt in the 
2000s. Popular mobilisations against expensive bread, informal buildings’ demolition, 
drinking water shortages, pollution and other environmental issues (Elmusa and Sowers 
2009) took place. However, struggling for such basic goals was increasingly associated 
with a fight for rights. Capitalising on previous experiences of relatively recent collective 
                                                          
104 Max Rodenbeck, “A special report on Egypt. After Mubarak - Change is bound to come, but when?”, 
The Economist, 15 July 2010: http://www.economist.com/node/16564206. 
105 Jessica Glover classifies protest into three types: revisionary protests question the authoritarian regime, 
while limited protests and labour protests aim at extracting concessions from the existing regime. Jessica 
L. Glover, “The Role of Protest in Egyptian Politics”, IMES Capstone Paper Series, 2010. 
106 Dina Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt. Opposition, conflict, and cooperation, (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2010). 
 
70 
 
mobilisations, Kifaya constituted a “new dynamic of opposition politics”107 and 
incarnated a climax in the mobilisations of the 2000s demanding political reform. It 
demanded a democratic political transition and overtly denounced the illegitimate nature 
of the authoritarian state. It was the first, in a long time, to break a wide range of 
authoritarian taboos, ranging from the organisation of public protests without official 
authorisation and the denunciation of the state’s violations in all fields, to the direct 
criticism of the leader and questioning the right of Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father. 
 
The collaboration of numerous actors of the anti-authoritarian opposition was facilitated 
by the “umbrella” structure of Kifaya. Indeed, decentralised organisations relying on 
networks then proved efficient in establishing connections between different groups, 
providing them with the opportunity to coordinate common activities. Thus, Kifaya was 
able to gather the activities of very different movements and organisations which, with 
the exception of the Ghad Party, were all listed as illegal by the regime. Kifaya’s 
organisers and leaders played an important role in both increasing public awareness and 
helping people overcome their fears. They widely used media coverage and new 
information technologies and social media to publicise their cause, depicting the political 
order as unjust and unacceptable. In spite of the government’s censorship, activists 
extensively used Facebook, Twitter and diverse blogs, in order to release videos of their 
public actions on the web, publishing pictures showing the intense violence of the 
government’s repression, and channelling news related to arrests of activists. To some 
extent, they succeeded in framing the situation at the time as intolerable and in increasing 
people’s sense of injustice. 
 
Kifaya’s relatively successful mobilisations provided a significant stimulus to protest at 
the time and contributed to an expansion of political space (Glover 2010). Indeed, they 
fostered people to organise and take part in public collective actions in order to voice 
complaints. This is reflected, first, by the involvement in protest movements of people 
who had long been excluded from the political arena: youth, women, workers and urban 
poor, amongst others. Even though the movement was criticised for its elitist nature and 
for insufficiently reaching popular classes, it initiated a progressive reintegration of 
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previously marginalised groups to public affairs. The second element supporting this 
expansion of a new culture of dissent in Egypt in the 2000s is the appearance of other 
movements for change increasingly resorting to protest, tactics and strategies that were 
popularised by Kifaya. The latter inspired the creation of many sub-movements 
promoting the interests of particular groups while sharing a common pro-democracy 
agenda: Youth for Change, Students for Change, Journalists for Change, Artists for 
Change, Lawyers for Change and Doctors for Change, amongst others. In parallel, several 
sectorial protest movements also demanding an end to the authoritarian status quo and 
refusing succession politics emerged. Kifaya’s “demonstration effect”108 included an 
unprecedented mobilisation of judges demanding a full supervision of elections and a real 
independence of the judiciary109, peasant protests against irrigation water shortages, and 
Cairo’ shantytown dwellers claiming the housing that was promised by the government. 
Moreover, workers’ movement reached a climax with several waves of strikes between 
2006 and 2008, notably in Mahalla al-Kubra, forcing the government to capitulate on 
several occasions. The crackdown on a planned labour strike in Mahalla al-Kubra in 2008 
gave birth to the April 6 Youth Movement, another all-inclusive group gathering a 
majority of young people, which would play a decisive role in the 2011 uprising. In sum, 
Kifaya inspired and encouraged the eruption of other protest movements, or fostered 
existing movements to express more radical demands. It also contributed, at least within 
activist circles, to building a new culture of contestation throughout the years preceding 
the 2011 uprising.  
 
In the Upper Egypt of the 2000s, political activism outside the ruling NDP was relatively 
rare, especially in the countryside. However, there were occasional popular mobilisations, 
including by disenfranchised peasants and workers. Zaineb Abul-Magd even wrote that 
“the southern provinces were the most rebellious among Egypt’s regions against the 
central government in Cairo, which applied the dysfunctional US policies of market 
reform”110. At the same time, many Upper Egyptians temporarily or permanently living 
in Lower Egypt acquired activist experience there, sometimes before returning home and 
participating in the 2011 uprising and the protests that followed. Confirmed political 
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activists from Aswan and Luxor as Mahdi, Sabri and Nabil, whom I expose the portraits 
in the next chapters, all started in pro-democracy movements, youth groups or opposition 
parties prior to the 2011 uprising. For example, Hani, a member of the April 6 Youth 
Movement in Aswan, went to Tahrir Square on 28 January 2011. He had previously been 
active in Muhammad al-Baradei’s National Association for Change. Leading the 
contestation against drinking water pollution in Aswan (see chapter 2), Sabri has a 
relatively long experience in anti-government protests. He was a rather unruly student in 
business studies at Cairo’s al-Azhar University, which he never graduated from. He 
claims that this is due to his participation in several protests in the first half of the 2000s, 
mainly in support for Palestinians. 
 
Yet, new social movements such as Kifaya and, from 2008, the April 6 Youth Movement, 
lacked many things, starting with a significant grassroots base. Indeed, the new culture of 
protest did not really reach the disenfranchised, who remained largely unaware of these 
movements’ existence. The most vulnerable sections of the population were difficult to 
reach because they often lacked structures to represent them. They tended to remain 
outside all forms of oppositional activity. In addition, pro-democratic aspirations of such 
movements were unable to suppress traditional ideological divisions such as those 
between Islamists and secularists (Shehata 2010). Many scholars also emphasised a 
failure of these movements to raise positive propositions and an alternative political 
project to the authoritarian rule, a lacuna that would persist long after the 2011 uprising.  
 
Despite a number of successes, the labour movement of the 2000s similarly failed to give 
birth to an organised opposition able to durably challenge the Mubarak regime and 
articulate a new political vision. For Beinin and Duboc, “the Egyptian workers’ 
movement of the 2000s was primarily a class-based response to neoliberal economic 
restructuring”111, including the increasing job insecurity, the decline of public sector 
employment, the acceleration of the privatisation of public sector companies and workers’ 
reduced social benefits. Workers wanted the state to intervene to correct perceived 
injustices by company managers and preserve their achieved rights and standard of living. 
According to Beinin and Duboc (2013), this is similar to the moral economy based on the 
                                                          
111 Joel Beinin and Marie Duboc, “A Workers’ Social Movement on the Margin of the Global Neoliberal 
Order, Egypt 2004-2012”, in the second edition of Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in 
the Middle East and North Africa by Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, eds., (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2013). 
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populist pact under President Nasser described in the first section of this chapter. 
Workers’ declining status led to above 3,300 strikes, sit-ins and other collective actions 
by millions of Egyptian workers from 1998 to 2010112. Yet, while presenting all the 
features of a social movement, the labour movement could not form a durable 
organisational body, regional or national coordinating structures, which would support 
broader collective action (Beinin 2016). Instead, the organisation of workers’ protests 
relied on a few factory leaders and committees, and local informal networks. However, 
“the local and informal character of the networks that enabled the Egyptian workers’ 
movement of the 2000s simultaneously limited its ability to act as a national force because 
those relationships could not be replicated beyond their local social context”113. In 
addition, “professional” political activists remained largely isolated from workers, who 
“were suspicious of ‘politics’, which they typically understood as opportunistic meddling 
of Cairo-based intellectuals seeking to co-opt their struggles for some other purpose”114. 
 
Less organised, farmers also largely failed to make their voice heard beyond the local 
scale. Yet, they tried to resist the state-led gradual transformation of agriculture at their 
expense, albeit essentially in informal and spontaneous ways (Ayeb and Bush 2014). The 
2009 and 2010 years totalised 180 sit-ins, 132 demonstrations, six strikes, 400 subsequent 
deaths, 2,500 injuries and 3,000 arrests in rural areas, according to figures by the Sons of 
the Soil Land Centre115. For instance, sugarcane cultivators went on strike, rejecting the 
deemed unfair low prices offered by the government in exchange for their harvest, several 
times in Qena and Luxor provinces in the 2000s (Abul-Magd 2013). However, peasants 
and farmers’ protests seemed more unrelated, dispersed and locally contained than 
workers’ collective actions, resembling more what Asef Bayat calls non-movements116 
(El Nour 2015) than a proper social movement.  
 
5. From the national to the local: the shift of the 25 January uprising (2011 – 
2013) 
 
                                                          
112 Joel Beinin, “Political Economy and Social Movement Theory Perspectives on the Tunisian and 
Egyptian Popular Uprisings of 2011”, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, 14, January 2016. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 See Habib Ayeb and Ray Bush, “Small Farmer Uprisings and Rural Neglect in Egypt and Tunisia”, 
MER272, vol.44, fall 2014.  
116 “The non-movements had emerged largely to lower the cost of mobilization in the face of tyrannical 
regimes”. Asef Bayat, “The Arab Spring and its Surprises”, Development and Change 44(3), 2013. 
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In the same way the 1977 bread riots have long haunted Egypt’s political rulers, making 
them think twice before significantly reducing state subsidies on basic commodities, the 
2011 mass popular uprising that led to the withdrawal of President Mubarak marks an 
important change in Egyptian politics. Every president would then feel deeply vulnerable, 
as shown by President Sisi’s enduring crackdown on opponents and critiques. Significant 
resources are also deployed to limit popular discontent at rising prices, unemployment 
and deteriorating living conditions. The partial success of the 2011 uprising, combined 
with the relative relaxation of authoritarian conditions and the opening of the political 
arena that followed, encouraged many new actors to get involved in local or national 
politics in various ways. It also fostered an unprecedented number of ordinary people to 
mobilise for sometimes long existing grievances. These trends were observed in Upper 
Egypt, challenging the typical cliché about a lacking political participation in the region, 
whereas some scholars, on the contrary, estimated that residents “were building on a long 
tradition of expressing discontent and rebelling”117. 
 
5.1. Southern Upper Egypt during the uprising (25 January – 11 February 2011) 
 
It is not true to say that no protest took place on 25 January 2011 in Upper Egyptian cities. 
Indeed, largely ignored or underestimated protest plans, especially in provinces and even 
more in the south of country, led to an under-coverage of such events. Yet, many activists 
from Aswan, Luxor and Qena told a different story. While they were often a minority in 
the streets and squares of their cities on 25 January, they were joined by more important 
crowds starting from 28 January, as elsewhere in Egypt. The “revolution” may not have 
occurred in the countryside. However, numerous testimonies of participants and abundant 
online material prove that protests took place in the cities of Aswan, Luxor and Qena 
between 25 January and 11 February 2011. In addition, as I demonstrate below, the 2011 
uprising would have a deep impact on regional politics and ordinary people’s 
participation. It directly fostered many common citizens to go to the streets for the first 
time of their existence to raise demands, culminating with a another mass popular 
mobilisation ahead of the military coup in 2013. But let us first briefly address the 
circumstances of the 2011 uprising in the cities of Aswan and Luxor. 
 
                                                          
117 Abul-Magd, Imagined Empires: A History of Revolt in Egypt. 
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In Aswan, several of my respondents118, reported that about 30 activists had demonstrated 
on 25 January in the city. Several lawyers at the local branch of the Hisham Mubarak Law 
Centre (HMLC) attended the event. Ahmed D., a Kifaya member I met in Aswan in 
January 2014, was also one of them. An old-generation activist, he had participated in the 
1977 protests. Activists of the April 6 Youth Movement also attended this first 
demonstration. Many of my informants claimed that numbers significantly grew as 
elsewhere in Egypt on 28 January, when they were joined by crowds of more ordinary 
people angry at security forces. Opposition to police brutality, more than to President 
Mubarak, allegedly drove people to the streets119. Facebook events and the distribution 
of leaflets helped to mobilise beyond the initial activist community that organised the first 
protests120. Fawzi, a leading Nubian activist, participated in the protests in Aswan after 
receiving calls from Kifaya and 6 April Youth Movement members. 
 
In Luxor, protests followed similar trends, with people going out in significant numbers 
from 28 January 2011 mainly to express their anger at security forces’ exactions. Al-Teri, 
who claimed to have participated in the “revolution” in Luxor, remembers: “At the 
beginning of the revolution, people didn’t know how the world was going. People were 
afraid to go out”121. In addition to nationwide motivations, mainly the hatred for the 
police (Ismail 2012), people mobilised for local concerns. In Luxor, there was a wide 
resentment against Governor Samir Faraj, seen as responsible for the unfair 
implementation of a UNESCO tourism project that implied the relocation of families 
residing next to archaeological sites, such as in Karnak area122. On 28 January, people 
marched across Luxor’s city centre, ending their demonstration at the governorate 
building. There were clashes and tear gas, and the local office of the ruling NDP and other 
buildings were torched. Some people accused the authorities of infiltrating protests, and 
instructing their agents to destroy public assets in order to make the “revolutionaries” 
appear as destroyers (mukharribīn)123. After 28 January, protests became daily. 
 
                                                          
118 From various meetings and interviews with the pro-revolution activist Amr A. and several lawyers at 
the local branch of the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre. 
119 Informal conversation with Muhammad S., 45, Electricity Company employee, Aswan, April 2015. 
120 Informal conversation with Mahdi, 33, travel agent, Aswan, January 2014. 
121 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
122 Interview with Nabil, 36, unemployed (Bachelor in business studies), Luxor, March 2015. 
123 Ibid. 
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Some public places, including central city squares, governorates’ headquarters, other 
local public buildings such as courts, and some public companies, became habitual and 
recurrent protest locations. As almost every provincial capital, Aswan has its mīdān, 
which is the big square hosting the railway station at one extremity, the governorate 
building on a side, and a series of popular coffee places on the other side, frequented by 
activists and tourists. The square also has several grass areas and is surrounded by two 
gardens, where it is easy to imagine the multiple past sit-ins. As a small Tahrir Square, 
Midan al-Mahatta (the “station square”) or al-Mahatta Square used to be the place where 
all kinds of people gathered for a common cause; where informal networks overlapped; 
where new networks were born; where people exchanged views and educated themselves 
politically; where passers-by could join a demonstration or unwillingly breath tear gas; 
and where protesters could initially gather without previously contacting each other. The 
big protests of the 2011 and 2013 uprisings took place there. Of course, the square I 
discovered in late January 2014 was quieter than it used to be. The protest law had 
discouraged gatherings, except for pro-government demonstrations as the celebrations 
that took place on 25 January 2014. MB supporters had moved their weekly protests to 
other neighbourhoods after the police had been waiting for them in the square on several 
Fridays124. Luxor’s main mīdān is Midan Abul Hajjaj, facing Luxor Temple and only a 
short walk from the train station. While MB supporters were still occupying it during 30 
June protests, anti-MB protesters used to gather in Saladin Square125. Qena also has its 
Midan al-Mahatta, while the court and the Lawyers’ Syndicate headquarters have also 
been frequent protest locations126. Under Muhammad Morsi’s presidency, MB supporters 
used to gather in another major square, Midan al-Sa‘a, while anti-MB protesters usually 
stayed in Midan al-Mahatta to avoid clashes potentially escalating into tribal conflicts127. 
 
5.2. In the aftermath of the uprising, an unprecedentedly favourable 
environment facilitates protests in the region (February 2011 – July 2013) 
 
Throughout the two years that followed the 2011 uprising, Egypt experienced a 
proliferation of all kinds of protests in all sectors, including in rural areas. The 
economically unstable context that prevailed after the uprising, combined with a 
                                                          
124 Interview with Khadija, 43, school teacher, Abul Rish (Aswan), April 2014. 
125 Interview with Youssef, 23, student (technical education), Armant (Luxor), March 2014. 
126 Interview with Moemen, 20, university student, Qena, May 2014. 
127 Interview with Mahmud, 25, lawyer, Qena, May 2014. 
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relatively open political environment, encouraged many ordinary people to mobilise 
through peaceful protests to raise the attention of the authorities. In most Egyptian 
provinces, staging demonstrations or sit-ins outside governorate buildings has been one 
of the most common repertoires, understood as a way to be seen and compel local 
authorities to initiate a dialogue. People sometimes expanded their “repertoires of 
contention” (Tilly 2006, 2008), occupying diverse public spaces or blockading major 
roads. The initial success of the 2011 uprising made many ordinary Egyptians inspired 
by the intuition of new possibilities more than by a thought sense of opportunities128, gain 
confidence in their ability to mobilise for the resolution of long-standing problems. In 
other words, a favourable context combined with examples of positive responses by the 
authorities to some protest movements suggests that an increasing number of citizens 
considered that they could obtain much more through public protests, rather than via the 
traditional political and legal steps. Workers also mobilised en masse to demand better 
incentives, with the number of strikes and labour protests rising from 1,256 in 2011 to 
2,161 in 2012 and 1,972 in the first half of 2013129. As for small farmers, they staged 158 
protests throughout 2012, according to a report published by the Land Centre for Human 
Rights130. 
 
The less authoritarian and relatively open political environment that followed the 2011 
uprising had several characteristics. Firstly, there was less repression, especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the uprising. One of the biggest losers of the uprising, the police 
was felled, largely absent from the streets, and subsequently from demonstrations. 
Particularly hostile to labour protests, the army did not systematically repress them, and 
could not prevent the hundreds of labour actions that took place after the 2011 uprising. 
Military rulers also continued to tolerate for some time street protests. From time to time, 
most notably during the 2013 uprising against the Muslim Brotherhood, security forces 
supported and even incited protests (Ketchley 2015).  
 
                                                          
128 For a critique of the theory of political opportunities in social movements, see, for instance, the chapter 
1 in Marie Duboc, Contesting without Organisations: Mobilisation Strategies, Social Question and Space 
of Visibility in Strikes of the Egyptian Textile Industry 2004-2010, Doctoral Thesis in Sociology, EHESS, 
Paris, 2012. 
129 Data by the NGOs Awlad al-Ard and the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights, quoted in 
Irene Weipert-Fenner and Jonas Wolff, “Socioeconomic Contention and Post-Revolutionary Political 
Change in Egypt and Tunisia: A Research Agenda”, PRIF Working Paper No. 24, March 2015. 
130 Quoted in Saker El Nour, “Small farmers and the revolution in Egypt: the forgotten actors”, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 8:2, 198-211, 2015. 
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Secondly, the post-2011 uprising transition period was characterised by weakened local 
authorities, which suffered from the national political instability, as well as the disgrace 
of Mubarak’s NDP. Across governorates, especially the remotest ones, the dissolution of 
the NDP and the local councils it dominated led to a political vacuum. Mostly former 
NDP members, local officials and traditional mediators between citizens and the 
authorities were partly discredited. In particular, local NDP leaders and members of 
parliament had partly vanished or had lost influence or credibility. In addition, local 
officials showed some reluctance towards making decisions outside the daily 
management of common affairs. Indeed, the people had emerged from the uprising as a 
threat to rulers, who now feared to provoke any expression of discontent. Khaled, an 
Aswan social activist, said that after the “revolution”, officials were “afraid of facing 
people”131. Political instability also directly affected the administration of provinces: 
governors were changed three or four times since February 2011 in some governorates, 
including Luxor and Aswan, sometimes after popular protests demanding their removal. 
This largely left ordinary people, devoid of legitimate representatives to voice their 
demands, with no means other than staging public protests to communicate their demands 
to the authorities. Therefore, the resort to public protests also became more widespread 
in a response to lacking channels of communication.  
 
Thirdly, protests nurtured and encouraged each other. Indeed, the examples of successful 
protests spread by the media and social media made many people perceive that there was 
an opportunity for them to obtain their demands in a similar way. For instance, I met 
garbage collectors in Kom Ombo, north of Aswan, who said they had gone on strike to 
demand the same benefits that their colleagues from Aswan had obtained after staging 
strikes. In addition, some key protests, such as the anniversaries of past protests or deadly 
events, simultaneously took place in Cairo and provinces, or the latter reacted to events 
that had happened elsewhere in Egypt. Thus, starting from 2012, the massacre of 
protesters outside Cairo’s national TV and Radio Maspero building and in Muhammad 
Mahmud Square would be commemorated in most city squares across Egypt. Finally, 
local mobilisations would benefit from the experience of some local activists who had 
lived in Lower Egypt and joined various political movements in the 2000s, and others 
who had participated in the 2011 uprising in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. 
 
                                                          
131 Interview with Khaled, accountant, Aswan, April 2015. 
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These rather favourable conditions fostered ordinary people to go to the streets, including 
in Upper Egypt, where multiple protests took place between February 2011 and July 2013. 
Even though Upper Egyptians’ participation in the 25 January revolution was limited to 
a few activists and educated youth, ordinary people have been highly affected by all 
political developments since then, and have also learnt to mobilise to defend their rights 
or express demands. In Aswan and Luxor in particular, the tourism industry has been 
dramatically affected by political and security events, leaving thousands of people jobless 
or surviving through small activities. Interviews in the regions of Aswan, Luxor and 
Qena, unsurprisingly confirmed that the very wide majority of ordinary people had 
participated in protests for the first time after the 2011 uprising. In particular, respondents 
had occasionally participated in social or political protests related to local issues and 
labour strikes to demand permanent contracts and pay increases during the period 
immediately following President Mubarak’s removal. Later, the official discourse 
supported by the media and backed by the army blaming the persisting instability and the 
deterioration of the economy on street protests, partly discouraged popular mobilisations. 
Without completely demobilising, many past protesters then chose to wait for the 
parliamentary and presidential elections and the political transition to continue.  
 
In this first phase of intensive protests following the 2011 uprising, Upper Egyptian 
women and men rose against sometimes old grievances such as those related to a 
deterioration in public services (see chapter 2), which had gradually accelerated 
throughout the last ten years of the Mubarak era. This was a consequence of the state’s 
increasing inability to assume its duties and sometimes deliberate neglect. Particularly in 
rural areas, including in the remote provinces of Upper Egypt, public services have been 
further worsening since the 2011 uprising due to national and local political instability, 
lacking structural reforms to end crises in key sectors such as energy, and a persisting 
government prioritisation of large urban centres over the countryside. Upper Egyptian 
provinces have long been excluded from most development projects undertaken by Cairo. 
In these regions as elsewhere in Egypt, fuel shortages, power cuts and deteriorating road 
infrastructure amongst other failures, have become increasingly frequent, 
correspondingly driving popular discontent.  
 
Ordinary people also participated in more politically-driven protests. Thus, Nubians 
staged several protests against their marginalisation by Cairo’s central government and to 
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demand a recognition of their right to return to their ancestral lands on the banks of Lake 
Nasser, south of Aswan. Families of Nubians who were displaced and relocated in the 
area of Nasr al-Nuba in the sixties were particularly active. Nubians’ movement 
culminated with a sit-in in September 2011 that lasted eight days, during which protesters 
maintained the governorate building closed132. The sit-in comprised only Nubians, who 
were about 1,000 participants133. While several political parties and movements, 
including Kifaya and the Wafd Party, were known for their support for the Nubian cause, 
they were not officially involved in order to avoid potential divisions among protesters134. 
A member in Muhammad al-Baradei’s Constitution Party and leading Nubian activist, 
Fawzi was 11 when his family had to move to Ballana, a village in Nasr al-Nuba area. He 
still remembers those hard times and is a strong supporter of the Nubian cause. Partly 
organised by Fawzi, who spent there five nights, the sit-in outside Aswan’s governorate 
building was part of a series of Nubian protests that took place in Aswan, Cairo and 
Alexandria between 2011 and 2013. It ended when Nubian leaders obtained concessions 
from the government. However, it is only with the 2014 constitution that Nubians 
formally obtained the right to return to their ancestral lands, a constitutional clause whose 
implementation remains pending. Fawzi confirmed that more than a land issue, what has 
been at stake is the recognition of Nubians’ existence and rights as Egyptians. 
 
From September 2012, Aswan also saw a 40-day sit-in outside the governorate building 
to demand Mubarak-era and deemed corrupt Governor Mostafa al-Sayyed’s departure. 
The governor briefly resigned in October 2012, but was definitely removed only in 2013. 
Nubians were among the strongest opponents to Al-Sayyed, whom they accused of 
opposing their cause. In particular, they accused him of wasting public funds in the 
chaotic implementation of an agricultural and housing project launched in 2010 in Abu 
Karkar, an area southwest of Aswan that was eventually found unfit for cultivation. 
Political protests also took place in Qena where, for instance, about 500 students protested 
at the governorate building to demand reforms in the education sector two months after 
the “revolution”. The movement was followed by a sit-in and other protests, and had a 
national resonance135. Other protests had a sectarian connotation. In 2012 in Qena, 
ordinary protesters demanded the appointment of a Muslim governor to replace the Coptic 
                                                          
132 Informal conversation with Fawzi, 60, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Aswan, April 2015. 
133 Interview with Amir, 26, school teacher, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
134 Meeting with Fawzi, 60, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Aswan, April 2015. 
135 Interview with Moemen, 20, university student, Qena, May 2014. 
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Christian then occupying the post, accused of inertia. Coptic Christians also protested at 
the governorate building in Aswan to support the construction of new churches. 
 
Public sector workers also protested in Upper Egypt, whether at sugar factories and the 
Drinking Water and Sewerage Company. Various strikes took place at the latter’s branch 
in Aswan in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Demands were related to workers’ 
perceived oppression136, corrupt managers, pay increases and permanent contracts. Many 
workers obtained permanent positions in March 2011 thanks to a successful strike. In July 
and September 2011, workers at the sugar factory in Armant, near Luxor, staged several 
protests and strikes that lasted for several days. They also demanded the resignation of 
the board of directors, as well as pay increases. They obtained the majority of their 
demands, according to a factory union leader137. Teachers on fixed-term contracts 
protested in 2011 to demand their appointment at permanent posts, including in Aswan 
province. As many other public sector workers, they simply demanded the 
implementation of a law giving permanent contracts to people who have been employed 
for above three years. In November 2011 in Kom Ombo, after two months of negotiations 
had failed, 1,400 teachers closed the Education Directorate during eight days138. The 
movement expanded across the province, and teachers’ sit-in did not end until they 
obtained pay increases. Garbage collectors and postal workers also mobilised in southern 
Upper Egypt throughout the same period. They all demanded permanent contracts, higher 
wages and, sometimes, the implementation of a minimum wage. Protests in provinces 
also regularly echoed events taking place elsewhere in Egypt. For instance, a protest took 
place in Aswan against the massacre of football fans in Port Said. 
 
Under the presidency of Muhammad Morsi, who was quickly perceived as failing to 
implement promises, a new wave of popular protests took place. Discontent gradually 
grew as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed government’s perceived inability to 
respond to a widening economic crisis, declining tourism, fuel, power and water 
shortages, and persisting insecurity and terrorism. Ordinary people’s expectations were 
high, and they could not forgive President Morsi for taking orders from what was 
increasingly perceived as a mafia seeking its own interest rather than taking care of the 
                                                          
136 Interview with Ali, 29, operator at the Drinking Water Company, Aswan, March 2014. 
137 Interview with Muhammad, 45, quality manager at Armant’s sugar factory, Luxor, April 2014. 
138 Interview with Hamdi, 33, school teacher, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
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poor and reforming the economy. Increasingly galvanised by the anti-MB media 
propaganda, many ordinary people took to the streets, blaming all their problems, 
including frequent electricity cuts, on President Morsi’s administration. Groups began to 
form on Facebook against the president and the Brotherhood, such as “Luxor online” or 
“Youth against the brothers” (Shabab dedd al-Ikhwan). Coptic Christians also 
participated in protests against the rule of the MB. Additionally, some government 
decisions were perceived as provocations or evidence of the authorities’ incompetence. 
In Luxor, in June 2013, protesters prevented a newly-appointed governor, a figure of the 
hard-line Islamist group al-Jama‛a al-Islamiyya accused of being involved in the 1997 
massacre of tourists at Deir al-Bahari Temple, from entering his office in the governorate 
building until the decision of his appointment was reversed. Such sources of discontent 
combined with security forces’ support and numerous local activists’ engagement in 
Tamarrod139, drove significant numbers to mobilise against the president in June-July 
2013 mass protests (see chapter 6).  
 
6. Conclusion: Upper Egyptians reclaiming their belonging to the national 
polity 
 
Welcome back Egypt, from every corrupt era 
Welcome back Egypt, from an Egyptian occupation of Egypt 
Welcome back Egypt, for the people I protect her every day 
And if you asked the occupier, he will not know who she is 
Welcome back Egypt, from people living in mews and forgotten shanties 
And people in villages and towers, who were thieves 
Welcome back Egypt, from where you have in you blindness to bring me back and victim 
And if you asked the illiterate victims, ignorance will increase 
If you asked the illiterate starved, you will add a hundred to a billion 
Welcome back Egypt.140 
 
As suggested by this poem, for every Egyptian, there will be a before and after what was 
quickly called the “25 January revolution”. Even for the most remote populations of 
southern Upper Egypt, the 2011 uprising has definitively turned a page, whether that of 
disinterest in politics or fear to question authorities. The event and its consequences have 
                                                          
139 Tamarrod (“rebellion”) is the name of a petition campaign demanding President Morsi’s resignation 
followed by the organisation of early elections. Organised throughout the weeks that preceded the mass 
demonstrations which led to Morsi’s ouster by the army on 3 July 2013, it mobilised many activists of 
diverse political backgrounds, who collected signatures of citizens across the country (see chapter 6). 
140 Poem about the “revolution” told by Abdelrahim, a 37-year-old driver at the cleaning company, Kom 
Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. Translated by author from mainly Colloquial Arabic. 
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dramatically affected ordinary citizens’ daily lives, regardless of their participation. It has 
also encouraged an increased segment of the population to embark on direct collective 
action to raise demands. However, contrary to a rather popular view essentially spread by 
the media, the Arab “masses” did not abruptly awaken in 2011. They did not suddenly 
realise the extent of grievances they had long accumulated due to massive injustices and 
breaches to their rights. Constituencies for political change did not rise from nowhere but 
most likely emerged with several trends fuelling discontent. These have included 
aggravating socioeconomic conditions, widening inequalities, an increasing 
pauperisation of lower and middle classes and a rampant corruption in all areas. The 
decline of a previous tacit social contract between the people and the authorities, the 
weakening of the public sector, and an increasing overreliance of the state on violent 
coercion accelerated the erosion of a regime plagued by malfunctions. This situation of 
“domination without hegemony” (Chalcraft 2012) had long prevailed, with ordinary 
people collectively expressing their concerns about, and opposition to changes deeply 
affecting their lives, in many different ways. These ranged from everyday resistance 
tactics and quiet encroachment strategies, to labour actions and street protests.  
 
While their contentious politics did not imply the rejection of a widely popular state 
system under Nasser and most of Sadat’s years, but rather sought to preserve its 
foundations, the mass ideological support for the regime gradually declined under 
Mubarak. However, with the exception of some Islamist groups’ radical militancy, this 
decline of national mass politics did not immediately result in a widening open opposition 
to the state. Islamic activism essentially sought to mobilise at the local level through the 
provision of commodities and welfare services in lieu of the state, largely succeeding in 
constituting a mass popular movement evolving on the fringe and autonomously from the 
state, and in imposing a conservative vision and practice of Islam within society. 
However, the Islamists essentially failed to conceive a political project and a real 
alternative ideology able to compete with the dominant order. This partly explains why, 
only one year after bringing them to power with the election of Muhammad Morsi as 
president, ordinary people turned away from them and supported a military coup. 
 
Before the 2011 uprising, with no entity to adequately represent them and promote their 
interests, most ordinary people acted rather pragmatically to ensure their survival. 
Marginalised by an increasingly exclusionary, elitist order, they mainly resorted to 
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discrete, diffuse repertoires of contention to tackle immediate, individualistic needs, 
while occasionally rising against perceived threats and injustices. Collective struggles for 
bread, decent wages or electricity, continued to take place in workplaces and the streets. 
A shift in the number and scale of contentious events slowly took place starting from the 
late nineties, including an increasingly more active labour movement, renewed opposition 
activism and popular mobilisations, and the appearance of movements exclusively 
demanding political change. In particular, the second part of the last decade saw an 
increasing vitality of labour protests, which growingly evolved from work-in actions to 
work-stoppage lasting more time (El-Mahdi 2011). This relative radicalisation in 
workers’ repertoires of contention was accompanied by the raise of new demands and 
their increasing politicisation. Most of these protests constituted signs of an increasingly 
widespread discontent towards state policies and inaction, preparing the ground for the 
mass uprising of 2011. However, as pointed by Charles Tripp, these yet recurrent acts of 
resistance and contentious events have often been described as “episodic, rather than 
systemic”141. Indeed, geographically dispersed and lacking transcending networks and 
organisations to coordinate their contentious actions, ordinary people were not able to 
assemble in collective struggles overstepping the local level, and identify with others 
sharing similar grievances. In the other chapters of the thesis, I will attempt to explain 
why this has been an enduring curse until today and despite the parenthesis of the 2011 
uprising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
141 Charles Tripp, The Power and the People. Paths of Resistance in the Middle East, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Chapter 2: Local leaders, networks and solidarities in the protests 
against deteriorating public services 
 
1. Introduction: examining the local coordination of protests in two case studies 
 
Ordinary people go to the streets on rare occasions. Outside democracies and large 
agglomerations, popular protests against expensive life, price increases, water shortages, 
electricity cuts, or deteriorating infrastructure, usually go unnoticed. Often ephemeral, 
these movements, which have taken place everywhere, from Algeria to South Africa and 
Egypt, are hardly observed outside the geographical space where they remain contained. 
Without experienced activists or “brokers”142 to connect them to similar mobilisations 
happening elsewhere, and significant media coverage to expand their visibility beyond 
the local level, these protests do not really alarm the authorities. Yet, their socioeconomic 
demands often exceed the neighbourhood or the village where they erupt. They usually 
reflect a broader demand for a stronger state, which has perceivably neglected its citizens 
by failing to provide the most basic services. In addition, these mobilisations, especially 
in rural areas, raise questions regarding the protest culture of relatively marginalised 
populations that had been distant from activism in big cities. 
 
We saw in chapter 1 that throughout the two years that followed the 2011 uprising, Egypt 
experienced a proliferation of all kinds of protests in all sectors. The economically 
unstable context that prevailed after the uprising, combined with a relatively open 
political environment, encouraged many ordinary people to mobilise. Many citizens 
protested against the deterioration of public services, which had gradually accelerated 
throughout the last ten years of the Mubarak era as a result of the state’s increasing 
inability to assume its duties and sometimes deliberate neglect. Particularly in rural areas, 
including in the remote provinces of Upper Egypt, public services have been further 
worsening since the 2011 uprising due to national and local political instability, lacking 
structural reforms to end crises in key sectors such as energy and water, and a persisting 
government prioritisation of large urban centres over the countryside. In addition, Upper 
Egyptian provinces have long been excluded from most development projects undertaken 
                                                          
142 By “brokerage”, I here mean “the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit 
that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites”. This is Tilly, McAdam and 
Tarrow’s definition in Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). I do not 
use Auyero’s definition of brokers as part of clientelist networks. 
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by Cairo, while health, road, water, electricity infrastructure have deteriorated. In these 
regions, fuel shortages, water and power cuts, deadly road accidents, amongst other 
failures, have been particularly frequent, potentially driving popular discontent. In this 
chapter focusing on popular mobilisations denouncing failures in services normally 
provided by the state or its local representatives, I intend to modestly contribute to the 
puzzle of ordinary people’s motivations to take action, bearing in mind the following 
questions: Why do ordinary people resort to street protests at particular times? How do 
they adapt their mobilising strategies to switching contexts? What does facilitate or 
restrain popular mobilisations? Despite their structural roots, why have mobilisations 
against deteriorating public services remained discontinuous, dispersed and ephemeral?  
 
Occasional, but not less noticeable, protests organised by ordinary citizens to demand the 
re-establishment of public services such as drinking water or electricity, or to denounce 
an injustice or a threat to their community, are the object of this chapter looking at how 
mobilisation takes place locally. I explore the eruptions and trajectories of two cases of 
“service delivery protests”143 since the 2011 uprising in two Upper Egyptian villages. I 
emphasise the contribution to mobilisation of ordinary networks, activists and solidarities, 
to show how local coordination is generally achieved. I do so by analysing protests against 
drinking water pollution in Abul Rish, just outside the city of Aswan, as well as a dispute 
over a small piece of land turned into a football field, which legal use has been 
continuously denied to residents of Al-Hebeil, near Luxor. The chapter argues that 
mobilisation is typically achieved at the heart of the village or the neighbourhood thanks 
to the initiatives of a few influential members of the community able to rely on 
experienced activists, communal solidarities and ordinary informal networks. It also 
sketches some of the constraints and limits to these local mobilisations that remain 
essentially short-lived, disseminated and irregular, before systematically discussing, in 
the remaining chapters, why such movements do not grow further. In addition, I intend 
to shed light on the impact of national events in the “periphery”, and particularly on how 
the 2011 and 2013 uprisings respectively affected mobilisation levels and processes in 
the remote Upper Egyptian provinces.  
 
                                                          
143 Luke Sinwell, Joshua Kirshner, Kgopotso Khumalo, Owen Manda, Peter Pfaffe, Comfort Phokela and 
Carin Runciman, “Service delivery protests. Findings from quick response research on four ‘hotspots’ – 
Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot”, Centre for Sociological Research, Faculty of Humanities, 
University of Johannesburg, 1 September 2009. 
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Firstly, I analyse the trajectories of small protest movements in Al-Hebeil and Abul Rish, 
arguing that a multitude of overlapping ordinary, local networks and often brokers using 
their own activist experience and connections, facilitated mobilisations for decent public 
services between February 2011 and July 2013. I show that the solidarity among friends, 
neighbours, clan members, increases the number of participants, or decreases it when the 
movement loses momentum. I also demonstrate that the involvement of more or less 
experienced political or social activists in a protest movement enhances its visibility and 
raises chances to engage in negotiations with decision-makers. Secondly, I discuss the 
motivations behind the occasional resort to public protests. I wonder whether, in both 
cases, ordinary people had gone to the streets to denounce violations to specific norms 
sustaining their relationship with the state, or simply because they perceived an 
opportunity to successfully do so. Indeed, in such rural areas, protests against 
deteriorating public services could signal a crisis of moral economy where the state is 
rather demanded, not rejected, to correct a negligence or to re-establish a past gain. I argue 
that ordinary protesters may have been motivated to mobilise by the memory of a strong 
state, and perhaps of an old moral economy. However, I also attempt to demonstrate that 
even though moral values and the belief in raising legitimate demands have indeed incited 
people to act, their mobilisations have been conditioned by their perceptions of an 
opportune context to go to the streets in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Eventually, 
this is reflected by the large demobilisation that has taken place since President Morsi’s 
ouster in July 2013, while some key activists have pursued the fight through less 
transgressive and deemed more acceptable means.  
 
2. Al-Hebeil residents’ fight for a football field 
 
Al-Hebeil, a village144 located about ten kilometres from Luxor’s city centre, has only 
one youth centre for approximately 35,000 inhabitants. Dotted with farmland, sugarcane 
farms and modest concrete houses, the village looks like many other Upper Egyptian rural 
areas. The typical way to reach Al-Hebeil is by microbus from Luxor’s train station. Most 
residents are farmers usually having a second job, public sector employees, small shop 
                                                          
144 In Egypt, the naja‛ (plural: nujū‛) is the smallest administrative unit. The village (qarya) is usually an 
agglomeration of multiple nujū‛, including rural and sometimes semi-urbanised areas. This explains the 
high number of inhabitants in the village of Al-Hebeil, which includes 17 nujū‛. Al-Hebeil is the most 
populated village in al-Bayadiyya markaz (plural: marākiz), another administrative unit that gathers several 
local units (wihdat mahalliyya), themselves encompassing various cities, towns and/or villages. 
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owners or drivers. Unemployment and poverty are high. The village reportedly has four 
primary schools, two secondary schools, one health unit which includes only one doctor, 
and a unique youth centre. It has no high school, no supply bureau, and sewage networks 
are underdeveloped. Water and electricity networks are connected, which is a 
complication, especially in summer when power cuts are frequent and therefore 
simultaneously lead to water cuts. The village suffers from most of the typical problems 
that can be found in Upper Egyptian rural areas. A Google search of Al-Hebeil in Arabic 
shows links to diverse press articles on protests related to endemic problems affecting the 
village, from polluted drinking water145 to failures in sanitation services and power cuts.  
 
Yet, the residents I first met in April 2014 had been involved in a rather different kind of 
fight. They had been struggling for a small piece of land with local officials for years. In 
the nineties, a number of residents began to informally use a vacant state land as a football 
field, without a proper authorisation of the Ministry of Endowments, the owner of the 
land. Residents had plans to build a youth centre, but were stopped due to a dispute which 
erupted around 2010, when a local official seized the land. Consequently, residents 
embarked on a complex administrative process asking the Ministry of Youth and Sports 
to buy the land from the Ministry of Endowments. The sale would formalise their use of 
the land and avoid further attempts to seize it for other purposes. After years of 
bureaucratic intricacies and several protests organised by the villagers at the governorate 
headquarters in Luxor, the Ministry of Youth and Sports continues to refuse to purchase 
the land, under the pretext that its fixed price is too high. Because of two state bodies’ 
inability to reach a consensus, families came to a temporary arrangement with the 
authorities, whereby they were allowed to use the land in exchange for an EGP10,000 
annual rent paid to the Ministry of Endowments, a considerable sum for the villagers.   
 
As in many other similar cases, this land dispute goes back to before the 2011 uprising. 
However, it is only in its aftermath that villagers significantly radicalised their action. 
Indeed, they saw the “revolution” as an opportunity to increase pressure on decision-
makers and solve the longstanding issue of the football field: “After the revolution, our 
only goal was the issue of the playing field”146. For Taha, a 40-year-old government-
                                                          
145 For instance, residents blocked a public administration building in a protest against the pollution of 
drinking water in February 2013. 
146 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
 
89 
 
employed technician, things were taken for granted in Upper Egypt, but the “revolution” 
changed this and “opened a door”147. Residents first bombarded different administrative 
entities involved in the issue with petitions. They addressed the governorate, Luxor City’s 
General Administration of Youth, the Egyptian Endowments Authority, Luxor markaz 
and Bayadiyya City, the presidency of the Council of Ministers and the National Council 
for Youth. After being denied several requests to meet the governor, Youssef, a 45-year-
old electrician employed by the city council and one of the most active villagers pursuing 
this issue, decided with two of his friends to organise a sit-in outside the governorate 
building in Luxor to demand the right to legally use the football field. Several protests, 
including a sit-in in May 2011, took place at the governorate headquarters in Luxor. 
Protesters demanded the governorate to intervene to solve the land dispute. Salman, 39, 
is a well-known and respected local entrepreneur, and an activist of the Popular 
Current148. He justified the resort to public protests in these terms: “Nothing happens 
unless you make popular pressure, media pressure, so that your demand is achieved”149.  
 
Residents’ protests outside the governorate headquarters in Luxor had a relative visibility. 
Several newspaper articles were written about Al-Hebeil residents’ fight for a football 
field, while a number of reports were aired on TV, including on the privately-owned 
channel ONTV150. However, no concrete result was achieved. The arrival of a new 
governor in 2013 brought the case back to square one. Mainly in their thirties and forties, 
the men I met were outraged. Beyond practical issues, they questioned their perceived 
marginalisation from the rest of Egypt, while reclaiming their rights as Egyptian citizens: 
“The Sa‛id is outside the map”151, a resident told me. According to Taha, Upper Egyptians 
have suffered since the end of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era, when the region was 
disregarded152. He complained that no major development project had been undertaken 
in the area since the construction of Aswan’s High Dam. He regretted what he understood 
as politicians’ disinterest vis-à-vis Upper Egypt on the one hand, and popular classes on 
the other:  
                                                          
147 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
148 The Popular Current (Al-Tayyar Al-Shaabi) is the political movement led by the former presidential 
candidate at the 2012 and 2014 elections Hamdeen Sabbahi. 
149 Interview with Salman, 39, entrepreneur, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
150 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-r3ZzfTrnAI. 
151 Interview with Mahmud, employee at Al-Hebeil’s only youth centre, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
152 For an analysis of memories of Nasser’s era by Upper Egyptians through the example of former High 
Dam workers in Aswan, see Alia Mossallam, Hikayat Sha‘b – Stories of Peoplehood: Nasserism, Popular 
Politics and Songs in Egypt, 1956-1973, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
2012. 
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“I have not participated in any political protest… Not because I am passive. But 
because I know what happens. What happens is that politics consists in positions, and in 
people looking for positions. No one cares about the people”.153 
 
Youssef similarly blamed the authorities’ ignorance of poor people, claiming that they 
had obtained nothing since the 2011 uprising:  
 
“The people who live in Cairo don’t feel what [has happened to us] for three 
years: there is no work, no jobs, no tourism, and 90% of people in Luxor work in 
tourism”154.  
 
In Al-Hebeil, it is youth networks involved in the conflict with governorate officials, and 
more generally the people who used the field, that essentially organised and coordinated 
the protests and other steps. Friends, fellows, neighbours, had sometimes jointly 
participated, after the 25 January “revolution”, in the popular committees tasked with 
ensuring security outside homes while the police were absent. According to Youssef, the 
“revolution” had at least one positive outcome: it had gathered and unified the youth. 
These “youth”155, who usually gather on a daily basis, including in the little office of a 
local family association156, essentially organised everything among themselves in order 
to defend a largely symbolic cause. Indeed, they justified the need for this field with social 
and educative purposes since it was better to provide the youth with a space to gather and 
practice sports, rather than to leave them to spend the entire day at a café in idle 
unproductive activity, taking drugs, or even falling into violence or terrorism. However, 
what seemed to be really at stake in this issue was the claim for a violated collective right.  
 
Yet, this movement has enjoyed the support of a number of more or less experienced 
activists. Salman has a bigger protest record than most of his fellows. He participated in 
numerous demonstrations, especially under President Morsi. He went once to a 
demonstration against Morsi’s constitution in Luxor. He was particularly active in 
                                                          
153 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
154 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
155 Here, youth has uncertain boundaries. My informants in Al-Hebeil were between 39 and 45 years old, 
and all claimed being part of the youth of the village. 
156 The Islamic Welfare Association for the Well-being of Al-Hebeil (Al-Gameeyya al-Khayreyya al-
Islamiyya Balsawalha Al-Hebeil), founded in 2012 and located in Al-Hebeil’s main street. 
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protests related to the sūlār157 crisis with fellow workers at other companies. Indeed, 
Diesel shortages paralysed their work since they needed this fuel to transport goods. They 
organised a six-hour protest outside the airport, which prompted the authorities to provide 
them with significant quantities of sūlār. However, this protest did not lead to 
comprehensive solutions to the problem, and shortages recurred. With his employees, 
Salman organised a second protest, this time outside the governorate headquarters. After 
threatening to block roads, including the Airport Road, he forced officials, including the 
governor and the security director, to negotiate. He obtained, along with other colleagues, 
an official contract of sūlār supplies from the governorate. Salman attended mass protests 
against the MB and spent 25 days in an anti-government sit-in in Cairo’s Tahrir Square 
in June 2013. He also collected signatures for the Tamarrod campaign. An activist 
checking Facebook on a daily basis, he is rather a protest organiser who claims his support 
for “revolutionary” forces. Salman explained that he had joined the Popular Current 
because it aimed to gather diverse political currents around the goals of the “revolution”, 
namely “bread, freedom, social justice”. He said these goals would be achieved thanks to 
Egypt’s numerous resources, which are currently monopolised by a minority “eating” the 
country’s prosperity. According to him, everyone should benefit from a minimum wage. 
If there was justice, everyone would work with conscience (ḍamīr).  
 
Salman has connections in activists’ circles in Luxor thanks to his membership in the 
Popular Current. For example, he knows well Nabil, the coordinator in southern Upper 
Egypt of the April 6 Youth Movement (see chapter 4), who put him in touch with 
journalists to publicise the football field issue. In 2014, Salman joined Hamdeen 
Sabbahi’s presidential campaign. He said his increasing political activism had been 
affecting his work. Salman is also the head of a welfare association. He voted in most 
elections, even under President Mubarak, always against the candidate of the formerly 
ruling NDP. Salman had not participated in protests since 30 June 2013, admitting the 
protest law had been discouraging him. He opposed it, considering that a government 
which came to power thanks to demonstrations, should not ban them. He had a rather 
negative opinion of politicians, whom he considered particularly active in the media, but 
not in the field. According to him, the football field issue would be easy to solve in a 
couple of days if politicians took the time to negotiate a consensus. 
                                                          
157 Widely used in Upper Egypt, the sūlār or Diesel fuel experienced several long-lasting shortages under 
President Morsi’s rule. 
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All political trends were present in Al-Hebeil. Media reported numerous marches by MB 
supporters in the village in 2013, 2014 and 2015, as well as motorcycle protests158. Both 
Youssef and Salman confirmed that figures of Mubarak’s NDP also remained present and 
influential in the area. Other villagers involved in the football field dispute had limited 
activist experience.  
 
Youssef had participated in a number of politically-driven demonstrations. He attended a 
small pro-Palestinian protest in Luxor after the 2011 uprising. More recently, he had gone 
to the streets the day after the bloody dispersal of Muslim Brotherhood’ sit-ins in Cairo 
in order, he claimed, to protest against the use of violence, and not in support for the 
Islamists. When I met him for a second time in March 2015, Youssef did not hide his 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood, especially because of the services they used to 
provide. However, he was not a formal member of the organisation and did not 
necessarily endorse their political or religious agenda. At the 2012 presidential elections, 
Youssef voted for former MB member Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh at the first round, 
and for Muhammad Morsi at the run-off. Treasurer in a local welfare association, he 
believed political parties were in another “valley”159, and boarded the boat depending on 
the climate. He said that he would not give his voice to a party which would not care 
about his concerns. He specifically expressed disappointment towards the Salafi Nour 
Party, whose pro-coup stance during the 30 June 2013 events was reportedly opposed by 
many people in the area160. As many Egyptian ordinary citizens (see chapter 4), Youssef 
defined politics as a “dirty game” (li‛ba wiskha or li‛ba qazira), as well as a “verbal game” 
(li‛ba lafẓiyya). Politicians were busy talking instead of delivering what people expected 
from them. Thus, presidential candidates were only good at making promises in platforms 
that did not specify how they would achieve the beautiful things they were proposing to 
accomplish. He said he would however participate in the 2014 elections in order to avoid 
regrets, and would vote for the less bad candidate. His life had changed since 2011 
because citizens had started to get involved in politics and would no longer remain silent: 
“25 January made us get involved in everything”161. 
                                                          
158 In February 2014 and April 2015, respectively: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8kBkbHXomQ, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BgDrBDDMrVg. 
159 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
160 For more details about self-proclaimed Salafists now rejecting the Salafi Nour Party and supporting the 
Muslim Brotherhood, see chapter 6. 
161 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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Taha did not support any political current and claimed he was not involved in formal 
politics either: “we are out of politics, in Upper Egypt, they made us out of it. […] They 
drove us away, and we went away”162. He said he would never listen again to politicians, 
whom he did not trust anymore. Since they were not able to provide them with a football 
field, what could they do for more important issues such as education or health? When 
asked about his opinion on political parties and movements, he answered with a smile and 
a single word: “decoration”163. Taha participated in the 2012 presidential elections 
because he thought there was some ongoing change. He was now delusional and said he 
would probably not vote in the next polls. Taha mainly followed pro-government media, 
reading Algomhuria state-run newspaper. He also watched the conspiracy theories-expert 
TV channel al-Kahera wal nas, as well as the “anti-revolution” and pro-Mubarak figure 
Tawfiq Okasha’s al-Faraeen channel.  
 
To my knowledge, no external actors, whether NGOs, political parties or brokers, played 
any important role in the issue of the football field. In 2014, Nabil, the coordinator in 
southern Upper Egypt of the April 6 Youth Movement, asked one of his journalist friends 
to make a report about the land dispute. In addition to his friendship with Salman, Nabil 
participated in a number of charity events and campaigns in Al-Hebeil. For example, in 
winter 2015, he distributed blankets to the poor. This has made him increasingly close to 
some of the members of the previously-mentioned family association who are active in 
the field issue. During my last visit in March 2015, Nabil was helping them with small 
things. For instance, he created a Facebook page for the association. However, Nabil 
never became directly involved in the football field issue.  
 
Al-Hebeil residents’ protests for a football field did not constitute a rebellion against the 
government. Instead, it was a demand addressed to the authorities, asking back their right 
to enjoy the football field. The November 2013 protest law deterred villagers from 
organising more protests. They have resorted to administrative and legal steps instead, 
through writing petitions and the like. They have been unsuccessful so far, however. 
Worse, the leaders of the contestation have been subject to several intimidation attempts 
and indirect threats aimed at discouraging them from acting further, while their leaders 
have been threatened with lawsuits for illegally occupying land. Seven of them facing 
                                                          
162 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
163 He used the English word. 
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such charges were recently cleared. This likely explains why some of the people involved 
in the issue were scared to talk to me, despite the fact that I was introduced by Salman, 
whom they trusted and respected. Some of them agreed to help me only after making me 
promise to write and publish something on the issue, which I naturally did164. However, 
a number of protagonists in the issue never let me individually interview them. One of 
them specifically asked for his name not to appear anywhere. 
 
Since 30 June 2013, prospects to solve this land dispute have appeared more distant than 
ever. The opportunity that residents had seen after the 2011 uprising seemed to be 
definitively gone. Youssef says, with humour, “God bless her soul” each time he 
mentions the 25 January “revolution”165. None of this would have happened if the 
Ministry of Youth and Sports had agreed to buy the land from the Ministry of 
Endowments a long time ago. “The two ministries belong to the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
What’s the problem? […] Routine166  and administrative corruption” 167, Al-Teri Hassan 
Abdu, a local parliamentary candidate, told me. However, despite obstacles, Al-Hebeil 
residents expressed their determination to continue the fight in a peaceful way, 
prioritising legal steps for now. “It’s a matter of life or death”168, Taha explained. Not 
only do Al-Hebeil residents see their demand as legitimate, but they also take 
responsibility for their past actions, even the most contentious ones. Even though no more 
protests had taken place since President Morsi’s ouster, this apparent demobilisation was 
only partial: residents were waiting for the outcome of their legal steps, while attempting 
to publicise their cause.  
 
Ultimately, I have used this case to show how residents locally organised to raise both a 
formal demand, the legal use of the football field, and a symbolic one, the recognition of 
their legitimacy to raise this grievance. They did so thanks to various supporting 
networks: local activists who contributed to organising protests, mediatising the issue and 
obtaining dialogue with local officials on the one hand; family associations and 
communal solidarity networks who provided a moral and financial support on the other. 
The cohesion of this group of men leading the contestation, all in their thirties and fourties 
                                                          
164 http://www.madamasr.com/en/2015/12/20/opinion/society/villagers-demand-a-football-field/. 
165 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
166 Routine is the popular denomination used to refer to excessive red tape and bureaucracy. 
167 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
168 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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and all sharing the same passion for sports, has nurtured their determination despite 
failures, disappointments and intimidations. I also showed how villagers engaged in this 
issue have been combining official ways, including administrative and legal steps, with 
occasional disruptive protests, including the occupation of the land and demonstrations at 
the governorate building in Luxor, in order to press the authorities to respond. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The building of the Islamic Welfare Association for the Well-being of Al-Hebeil, March 2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The disputed field in Al-Hebeil, March 2015. 
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3. The intervention of local activists combined with the presence of multiple 
local networks: a more visible mobilisation in Abul Rish 
 
In Abul Rish village169, just outside Aswan city, residents suffer from the multiple 
consequences of polluted tap water. Fifteen years ago, it was a village surrounded by 
agricultural land. Nowadays, it is largely urbanised, especially in the area of al-Aqalim 
bus station where I used to live. Buildings have gradually eroded farmland, while many 
informal constructions have arisen, sometimes to the slopes of the hills. Many of these 
areas are affected by the pollution of drinking water which, in addition to sewage water, 
mainly comes from the waste of several factories and public facilities. These include a 
chemical industries factory of the Kima Company, a Coca Cola factory, Aswan’s public 
hospital and other clinics such as the Magdi Yaaqub Heart Centre. In the absence of an 
appropriate sewage system, these wastes are thrown into a canal, which was originally 
dug to evacuate rain water falling from surrounding hills. With time, this canal, as many 
canals across Egypt, has become an open-air discharge endangering the health of residents 
in the areas where it passes. The 20-kilometre “Kima Canal”170 flows into the Nile River 
only a few hundreds of metres from the network that supplies drinking water to Aswan 
and surrounding villages, including Abul Rish. It is widely admitted that the subsequent 
pollution of drinking water has continuously caused liver diseases, renal failures and 
cancers, in popular areas where mainly low-income families cannot afford the cost of 
mineral water to drink, cook or cultivate lands. In Abul Rish, residents reported the 
presence of worms and sand in tap water171. According to them, analyses of drinking 
water samples showed high rates of nitrate, ammonia and organic products. They 
denounced that some officials had denied the results of tests, saying that the water was 
not polluted and that diseases were caused by something else.  
 
The Kima Canal poses a threat to the health of populations far beyond Aswan. It is only 
one example of a widespread phenomenon and a structural issue in Egypt. According to 
national statistics, the access to safe drinking water has continuously improved over the 
                                                          
169 Abul Rish is, in fact, a “local unit” (wihda mahalliyya), another administrative unit between the village 
(qarya) and the centre (markaz). Comprising about 55,000 inhabitants, Abul Rish includes three villages. 
170 It was initially called Tir‛at Kima (the Kima Canal) because the Kima Company was considered the 
main entity responsible for the pollution of water. We now know that several hospitals and other companies 
also throw their waste in the canal. 
171 Informal conversation with a group of women residing near al-Aqalim bus station, Abul Rish (Aswan), 
February 2014. 
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past decade. However, important regional disparities have persisted, while the 
countryside and urban slums have less access to clean drinking water. The Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Community reported in 2007 that while 89% of urban households 
were connected to a public sewer system, only 37% were in rural areas, and only 6% of 
villages enjoyed sewage systems and wastewater treatment services. In 2010-2011, the 
Egyptian national statistics agency CAPMAS reported only 24.7% of the rural 
population, against 88% of the urban population, was connected to a sewage system. 
Lacking sanitation services and safe drinking water, and subsequently poor hygiene, 
contribute to the propagation of water-related diseases, including severe diarrhoea. In 
addition, wastewater from industrial pollution has maintained a high level of diseases 
such as kidney failure, renal diseases, Hepatitis C and cancer.  
 
Sabri, 28, gave his mother a lobe of his liver. She needed this transplant to recover from 
a liver failure allegedly caused by a too high level of ammonia in drinking water. She still 
regularly needs to travel to Cairo for medical care and to get fresh blood. In April 2011, 
Sabri came back to Aswan after spending several months in Cairo with his mother 
between surgeries and convalescence. He was then determined to do something so that 
no one else would have to endure what his family had just suffered. He used his own story 
to mobilise other residents in his neighbourhood and beyond, circulating it online and on 
leaflets, while calling on families to gather outside the governorate headquarters in 
Aswan. He created an event for a protest on Facebook, and was surprised to see large 
numbers of potential participants. He then called for the protest on Aswan’s local Tiba 
TV channel, after which he received a call from the governor himself, who offered him 
some compensation for treatment costs in exchange for the cancellation of the 
demonstration, an offer that Sabri declined172.  
 
Sabri has a relatively long experience in anti-government demonstrations. He claims he 
never obtained his degree from Cairo’s al-Azhar University due to his participation in 
several protests. In addition, later, he had to leave a job as food inspector in the health 
sector in Hurghada, in the Red Sea governorate, because he had many problems with the 
management after denouncing abuses and bribes taken by his colleagues. Sabri now 
works as a customs inspector at Marsa Alam Airport, but spends an average of one month 
of two in Aswan since activity has been low in the Red Sea resort due to the scarcity of 
                                                          
172 Informal conversation with Sabri, 28, airport customs inspector, Cairo, April 2015.  
 
98 
 
tourists. Sabri participated in most of the 18 days of the 2011 uprising in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square, where he went on a daily basis between 28 January and 7 February. He 
remembers those days: “Whoever attended 28 January in Cairo will never surrender to 
anything until the revolution rules this country… Until bread, freedom, social justice, are 
implemented […] because, honestly, we saw torture in the streets”173. In Tahrir Square, 
he said he had felt Egyptian and part of this country for the first time in his life. 
Afterwards, he also took part in a number of big demonstrations in Cairo, including 
protests against military rule, in Muhammad Mahmud, at the cabinet building, and so on. 
On returning to Aswan, he also participated in many protests. For instance, he went to a 
march against the Port Said Massacre from Midan al-Mahatta to the Security Directorate. 
During these instances of mobilisation, he met most of Aswan’s political activists, 
including other supporters of the “revolution”. While studying journalism in Aswan after 
the “revolution”, he wrote “down, down with military rule” on an exam paper. He also 
got involved in Hamdeen Sabbahi’s first presidential campaign in Aswan. Sabri is against 
both military rule and the Muslim Brotherhood. He said the regime had not changed a lot 
since Mubarak’s fall. Sabri’s last participation was in 30 June protests and Tamarrod. 
After that, he was not convinced by the Tafwīḍ174, and felt that the army was going beyond 
its traditional role. Later, he felt ill-at-ease when pro-MB sit-ins were violently dispersed 
in Cairo. Overall, Sabri was disappointed with the army’s ouster of President Morsi, 
which he called a coup. He was also disappointed with Tamarrod, considering that they 
had been “fooled” since nothing of what they had demanded was implemented175.  
 
Two key activists helped Sabri to increase awareness among Abul Rish residents. On the 
one hand, Khaled, one of his relatives also residing in the area, is an accountant and a 
well-known social worker often collaborating with the Aswan branch of the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Centre (HMLC)176. On the other, Mostafa al-Hassan, the director of HMLC 
Aswan and a founding member of the law firm, is also a resident in Abul Rish. He has 
been leading with his team the legal file of the Kima Canal issue, which dates back to 
1996177. The three activists toured the associations of the area, including family 
                                                          
173 Interview with Sabri, 28, airport customs inspector, Aswan, February 2014. 
174 Tafwīḍ or “mandate”, was the name given to a mass protest convened by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in July 
2013 to give the army a mandate to fight “terrorism”.  
175 Interview with Sabri, 28, airport customs inspector, Aswan, February 2014. 
176 The Hisham Mubarak Law Centre has only two branches, the main one in Cairo and another one in 
Aswan. Founded in 1996, the last one is supposed to cover all Upper Egypt. 
177 Lawyers at HMLC have been filing and winning lawsuits related to the Kima Canal, which have not 
been implemented, for almost 20 years.  
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associations and charities, as well as youth centres and mosques, to get some help in 
spreading the news about the protest event. The demonstration eventually took place in 
July 2011 outside the governorate building in Aswan. Tens of residents of Abul Rish 
participated, including elders which, according to Sabri, gave the movement more 
credibility before the governor since people of their age did not usually attend public 
protests178. Even though the pollution of drinking water was not new, the choice of the 
timing, in the post-uprising context, was justified in these terms by a woman living in the 
area: “we felt we could speak, and people would listen to us”179. 
 
Following the demonstration, a governorate committee was sent to a youth centre in Abul 
Rish to start a dialogue with the leaders of the contestation. Another protest followed in 
September 2011, further pressuring local authorities to act. This time, residents called for 
the governor’s resignation. Even though activists and protesters blamed the Kima 
Company and the other entities contributing to the pollution of water through throwing 
their waste into the canal, they mainly emphasised local authorities, especially the 
governorate’s, responsibility180. In a leaflet calling for this protest, Sabri denounced 
governorate officials’ neglect, slow reaction and corruption, referring to a “strange” use 
by the governor of millions of Egyptian pounds that should have gone to the construction 
of a new sewage station. Presenting his own story as an example of what could happen to 
anyone in the area, he used relatively strong vocabulary, referring to an issue which “kills 
our children". He warned the governor: “we won’t return from our protest without a 
solution”. Regardless of their political opinions, most people blamed the local authorities 
without necessarily attacking the central government. In April 2013, tens of local 
residents again protested at the governorate building in Aswan, denouncing the 
authorities’ failure to solve the Kima Canal issue despite the waste of more than EGP 80 
million. They demanded the prosecution of officials involved in this waste of public 
money.  
 
Activists’ degree of organisation took another step when they formed a “popular” 
coordination committee181 to brainstorm on solutions and represent Abul Rish residents. 
                                                          
178 Informal conversation with Sabri, 28, airport customs inspector, Cairo, April 2015. 
179 Informal conversation with a group of women residing near al-Aqalim bus station, Abul Rish (Aswan), 
February 2014. 
180 Interviews with local activists Khaled, accountant, and Tariq, High Dam administration employee, 
Aswan, April 2015. 
181 Activists and residents called it the “popular committee”. 
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This committee includes three to four activists as Mostafa al-Hassan and Khaled, as well 
as a number of local residents, one farmer, one engineer, less than ten members in total 
having different roles. While lawyers mainly act on the legal front, an engineer, a farmer 
and other ordinary people work on proposing feasible solutions to the problem of the 
Kima Canal182, and local activists campaign to increase awareness among residents. The 
HMLC, several local associations and a youth centre, have hosted meetings. Women have 
been invited to attend meetings, but there is no woman in the coordinating committee. 
Family associations and mosques (using their microphones) used to spread information 
on meetings183.  
 
Tariq, a 45-year-old employee at the High Dam administration residing in Abul Rish, is 
one of the members of the coordination committee. He is a well-connected local activist. 
Heading the union at his work, where he once organised a protest which disrupted traffic 
by the High Dam, he is a member in several associations and in a youth centre in Abul 
Rish. He is also a political activist, who used to be the youngest member in the local 
council, in charge of youth issues. Tariq explained that he was a member of the NDP from 
1997 to 2001 because this used to be the only way to provide services locally. He said he 
had opposed the lead of businessmen such as Ahmed Ezz within the party, and the rigging 
of the 2010 elections, which made him participate in the 2011 uprising in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square. Later, he joined the pro-government Egypt My Country Party (Hizb Misr 
Baladi)184 as the secretary of Aswan’s markaz. Tariq did not like the MB, denouncing its 
deemed opportunism and corruption, which he qualified as bigger in one year than 
Mubarak’s corruption in 30 years. He participated in the 30 June anti-MB protests in 
Aswan, and then in the pro-Sisi campaign Mustaqbal Watan185. Tariq is also a well-
experienced speaker to the media, and a mobile activist who often travels to Cairo and 
elsewhere, including to attend human rights and other activist trainings. 
 
Other activists, including women, played a significant role in the mobilisation against the 
Kima Canal, which was apparently not the case in Al-Hebeil. A mother, Nahed is a local, 
Nubian activist engaged in diverse community and welfare activities related to women’ 
status, the Nubian cause, and health issues. She now has her own association, mainly 
                                                          
182 Interview with Khaled, accountant, Aswan, April 2015. 
183 Ibid. 
184 One of the small political parties that re-emerged after President Morsi’s ouster in 2013. 
185 Initially a campaign supporting Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s presidential bid, Mustaqbal Watan became a party. 
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involved in women issues. For instance, she organises training sessions on how to vote 
freely and avoid manipulations because, she says, “the woman has awareness”. Active in 
other associations and member of the Modern Egypt Party (Hizb Misr al-Haditha)186, 
which essentially gathers former NDP members, Nahed has connections in Abul Rish and 
at the governorate level. Her political activism goes beyond her participation in meetings 
and symposiums, since she is a former candidate at local elections (mahalliyyat) and 
intends to run at the next local polls. She explained that she wanted to represent her 
community because she was one of them, had the same living conditions, and similarly 
suffered from the polluted tap water. She wanted to become a local representative in order 
to provide services to her community.  
 
Admitting that her party had done nothing in Aswan, she said people worked better in 
family associations than in Parliament or local councils. As for the pollution of water, she 
said that she had learnt from protests to never remain silent again, vowing to continue to 
mobilise until the problem was solved. At the opposite of “revolutionary” activists’ pro-
democracy discourse, Nahed insisted: “we can’t be ruled, except by the army”187. When 
I met her in winter 2014, she had just joined a campaign of support for Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi’s presidential bid. Like many other people at the time, she did not hide her admiration 
for the minister of defence, seen as a patriot, a saviour, a new Nasser. Nahed is a cousin 
of Sabri’s father, which may explain that they could mobilise together despite their 
different political backgrounds. She obviously had a better access than Sabri and other 
male activists to her female neighbours. When I went back to Aswan in April 2015, her 
sister’s husband had just died at the age of 56, allegedly from a disease caused by the 
polluted drinking water. This new tragedy shows that despite residents’ mobilisation, the 
problem is far from being solved.  
 
Following protests by Abul Rish residents, the local authorities took multiple 
commitments, but quickly failed to honour most of them. More than five years after the 
2011 uprising, nothing has changed. A wastewater treatment plant was built but, for 
unclear reasons, was never used. High suspicions of corruption are associated with the 
disappearance of between EGP80 and 90 million, which were originally released to fund 
                                                          
186 The Modern Egypt Party was founded in July 2011 by former members of the NDP following the latter’s 
dissolution. 
187 Informal conversation with Nahed, social worker, Abul Rish (Aswan), February 2014. 
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diverse works to fill and replace the Kima Canal. Some parts of the canal were covered 
with concrete; however, this did not disrupt water flow, and was undertaken exclusively 
for esthetical and business motives188. A promise by the new governor to completely fill 
and ban the use of the Kima Canal by 30 August 2015 had not been completely fulfilled 
as of mid-2016, and nothing indicated that it would be in a near future. In any case, this 
would constitute an only temporary solution. What is much needed is the construction of 
sewer systems for the entities that pollute the canal. Court decisions vindicating residents 
have not been implemented. Ultimately, nothing significant had been undertaken to solve 
the problem, despite Abul Rish residents’ mobilisation, a relative media coverage of their 
movement, and the support of several activists and organisations. Additionally, Khaled 
explained that getting rid of the Kima Canal was only one problem to solve. There is also 
the need for sewage networks, healthcare for people, and so on. For instance, activists 
have asked the authorities to provide them with an ambulant health unit in order to 
conduct blood tests and detect diseases at an early stage189. Equally important, progress 
on this issue has been delayed by the corruption of local officials.  
 
Even though a legal battle had been engaged against the Kima Canal for almost two 
decades by the HMLC, it is the personal initiative of Sabri and the support of a few key 
activists which triggered an escalation of the movement in 2011. Several activists residing 
in Abul Rish played an important role in mobilising their neighbours, using their own 
networks in Aswan and beyond to give the movement against the pollution of water a 
larger visibility. Activists have represented the families in negotiations with the 
authorities, mainly at the governorate level. Through their “popular committee”, they 
have regularly briefed the families during local meetings. Leaders of the contestation have 
widely used the media, social media and storytelling to mobilise support and publicise 
their cause. Numerous local and national newspaper articles relating the issue were 
published, while the leaders of the movement against the Kima Canal appeared in many 
TV reports190. Lawyers and multiple local networks supported the mobilisation, including 
family associations, Nubian networks, youth centres/sports clubs and mosques. The joint 
efforts of activists having very different backgrounds shows that for a cause of communal 
                                                          
188 Behind the army’s hotel in Aswan, not far from the Corniche and the train station, some bazar shops 
were even built above the canal and despite the persisting bad smell.  
189 Interview with Khaled, accountant, Aswan, April 2015. 
190 A few reports on the pollution of water were released on private TV channels such as ONTV between 
2011 and 2014, while youth and activist groups in Aswan posted numerous videos on YouTube and 
Facebook. 
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concern, solidarity goes far beyond political and class differences. The heterogeneous 
profiles of the participants in the protests against the pollution of drinking water resulting 
from the Kima Canal appeared as a strength to federate at the beginning of the movement. 
As pointed by Sabri, having elders attending the protests gave credibility and legitimacy 
to the contestation.  
 
However, in Abul Rish, the escalation also proved to be only momentary. When I first 
visited the village in February 2014, I could feel a certain despair. Protests were no longer 
on the agenda, partly due to the November 2013 protest law. Coordination meetings now 
took place less often, and no one seemed to know what to choose as a next step. Yet, 
members of the committee have remained active and determined to keep the pressure on 
the authorities, while lawyers continue to follow up on the related legal issues. However, 
partly but not exclusively due to the constraints of an increasingly repressive context, 
Abul Rish residents’ protest movement has not exceeded its local setting.  
 
In such a centralised political system as the Egyptian regime, social movements are rarely 
heard if they do not go out of their localities. In Abul Rish, we saw that local activists 
were active in representing and defending their neighbours. But as far as I am concerned, 
they have not attempted to link their fight to other similar cases elsewhere in Egypt. They 
have not organised protests in Cairo, for instance at the Cabinet headquarters, as other 
movements in search for a national visibility have done (the Nubians for example). 
Without credible brokers to link different but similar movements across Egypt or at least 
in a sole region, activists’ pressure will remain too weak to represent the kind of threat 
which usually forces the authorities to significantly respond.  
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Figure 2.3: View of the Kima Canal in the area of Aswan’s public hospital in April 2015. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Nile view in Aswan, where the Kima Canal and its filth flow into the river, April 2015. 
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4. The choice to protest: a political opportunity or a response to the state’s 
violation of well-established norms?  
 
Both examples of local protest movements show that mobilisation essentially takes place 
in an informal way, typically thanks to the initiatives taken by a few influential members 
of the community, who then convince their relatives, neighbours, friends or colleagues to 
join the cause. Therefore, contrary to common accounts of “spontaneous”, emotion-
driven protests by angry villagers, these cases show the key role often played by local 
leaders not only in mobilising others and deciding on the means to raise demands, but 
also in negotiating on behalf of protesters with the authorities. A number of “external”191 
activists have also either contributed to mobilisation, talks with governorate officials, 
following up on the legal dimensions or enhancing the media visibility of both cases. 
Abul Rish residents’ fight against polluted drinking water has been widely supported by 
a formal organisation, the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre. In Al-Hebeil, a leader of the 
April 6 Youth Movement residing in Luxor helped residents to publicise their cause in 
various ways. Local, ordinary networks, have also been crucial in supporting 
mobilisation. In particular, family associations have provided spaces for gatherings to 
inform residents and decide on the next moves. In Abul Rish, local youth centres and 
mosques also contributed to mobilisation. Other studies have insisted on this crucial 
contribution to (de)mobilisation of local informal networks192, on the links between 
formal organisations and informal networks193, while observing how mobilisation also 
creates new social ties194, as through the popular coordination committee formed by Abul 
Rish activists to follow up on the Kima Canal issue. Finally, the solidarity among 
residents has been vital to sustain both movements over time and despite a gradual return 
to repressive conditions after the July 2013 military coup. In Al-Hebeil, the young fathers 
who constitute the majority of the protagonists of the issue have not yielded to threats of 
repression, while their families have financially contributed to paying the rent for the 
football field. In Abul Rish, the participation of heterogeneous populations, including 
                                                          
191 By “external”, I do not necessarily mean from outside the village or the region, but outside the activist 
networks present in the area. I thus consider lawyers of the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre, a nationwide 
firm, as external actors that have contributed to the mobilisation of Abul Rish residents, even though a 
number of them reside in the area.  
192 See, for instance, the contribution of cafés to processes of (de)mobilisation of the youth in Gafsa in 
Amin Allal and Jasper Cooper, “‘Revolutionary’ trajectories in Tunisia. Processes of political radicalization 
2007-2011”, Revue française de science politique (English), 2012/5 Vol. 62, p. 55-77.  
193 See Roger V. Gould, “Multiple Networks and Mobilisation in the Paris Commune, 1871”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 56, N°6, pp. 716-729, December 1991. 
194 Ibid. 
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different socioeconomic statuses, generations, genders and political backgrounds, has 
shown how neighbourhood solidarity around a communal concern could transcend the 
divisions that traditionally impede wider mobilisations.  
 
In sum, the analysis of both cases has shed light on some of the mobilising agents, 
structures and mechanisms that are typically at play in local instances of mobilisation, 
especially those which denounce a deterioration or failure in public services. However, 
the question of the motivations behind ordinary residents’ decision to resort to public 
protests at specific times remains to be answered. Why did residents of Al-Hebeil and 
Abul Rish go to the streets for the first time after the 2011 uprising? I suggest that the 
memory of a strong, all-inclusive state framed as the state under President Nasser, as well 
as the related reminiscence of an old moral economy, have been important in encouraging 
ordinary people to mobilise. This is clearly illustrated in their invocation of rights to 
justify and legitimate their actions, including the most contentious ones. However, the 
timing was not innocently chosen by protest organisers and participants who, 
undoubtedly, perceived a historic opportunity to mobilise in the immediate aftermath of 
the 2011 uprising, as other Egyptians did (see chapter 1). I thus argue that, in addition to 
temporarily easing authoritarian conditions, the 2011 uprising has revived the memory of 
authorities able to deliver decent public services in exchange for popular support, 
subsequently encouraging ordinary citizens to claim their due.   
  
The question of timing has been widely discussed in social movement studies, including 
perceptions of political opportunities and threats195, in relation to repression and the 
characteristics of a given historical context. The moral economy approach generally 
focuses on subsistence and on commonly shared, acknowledged norms and values whose 
violation fosters mobilisation. It has been relatively popular since Thompson’s inspiring 
work emphasising the moral values guiding the mobilisation of the English populace in 
the eighteenth century (Thompson 1971). A number of scholars have used this approach 
to study popular mobilisations in the Middle East, and particularly labour and peasant 
protests (Lockman 1994, Posusney 1994, Aytekin 2012). Lockman defined collective 
actions corresponding to a moral economy view as responses to “violations of norms and 
                                                          
195 See Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, 
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 
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standards that the subalterns have become accustomed to and expect elites to maintain”196, 
which aim to restore the previous status quo. Posusney situated this process in the 
framework of a patron-client relationship between the state and a given population, in her 
case workers197. More recently, Aytekin defined Ottoman peasants’ moral economy as a 
“combination of subsistence ethics, a notion of what is just and what is not, and a tendency 
to valorise labour”198. 
 
Is there a crisis of moral economy behind the decisions to protest of Al-Hebeil and Abul 
Rish residents? Firstly, the presence of moral economy norms implies a kind of social 
contract in which the authorities constitute a full stakeholder. However, in both villages, 
residents depicted a state that has long been distant and neglectful. In addition, the 
pollution of drinking water resulting from the Kima Canal and the dispute over the land 
of the football field both go back to a long time before the 25 January “revolution”, while 
residents did not significantly mobilise until 2011. Therefore, if there were once norms 
that people were accustomed to, these were broken by the authorities a long time ago. In 
addition, even since the 2011 uprising, ordinary residents’ protests have been exceptional, 
which makes them distinct from the systematic reactions to violations or threats described 
by Thompson, Posusney and other scholars.  
 
Secondly, even though it is generally admitted that most ordinary people tend to mobilise 
when their immediate interests are at stake (Bayat 1997, 2010; Posusney 1994; Sadiki 
2000), protests in Abul Rish and Al-Hebeil were not only about mere subsistence or 
survival. In Al-Hebeil, there is no doubt about that since the absence of a football field 
cannot be seen as something threatening people’ subsistence. Yet, some residents have 
described their fight as a matter of life or death. In Abul Rish, where the provision of 
drinking water and health issues are involved, one could argue that there is, indeed, a 
matter of survival. However, people have long managed to survive by themselves. 
Beyond concrete and clearly formulated demands199, what is really at stake in both cases 
                                                          
196 Zachary Lockman, Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994). 
197 See Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Irrational Workers: The Moral Economy of Labor Protest in Egypt”, 
World Politics 46 (1), October 1993, 83-120.  
198 E. Attila Aytekin, “Peasant Protest in the Late Ottoman Empire: Moral Economy, Revolt, and the 
Tanzimat Reforms”, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IRSH), 57 (2012), pp. 191–227. 
199 Solutions were generally raised by protesters along with demands. In Al-Hebeil, residents considered 
the purchase of the disputed land by a ministry from another as the best way to formalise their use of the 
land. Different ways to fill the Kima Canal or divert water flow have been similarly suggested to the 
authorities by members of Abul Rish’s popular coordination committee.  
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largely exceeds subsistence concerns. The response lies in the protagonists’ language of 
rights. What all these people have definitely in common is their quest for a recognition of 
their rights. Youssef said he was “asking for a public service for everyone”200. This 
mention of a general interest is meant to oppose individual or sectorial interests such as 
workers’ demands, often referred to as factional or fa’awiyya201. It also aims to present a 
claim supposed to be unquestionable in terms of legitimacy. It ultimately refers to a right, 
in this case the right to decent public services. 
 
Individual and collective rights infer the presence of an ultimate authority accountable for 
their protection. Thus, in both cases, ordinary people have been demanding the return of 
a largely absent state to, firstly, recognise their rights and, secondly, protect them. 
Because they are all related to a failure in a public service, demands are directed to the 
state in general, and not only to its local representatives. Al-Hebeil and Abul Rish 
residents’ protests demanded the return of a powerful state giving them their legitimate 
rights back. Even though moral values are not absent from this claim, more important are 
the various issues of political economy behind the protests against deteriorating public 
services. These include national choices of economic development and plans that have 
tended to prioritise some places and some groups, while neglecting or ignoring others. In 
both cases, residents have questioned state policies that have resulted in their 
marginalisation from the rest of Egypt, in the neglect of their regions. The deterioration 
of public services is seen as a consequence of this neglect. This is the reason why people 
raise their demands to the state, whom they consider as both the cause and the solution to 
these failures. In other words, while the state is responsible for the deterioration of the 
services it is supposed to provide, it is responsible for the re-establishment of citizens’ 
equal right to decent public services.  
 
However, the demand for state accountability presents an apparent paradox. The state’s 
persisting failure to deliver decent services has entailed a decline of its credibility as a 
provider. Some residents have indeed expressed a mistrust, especially in politicians and 
officials’ ability to solve their problems, or at least engage in dialogue and take significant 
steps. Corruption and bureaucracy were widely denounced as failures in the state system. 
                                                          
200 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
201 The term has been widely used since February 2011, especially by the Egyptian army and its supporters, 
to discredit labour protests, qualified as disturbances of the “wheel of production” and the country’s stability 
by a minority seeking specific, not collective interests. 
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In particular, local officials were somehow perceived as “incompetent and 
unresponsive”202 to people’s needs. Additionally, in both cases, people decided to 
organise protests after formal attempts to communicate their demands had all failed. In 
consequence, a moral economy approach is not sufficient to explain these cases, because 
there is no system of exchange of mutual duties in a relationship of trust between people 
and the state. While the memory of a past moral economy may be driving protests, 
ordinary citizens have been predominately reclaiming the restoration of the state’s basic 
mission of protection of their rights through the provision of adequate public services. 
Where does this claim come from?  Why has it apparently resurfaced after the 2011 
uprising?  
 
In the historical memories of most Upper Egyptians, even among the youngest, there was 
once in Egypt a powerful state serving people’s needs. According to several respondents, 
the last emanation of this state was under the rule of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Indeed, particularly in Al-Hebeil, the leaders of the contestation referred to the 
deteriorating situation of Upper Egypt since the end of President Nasser’s era203. Under 
Nasser, even in Upper Egypt, the state used to carry on its duties, not only delivering 
services, but also caring about the poor and the marginalised, and favouring social 
mobility. Many of the people I met in Upper Egypt expressed nostalgia for an idealised 
Nasser era (see chapters 1 and 5), during which the state supposedly used to carry on its 
duties, including in the southern provinces. According to this vision, not only did the state 
deliver decent services, but it also cared about the poor. A strong and fair state then 
sought, instead of marginalising the poorest segments of the population, to educate them 
and favour social mobility. This nostalgia sometimes coincided with a support for Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi, then often seen as a patriot exercising his duty who would take care of the 
poor. The 25 January “revolution”, which emphasised the ideals of equality and social 
justice, served as a click reminding many citizens of the state’s duties towards them. 
While many informants claimed they had no great expectations from the authorities 
before the 2011 uprising, they said the “revolution” had made them hope for a better 
future that would be driven by political change: 
 
                                                          
202 Sinwell, Kirshner, Khumalo, Manda, Pfaffe, Phokela and Runciman, “Service delivery protests. 
Findings from quick response research on four ‘hotspots’ – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot”. 
203 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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 “Do you know the only thing that makes me sad? I was born in corruption. I found 
it like that. But a light came. I looked at my time and found achievement, so I was 
happy.”204 
 
The “light” that Youssef refers to is the hope generated by the “revolution”. The sadness 
he expresses comes from the removal of this hope, with the state becoming again 
authoritarian and corrupt. While the uprising made popular expectations increase, it also 
generated the hope for a return of a powerful, fair and all-inclusive state giving to all its 
citizens the same access to public services and life opportunities. Combined with the 
perception of a more suitable political environment, it is this memory of a strong state 
revived by the 2011 uprising which encouraged ordinary people to mobilise. The use of 
a moral economy approach has thus helped to uncover some of the moral motivations and 
justifications behind the protests against deteriorating public services that have erupted 
since 2011 in Al-Hebeil and Abul Rish, as elsewhere in Egypt.  
 
Since there is no relationship based on an absolute trust between people and the 
authorities, and the systematic endorsement of mutual rights and duties, we cannot strictly 
say that there is a moral economy informing these popular mobilisations, simply because 
the state has been largely unable to perform what residents would expect as its duties, 
namely the equal provision of decent public services to all citizens. However, I have tried 
to establish that what was really at the core of people’s demands was the recognition of 
their citizenship and its associated rights. While reclaiming their belonging to the polity, 
to the sha‛b, people demanded the return of the state. Using a language of rights and 
legitimacy, people have expressed a desire, a dream, a hope for a strong state carrying its 
mission. Since this desire is mainly framed in well-known, popular historiography of the 
Nasser era, it could be referring to an idealised “moral polity” similar to the one Roberts 
detected in the 1988 riots in Algeria205. The 2011 uprising awakened these ideals, while 
the less authoritarian political conditions that prevailed in its aftermath made people 
perceive an unprecedented opportunity to mobilise.  
 
 
                                                          
204 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015.  
205 See Hugh Roberts, “Moral Economy or Moral Polity? The Political Anthropology of Algerian Riots”, 
Crisis States Programme, Working Papers Series No. 1, DESTIN, London: London School of Economics, 
2002. 
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5. Conclusion: a latent contestation in marginalised spaces 
 
This analysis of small protest movements against deteriorating public services in Al-
Hebeil and Abul Rish sheds light on the way local coordination is achieved. The citizens 
I met in both villages have mobilised in accordance with two main things. Firstly, they 
have reacted to opportunities and threats, adapting the forms of their mobilisation to 
changing contexts. Secondly, their mobilisations have been shaped by the local social and 
cultural settings where they erupted. I have argued that three interacting parameters 
typically played an essential role in the successful mobilisation of ordinary people: the 
presence of local leaders, the availability of area support networks, and a communal 
solidarity transcending traditional divisions. In addition, people were encouraged to stage 
protests by the favourable and relative openness of the political context after the 2011 
uprising, as well as the hope for a return of an idealised state reintegrating all its citizens 
and carrying its traditional duties. Not only has the 25 January “revolution” encouraged 
many ordinary people to resort to protests in the hope to solve persisting problems, but it 
has also made them reclaim their rights as citizens. Denouncing the state’s deficient 
presence in their region, Upper Egyptians have, including through demanding a better 
provision of public services, called for the central political power to perform its traditional 
duties of protection and (re)distribution. This is partly the legacy of the 25 January 
“revolution”.  
   
The ideals of justice and equality expressed by many ordinary people who mobilised for 
decent public services in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising have persisted. However, the 
then opportunity to attempt to make them triumph has now largely disappeared. This has 
led most ordinary people in Al-Hebeil and Abul Rish demobilise, while leading activists 
have been forced to adapt their strategies to the renewed repressive context. When I first 
visited Abul Rish and Al-Hebeil, in January and April 2014 respectively, residents had 
largely stopped organising demonstrations to voice their demands. While some progress 
had been made in both cases, movements had essentially secured promises that still need 
to be delivered on. Residents justified their demobilisation either by a discouragement 
resulting from the failure to achieve significant results, the increased repression now 
supported by a November 2013 law criminalising protests, or a demand for stability206 
                                                          
206 Using the language of the official propaganda mainly spread by TV channels, many ordinary people 
now saw protests as destabilising the economy and the security of the state (see chapter 3).  
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ahead of decisive presidential elections expected to take place in May 2014. Indeed, there 
was then a large hope to see Abdel Fattah al-Sisi initiate a new era during which the 
concerns of the ordinary would be finally taken into account, which seemed to justify 
people’s patience. As for the more sceptical, they estimated that nothing significant would 
be decided before the elections, and that they consequently had to wait. Some people also 
sought to differentiate their mobilisations from the then ongoing protests, deemed violent, 
of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various intimidations were also mentioned 
by interviewees, including attempts by governorate officials to dissuade them from 
reorganising public protests.  
 
When I returned to Al-Hebeil and Aswan in spring 2015, I was confirmed that the leaders 
of both protest movements had not totally given up. They were now resorting to 
apparently less transgressive or less contentious forms of mobilisation, namely avoiding 
street protests and prioritising discrete initiatives. They were displaying a certain degree 
of self-restraint or “self-limitation” (Vairel 2015) in their choices of tactics and collective 
actions, now ranging from diverse administrative and legal steps, as well as actions to 
increase the visibility of their causes, including through media coverage207 and online 
campaigning on social media.  
 
Ultimately, in Abul Rish and Al-Hebeil, many residents have accused the authorities of 
ignoring the poorest, the weakest, the youngest, denouncing their marginalisation and 
Upper Egypt’s isolation. In the long term, issues such as the football field and the Kima 
Canal may further fuel popular discontent. This is how Youssef imagines it:  
 
“We entered the bottle, and we were shut inside. One day, we’ll break it and 
escape. And on that day, no one will be able to stop us, because we’re suffocating in 
it…Either we obtain what we want, or we will die”.208 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
207 I have already mentioned, for instance, that Al-Hebeil residents had asked me to publish their story. 
208 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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Chapter 3: When the tide turns: state strategies of containment and 
the marginalisation of protests in favour of stability 
 
1. Introduction: renewed repression and its implications for mobilisation  
 
In chapters 1 and 2, we saw that Egyptians, including in the remote and rural regions of 
Upper Egypt, have never totally stopped mobilising for a wide range of issues. In 
particular, the unprecedented opening of the political climate that followed the 2011 
uprising encouraged many ordinary people to voice old and new grievances, whether 
political, social or economic in nature. Chapter 2 analysed two examples of local protests 
against deteriorating public services that erupted in the favourable context of the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprising. Popular mobilisations culminated with the mass protests 
that enabled the army to oust the first ever-elected civilian president in July 2013. Since 
the aftermath of the coup, an overwhelming popular desire for stability combined with 
repressive steps taken by supporters of the “counter-revolution” (Abdelrahman 2015) 
have caused a mass demobilisation and discouraged most people still having ambitions 
to protest. The “revolutionary” enthusiasm that had pushed many ordinary people to 
engage in contentious politics between February 2011 and June 2013 was essentially 
gone. While demobilisation dominated, remaining forms of activism have tended to be 
less transgressive and/or more discrete since favourable conditions for protests had 
vanished. In other words, since President Muhammad Morsi’s ouster in July 2013, 
ordinary citizens have either demobilised or embarked on less disruptive or 
confrontational collective actions.  
 
Dissent has persisted through essentially discrete or less transgressive actions. This is 
reflected by residents of Abul Rish and Al-Hebeil’s abstention from staging protests since 
July 2013 while insisting on their demands in other ways. A number of larger protest 
movements also persevered, particularly the anti-coup movement led by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, “revolutionaries” and workers, but failed to attract support beyond their 
traditional base (see chapter 6). Additionally, a multitude of small socioeconomic protests 
has subsisted. In June 2016, a new water crisis erupted across Egypt, leading ordinary 
people to stage protests and block roads and highways in the provinces of Aswan, Luxor, 
Qena, North Sinai, Daqahliya, Beheira and New Valley. These examples of protests 
persisting despite unfavourable conditions once again confirm that fierce repression does 
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not fully suppress dissent. More importantly, repression fails to explain the discontinuous, 
dispersed and ephemeral nature of a number of popular mobilisations, especially local 
socioeconomic protests related to structural deficiencies which are present across Egypt. 
Even between 2011 and 2013 when conditions were less repressive, protests remained 
very occasional, while people usually displayed a preference for negotiations within the 
“legal” framework and for non-transgressive forms of contention. 
  
Drinking and irrigation water shortages are widespread in nearly all Egyptian provinces, 
especially in rural areas, due to poor infrastructure. Water pollution poisoning villagers 
is not uncommon in the Egyptian countryside, where sewage systems are generally 
obsolete or non-existent. Recurring electricity cuts can also be traced back to a severe 
energy crisis caused by shortages of fuel necessary to aliment power stations, the latter 
also needing to be upgraded. Yet, people have protested against these failures locally, 
without seeking the association of other populations suffering from similar dysfunctions 
in the state’s provision of infrastructural services. Local protests such as those that recur 
every summer against water shortages and electricity cuts have remained occasional and 
short-lived. They have often been followed by their protagonists’ demobilisation even 
when, frequently, they do not succeed in securing significant guarantees from the 
authorities. In addition, these protests have remained dispersed despite the existence of 
similar grievances elsewhere in the country, which generally point to structural problems 
necessitating broader reforms at the national level, and not only pragmatic measures at 
the local level. Chapter 2 showed that movements against polluted drinking water and to 
demand a football field never expanded from their original space. Despite their often-
structural roots, why have mobilisations such as those erupting on a regular basis against 
deteriorating public services remained discontinuous, dispersed and ephemeral? What is 
the contribution of state strategies in locally containing such popular mobilisations? 
 
In this chapter, I explore state strategies aiming at limiting popular mobilisations and 
containing protests. This is essential before turning to other potential factors preventing 
ordinary people’s contentious politics from expanding. These may include the 
vicissitudes of leadership, which I explore in chapter 4, sociocultural constraints as 
suggested in chapter 5, and the low attractiveness of the currently available nationwide 
protest movements, which I attempt to explain in chapter 6. Bearing in mind that the level 
and forms of mobilisation are closely related to, and evolve with, the characteristics of 
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the historical context in which contention takes place, I assess in this chapter state 
strategies’ efficiency in avoiding, restraining and ending popular mobilisations since July 
2013 in Egypt. The chapter argues that media tactics of manipulation of emotions and 
beliefs, as well as mechanisms of local co-optation209, massively contribute to avoiding 
or containing protests, or to completely demobilising ordinary people, in addition to the 
direct repression of protests and opponents. Indeed, an anti-protest propaganda and 
conspiracy theories have undermined many political activists’ reputations, and therefore 
their ability to mobilise. At the same time, they have contributed to convincing people 
that protests were the problem behind Egypt’s persisting instability, and definitely not the 
solution. This has encouraged many people to marginalise the “revolution” and other 
protest campaigns in favour of stability. Local logics of patronage, including governorate 
officials and pro-government activists offering services or mediation, as well as the co-
optation of local leaders, have similarly impeded many mobilisations to grow. 
 
In a first section I review the range of options available to the state to demobilise the 
population and limit mobilisations, including open moves such as the direct repression of 
protesters and opponents, and subtler strategies aiming at delegitimising and co-optating 
current and potential opponents. I also discuss the forms of activism that have persisted 
despite these repressive state strategies. In a second section, I attempt to interpret Upper 
Egyptians’ non-mobilisation, demobilisation or weaker mobilisation in interaction with 
the implemented state strategies of containment. I particularly emphasise the deterrent 
role of the official propaganda and conspiracy theories mainly spread by television, which 
have helped frame the Muslim Brotherhood and the “revolution” as the enemies of the 
new regime, and define protests as threatening Egypt’ stability. I also suggest the 
efficiency of co-optation strategies through showing how the intervention of local pro-
government political activists has successfully contained a strike by garbage collectors in 
Kom Ombo, Aswan province. In the third section, the case study of a low-intensity 
mobilisation against drinking water shortages in Nagaa Abdel Qader, a village in Qena 
province, illustrates the effectiveness of some of these state strategies of containment. I 
attempt to explain the reticence of village elders to directly confront the authorities, 
                                                          
209 Joshua Stacher defines co-optation as “a mechanism that allows for a government to extend power and 
garner support within society”, “a process of incorporating, mobilizing, and sometimes, depending on the 
context, neutralizing individuals in the state’s structural and institutional framework”, “within a system of 
informal patron-client and corporatist relationships”. Joshua Stacher, “Adapting authoritarianism: 
institutions and co-optation in Egypt and Syria”, PhD Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 2007. 
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pointing at their apparent co-optation and self-restraint in adaptation to the repressive 
context. 
 
2. Non-mobilisation, demobilisation, or discontinuous mobilisation?   
 
2.1. State strategies to limit mobilisation and demobilise the majority: 
repressing, delegitimising, co-opting 
 
The study of demobilisation processes has been rather neglected by researchers of 
contentious politics, generally more interested in collective actors and individuals’ 
resources and motivations for participation, than in their gradual or brutal retreat. There 
is no strict consensus on the term “demobilisation” itself, which may encompass distinct 
realities. These range from the simple and sudden withdrawal of individuals or groups 
from a contentious episode, the end of a mobilisation campaign that has either succeeded 
or failed210, to a more or less long process of collective or individual disengagement with 
people returning to the common occupations of everyday life. For Charles Tilly, 
demobilisation designates the return to passivity of individuals that used to actively 
participate in public life211. Olivier Fillieule distinguishes “demobilisation”, referring to 
a collective phenomenon, from “disengagement”, an individual decision observed at the 
micro level (Fillieule 2015).  
 
More importantly, students of contentious politics have rarely addressed the case of 
discontinuous activism, of these occasional participants in episodes of contention who 
remain demobilised most of the time. As pointed by Fillieule, “apart from a few 
exceptions, research has mainly dealt with committed activists, without exploring not-so-
committed participants”212. Demobilisation, a process supposed to follow a previous state 
of mobilisation, seems to be a term a little excessive to qualify the withdrawal from 
participation of occasional activists. Indeed, these people may have never really 
mobilised in the first place, at least if we understand mobilisation as a sustained 
participation supported by the full adherence to a cause. On the contrary, we are dealing 
                                                          
210 “Demobilization may relate less to a specific sector than to the slow collapse of a mobilization campaign, 
as a result of its success or, conversely, its failure”. Olivier Fillieule, “Demobilization and disengagement 
in a life course perspective”, chapter in Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
of Social Movements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, November 2015). 
211 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 54. 
212 Olivier Fillieule, “Demobilization and disengagement in a life course perspective”. 
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here with those people who may attend a number of protests or even a unique one, often 
for a specific demand, and not necessarily for a more elaborate or long-term project. For 
these people, mobilisation remains an exception motivated by very specific reasons and 
constrained by a wide range of characteristics of the political, social, economic and 
cultural environment, as I intend to establish throughout the coming chapters. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that people are passive and/or insensitive to changes 
occurring in their environment. It only means that they are less active, or differently 
active, that they do not assess transgressive contention as an appropriate or worthwhile 
way to act, or that they are simply waiting for what they perceived as a success of previous 
episodes of contention to materialise. 
 
In Egypt, the 2011 uprising that removed President Mubarak after 30 years in power was 
seen and analysed by many researchers as the beginning of a long revolutionary process. 
According to the same observers, this process underwent its first setback with the 3 July 
2013 military coup that overthrew President Morsi only one year after his election. But 
what about the large numbers of Egyptians who supported President Morsi’s removal? 
Why has a majority apparently turned away from the changes initiated in 2011? 
Ethnography proved essential to understand this apparent turnaround because it 
highlighted ordinary citizens’ concerns, hopes and perceptions of possibilities in relation 
to a constantly changing context. While reasons to mobilise have never lacked in Egypt 
since July 2013, my field research in the provinces of southern Upper Egypt shed light 
on two main factors maintaining a majority of ordinary people in a non-mobilised, 
demobilised or less mobilised condition: the repressive context and the weariness towards 
instability.  
 
Firstly, the repressive context has discouraged most initiatives to organise or get involved 
in contentious politics. Repression, understood as “state or private action meant to 
prevent, control, or constrain noninstitutional, collective action (e.g., protest), including 
its initiation”213, cannot be restricted to security forces’ actions and may take multiple 
forms (Duboc 2012). In Egypt, the post-July 2013 immediate context was characterised 
by a spectacular, unbounded repression of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, quickly 
followed by attempts to silence all political opponents and government critics, now 
                                                          
213 Jennifer Earl, “Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control”, Annual Review of 
Sociology, April 2011. 
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labelled terrorists and/or foreign agents seeking to destabilise the state. Repression has 
involved multiple strategies, open or subtle, implemented by supporters of the new 
regime. These have included the use of violence to crush protests; the mass detention of 
protesters and political opponents; the deployment of a legislative arsenal to justify and 
cover human rights violations; the harassment of journalists and all real or potential critics 
of the government; the co-optation of many public figures in the media, judiciary, and 
civil society sectors, as well as local community leaders and activists; the co-optation of 
ordinary citizen through glorifying their patriotism; the mobilisation of national and 
private media to promote the regime’s agenda, as well as spread conspiracy theories 
accusing political opponents of seeking to destabilise Egypt; the deconstruction of the 25 
January uprising’s legitimacy; and the blame on protests for the persisting instability. 
These strategies have all contributed to gradually re-installing a harsh authoritarianism, 
with fears and suspicions retaking top position among ordinary people. Occasional 
participants in contentious episodes, often mobilised in essentially networked movements 
for the sake of short-term goals and/or local interests, are particularly vulnerable to these 
repressive strategies, precisely because their commitment tends to be only partial and 
short-sighted. Even people who were not involved in direct contentious activities could 
be arrested. A Writers’ Union member, Mahmud once mentioned the Security State (Amn 
al-dawla) in a poem, which has earned him to spend 20 days in custody on suspicion of 
being a MB member. Yet, Mahmud denied this and claimed he had never participated in 
a protest or joined a party214.  
 
Secondly, most respondents expressed a deep fatigue towards the instability prevailing in 
the country since the 2011 uprising. Far from the romantic accounts of and hopes 
generated by the 25 January “revolution”, most ordinary people have suffered from its 
attributed negative consequences, and mainly from an aggravating economic crisis and 
the accelerating deterioration of public services resulting from the political instability. 
The latter has been reflected at the local level by a certain paralysis of decision-making. 
In the remote regions of southern Upper Egypt, political instability and increasing 
insecurity have led to a desertion of tourists, while ordinary people have been severely 
hit by shortages of fuel, electricity and water, as well as record inflation rates. In 2013-
2014, some people saw in Abdel Fattah al-Sisi a new Nasser, a saviour, a providential 
man able to care about the poor and impose social justice and the other goals of the 
                                                          
214 Interview with Mahmud, employee at Al-Hebeil’s only youth centre, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
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“revolution”. Many others were simply hoping that his accession to power would restore 
stability and security, even if this would occur at the expense of the “revolution”.  
 
               
 Figure 3.1: Poster of al-Sisi saying “Egypt is the mother of the world and will be like the world” 
     
 
Figure 3.2: Poster displaying Abdel Fattah al-Sisi next to a picture of former President Nasser 
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2.2. Mobilising otherwise: forms of activism in time of intensified repression 
 
“The return to ‘normalcy’ implies for some people a ceasing of the protest, and for others, 
an even stronger form of political radicalisation”215. The first has characterised the 
attitude of a majority of Egyptians since July 2013 due to the above-described conditions 
and state strategies of containment further analysed in the following section. Further 
radicalisation has been the situation of many Muslim Brotherhood supporters. However, 
there is a middle-way adopted by some activists, especially occasional, discontinuous 
ordinary protesters. The absence or scarcity of protests does not necessarily mean that 
everyone has become passive or inactive, especially when key grievances remain. On the 
one hand, some occasional participants in protests (and not protest organisers) said they 
had not attended a protest in recent times simply because the “offer” was low or 
inexistent, especially regarding the issues that matter to them. For example, a young man 
committed to the Nubian cause said there were no more protests organised by Nubians216. 
On the other hand, many people have sought to continue to campaign for their cause 
within certain limits thought to be tolerated by the repressive, authoritarian authorities. 
Between contained and transgressive forms of contentious politics as defined in 
Dynamics of Contention217, this less confrontational activism keen on respecting the legal 
authoritarian framework while bearing some degree of provocation has been called 
“boundary-spanning contention” (O’Brien 2003). Encompassing “acts located near the 
boundary between official, prescribed politics and politics by other means”218, it includes 
repertoires of contention that cautiously avoid transgressions. The latter are those 
practices which may lead to open confrontations with the authorities. At the same time, 
boundary-spanning contention is not necessarily contained since it can have some 
visibility, last over time, and obtain concessions from the authorities, who therefore 
recognise that the movement in question could become a threat if it was left to escalate. 
                                                          
215 Amin Allal and Jasper Cooper, “‘Revolutionary’ trajectories in Tunisia. Processes of political 
radicalization 2007-2011”, Revue française de science politique (English), 2012/5 Vol. 62, p. 55-77.  
216 Interview with Amir, 26, school teacher, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
217 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly distinguish two variants of contention. Contained contention encompasses 
“those cases of contention in which all parties are previously established actors employing well established 
means of claim making”, which implies that “all parties to the conflict were previously established as 
constituted political actors”. Transgressive contention takes place when “at least some parties to the conflict 
are newly self-identified political actors” and/or “at least some parties employ innovative collective action”. 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
218 Kevin J. O’Brien, “Neither Transgressive Nor Contained: Boundary Spanning Contention in China”, 
Mobilization, vol. 8, n°1, 2003, p. 51-64. 
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As noticed by John Chalcraft, “there is no reason to suppose that both transgressive and 
contained forms of mobilisation – while analytically separable – do not co-exist, often 
but not always in tension, in a given movement”219.  
 
In Egypt’s post-coup context, many people have kept raising grievances while refraining 
from organising street protests, the ultimate transgression. Instead, they have resorted to 
less contentious tools falling into the boundary-spanning contention category. Their 
behaviour has been characterised by “self-limitation” (Vairel 2015), a repertoire of 
collective action allowing “contentious actors to maintain their activist practices without 
paying a heavy price”220, within certain limits tolerated by the authorities. In post-coup 
Egypt, self-limitation means carefully avoiding transgressive forms of mobilisation such 
as public protests at the governorate building, criticising the governor and central 
authorities, suggesting accusations of corruption, amongst other tactics that were more 
commonly used between 2011 and 2013 when the context was perceived as more 
permissive. The idea is that people tend to act within the framework of the institutions 
without questioning them, within the boundaries of what they perceive as feasible and 
acceptable by the authorities, and without risking a confrontation with the latter. Actions 
seem to have varied in accordance with actors’ perceptions of the tolerable, since options 
are largely conditioned by their anticipation of the authorities’ reaction (O’Brien 2003, 
Vairel 2015). Self-limited or self-restrained contention may include a myriad of 
possibilities. It has involved the continuation of mobilisation through less loud means, 
including legal or administrative steps and strategies to gain visibility, for example 
through media coverage. I mentioned in chapter 2 a number of such tactics used by 
protesters in Al-Hebeil and Abul Rish. The use of social media, mainly Facebook, has 
become for more or less committed Egyptian activists, especially the youth, a very 
popular tool to campaign for a wide range of issues (denouncing cases of corruption for 
example), or just vent their frustrations. In particular, supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as well as “revolutionaries”, have been increasingly left with no other 
platform than online social media to voice their opposition and campaign against the new 
regime as street politics were no longer tolerated. In an authoritarian environment, this 
                                                          
219 John Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). 
220 Frédéric Vairel, “How Self-Limiting Mobilizations Work:  Morocco to the Bedside of Social Movement 
Studies?”, Paper presented at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Middle East Centre 
Seminar, 20 May 2015. 
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sort of “flash activism is harder for authorities to control and less costly for protesters 
than street protests”221, and “has increasingly allowed social movement participation 
outside of organisations”222. 
 
Boundary-spanning contention and self-limitation usually hide a certain dose of self-
censorship. In Egypt, even when there was more freedom of speech between February 
2011 and June 2013, the army managed to preserve its position, standing as a red line for 
a majority of Egyptians who avoided to directly criticise the institution. Even when anti-
military rule protests erupted in 2011, most people were careful to differentiate between 
the army as an institution seen as the ultimate foundation of the Egyptian state, and its 
leaders ruling the country, mainly the members of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF). Despite reported exactions, the army has always managed to maintain its 
popularity and its image as last bulwark against chaos. Many of my respondents said they 
loved the army, praising its patriotism, arguing that it had never failed the Egyptian 
people. Many people saw no alternative to a strong military rule since Egyptians did not 
behave and were supposedly unable to respect civilian rulers. 
 
Eventually, some people believed in playing by the rules. For instance, residents of Aniba, 
a village in Nasr al-Nuba, Aswan governorate, organised in November 2013 a protest to 
demand the release of Maha, a 19-year-old science student from the village who was 
among a group of girls arrested in a pro-MB demonstration in Alexandria and quickly 
sentenced to 11 years in prison. Ramadan, a 53-year-old social worker from the village, 
requested from the police station a permit to stage this protest, in accordance with the 
requirements of the new protest law. But despite obtaining this authorisation, Ramadan 
explained that not everyone participated. Some people were still afraid, while others, 
mainly youth, disagreed with the fact that organisers had requested an authorisation from 
the police and did not recognise the protest law223. In addition, the authorities had ordered 
the protest to take place on a Sunday, a working day, which limited the attendance of 
employees and students224.  
 
                                                          
221 Jennifer Earl, Jayson Hunt, R. Kelly Garrett, and Aysenur Dal, “New Technologies and Social 
Movements”, chapter in Della Porta and Diani, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Interview with Ramadan, 53, social worker, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
224 Ibid. 
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According to my research, most instances of boundary-spanning contention are easily 
explained and determined by their protagonists’ fear of repression. However, in a number 
of situations, fear is not necessarily the main or the only motivation for avoiding to 
confront the authorities. People may perceive that they have a better interest in 
maintaining a good relationship with local officials, as suggested by the below example 
of a limited contestation against drinking water shortages in Nagaa Abdel Qader. The 
latter indeed shows that, whether co-opted or sincerely loyal to the authorities, elders of 
the village have declined to radically confront officials through louder public protests. 
For now, I aim to understand why a majority of ordinary Upper Egyptians have 
demobilised since July 2013, while others have continued to mobilise in restricted ways. 
 
3. Interpreting Upper Egyptians’ large demobilisation or limited mobilisation  
 
3.1. Media propaganda and conspiracy theories: framing the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the “revolution” as the enemies  
 
In preparation for my first trip to Aswan, I first tried to get in touch with local activists. 
To this end, I wrote to the administrators of Facebook pages containing references to the 
“revolution”, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Tamarrod campaign (see chapter 6), and 
the main political parties present in the region. This is the reply of the administrator of a 
page supporting Tamarrod (but apparently, not the official page of the campaign in 
Aswan, though the page is called “Tamarrod campaign in Aswan”), dated 25 December 
2013: 
 
 “I would like your excellency to know that Tamarrod Aswan and every free 
Egyptian’s view on research about Egyptian internal affairs in the interest of foreign 
entities and organisations at this time of the nation’s age is intelligence work that is hostile 
and does not carry anything good at all… Egyptian affairs and Egyptians’ problems are 
non-tradable issues or cannot be made a research topic or a scientific thesis, as you cannot 
tell citizens in Egypt to write history so that you can study it… No research of unknown 
identity, source and order is sane… You asked for advice… I advise you to change your 
research topic and research something else that would be the widening size of the political 
crime and the extent of the United States’ support to terrorism in the world… It is still 
your specialisation… What do you think? Or such research works don’t bring money?” 
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When I read this note, I had been in Cairo for two weeks, busy making contacts and 
deciding on regions to visit for my research. This was also my first visit since the military 
coup that ousted President Morsi in July of the same year. Even though I had been 
following events on a daily basis, I had not anticipated that the atmosphere had changed 
to such extent. It took me some time to really comprehend this new context, and even 
more time to deal with it, first as a returning Egyptian, and second as a research 
apprentice. My first shock was to hear how happy people were about the violent 
repression of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Even among some of my relatives, I could 
hear things like “they deserve it”, “they had it coming”. My second shock was television. 
While all channels were openly campaigning for the “yes” to the new constitution, they 
glorified Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, demonised the Muslim Brotherhood, denounced the 25 
January “revolution” as a foreign conspiracy, in short participated in a conventional 
propaganda supporting the new authorities. Therefore, I was not really surprised by the 
suspicion expressed in this Tamarrod supporter’s message, although it was a little strange 
to have the confirmation that some people really viewed research in social sciences as a 
form of espionage. I first sought to reassure this person about my intentions and try to 
understand this suspicion. On 12 January 2014, he wrote back: 
 
 “The crimes of the Third World are also known so why repeat researching them? 
Don’t you see the limitation of scientific research to certain countries and from certain 
countries, and that research works usually end in the drawers of politicians in these (same) 
countries… It is a duty to respect scientific research having impact on the internal affairs 
and offered to responsible entities within the country to reform and repair the problems 
that can be contained… There is a question I hope can be answered… If these research 
works go to other countries, what is the promise and what is the benefit for Egypt of your 
scientific research?” 
 
Despite being sceptical, he gave me his name and phone number, saying I was welcome 
in Aswan. I had probably amused him or stimulated his curiosity. He then asked about 
my real name and the name of my family in Aswan, probably in a way to test me. I made 
a few jokes to relax him, like “you still think I am a Mossad spy”, and so on. After ending 
this conversation, I decided I would not contact him once in Aswan. He could have been 
some kind of security informant after all. If I bumped into him in Aswan, I was never 
aware of it. I chose to relate this anecdote because it gives an example of the prevalent 
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discourse at the time of my presence in the field, and of the way foreign researchers were 
increasingly depicted. Regardless of his identity, my interlocutor was obviously well 
educated, curious and aware of the ongoing developments in Egypt. As many of his 
compatriots, he probably reads and watches the news on a regular basis. He displayed a 
suspicion regarding the possible financial gains that my research would generate. 
Through mentioning alleged US support for terrorism, he probably meant the so-called 
US backing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was then demonised and portrayed as a 
terrorist organisation receiving foreign support. While trying to convince me that my 
research would not benefit Egypt since it would go to foreign entities, he may have 
borrowed the assimilation of academic research to intelligence collection from the then 
dominant narrative.  
 
This narrative full of conspiracy theories was mainly spread by television, both public 
and private. At that time, Amani al-Khayyat used to present a programme called “Sabah” 
every morning of the working week on Naguib Sawiris’ ONTV channel. For example, 
one morning, I saw on this programme a so-called expert accusing members of the Beirut-
based Carnegie Middle East Centre, including the Egyptian academic and activist Amr 
Hamzawy and the American researcher Michelle Dunne, of being foreign agents working 
for the US, Israel and/or the Muslim Brotherhood. Another TV programme specialised 
on conspiracy theories (which I would later hear about in my interviews) that was popular 
at the time was called the “Black Box” (al-ṣandūq al-iswid). Broadcasted on al-Kahera 
wal nas private TV channel, it was presented by Abdel Rahim Ali, now a pro-government 
member of parliament. Its official purpose was to unveil the alleged crimes of many 
opposition figures, whose private telephone conversations (the famous leaks or tasrībat, 
whose provenance remains a mystery since Abdel Rahim Ali has always refused to 
divulge it) were aired and used in an attempt to make them appear as actors in a so-called 
conspiracy to destabilise Egypt. Many of my respondents also said they watched on a 
regular basis the former programme of famous conspiracy theorist and vocal opponent to 
the 25 January “revolution” Tawfiq Okasha on al-Faraeen TV channel.  
 
Formal interviews and informal conversations with many Egyptians made me realise the 
resonance of these kinds of programmes among the general public. Even though their 
impact is hard to measure, they unquestionably contributed, as I will show, to the 
deterioration in public opinion of the image of the 25 January “revolution” and its main 
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protagonists, including members of the April 6 Youth Movement and opposition figures 
such as Muhammad al-Baradei, Ayman Nour and many others. From a retrospective point 
of view, this narrative contributed to justifying the repression, arrest, “forced 
disappearance”225, prosecution or killing of thousands of alleged opponents, human rights 
activists, journalists, researchers, without anyone really criticising it apart from some 
brave NGOs and human rights groups. Charges were all related to the destabilisation of 
the regime and “threatening national security”, ranging from inciting or participating in 
protests, spreading false news, harming the “wheel of production”, and so on. At the same 
time, the propaganda of the “counter-revolution” went hand in hand with the 
implementation of an anti-opposition legislation. This has included the November 2013 
protest law, the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood and all its affiliated organisations, the 
April 6 Youth Movement and the Ultras Ahlawy football fan club, and the labelling of 
the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group. Finally, in 2015, an anti-terrorism law was 
amended to widen the definition of terrorism, now including striking workers and anyone 
reporting on issues bothering the regime. This atmosphere made many people fearful to 
talk about their own political opinions. People subsequently sometimes got suspicious 
about my research purposes, which complicated my ethnographic task. Forced to go 
through known and respected intermediaries, I had to secure people’s trust first, and open 
these now sensitive topics in a roundabout way. Finally, the previous anecdote suggests 
that media propaganda has contributed to the development of a paranoia towards 
foreigners’ activities in Egypt.  
 
Conspiracy theories have identified two main enemies of the new regime: the Muslim 
Brotherhood firstly and, increasingly, the 25 January “revolution”. Indeed, “regularly 
used in history by counter-revolutionaries […], theories of conspiracy or handling 
crowds, whether attributed to the Muslim Brotherhood, the CIA or organisations such as 
OTPOR, can be seen as ways to deny the importance, and even the historical reality of 
the event”226. My conversations with Upper Egyptians enabled me to conclude that many 
people had a poor knowledge of what had really happened between 25 January and 11 
                                                          
225 This term, which appeared in 2015, designates the abduction by security forces of persons, who are then 
taken to an unknown location, often tortured before being formally arrested and charged, and sometimes 
killed. 
226 « Régulièrement utilisées dans l’histoire par les contre-révolutionnaires (Cochin, 1921), les théories du 
complot ou de la manipulation des foules, que ceux-ci soient attribués aux Frères musulmans, à la CIA ou 
à des organisations comme OTPOR, peuvent être vus comme des façons de nier l’importance, voire la 
réalité historique de l’évènement. ». Guillaume Mazeau and Giedre Sabaseviciute, « Archéologies 
révolutionnaires. Regards croisés sur la Tunisie et l’Égypte (2011-2013) », L’Année du Maghreb, 2014. 
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February 2011 (see chapter 6), making them relatively receptive to all kinds of narratives 
of those events, including the version of the foreign conspiracy. For instance, Amira, a 
22 unemployed recent graduate in business studies from Al-Hajindiyya village, a very 
remote village in Aswan governorate located about 35 kilometres north of Kom Ombo, 
believed that “the beginning of the revolution was planned from abroad”227. In the same 
way, information about the pro-MB protest movement was relatively scarce and 
definitively biased; thus, most people believed that MB supporters had all turned violent, 
denying the occurrence of peaceful pro-MB protests. Conspiracy theories were not the 
exclusive prerogative of the regime. Muslim Brotherhood supporters also used them. In 
2015 in particular, I often heard that security forces were behind the bombings in Sinai 
and elsewhere in Egypt, in order to put the blame on the Muslim Brotherhood228. 
 
Yet, limited information about and poor knowledge of events are not sufficient to explain 
the adherence to the simplified reality of conspiracy theories. The common view relates 
this to the level of education. However, my evidence refutes this. Indeed, many people 
living in Upper Egypt’s Aswan and Luxor regions and having a basic education expressed 
suspicion or distrust regarding news that they could not verify because of their 
remoteness, or topics they acknowledged they did not particularly understand. Some 
people had noticed contradictions in the news, accusing media personalities and 
politicians of lying. Despite many Egyptians deploring the “ignorance” (jahl) of the poor, 
making them easy to manipulate, I found that not everyone was politically naïve or 
believed everything he/she heard. For example, Fatma, a 44 accountant living in Aniba, 
has a degree in business studies. She clearly expressed doubts about what she saw or 
heard: “Personally, I hated politics after the revolution…due to what I see from 
politicians, the media…we don’t see where the truth is”229. Mahmud, a 64 retired 
veterinarian from Aniba, was also cautious: “I am one of the people who are about 1,000 
km from the political scene in Cairo… so this makes us get information from the radio 
and TV… And it is possible that the truth doesn’t reach us”230. Hoda, a 54 housewife 
holding a middle degree in business studies and living in Ballana, expressed similar 
doubts: “We don’t believe… Muhammad Morsi and all those who are now imprisoned, 
                                                          
227 Interview with Amira, 22, unemployed (Bachelor in business studies), Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 
2014. 
228 Informal conversation with Haggag, 24, journalist, Luxor, March 2015. 
229 Interview with Fatma, 44, accountant, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
230 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian and shop owner, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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have they really done all these things?”231. Ayman, a garbage collector from Kom Ombo, 
similarly said: “We meet people in the street, polite, good, respectable people… So I don’t 
know if the truth is what we see, different from what we hear. And what we hear is different 
from the people we deal with”232. On the contrary, even among highly educated Cairene 
“elites”, I sometimes heard the anti-Western, anti-MB and anti-revolution discourse of 
renowned TV presenters as Tawfiq Okasha, a then fierce supporter of the 25 January 
“conspiracy”. Based on memorising more than on critical thinking, the educational 
system does not teach people to argue or substantiate their assertions with evidence. As 
such, education has its share of responsibility. Cultural factors should also be considered. 
In Egypt, and even more in the conservative countryside, people are not used to question 
their elders, and more generally anyone enjoying a higher social status or authority.  
 
To what extent are the populations of the Qena, Luxor and Aswan governorates exposed 
to media and social media? Southern Upper Egypt may be far from Cairo. However, it is 
not completely isolated as common beliefs might suggest it. Television is by far the main 
source of information for the majority. Upper Egyptians watch the news but also political 
talk shows on TV. They not only watch public and private TV channels such as Dream, 
ONTV, CBC, Tahrir, and diverse pro-MB channels, but also international news channels 
such as BBC Arabic, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. It is true that many households, especially 
in villages, still lack access to satellite TV channels. However, national TV is hardly the 
only source of information for residents of the countryside. Most adults and younger 
people have cell phones, which constantly keep them in touch with larger circles 
exceeding the village or the neighbourhood. People have relatives in Cairo and/or 
elsewhere in Egypt, who keep them aware of news they would not necessarily hear on 
TV. These relatives are either people who have permanently moved to Lower Egypt for 
economic reasons, or youth studying at universities in Upper Egyptian cities as Asyut or 
Sohag. A number of respondents told me that they were aware of the lies of the media, 
especially national TV, during the 18 days of the 2011 uprising because they had contacts 
with relatives and friends who had attended or seen the mass protests in Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square and elsewhere. For instance, Hassan, a resident in Aswan, said he was in touch 
with one of his cousins in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which made him realise that the media 
                                                          
231 Interview with Hoda, 54, housewife (middle degree in business studies), Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
232 Interview with Ayman, 30, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
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was lying233. If Internet access, widespread in southern cities, is scarcer in villages, it does 
not prevent most youth (generally up until their fourties) from having at least an account 
on Facebook, another increasingly important source of information.  
 
3.2. Protests threatening stability and Upper Egyptians’ fatigue towards the 
“revolution” 
 
How have conspiracy theories and media propaganda contributed to ordinary citizens’ 
mass demobilisation or weaker mobilisation since July 2013? In addition to turning the 
majority away from opponents of the “revolution” or the Muslim Brotherhood, and from 
protests in general as detailed in chapter 6, they have exploited most Egyptians’ lassitude 
after years of political and economic crisis. In particular, the new authorities have 
succeeded in presenting protests as troublemaking and threatening Egypt’s national 
security and stability. This constituted a strategy to prevent further dissent complementary 
to the violent suppression of street protests and the legal tool provided by the protest law 
to justify the crackdown on opponents. The media had already played an important role 
in mobilising against President Morsi ahead of June-July 2013 mass demonstrations, 
exciting public anger towards the MB, exploiting the then daily power cuts, and directly 
encouraging citizens to participate in protests (see chapter 6). In the aftermath of the 
uprising, they were similarly active, but this time in deterring collective action. In addition 
to describing pro-MB protests as exclusively violent, they aimed to respond to most 
ordinary people’s quest for stability and security and capitalise on the popular discontent 
caused by three years of economic turmoil, political instability and rising delinquency in 
a country unused to it. They also glorified the respectability and patriotism of those 
citizens who did not disturb the wheel of production, emphasising the destructive 
character of protests. At the opposite, they blamed those protesting, and therefore 
disturbing public order. Protests were often, justifiably or not, associated with destruction. 
In addition, the mainstream media tended to exaggerate incidents affecting the security 
situation across the country, recycling former President Mubarak’s discourse “either me 
or chaos”. In Al-Hajindiyya, residents regretted the end of the Mubarak era because they 
used to feel safe, which was no longer the case. They told me that they feared security 
problems, making security a priority, while admitting that there was no insecurity in their 
village.  
                                                          
233 Interview with Hassan, 35, bazar employee, Aswan, February 2014. 
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In accordance with this discourse making dissent since January 2011 the source of 
Egypt’s instability, many respondents denounced protests as threats to national stability. 
The official propaganda succeeded in portraying protests as the source of Egypt’s 
instability and increasing insecurity. Now that protesters were depicted as violent and 
soon called “terrorists”, they were blamed for the continuous economic turmoil and 
tourists’ persisting avoidance of Egypt. While many ordinary citizens praised the “bread, 
freedom and social justice” revolutionary slogan, they generally insisted on bread and 
social justice. Freedom seemed not to be a priority, contrary to stability and security. 
Many people said they regretted the Mubarak-era for its stability and security. 
“Democracy” was almost a swear word, and part of a foreign conspiracy aiming at 
enslaving Egypt. In Upper Egypt, the 25 January “revolution” was blamed for an 
unprecedentedly long crisis in the tourism sector and a further deterioration of public 
services. This explains that protests, whether organised by political opponents or workers, 
were almost systematically denounced in Luxor, where tourism constitutes the first 
economic sector of activity. Stability was seen as a precondition for tourists’ return, while 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was often seen as the providential man able to reverse this situation. 
Yet, tourist workers were not always against protesting. Many of them had taken to the 
streets in June 2013, when President Morsi appointed as governor of Luxor an al-Jama‛a 
al-Islamiyya leader, who allegedly participated in the 1997 massacre of tourists. They 
also participated in the demonstrations that eventually ousted Morsi.  
 
The official discourse linking instability to protests and the revolution succeeded in 
convincing many other ordinary Egyptians that protests had to stop in order to achieve 
stability. Hamdi, a 33-year-old teacher based in Kom Ombo, was now against protests. 
He believed there was no more reason to go to the streets now that there was a political 
roadmap: “now I ban protesting for the destiny of the country to go on”234. In addition, he 
was proud about having learnt how to solve problems without staging protests, 
explaining: “I protest to oppose, whereas I participate in the elections in order to 
build”235. After leading a protest movement to demand permanent posts and a minimum 
wage for teachers in 2011, Hamdi successfully positioned himself as a credible negotiator 
with the local authorities. He was now acting as a mediator for others and served, for 
example, as an intermediary when garbage collectors went on strike in 2014 in Kom 
                                                          
234 Interview with Hamdi, 33, school teacher, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
235 Ibid. 
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Ombo. In addition to his connections at the governorate level, Hamdi was anxious to 
preserve good relations with security services. I was interviewing him in the cafeteria of 
the Kom Ombo Temple, when he interrupted the meeting to go greet and reassure officers 
of the State Security Investigations Service who were sitting a few tables away. 
 
The quest for stability also partly explains the weak solidarity with most protests by 
workers, also seen as relatively privileged in comparison with those devoid of a stable 
activity. I will elaborate on that in chapter 6. For now, it is sufficient to say that the 
discourse blaming protests for chronic instability, combined with the repression of all 
political oppositions, affected ordinary people’s levels of mobilisation and chosen 
repertoires of contention. In addition, ordinary people often expressed a preference for 
the security of something they knew rather than the instability of a revolutionary situation. 
Even though they were not always fully happy with the new regime, many really thought 
that after successfully getting rid of President Morsi, a new era of stability and prosperity 
would begin. This prompted them to demobilise since “feelings of pride and satisfaction 
in the attainment of movement goals can encourage demobilisation”236. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Campaign poster saying yes to the 2013 constitution because “it ends the  
transitional phase and brings stability back to Egypt”, Aswan, January 2014. 
                                                          
236 Ronald R. Aminzade and Doug McAdam, “Emotions and Contentious Politics”, in Ronald R. Aminzade, 
Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Sidney Tarrow and Charles 
Tilly, Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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3.3. Local protest movements’ vulnerability to co-optation strategies: the case 
of a short strike by garbage collectors in Kom Ombo 
 
One of the trends that the 25 January 2011 uprising apparently encouraged is the youth’s 
increasing interest in getting involved in local and national politics. But this has not meant 
a systematic commitment to the idea of a radical, “revolutionary” change. Not everyone 
has agreed on the way to achieve the ideals of “bread, freedom, social justice”. Many 
activists, especially at the local level, have sought to work within the rules of the current 
authoritarian regime237. In particular, many youths previously involved in Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party (NDP) have been seeking a greater participation in activities 
aiming at improving living conditions in their communities. They have deliberately 
chosen to work within the system in order to benefit from the networks and resources of 
government entities and be able to do concrete things and deliver services. I develop this 
in chapter 4, which is about local activists. For now, I am interested in the way these local 
activists can participate in co-optation mechanisms that contribute to containing protests.  
 
In Kom Ombo, in February 2013 and again in March 2014, garbage collectors went on 
strike over three main demands in addition to clothes and better equipment: being 
appointed permanently and obtaining the same rights and benefits as permanent workers, 
earning the minimum wage, and enjoying the status of other public sector workers and 
salary equality with their colleagues in Aswan. This demand for equality with their 
regional colleagues was described by most respondents as more important than minimum 
wage. This was also due to minimum wage being seen by many as a demand less likely 
to be met. Minimum wage “was given to people sitting under air conditioners, and not to 
people working in the field”238, according to a garbage collector. Another one explained 
that they had gone on strike in the hope to obtain what they wanted, as others had 
succeeded this way before: 
 
“The Water and Agriculture Company staged a strike, and they obtained pay 
increases. The sugar factory went on strike and they got pay increases and permanent 
jobs. The electricity also in the same way. Real estate also in the same way. Today there 
                                                          
237 See Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: strategies and repertoires of 
political participation”, Mediterranean Politics, 21:1, 2016, 44-63. 
238 Interview with Muhammad A., 44, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
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is nothing except when you stage a strike. Everyone went on strike in the same way […] 
All factories staged strikes… we are the only ones who have not obtained permanent jobs 
or money increases. But we still hope for the best”.239 
 
There was a 100% participation rate in the strike, a new escalation after the previous 
February 2013 strike. Garbage collectors and their colleagues said they had ended their 
strike because streets were dirty. Yet, they had not obtained results other than promises 
that their demands would be examined, with no specific dates or terms. Local officials, 
whether at the City Council or the Aswan governorate, shirked all responsibility, saying 
such an issue was not in their hands, that only the central government could answer their 
demands240, and that there was no money241. One of the garbage collectors denounced 
that they were not given receipts of their wages, which made them unable to prove how 
much they were being paid exactly. This prevented them from proving to officials that 
their colleagues in Aswan and elsewhere received higher pays, and those who publicly 
revealed how much they earned could end up on a “blacklist”242. This shows how officials 
use workers’ fear to lose their jobs, as well as their inability to provide evidence of wage 
inequalities, to delay pay increases. 
 
Garbage collectors had suspended their strike not only out of fear of residents becoming 
ill but also because they had been pushed to do so by a number of pro-government 
activists mediating between them and the government. A garbage collector remembered 
that members of Mustaqbal Watan had told them that they should keep working, while 
on their side they got in touch with the governorate to raise their demands243. According 
to several workers that I interviewed, “youth” from the then pro-Sisi Mustaqbal Watan 
campaign had stood by their side, praising their cause at the governorate and helping them 
getting access to officials. However, they all agreed that this mediation had not succeeded 
in obtaining what they demanded yet. In Kom Ombo, Mustaqbal Watan was then led by 
Hamdi, a primary school teacher I previously mentioned. Hamdi claimed he had “solved” 
the garbage collectors’ issue, no more, no less. He explained that with his colleagues they 
had mediated between the garbage collectors and the governorate via their political 
                                                          
239 Interview with Erkabi, 48, driver at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
240 Interview with Muhammad A., 44, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
241 Interview with Erkabi, 48, driver at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
242 Interview with Muhammad K., 30, supervisor at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
243 Ibid. 
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connections to make sure negotiations would take place and demands were 
communicated244. However, he did not specify what they had achieved. In this case, it 
seems that young pro-regime activists’ intervention has contributed to containing the 
garbage collectors’ strikes. Their ability to reach local authorities made them trustworthy 
and credible interlocutors, inciting workers to wait for promises to be fulfilled. At the 
same time, they successfully prevented the movement from escalating. Garbage collectors 
said that apart from these activists, no one had helped them.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Posters of the pro-Sisi campaign Mustaqbal Watan campaigning for the “yes” to the new 
constitution, displayed in the office of the garbage collectors in Kom Ombo, April 2014. 
 
Muhammad A., a 44-year-old garbage collector, said the NDP was still present in each 
household in the area245. However, Muhammad A. and his colleagues were not 
necessarily linking NDP remnants to Mustaqbal Watan. For instance, Khaled, a 43-year-
old head of sector at the cleaning company, said he had rejected several offers to join the 
NDP because they were not good in the area. On the contrary, he intended to join 
                                                          
244 Interview with Hamdi, 33, school teacher, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
245 Interview with Muhammad A., 44, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014. 
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Mustaqbal Watan, a group of good, reassuring faces, that wanted to help the country and 
especially the youth. He confirmed they had connections at the governorate level and 
could make you sit with officials, without always being able to force the latter to do 
anything. He praised their involvement in the garbage collectors’ issue: 
 
“They began to appear with us on the picture, here in Kom Ombo… they came to 
Aswan with us… they chose to provide the service first, so that we join them 
afterwards”246. 
 
In sum, local pro-government activists such as Hamdi, involved in the pro-Sisi Mustaqbal 
Watan campaign, have contributed to discouraging garbage collectors from escalating 
their strikes. It remains to be seen whether their intervention manages to obtain all of what 
the striking garbage collectors had demanded. In April 2015, I called Muhammad A. for 
an update on the situation. He said that their situation was better and that some of them 
had obtained permanent positions. 
 
4. The case of a limited mobilisation without challenging the authorities: Nagaa 
Abdel Qader residents’ fight for drinking water 
 
It is a hot day of May 2014 in the village of Nagaa Abdel Qader, near Dishna, in the 
Upper Egyptian governorate of Qena. I am having tea with some elders of the village. We 
are talking about recurrent, prolonged drinking water cuts, the area’s main problem, 
which often compels residents to walk various kilometres to other villages to get water. 
The conversation sometimes slips to political matters, with my hosts expressing their 
hope to see the army and future President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi fix Egypt’s problems and 
restore a long awaited stability after more than three years of turmoil. What strikes me is 
these men’s indulgence and even loyalty towards the authorities despite, in my view, the 
latter’s persisting failure to provide the village with the most vital public service. Buying 
bottled water is too expensive for the mainly low-income residents of Nagaa Abdel Qader. 
Water cuts consequently meant that people could not drink, wash, irrigate farmland or 
take care of cattle, entailing a higher risk of dehydration, deplorable hygiene and the 
impossibility for farmers to make a living. I wondered how the villagers could tolerate 
                                                          
246 Interview with Khaled, 43, head of sector at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
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such an unbearable situation, especially in summer, and why they remained loyal to 
politicians that had been unable to end it. 
 
In Luxor, I met Mahmud Al-Desuqi, a journalist based in Dishna, in the province of Qena. 
He publishes in state-run al-Ahram and Dishna al-Yom newspapers. He covered various 
water crises in Nagaa Abdel Qader, and told me about protests that had taken place in the 
village of Nagaa Abdel Qader. I consequently decided to visit the village with a journalist 
and colleague of Mahmud in Dishna.  
 
Nagaa Abdel Qader looks like many other Upper Egyptian villages. Houses, all similar, 
have generally no more than one floor, include two or three rooms, and still look relatively 
new. The village was indeed entirely rebuilt further up in 1994 following floods that 
destroyed original constructions. It looks peaceful, especially during hot hours. Streets 
are calm and cars are scarce. However, an attentive visitor could notice one particularity. 
From time to time, a child on a donkey passes by with a jerrycan. Children of all ages, 
boys and girls, as well as old people, would go at any time of the day to the drinking water 
tank at the entrance of the village, hoping to find some of the precious liquid for their 
homes. They would often come back with their jerrycans empty, or have to walk several 
kilometres in the heat to another water tanker. In Nagaa Adel Qader, recurrent and long-
lasting water shortages have been an enduring curse, especially in summer. They have 
occurred since April 1996, according to residents.  
 
In Nagaa Abdel Qader, residents have long been suffering from the multiple 
consequences of these frequent shortages of tap water. The latter have aggravated both in 
their extent and in frequency since the January-February 2011 uprising. They have been 
limiting land cultivation, threatening cattle’ survival and deteriorating hygiene 
conditions. Nagaa Abdel Qader was conceived as an agricultural village. But water 
scarcity has considerably reduced its agricultural potential, while farmers have been 
desperately watching many of their animals die from thirst. Despite the availability of 
agricultural land, many men had to seek jobs outside the village, and were employed as 
drivers or temporary workers at the sugar factory in nearby Dishna. Furthermore, when 
available, tap water was not always clean. Various health issues related to water, 
including cases of renal failure, have been reported. More importantly and urgently, water 
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shortages have been condemning the 7,000247 residents of the village to thirst, particularly 
during hot summers. This has even led some of them to drink the water of local canals248.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image has been removed due to copyright restrictions.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Young girl on a donkey carrying a jerrycan, on her way to or coming from a water tank. In the 
background, an elder of the village. Nagaa Abdel Qader, May 2014. 
 
 
 
It is only after the 2011 uprising that residents started to take initiatives to make 
themselves heard. One of the worst, prolonged crises took place in June-July 2011, with 
water shortages lasting several weeks. While the water tank of the village was empty, 
residents had to walk several kilometres to fetch water from surrounding villages. 
Officials at the governorate level did nothing, while the ‛umda249 had expressed his 
powerlessness. Residents essentially directed their anger towards the local branch of the 
National Water and Sanitation Company, filing a lawsuit. They also organised a petition 
in June 2011, followed by a protest under the scorching sun at the water tank in the 
                                                          
247 Some media sources quote 3,000 people, a figure that I could not independently verify.  
248 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTXEwYyiJb0. 
249 In many villages in Upper Egypt, the ‛umda or mayor remains an intermediary between villagers and 
higher authorities. In practice, he may be a respected figure without real power.  
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village250. Residents testing this “new” way to pressure the authorities did not demand 
anything but drinking water. They did not criticise the local authorities or the government. 
However, this movement, which essentially aimed at attracting the media and authorities’ 
attention, had little visibility apart from some brief newspaper reports in al-Ahram and 
Dishna al-Yom251. No permanent solution was raised to a structural problem affecting 
many other villages in the governorate and elsewhere in Egypt, and despite the recurrence 
of similar crises. Even during the presidential elections of May 2014, media reported a 
low turnout in the village, as residents were busy getting water252. Despite shortages, the 
only place in the village where water was available during the elections was a school 
transformed into a polling station, suggesting that residents may have abstained from 
voting in protest against this situation253. The media also reported water cuts persisting 
for several days and weeks during the 2014 and 2015 summers. On 5 August 2015, 
reporters at the local newspaper Dishna al-Yom posted a video on YouTube showing 
residents angry at the burning of the water tank’s engine, and denouncing officials’ 
inaction254. 
 
Without openly criticising the authorities, residents of Nagaa Abdel Qader defended their 
fight for water as a legitimate cause while widely denouncing their marginalisation. As 
in many Upper Egyptian villages and remote areas, they complained about the state’s 
neglect and ignorance of their problems, saying they had been completely abandoned: 
“Why? Aren’t we Egyptians?”, one of them wondered. Another resident told me that even 
the dead had water. According to another one, no one has taken care of Upper Egypt since 
Nasser’s era. Residents have been increasingly demanding the attention and support of 
the media, civil society organisations and local authorities. Despite efforts to publicise 
their cause, they were claiming no one had come to visit them, whether the governor, the 
head of the City Council or others. Officials had made promises, without taking any steps. 
                                                          
250 As explained below, I experienced difficulties in gathering data about the protests from the residents I 
met. The media reported at least one protest against water shortages in Nagaa Abdel Qader in June 2011: 
http://www.masress.com/ahramgate/84091. 
251 Apart from Mahmud Al-Desuqi and his colleague, I have not been made aware of other journalists 
covering water issues in Nagaa Abdel Qader.  
252 “Bisabab inshighālhom bitawfīr al-miya limanāzilhom.. lagna ‘15’ biQena tashhad taṣwīt 40 muwaṭinan 
faqaṭ” (“Because they were busy providing water to their homes.. Station ‘15’ in Qena sees the votes of 
only 40 citizens”), by Mahmud Al-Desuqi, al-Ahram, 26 May 2014: 
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/496848.aspx. 
253 Ibid.  
254 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ty5bjFIdk4U. 
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Residents largely expressed their scepticism towards politicians, who were perceived as 
looking for their own interests.  
 
When I visited Nagaa Abdel Qader in May 2014, residents were no longer organising 
demonstrations to voice their demands. Their mobilisation now focused on legal steps 
rather than on street protests. After the fall of President Morsi, most protests became 
assimilated with an opposition to the government, sometimes framed as an association 
with the Muslim Brotherhood’s protest movement. Despite the unsolved, long-lasting 
problem of drinking water shortages, the people I met in Nagaa Abdel Qader remained 
resolutely reluctant to escalate their action. They expressed a will to go exclusively 
through what they perceived as the official channels, therefore privileging the legal path 
and allowing media coverage. Protests never intensified despite a clear deterioration of 
the situation, combined with frequent electricity cuts compelling people to stay indoors 
after the dark. Nagaa Abdel Qader residents’ mobilisation against water cuts never 
escalated beyond the geographical framework of the village. I saw no signs of local or 
external brokers’ involvement, while residents never organised protests outside the 
village, which limits the visibility of their contestation. Indeed, organising protests 
outside the village and gathering higher numbers of people entailed the risk to send a 
message that could be wrongly interpreted by the authorities as political dissent. On the 
contrary, village elders leading the water issue, mainly retired workers in their sixties with 
a basic school education, expressed their full support for, and loyalty to, the authorities. 
How can we explain this continuing support? Why have residents of Nagaa Abdel Qader 
remained loyal to the authorities despite the persistence of water cuts?  
 
The particular context prevailing during my fieldwork suggests why the men I met in 
Nagaa Abdel Qader expressed a certain embarrassment towards public protests and the 
possibility to escalate a confrontation with the authorities. Despite that they had 
participated in protests in the past, protest was now for them a swear word, a synonym of 
violence, and/or an insult to the ruler(s), which could not be tolerated. Ahmed, a 49-year-
old blacksmith, explained that he avoided demonstrations because he was a “respectful” 
person255. Contrary to his elders (see below), he showed no particular interest in politics 
or parties, was rather annoyed by my questions, and actually left in the middle of the 
meeting. Even the local reporters at Dishna al-Yom and al-Ahram covering water issues 
                                                          
255 Interview with Ahmed, 49, blacksmith, Nagaa Abdel Qader (Qena), May 2014. 
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in the region showed reticence when I asked them about past protests. This 
embarrassment was not surprising since many people were afraid to talk due to the 
repressive context that prevailed at the time, as all forms of political opposition were 
being crushed. However, when I insisted, Nagaa Abdel Qader residents admitted that they 
had participated in protests in the past, at least against the Muslim Brotherhood in June 
2013 and once in the village to denounce water shortages. In the last case, they strongly 
insisted on the peaceful character of the protest, which was mainly a way to attract 
attention on this issue, while emphasising the apolitical nature of their demand. They were 
not really qualifying their protests as contentious. They wanted to avoid a confrontation 
with the authorities at any price, claiming their support for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for 
president, hoping to obtain some change through his election. On the other hand, my 
interlocutors were more willing to talk about their participation in anti-MB protests in 
Dishna and Qena in June and July 2013, seeing them as legitimate. In particular, village 
elders expressed a strong hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi, 
blamed for the persisting deterioration of public services, including fuel shortages, 
electricity and water cuts. However, as I mentioned above, water shortages went back to 
long before Morsi’s arrival to the presidency, and lasted several weeks in summer 2015 
in Nagaa Abdel Qader as elsewhere in the Qena governorate, while the Muslim 
Brotherhood could no longer be blamed.  
 
The loyalty of the most influential village householders towards the government, and thus 
its local representatives, seems to partly explain the weak mobilisation in the water issue. 
One of my interlocutors mentioned that he had a family of eight, including one of his sons 
who had been home since his graduation in 2003, while the others were still being 
educated. He explained that he had been delaying a much-needed surgery for more than 
year, waiting from some local officials to help him get financial assistance to be able to 
do it. This suggests that the loyalty to the authorities might be motivated by the provision 
of services, at least individually. Village elders and local tribal leaders might be co-opted 
by higher authorities. However, I could not dig into this issue since I did not have the 
opportunity to conduct more thorough research in the village. Indeed, when I asked, 
through the mediation of journalist Mahmud Al-Desuqi, if I could come back to the 
village in spring 2015 to conduct more research on water issues, I was told that I was 
welcome at the condition of having an authorisation from security forces. People were 
obviously anxious and did not want to provoke any conflict with the authorities, while 
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perhaps lacking trust in my intentions. Conspiracy theories involving “foreign agents”, 
including academics, remained common at the time, and my interlocutors in Nagaa Abdel 
Qader said they watched some of the TV channels or programmes known for spreading 
these views256. 
 
A more social factor potentially encouraging or discouraging people to mobilise is the 
solidarity among villagers. Whatever they decide, everyone usually commits to the entire 
group’ stance. Loyalty to the group, sometimes itself loyal to external actors, appears 
determinant in mobilisation and demobilisation processes. Nagaa Abdel Qader has 
several public spaces potentially appropriate for political socialisation, including a social 
club and a “house of events”. In such places, elders and youth, mainly men, discuss issues 
of interest for the whole community. In addition to elders’ homes, it is essentially in these 
places that householders have decided on protests and other actions related to water 
shortages. It is also there that many signatures for the Tamarrod campaign were collected. 
Loyalty to the community, whether to the extended family, the village or the tribe, plays 
a role in the organisation of collective actions (see chapter 5). Ahmed confirmed that even 
voting at elections was influenced by the stance of the group. In addition, tribal 
allegiances remain strong in Nagaa Abdel Qader and condition many political behaviours. 
The only Facebook page mentioning the village is called “Nagaa Abdel Qader youth” 
(Shabab Nagaa Abdel Qader) and mainly supports the Hawara tribe, one of Qena region’s 
prominent historical tribes. It shows pictures of young men carrying weapons in an 
apparent attempt to intimidate potential rival tribes, especially the Arab tribe, another 
important one in the area.  
 
In Nagaa Abdel Qader as elsewhere in Upper Egypt, elders’ authority is rarely directly 
questioned. This is reflected in the attitude of Zakaria, a 38-year-old driver, who was 
embarrassed by the presence of his elders when I asked him about his political opinions, 
and told me almost nothing. In Nagaa Abdel Qader, rather conservative elders are the true 
leaders and decision-makers of the village. Gomaa, 64, used to be a petty merchant. 
Having himself only primary education, he talks about his children’s higher education 
with pride. He is one of the elders of the village who has been leading actions to re-
establish tap water. He is politicised, and was a member of the Arab Democratic Nasserist 
                                                          
256 Such as Tawfiq Okasha’s programme on al-Faraeen channel or, more recently, Ahmed Moussa’s talk 
show on Sada al-Balad. 
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Party257, which he left shortly after the 2011 uprising because it saw it as an old party. 
Gomaa seems to have played an important role in mobilising his neighbours against the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, he collected signatures for Tamarrod and participated in 
protests against the Muslim Brotherhood in Dishna and at the governorate headquarters 
in Qena. He said he was informed about the protests by acquaintances, including members 
of al-Karama Party258. More recently, Gomaa collected signatures for Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi for president’s campaign “Continue your duty” (Kammel Gamilak)259.  
 
Gamee, 62, illiterate, used to be a driver but stopped working twenty years ago due to 
health issues. He hates the Muslim Brothers, whom he considers as traitors. According to 
him, they were not good people since Gamal Abdel Nasser’s time. He voted for Ahmed 
Shafiq at the 2012 presidential elections. He thinks Morsi was the president of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whereas he should have been the president of all Egyptians. Under his rule, 
terrorists of Hamas and Hezbollah were released from prison, put in Sinai, and left to 
divide Egypt, according to him. Gamee confirmed the Brotherhood was present in the 
area, used to give cooking gas tubes only to its supporters, and utilised people’s ignorance 
to buy their votes. According to him, even Israel was better than the MB. Gamee 
supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi but warned that the people would rise against him if he did 
like the MB, and that this time it would be more violent. Nostalgic about the Nasser era, 
Gamee said Sisi should look at the poor, peasants and Upper Egypt. In addition to his 
apparent allergy towards the MB, Gamee seemed to subscribe to conspiracy theories, and 
considered Muhammad al-Baradei a traitor who had financed the April 6 Youth 
Movement.  
 
Nagaa Abdel Qader elders remained resolute Mubarak supporters, for whom they used to 
vote and whom they regretted. They had supported him during the 2011 uprising, which 
they thought was a conspiracy driven by the US and the April 6 Youth Movement. One 
of them even confessed having cried when Mubarak announced his departure. They all 
saw the former president as a respectable man, blaming his entourage for all the crimes. 
They naturally intended to vote for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014. Like many people, they 
                                                          
257 It was founded in 1984. 
258 Founded in 1996, this other Nasserist Party used to be headed by former presidential candidate Hamdeen 
Sabbahi.  
259 The campaign, which gathered supports for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s presidential bid in autumn 2013 and 
winter 2014, has a Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/KamelGmeilak/info/?tab=page_info. 
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saw the latter as a saviour, a patriot, and the only trustworthy leader able to rule Egypt at 
the time. They had opposed the MB and actively contributed to the Tamarrod campaign 
in the village. Overall, they displayed a paradoxical view of protest actions. While being 
discrete about the small demonstrations they organised in the village to demand drinking 
water, they seemed proud of their participation in the mass protests that led to President 
Morsi’s ouster. In order to justify this participation, residents claimed they had suffered 
under the latter’s presidency. Ahmed and Gamee mentioned a huge increase in the price 
of Diesel fuel, affecting their activities. Zakaria claimed he sometimes had to wait two 
days to get gasoline amid severe shortages. Although apparently paradoxical, their view 
of protests is consistent with the then dominant narrative giving an important share to 
conspiracy theories, glorifying the army’s patriotism in the fight against “terrorism”, 
denouncing the drifts of the 25 January uprising, qualifying al-Baradei and the 6 April 
Youth Movement of being traitors, and so on. Now that the Muslim Brotherhood had 
been replaced by what they saw as true patriots, there was no more reason to go to the 
streets. In short, while remaining active in the water issue and lobbying for its resolution, 
Nagaa Abdel Qader elders did not want to risk their relationship with the authorities, and 
apparently with local officials. This is ultimately a case where no mistrust towards the 
authorities has been directly expressed, a fact that may come either from village elders’ 
will to remain loyal to the authorities in exchange for services and hopefully a solution to 
water shortages, or simply their fear to talk about it in front of me. 
 
5. Conclusion: assessing state strategies to prevent protests’ expansion 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate the efficiency of a number of 
state strategies other than or along with the direct repression of protests and opponents in 
containing popular mobilisations since July 2013 in Egypt. I have particularly suggested 
how media propaganda and local co-optation strategies successfully deterred most protest 
ambitions, without necessarily undoing all forms of mobilisation. I have tried to 
demonstrate that the borders between mobilisation and demobilisation are porous, 
especially when we are dealing with instances of discontinuous activism. Indeed, both are 
the product of dynamic relationships interacting with a constantly evolving political 
environment.  
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Beyond the multiform repression persisting since July 2013, the people I met in the 
governorates of Aswan, Luxor and Qena, expressed a big fatigue towards protests and the 
25 January “revolution”, perceived as the main source of political and economic 
instability. In particular, the authorities and the media have never ceased to portray most 
public protests as violent and destabilising the country’ stability. The official propaganda 
has successfully damaged in the eyes of many ordinary people the image of labour 
protests, pro-MB dissent and the “revolution” altogether. Therefore, not only have state 
strategies of containment been largely effective in discouraging popular mobilisations, 
but they have also turned many ordinary people against protests in general. This hostility 
towards protests was largely expressed by Nagaa Abdel Qader village elders, who also 
refused to openly challenge the authorities. Their reluctance to escalate their contestation 
against drinking water shortages also suggested a certain dose of co-optation. Local 
strategies of co-optation similarly limited the extent and duration of Kom Ombo garbage 
collectors’ strike. In the next chapter about leadership challenges, I more systematically 
explore how the same state tactics of containment have influenced movement leaders’ 
strategies, partly making them self-restrained and more cautious in their moves. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: The village of Al-Hajindiyya, Aswan governorate, in February 2014. 
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Chapter 4: The vicissitudes of leadership 
 
1. Introduction: Leaders’ indispensability  
 
When I started my fieldwork in Aswan in January 2014, I first contacted local social and 
political activists. However, my goal was to get to know, through their intermediary, those 
people that I call ordinary, occasional protesters, unprofessional activists, who engage in 
contentious politics on very rare occasions and for specific motives. The purpose was to 
understand their rationale for mobilisation and reconstitute their path to direct 
participation in episodes of contention. Therefore, the “professional” activists I met did 
not constitute my primary concern. However, they quickly emerged as essential political 
actors whose initiatives and strategies greatly affected the course of most contentious 
episodes, and this despite the fact that they operated in extremely constrained conditions 
since the July 2013 military coup. In Aswan in particular, I found a multitude of activists’ 
networks implanted in their communities in a relatively solid manner, that played a role 
in popular mobilisations, including those related to communal concerns. Many of them 
had a rich history of activism in the region, especially since the 2011 uprising. Their role 
deserves a place in this research well beyond the mediation and help they offered me to 
enter into contact with more ordinary protesters.  
 
Contrary to common stories about allegedly spontaneous protests (Polletta 2009), 
episodes of contention are rarely completely unplanned. Even when their organisation is 
basic and crowds do not seem to follow particular directions, protests do not come out of 
nowhere. It is true that they do not systematically correspond to the ideal-type of the 
orderly procession led by well-identified organisers. However, protests are generally the 
result of the choices of strategies and efforts to mobilise of more or less recognised 
leaders. At the local level, an identified leadership is particularly essential, especially for 
mobilisations that do not follow particular national campaigns or episodes of contention 
that are advertised in the media. Chapter 2 showed how the involvement of more or less 
experienced political or social activists in protest movements against deteriorating public 
services enhanced their visibility and opened up chances to engage in talks with decision-
makers. Against the so-called spontaneity of local protests, this chapter aims to 
demonstrate the indispensable character of leadership in local mobilisation processes, its 
intrinsic weaknesses, as well as its resourceful adaption to difficult conditions. How does 
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leadership affect levels of (de)mobilisation? Why do some vicissitudes of leadership 
prevent local protests from expanding? 
 
This chapter attempts to explain how strategies adopted by movement leaders are key in 
shaping the course of protest movements. It argues that protests often remain localised 
because leaders rarely attempt to coordinate with others sharing similar grievances 
elsewhere. For instance, leaders may fight for a normal provision of drinking water in 
their village or neighbourhood, without relating shortages to a countrywide problem of 
procurement that may require structural reforms. Most local protests have usually been 
short-lived, and even when they turned into prolonged sit-ins, protesters have almost 
systematically gone home once demands were met, some concessions obtained or, in most 
cases, when local authorities agreed to begin negotiations. The general emphasis on local 
concerns has limited dissent, enabling local authorities to contain protest movements, 
isolate them geographically, and solve them on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, a handful of 
citizens, as angry as they are, do not risk worrying anyone when they stage a momentary 
protest in their remote village.  
 
Apart from some initiatives to publicise their causes, protest leaders have rarely attempted 
to transcend the local level and export their contestation through, for instance, launching 
nationwide campaigns and coordinating actions with people suffering from the same ills 
elsewhere. They have not addressed the structural causes at the macro level of issues such 
as the energy crisis, or poor electricity and water infrastructure. This lack of motivation 
and limited national projection may come from divisions within the activist community, 
lacking experience in coordinating at a higher scale, a priority given to local pressing 
matters, personal political ambitions implying strategies to become known and respected 
locally, or co-optation by local authorities. However, beyond these factors, there is often 
the high cost of opposition activism in a repressive environment, as well as subtler state 
strategies to contain all forms of political dissent (see chapter 3). In addition, 
characteristics of the local political culture such as, in the Upper Egyptian context, 
ordinary people’s mistrust of politicians combined with their expectation of services in 
exchange for their potential support, may constrain leaders’ options.  
 
Firstly, I describe the diverse profiles of leaders and protest organisers that I have met in 
southern Upper Egypt, including community leaders, political representatives and 
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established political and social activists. I also refer to the informal networks activists 
have been able to rely on to mobilise, sketching a non-exhaustive typology and 
emphasising the formation of new connections through various instances of mobilisation. 
I then analyse the myriad of strategies leaders have implemented, distinguishing those 
that privilege local matters from those seeking coordination at a wider level. The latter 
include joining a political party, a nationwide movement or campaign, while the local 
provision of services and joining local welfare associations generally belong to the first 
category. I show how various motivations and constraints lead to different strategies, 
through a comparison between opposition and pro-government activists. I establish that 
leaders’ popularity and credibility’s reliance on their ability to provide services has 
constituted a serious obstacle to many activists, especially those who have no access to 
government resources and networks. While many local activists have complained about 
their lack of resources to enhance their base through providing services, others have 
abided by the existing rules and therefore supported the authorities locally to have access 
to government resources. I suggest the different ways leaders deal with loyalties built 
thanks to the provision of services and logics of patronage. I finally use the trajectory of 
Aswan’s Lamm al-shaml initiative, launched by a local activist to gather different people 
around common communal demands, to illustrate some of the different factors behind the 
containment of most local mobilisations. This case mainly shows how local social 
divisions and political differences among activists are hard to overcome, potentially 
preventing wider gatherings. Despite being imperfect, such initiatives have appeared as 
useful laboratories for activists to conceive new ways of doing politics locally, pursue 
their political socialisation, and perhaps acquire some leadership skills.  
 
2. Local leaders and activist networks 
 
In the Upper Egyptian context, who are the local leaders, mobilising agents and potential 
or actual protest organisers? Whether community leaders (village elders, tribal leaders…), 
political representatives (members of Parliament, local council members, governorate 
officials, former members of the ruling NDP), more or less known and respected social 
or political activists, all have an ability to mobilise others for a particular purpose, 
including for protests. Often members in several formal organisations and informal 
networks, leaders of protest movements and activists in general rely on multiple local 
solidarity mechanisms to mobilise. Knowing the difficult context in which they 
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sometimes operate, especially since President Morsi’s fall in 2013, what are activists’ 
motivations to act? How do they operate? What are their relationships with more ordinary 
citizens? What challenges have they been facing? Based on the portraits and trajectories 
of several activists I met in Aswan and Luxor, this chapter attempts to shed light on their 
networks, activities, motivations, challenges and weaknesses. The purpose is not to 
establish a history or a map of activism in the region, but to give a glimpse of the diversity 
of profiles, before studying activists’ strategies to engage with matters of national or local 
concern and mobilise support. 
 
2.1. Local activists’ profiles 
 
In southern Upper Egypt as elsewhere, there is great diversity within the social and 
political activist community. There are firstly members in national movements, whether 
political parties, NGOs, human rights organisations or youth movements. 
“Revolutionary” groups such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the former Revolution 
Youth Coalition (Ittilaf Shabab Al-Thawra) generally used to have branches or at least a 
coordinator or representative in provinces. Most traditional political parties remain 
present in southern Upper Egypt, including the leftist Nasserist Al-Karama and Al-
Tagammu. Some of the parties that emerged after 25 January 2011, including Muhammad 
al-Baradei’s Constitution Party (Hizb Al-Distur) and Hamdeen Sabbahi’s Popular 
Current (Al-Tayyar Al-Shaabi), also opened branches in Upper Egypt, but have so far 
essentially failed to attract support beyond a certain section of the youth. Some important 
human rights organisations are also present, such as the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre 
(HMLC), which has an office in Aswan, while other Cairo-based NGOs have 
coordinators or representatives across the provinces.    
 
In the wake of the 2011 uprising, many new and older “revolutionary” movements that 
were mainly formed by activists in Cairo established branches in the provinces, including 
in Upper Egypt. Nabil founded branches of the 6 April Youth Movement not only in his 
hometown of Luxor but also in Qena, Sohag, Aswan and Hurghada. He remains at the 
head of the Luxor branch, as well as the main coordinator of the movement in southern 
Upper Egypt. At 37 years old, Nabil has been unemployed for several years despite a long 
professional experience in business management and a bachelor’s degree in commerce. 
He remains unmarried and lives with his parents. In addition to his personal account, 
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Nabil manages the Facebook page of the local branch of the 6 April Youth Movement, as 
well as Ibn al-Nil (the son of the Nile), a personal page where he posts articles on mainly 
local stories of human rights violations, corruption cases and so on. As of late April 2016, 
he has 3,528 ‘likes’ on the latter. Even though he has largely stopped planning and 
attending protests since the adoption of the November 2013 protest law, he keeps 
reporting and sharing many issues, which makes him a permanent target for security 
services. Like many opposition political activists, Nabil could be arrested at any time 
under any pretext, including inciting protests, threatening national security, spreading 
false news, or simply belonging to a banned organisation since the 6 April Youth 
Movement was prohibited by a court verdict in April 2015. But this does not prevent him 
from constantly denouncing government violations.  
 
As many Upper Egyptian experienced activists, Nabil first entered the world of politics 
in the 2000s when he frequently spent time in Cairo. He was a witness to most 
mobilisations demanding change at the time, including Kifaya and the April 6 Youth 
Movement, but did not attend demonstrations. He became more interested in politics in 
2007, when Facebook started to spread in Egypt: 
 
 “When Facebook started to open in 2007, there were only 100 people… a very 
little portion used to talk about politics. I was among these people. I liked to air the 
corruption of the state…Of course, I had to face many friends telling me to stay away… 
At this time, we started to know people in the political world”260. 
 
Nabil started to write articles, including on corruption issues, and share them on 
Facebook, which was also a platform for discussions on diverse political topics. Social 
media also gave him a way to form new networks. He explained that at the time there 
were only three interesting political movements that he could join: Kifaya, which, 
according to him, was controlled by old people; Muhammad al-Baradei’s National 
Association for Change (NAC), which, still according to him, had started to decline when 
several members of the April 6 Youth Movement left it; and the 6 April Youth Movement. 
In 2010, he chose to join the latter because of its majority of young people, decentralised 
structure, defence of an independent speech, gathering of diverse trends and ideologies, 
and internal democracy. On 25 January 2011, anticipating that demonstrations would not 
                                                          
260 Interview with Nabil, 36, unemployed (Bachelor in business studies), Luxor, March 2015. 
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gather large crowds in his city as calls on social media had remained largely unanswered, 
he chose to stay home and share everything he heard on Facebook. Then he participated 
in protests in Luxor from 28 January, and gradually became known during these days of 
the “revolution”. Many people now had his number and used to call him to know daily 
protests’ itineraries, and join with their acquaintances. He gathered a group of people who 
had protested with him during the uprising and shared the same thinking, and they formed 
in April 2011 the local branch of the 6 April Youth Movement, of which he became the 
coordinator. By the end of 2011, he was also the main coordinator of the group in southern 
Upper Egypt after founding other branches in several cities. Nabil explained that the 6 
April Youth Movement had been conceived as a resistance movement, mainly to oppose 
corruption. Therefore, it could not become a political party, as this would generate 
divisions beyond members having different political orientations – whether Leftists, 
Nationalists, Islamists, and so on. 
 
After actively participating in gathering signatures for the Tamarrod campaign and 
mobilising for the 30 June 2013 anti-Morsi protests (see chapter 6), Nabil had bitter 
regrets just as many of his fellow “revolutionary” activists did. His presence at street 
protests essentially ceased after the adoption of the law criminalising protests in 
November 2013. His political activism has, since then, essentially remained online. For 
many of his friends and fellow activists in Luxor, Nabil remains a leader, a sort of mentor 
for the youngest, a man of integrity and a devoted partner for his fellows in other 
movements such as the Popular Current (see chapter 2). When asked about his ambitions, 
he hopes to have a political future.  
 
In southern Upper Egypt, I also met a number of lawyers and human rights activists. 
When I arrived in Aswan in January 2014, my first move was to seek to meet Mostafa al-
Hassan, a founding member of the HMLC and the director of Aswan’s branch. This small 
law firm comprised of four or five lawyers in Aswan plays an important role in human 
rights promotion through acting for local issues and defending political detainees, 
including Islamists and “revolutionary” activists. When it was founded in the nineties, its 
lawyers defended many leaders of the Islamist militant group al-Jama‛a al-Islamiyya 
detained under the emergency law. In the 2000s, they got involved in cases related to 
sectarian conflicts, and marches organised by Kifaya and the 6 April Youth Movement. 
The law firm cooperates with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and other 
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international and Egyptian NGOs. HMLC has played an active role, since the 2011 
uprising, in promoting and mediatising the fight against Nile pollution and the Kima 
Canal (see chapter 2), amongst other issues. It has also defended many people, mainly 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters, who were arrested and sometimes tortured since the fall 
of President Morsi.  
 
Lawyers at the HMLC are well-connected to the vibrant local activist community, in 
which they enjoy a generally good reputation. They often work in coordination with other 
lawyers and human rights activists as Khaled, an accountant and human rights activist 
from Abul Rish who has an office at the HMLC, and Ahmed R. a lawyer and 
representative in Aswan of the Egyptian Centre for the Economic and Social Rights261, 
both active in the Kima Canal issue. They know most of the local leading activists and 
protesters, whom they defended on several occasions. Many of them used to have in their 
mobile phones an already written SMS, which would be sent automatically to HMLC 
lawyers if they were arrested262. Thanks to the centre’s main branch in Cairo and frequent 
travels, HMLC lawyers are also well-connected to national networks of human rights 
activists. Although they generally claim their political neutrality for the purpose of 
defending everyone263, they are rather close to liberal or secular activists. The director 
Mostafa al-Hassan participated in the 25 January uprising in Cairo, attending sit-ins in 
Tahrir Square. Between 3 and 5 February 2011, he said he was abducted with others 
during three days by the military intelligence, then headed by future President Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi. Another HMLC lawyer, Wael explained: 
 
 “It is not appropriate for me to enter any party, because the MB, the secular, come 
to me (everyone)… and I provide him with legal assistance […] I can disagree with you 
politically, but I don’t disagree with you humanly”.264  
 
Overall, lawyers at HMLC enjoyed a good reputation and obvious credibility. Their 
contribution to major legal cases as the one surrounding the Kima Canal is significant, as 
I established in chapter 2. Their commitment to human rights made them unavoidable 
                                                          
261 Headed by former presidential candidate and labour activist Khaled Ali, this NGO has two main 
branches in Cairo and Alexandria, and a network of lawyers in provinces. 
262 Meeting with Mostafa al-Hassan, director of HMLC Aswan, Aswan, January 2014. 
263 Lawyers claim that they provide legal assistance to anyone, regardless of political affiliations.  
264 Interview with Wael, 28, lawyer (HMLC), Aswan, April 2015. 
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leaders of the local activist community, as well as important mediators to voice the 
grievances of subaltern populations such as Abul Rish residents. 
 
Other activists were involved in human rights associations having or aiming at developing 
a regional coverage. For example, Amani, a university graduate in her mid-twenties, was 
a founding member of the Free Southern (Woman) Initiative (Mubadarat Janubiyya 
Hurra). As indicated on the Facebook page265 of the movement founded in Aswan in 
2012, the purpose is to support southern women’s rights. The movement is conceived as 
a tribune for southern feminists, who evolve in a more conservative society where the 
patriarchal guardianship, tribalism and various rural traditions, are usually stronger and 
harder to overcome than in Cairo. The initiative thus aims to address issues such as 
violence against women and sexual harassment, which are almost taboo in the 
conservative Upper Egyptian regions, as well as increase women’s awareness about their 
political and social rights, provide psychological and legal support to the needy, and fight 
the “social repression”266 of women in Upper Egypt. The movement organises shows, 
training sessions, conferences and workshops to inform women about a wide range of 
issues (for example the constitution, violence targeting women in the private and public 
spheres, and so on). Amani and other founders of the initiative participated in various 
protests in the wake of the 2011 uprising, when not in the “revolution” itself. On these 
occasions, they met other women and men sharing similar concerns, and are now part of 
Aswan’s vibrant activist community. When I met Amani in January 2014, they were about 
to inaugurate the initiative as a registered civil society organisation. Amani was a rare 
Upper Egyptian feminist activist and a true “revolutionary” in the sense that she really 
wanted to improve the condition of women in society. In addition to protests, Amani had 
been involved in the Cairo-based Nazra (Foundation) for Feminist Studies267 (Nazra 
lildirasat al-nisawiyya) and briefly joined the Socialist Popular Alliance Party268 (Hizb 
al-tahalof al-sha‛bi al-ishtiraqi) before enrolling in the Bread and Freedom Party269 (Hizb 
al-‛ish wal hurriyya). 
 
                                                          
265 https://www.facebook.com/Ganoubia/info/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page_info. 
266 Ibid. 
267 The feminist group has an English website: http://nazra.org/en. 
268 Founded in 2011 after the uprising, this leftist party initially gathered former members of the Tagammu 
Party. Internal divisions led many members opposing the party’ siding with the repression of the army and 
the police after the coup to leave in November 2013 and found the Bread and Freedom Party. 
269 Founded in late 2013 by former members of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, it is also a leftist party 
promoting the goals of the 2011 “revolution”. 
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Hani, a member of the April 6 youth Movement in Aswan, used to be involved in the 
South Centre for Rights (Markaz al-janub lil-haqq), an initiative founded by 
“revolutionary” youth and lawyers270 that used, since the 2011 uprising, to post on its 
YouTube page videos of protests and the “revolution” in southern Upper Egypt, including 
in Aswan, Luxor, Qena and Sohag provinces271. As such, it constitutes a precious source 
of information about protests in the region, including during the 2011 and 2013 uprisings. 
First registered as a law firm in 2013, the South Centre for Rights registered in 2015 at 
the Ministry of Solidarity as the South Foundation for Economic and Social Studies 
(Mo’assasat al-janub lil-derasat al-iqtiṣadiyya wal ijtima‛iyya). It now has a website272 
and a Facebook page273, on which it denounces Upper Egypt’s economic and social 
marginalisation. Aiming to defend social and economic rights, the centre has organised 
training sessions and conferences on various issues. For instance, it hosted in 2013 a talk 
about independent unions by labour activist and former presidential candidate Khaled Ali. 
It claims its support for peasants and workers planning to form independent unions. Hani 
had previously been involved in Muhammad al-Baradei’s NAC. When the 2011 uprising 
erupted, he was at university in Port Said. He managed to go to Tahrir Square in Cairo on 
28 January 2011, and has pursued his political and social activism since then.     
 
In Aswan province, there are also many activists dedicated to advocating the Nubian 
cause. Increasingly active and organised since the 2011 uprising, they are often members 
of the General Nubian Union or the Nubian Union of associations274, as well as various 
political parties. These organisations, and particularly the General Nubian Union in 
Aswan, contributed to Nubians’ mobilisation, including for the 2011 sit-in at the 
governorate building. While many Nubians were wary of adopting an opposition stance, 
some of the youngest had joined “revolutionary” movements, thus distancing themselves 
from elders traditionally close to Mubarak’s NDP. For instance, Olfat is a young pro-
revolution lawyer involved in various political and social campaigns, not all related to the 
Nubian cause. Some rare renowned leaders of the Nubian cause were now resolutely in 
the opposition such as Fawzi, a leading member in Muhammad al-Baradei’s Constitution 
                                                          
270 The researcher Zaineb Abul-Magd was also among the founders of the initiative. 
271 https://www.youtube.com/user/scregy1. 
272 http://sfess.org/. 
273 https://www.facebook.com/S.C.R013/info/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page_info. 
274 Comprised of about 40 associations based in various Nubian villages, the union has its headquarters in 
central Aswan. It has a role of coordination, tries to speak for all these organisations and act as an 
intermediary with the authorities.  
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Party, who was among the organisers of the Nubian sit-in at Aswan’s governorate 
building in 2011. Since the 2011 uprising, Nubians have mobilised on various occasions 
(see chapter 1), obtaining the inclusion in the current constitution of their right to return 
to their ancestral lands on the Nile banks south of Aswan within ten years. However, a 
2014 presidential decree, the famous “444”, questioned this right. Approved by the 
Parliament in January 2016, the “444” presidential decree prohibited settlement in a big 
stretch of land next to the border with Sudan, making it a new restricted military zone 
located in old Nubian territory. In February 2016, Nubian activists mainly affiliated with 
the General Nubian Union, staged a protest against this allegedly anti-constitutional 
presidential decree at Abu Simbel Temple. 
 
In addition, many social and political local activists turned out to be formerly affiliated 
with President Mubarak’s ruling NDP. Many of them claimed they had chosen to join the 
NDP because it used to be the only way to get access to officials and resources in order 
to be able to provide services to their community: 
 
  “Why did we join the NDP? We entered the NDP to achieve interests for the 
village.”275 
 
 “I was in the NDP not because I liked its policies, but to provide services to the 
village. We used to see our brothers, with different views…who could not take any 
services from the country…. We felt we could not provide anything, any services, any 
plus, to our country… So our direction is the ongoing way to get services… it’s not 
political thinking… personally, I have nothing to do with politics apart that I like to know, 
hear and see… but no politics like opposing to a political issue… and it eventually proved 
that I was right… because I found out that everything we knew was a lie… the truths that 
we knew from state figures, from the big officials of the state…”276 
 
I elaborate on this strategy below, while showing that beyond the provision of services, 
many of these activists, including those who were active in 2013 and 2014 in pro-Sisi 
campaigns such as Kammil Gamilak and Mustaqbal Watan, have electoral ambitions. 
Opportunistic, simply pragmatic, or perhaps far-seeing activists in their thirties and forties 
                                                          
275 Interview with Muhammad H., 46, Agriculture Ministry employee, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
276 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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such as Hamdi in Kom Ombo (see chapter 3) or Al-Teri in Al-Hebeil, said they preferred 
to be in pro-government organisations so that they could prepare the youth, including 
themselves, to win the mahalliyyat, the election of the local councils. Thus they implicitly 
recognised pro-government parties and organisations as the best placed, organised and 
resourceful to win seats. This pro-government affiliation also gave them the ability to act 
as mediators between local authorities and more ordinary people, among whom they 
therefore tend to enjoy a good reputation thanks to provided services. However, many of 
these former NDP members were somehow ambivalent: they did not hide their pro-
government stance, while sometimes claiming that they had been on the side of the 25 
January “revolution”. As Tariq in Abul Rish (see chapter 2), they often justified this 
support by their internal opposition to corrupt businessmen close to Gamal Mubarak such 
as Ahmed Ezz or Zakaria Azmi, whom they blamed for the deterioration of the former 
ruling party’s integrity, which culminated with the spectacular rigging of the 2010 
parliamentary elections. This ambivalence is similar to the stance of ruling party members 
who participated in the Tunisian uprising (Allal and Cooper 2012). Sometimes but not 
always close to pro-government circles, protest leaders are also union leaders. I have 
already mentioned, in the previous chapters, the cases of Tariq and Hamdi.  
 
Other activists in Luxor and Aswan claimed no membership in or affiliation with any 
organisation or movement, just like Sabri, who led the mobilisation against the Kima 
Canal in Abul Rish (see chapter 2). While being a supporter of the “revolution” and after 
participating in Hamdeen Sabbahi’s presidential campaign in 2012 in Aswan, he was no 
longer involved in any movement or party277. An independent activist from Esna, south 
of Luxor, Zaineb had also left the Constitution Party, while continuing to support the 
“revolution”. At 30, Zaineb has a vocational diploma in business, and is currently 
studying journalism. She previously worked as a local reporter, but stopped because she 
considered the media to not be free and preferred to be independent.  
 
2.2. Mobilising, exchanging and building connections 
 
Activists network and exchange knowledge and ideas through various means as online 
social media, and during different kinds of events, including training sessions and 
conferences organised by human rights groups or political parties. Those who are able to 
                                                          
277 Interview with Sabri, 28, airport customs inspector, Aswan, February 2014. 
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do so, of course, attend training sessions, sometimes elsewhere in their region or in Cairo. 
However, mobility is the privilege of some well-connected people who are able, 
sometimes, to secure grants from NGOs organising trainings to fund their trips. Women 
have even less mobility since Upper Egyptian women travelling on their own are 
generally bad perceived, even when they are allowed to do so. Otherwise, activists are 
sometimes able to travel not too long distance in their region. For instance, in March 
2015, a training on human rights issues and international laws and conventions took place 
in Aswan. Independent activists or members of groups such as the April 6 Youth 
Movement from Aswan, Luxor and Sohag, participated in this training session, which 
lasted about three days. Three of the activists I had been following attended the event, 
where they met for the first time: Sabri from Abul Rish, Nabil from Luxor, and Zaineb 
from Esna. Having found common interests, they remained in touch. In addition, other 
relatively known young activists participated, including Ibrahim, a young journalist from 
Aswan who used to work for the media al-Badil, an activist close to Olfat, whom I 
previously mentioned, and Alaa, a member of the 6 April Youth Movement in Luxor.  
 
Zaineb was shocked by the resources that some organisations could deploy for these 
trainings. She denounced a gulf between human rights organisations’ principles and the 
reality of the costly trainings they organised, a waste of money according to her. She 
mentioned the example of a training by a Cairo-based group, the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Graduates (Markaz al-Qahira likhariji huquq al-insan)278 at the five-star 
Sonesta Hotel in Luxor. The event undoubtedly cost too much money for Zaineb, 
including an open buffet with a multitude of appetisers she had never seen in her life279.  
 
Khaled, involved in the Kima Canal issue, also mentioned previous mutual visits and 
trainings with other groups denouncing pollution in Giza and Suez, but said that these did 
not go very far. During regional trainings, they met people suffering from similar 
problems elsewhere, said they should meet again but never did so. He said that in Aswan 
they no longer had the financial resources to organise these visits, and that coordination 
with others working on the same issues elsewhere was difficult because each group did 
not entirely cover its own area of intervention280. This suggests that the priority for some 
                                                          
278 In reality, it is the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, an NGO founded in 1993. Zaineb probably 
mixed the name of the organisation with the topic of the event.  
279 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
280 Interview with Khaled, accountant, Aswan, April 2015. 
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activists may be to first work and obtain results in their region, before considering to ally 
with others elsewhere in Egypt.  
 
Apart from specialised activist networks, leaders rely on multiple, sometimes 
overlapping, local social networks in order to mobilise, including those based in popular 
cafés, professional clubs, youth centres, religious sites, family associations, as well as 
cultural, religious and kin-based networks. I previously mentioned that Nubians had many 
welfare and cultural associations, while Christians and other minority groups also have 
their own organisations. In addition, activists build new connections during episodes of 
mobilisation. Thus, in Aswan and Luxor alike, those who participated in diverse protests 
in 2011 met again later, either in other demonstrations (for example on 30 June 2013), or 
when they got involved in local or national campaigns or other newly-politicised 
networks. As a result, most activists in each place knew each other at least by sight or 
reputation. 
 
This non-exhaustive description of activists, leaders and protest organisers’ profiles and 
networks has aimed at showing the great diversity of actors possessing a mobilising 
potential. It has also attempted to show that even though the typical local activist 
community is small with its representatives largely able to identify fellows of past 
mobilisations and campaigns, contacts with activists based in other regions, especially 
elsewhere in Upper Egypt, were not that uncommon. These took place not only via 
Facebook but also during various events generally organised by human rights groups. 
Yet, these transregional connections have not given birth to large-scale, durable protest 
movements able to mobilise the ordinary. In search of an answer to this query, I now 
analyse local leaders’ strategies.   
 
3. Leaders’ strategies: focusing on the local or seeking to coordinate at a wider 
level? 
 
How do potential leaders and activists campaign, attempt to mobilise others, expand their 
networks and acquire knowledge? I here expose their main strategies corresponding to 
diverse motivations. I distinguish strategies prioritising local concerns, including 
providing services and joining family associations, from those motivated by national 
ambitions, such as joining a political party, a national movement or a specific campaign. 
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I argue that, even though many activists have proved their ability to locally mobilise their 
relatives, friends, neighbours, and other regional fellows on some occasions, they have 
been constrained from embarking on wider-scale coordination by two main sorts of 
difficulties, both affecting their personal motivations, their mobilising ambitions, and 
their organisational capacities and efficiency. On the one hand, they have been operating, 
especially since the July 2013 military coup, under extremely repressive conditions. This 
has led many opposition activists, now increasingly discredited and facing a constant 
danger of being arrested and imprisoned, to adopt a more discrete stance. At the same 
time, previous Mubarak-era NDP networks started to resurface, providing pro-
government activists with resources to maintain and build new constituencies. On the 
other hand, complying with the requirements of ordinary citizens’ political culture 
remains for many trendsetter activists, or outsiders, a serious challenge. While they do 
not always have access to key support networks and resources to satisfy people’s demand 
for the provision of services, they also face the populace’s general distrust of politicians 
and politics in general. Overall, such difficulties have limited leaders’ organisational and 
mobilisation capacities at the local level, as well as their ambitions for escalation or 
coordination at a larger scale. 
 
In addition to the media, online social media, local and informal social networks, which 
all provide spaces and tools for mobilisation campaigns, leaders have access to several 
means of campaigning depending on their motivations and purposes. Joining political 
parties is essential for some activists, but proved to be an only transitory step for others 
seeking to acquire political experience since the 2011 uprising. Many others have been 
active in local or regional cultural, welfare and human rights associations. The majority 
has been involved in at least one political or social campaign, whether national or local. 
Their motivations behind chosen strategies have varied, from curiosity and a new or 
renewed interest in politics in general, to the purpose of becoming known and acquiring 
support, at least locally. 
 
3.1. Campaigning in a repressive environment 
 
In early 2014, when I first started my fieldwork in Upper Egypt, ihbāt was felt by most 
young supporters of the 25 January 2011 uprising. They had been forced to leave streets 
and squares across Egypt by a not only violent but also vicious, multiform crackdown. 
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They had been excluded, along with other opponents to the authoritarian military rule, 
from the conventional political arena. Yet, many of them remained active, trying to find 
means of political participation that would still be tolerated by the authorities. Therefore, 
their non-resort to risky actions whose coordination would exceed the local scale must be 
put into perspective with the constraints of a renewed repression. 
 
Unsurprisingly, protests have been relatively scarce since July 2013. By 2014, most of 
the opposition activists I met in the Sa‛id had stopped organising or attending protests 
mainly due to the repressive environment. Witnessing a small protest in support of 
presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabbahi in Aswan’s Station Square in March 2014, I 
could realise myself how public protests had become marginal. Activists involved in a 
campaign to support Sabbahi, mainly members in the Nasserist Party and 
“revolutionaries”, had agreed on Facebook, by calling or sending mobile text messages 
to each other, to meet at 4.30 pm in a café on the square prior to starting the protest. The 
majority arrived late and many of them, including the girl who had informed me, never 
showed up. The protest started at around 5.45 pm, was attended by about 15 people, and 
did not last for more than half-an-hour. Protesters chanted “I am a revolutionary and I 
support Hamdeen, I am neither a liar nor a religion trader”. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Protesters standing in support for Hamdeen Sabbahi in Aswan, March 2014. 
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A second-year student in tourism and hotels in Luxor, Alaa, 21, is one of the last active 
members of the April 6 Youth Movement in the region since President Morsi’s removal. 
In November 2014, he said they were only five at a protest in commemoration of 
Muhammad Mahmud protesters’ killing, after which they were taken to the bandar, the 
police station. Policemen warned them against demonstrating again and, just because they 
had organised a protest, accused Alaa and his friends of supporting the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Alaa said he had attended a last protest with another seven people on 25 
January 2015. After being in the “nation without torture” (Watan bi lā ta‛zīb) 
campaign281, he is now in a human rights group, attempting to give more visibility to local 
problems and acting as intermediary in issues such as the “pipes mafia”282.  
 
In the repressive context that has prevailed in Egypt since 3 July 2013, the primary space 
for most activists to share ideas, discuss grievances and extend their networks, remains 
Facebook. Like Nabil (see above), many activists strive to report violations and incidents 
that are little covered or totally ignored by the mainstream media. Against the official 
stance, they write what they see, denounce cases of human rights breaches or corruption, 
spread news on underreported or non-reported events, share opinions, discuss, comment, 
on a daily basis. They claim this role of reporting to raise awareness about issues 
occurring even in remote and poorly known places. Zaineb explained that she had 
abandoned a more formal kind of journalism in order to be more independent. She said 
she posted articles on local issues on the Facebook page and the press blog Shabab al-
Nil283 (“the Youth of the Nile”), and mentioned Esna news and Luxor baladna (“our 
country Luxor”), a video page. This private, informal, home-based reporting has never 
ceased despite the arrest and detention since 2013 of numerous activists and more 
ordinary people denouncing abuses from behind their screens. Zained denounced the 
increasing danger of reporting on violations: 
 
 “We started to be afraid of fear itself.”284 
 
                                                          
281 Launched in 2012, this nationwide initiative fights against torture.  
282 This popular label designates the people who sell the butane gas pipes at high prices in the black market 
during recurring periods of shortages.  
283 Managed by young people claiming a different way of doing journalism, the initiative has a website: 
http://shbabalnil.com. 
284 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
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Additionally, activists sometimes use their networks in media circles to increase the 
visibility of an issue. For example, Nabil asked a journalist friend to make a reportage on 
the football field issue in Al-Hebeil following a request by his local friend Salman (see 
chapter 2). This constitutes both a way to provide a service, through calling a person 
having a concrete means to help, and a step further to report on an irregularity. 
 
3.2. Trying to comply with the local political culture by providing direct services 
 
Often presented by activists as a main purpose of their actions, providing direct services 
to ordinary citizens is nonetheless a strategy to gain visibility and support among 
constituents. This is particularly true in a social environment governed by patron-client 
relationships, characterised by a high level of clientelism, understood as “the 
particularised exchange of votes and support for goods, favours, and services between the 
poor and the elites”285 or, to put it simply, “a relationship between parties of unequal 
status that involves some form of exchange”286. At the same time, failing public services 
impel many ordinary people to rely on actors other than the state to obtain what they need. 
In the Upper Egyptian countryside in particular, leadership requires the ability to provide 
services to ordinary citizens. In exchange, activists acquire credibility, popularity and the 
loyalty of their people.  
 
This apparent pragmatism of the ordinary, who tend to prioritise the immediate 
satisfaction of a specific need rather than bet on a representative who will plead their 
cause on a larger scale, apparently stems from a poor opinion of politics in general and 
politicians in particular. Indeed, the everyday experience of flawed interactions with the 
state have been maintaining most ordinary people at a distance. Local representatives of 
the authorities are often seen, at best, powerless and incompetent to solve their problems 
and/or, at worse, malicious and corrupt. Some ordinary people openly expressed mistrust 
towards politics and state institutions in general: 
 
 “Security forces in the whole country do not fulfil their duty. Because there is no 
security, there are thugs, explosions. Security is also doubtful. The role of judges, officers, 
                                                          
285 Javier Auyero, Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2001). 
286 Lisa Blaydes and Safinaz El Tarouty, “Women's Electoral Participation in Egypt: The Implications of 
Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, pp. 364-380. 
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soldiers. They are the ones who have the weapons, and they are unable to fix the country 
[…] and the ordinary people does not want anything other than being well in its eating, 
drinking, health and these things […] they don’t care about politics”.287  
 
Such perceptions explain that ordinary people sometimes turn to those who can intercede 
on their behalf with the local authorities, assist them to overcome bureaucratic 
complexities and corrupt officials, protect them from various abuses, and so on. They also 
explain why many people continued to support local pro-government, generally ex-NDP 
activists, or MB leaders, rewarded for their services. Such loyalty to service providers 
may affect mobilisation processes for protests in the same way it does for elections. For 
instance, I met several people who told me that they had taken to the streets to express 
support for the MB after President Morsi’s removal because members of the MB were 
honest people who used to be known for their kindness and generosity.  
 
Aged 39, Al-Teri was a parliamentary candidate competing on the pro-government list of 
Mustaqbal Watan in Al-Hebeil in 2015. He holds a mājistīr (a master’s degree) in history 
of sciences and civilisation. A bazar owner, he started his political career when he was 
30. Before the 2011 uprising, he had always run against NDP candidates, in 2005 and 
2010. He participated in the 2011 and 2013 uprisings in Luxor. In 2012, he voted for 
Hamdeen Sabbahi at the presidential elections. Formerly independent, Al-Teri this time 
chose the list of Mustaqbal Watan Party because it mainly comprised youth. He insisted 
on the ability to provide services to local residents as a major criterion for a politician to 
succeed in Upper Egypt. In other words, the credibility of a political figure relied on 
his/her ability to deliver on what ordinary citizens typically expected. Therefore, the 
ability to provide services was the most important criteria to win political support: 
  
“Thank God, we have a good base and presence in the street”.288 
 
“Before running in elections, go serve the village first”.289 
 
                                                          
287 Interview with Dina, 33, housewife (Bachelor in social services), Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
288 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
289 Ibid. 
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For candidates such as Al-Teri, proving the ability to provide services was the main 
purpose of campaign strategies to convince local constituents. Al-Teri’s phone rang 
several times during our meeting, which made me suggest to him to answer to what could 
be an emergency. He had just been talking about the mediation role he had been 
performing between ordinary citizens and the bureaucratic apparatus: 
 
“The state administrative apparatus is not adapted for each citizen to go to this 
place to receive his service. There are specific things such as routine, which stand against 
him, the citizen himself is ignorant, he does not know, for instance, how to bring his right. 
[…] I serve him and teach him at the same time”.290 
 
Al-Teri answered the call and mentioned the words “hospital” and “doctor”, and everyone 
understood he was trying to arrange an appointment for someone needing medical 
assistance. Albeit unplanned, this call was another occasion to show how he was helping 
his more ordinary fellow citizens. This role of mediation between the ordinary citizen and 
the local authorities or public services has often been raised by respondents as an 
important criteria of respect for a leader.  
 
On a larger scale, politicians are described by most respondents as ambitious opportunists 
seeking their own interest, sometimes as “sons of a dog”291, while politics is called a 
“dirty game”. In addition, political parties remain largely unknown, except the populist 
ones. The former ruling NDP and its remnants are identified by everyone. Islamist parties 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi Nour Party 
are also known to most people. Otherwise, the ordinary Upper Egyptians that I met often 
qualified political parties as “decoration”, meaning that they considered they had no 
popular base or meaningful presence in the field, and that they were useless to them, 
except for the NDP and some Islamist parties, which have provided services. In addition, 
the proliferation of parties after the 2011 uprising left ordinary people confused: 
 
 “The parties…Honestly, I am not convinced by them. Their number increased… 
The most important thing is not to have a party, the most important is to do something”.292 
                                                          
290 Ibid.  
291 Interview with Hala, 50, public sector employee, Qena, May 2014. 
292 Interview with Fatma, 44, accountant, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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 “We don’t want parties in the country. For us, the most important is to have a 
good president, and judges. They are the ones who will fix the country”.293 
 
Among these “decorative” or “cartoon” parties (ahzāb cartūniyya), old leftist parties such 
as the Nasserist al-Karama Party retain some presence in Upper Egypt. However, they 
are largely forsaken. In Aswan, Al-Senoussi, the head of the local branch of the Nasserist 
Party, is a well-known and respected figure. He hosted me twice at the central Aswan’s 
dusty office of the party, in a meeting room which, despite its golden statue of former 
President Nasser, no longer hosted crowds.  
 
Regardless of their political affiliation, southern Upper Egyptian activists and potential 
leaders are aware of this political culture. They are also aware that loyalty usually goes 
to those who provide assistance and/or protection, which can be key in (de)mobilisation. 
Indeed, why would people take risks for a few adventurers making promises for the 
future, but unable to offer anything concrete in the time being? Therefore, activists’ 
strategies often attempt to meet the requirements of this particular local reality, aiming 
first of all to gain the sympathy of their fellow citizens through offering services. 
However, the local logics of patronage and loyalty to service providers constitute a 
serious obstacle to many activists. In particular, “revolutionary” activists have been 
facing difficulties to compete with Islamist activists and former NDP members now often 
in pro-Sisi groups, seen as the traditional service providers. In Upper Egypt as elsewhere, 
most political activist networks are based in cities, rather than in rural areas, even though 
some activists come from the countryside. This partly explains why “revolutionary” 
activists are less known in rural areas, where many people told me, for instance, that they 
believed the April 6 Youth Movement was made up of agitators paid by foreign entities 
(see chapter 3). They have largely suffered from their inability to provide services in these 
rather rural areas where patron-client relationships still prevail, and where the poorest 
tend to seek the protection of those, well connected to the local authorities, who have 
access to a very wide range of resources. Not only do these encompass material resources 
for everyday needs, but they also include the ability to intercede for the provision of all 
kinds of services, ranging from an emergency appointment with a doctor, to assistance 
for administrative steps and giving a ride to some remote place. Apart from officially 
apolitical family associations which provide all kinds of services to their community, two 
                                                          
293 Interview with Dina, 33, housewife (Bachelor in social services), Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
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types of actors have traditionally fulfilled this mission: organisations or activists who are 
members of or are close to the ruling National Democratic Party on the one hand, and 
Islamist organisations, networks and mosques affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, al-
Jama‛a al-Islamiyya or Salafi entities, on the other. When I undertook my field research 
in the post-Morsi era, many Islamist organisations had been weakened by repression, 
which forced them to essentially return to clandestinity. However, there was a revival of 
the first group despite the ban on the NDP.  
 
While many activists have been complaining about their lack of resources to further 
enhance their base through providing services, others have been abiding by the existing 
rules and supporting the authorities in order to have access to resources. Indeed, contrary 
to “revolutionaries”, many activists said they had entered pro-regime organisations to 
have access to resources. Five years after the 2011 uprising, many politicians were aware 
that the essential principles driving patron-client relationships, namely loyalty and 
support in exchange for the direct provision of services, remained. Al-Teri explained that 
he had joined the pro-government list of Mustaqbal Watan because if elected, this would 
allow him to get access to the wide resources of an organised entity: 
 
 “The party proved its success in the presidential elections and the constitution… 
[…] After winning, I will have with me a party or organisation through which I will be 
able to have an impact…”294 
 
Aged 39, Hesham is a teacher at a vocational school. He participated in teachers’ protests 
following the 2011 uprising, but also mediated between other workers and the local 
authorities. He supported a strike by natural gas workers, and obtained permanent 
contracts for 11 among them. Later, he attempted to speak for garbage collectors also 
demanding permanent contracts because, he said, they were unorganised and relatively 
ignorant295. Hesham is well connected to pro-government networks. Having several 
relatives employed by the governorate, he is also a former member of Mubarak’s NDP 
and of Aswan’s local council. 
 
 
                                                          
294 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
295 Interview with Hesham, 39, school teacher, Aswan, March 2014. 
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3.3. Taking part in local or national campaigns 
 
Generally devoid of significant financial resources, activists who belong neither to 
Islamist networks nor to pro-government circles have been attempting to provide some 
assistance in areas where they have acquaintances. Despite difficulties, many opposition 
activists have remained active in their community and beyond. Some attempts to provide 
direct services have included citizen campaigns undertaken thanks to the initiatives of 
some local activists. For instance, activists have cleaned streets and public spaces on 
various occasions. In Aswan in particular, activist campaigns have flourished since the 
2011 uprising. Some initiatives and movements seeking to respond to nationwide changes 
had often been founded in Cairo before giving birth to local versions. For instance, ‛askar 
kādhebūn (“military liars”) aimed at denouncing violations of human rights and others by 
the armed forces. Launched by young “revolutionaries” in December 2011 after security 
forces’ massacre of protesters near the Council of Ministers in Cairo, the nationwide 
campaign vowed to reveal the truth about the alleged crimes and lies of the ruling SCAF, 
denounce army and police violence against protesters, and gather evidence against or 
beyond what the mainstream media abstained from showing. It essentially circulated 
pictures and videos on YouTube and social media, and projected videos on big screens 
during events in various governorates. The idea was to dissociate in the eyes of the general 
public the army as an institution from the SCAF, which allegedly committed crimes 
against civilians. More recently, some MB supporters used the campaign to denounce 
security forces’ exactions against them296. In Aswan, I met several activists who had been 
active in ‛askar kādhebūn. 
 
‛alashānik ya baladī (“For you my country”) aimed at fighting poverty and 
unemployment and providing services to local communities. A development association 
based in Cairo, the latter was founded in 2002 and has an English website297. Its activities 
have mainly relied on volunteerism and university student networks, and have expanded 
in the governorates from 2010 onwards. Both young volunteers in ‛alashānik ya baladī 
in Aswan, Hani and his friend Shazli said local actions of the association had included a 
campaign entitled “the exemplary neighbourhood” to clean streets (in March 2012298 and 
                                                          
296 https://www.facebook.com/official.page.4.rab3a/?fref=ts. 
297 http://www.ayb-sd.org/ayb2/.  
298 http://www.masress.com/elbalad/110806. 
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January 2014299) and distributing second-hand clothes300. They explained that they 
usually refrained from talking about politics with local residents to whom they provided 
services301. Activists of ‛alashānik ya baladī also distributed blankets to the poor and 
orphans in various villages in Aswan province in January 2014. The association’s Aswan 
activists have a Facebook page302.  
 
Other groups sought to attract larger constituencies through declaring an apolitical stance. 
Founded in February 2013 in Aswan, ḍidd al-tayyar (“against the current”) is a student 
movement claiming on its Facebook page303 its support for the “revolution” and the poor, 
and its opposition to violence. It says it is not affiliated with any political party, and has 
no electoral ambitions. Yet, the movement chose to support presidential candidate 
Hamdeen Sabbahi in 2014. One of the most active figures in ḍidd al-tayyar, Haytham is 
in his early twenties. A known “revolutionary” in Aswan, he chanted slogans in the 
previously mentioned protest to support Hamdeen Sabbahi for president in March 2014. 
Haytham had participated in most protests and campaigns in Aswan since 2011, including 
in the uprising itself while he was only 17, in the sit-in against Governor Mostafa al-
Sayyed, in Tamarrod and 30 June demonstrations. He was also active in ‛alashānik ya 
baladī. He was opposing both military rule and the MB, but had voted for Morsi in 2012 
as many other “revolutionaries” fearing that Ahmed Shafiq would have restored 
Mubarak’s regime. Despite his young age, Haytham seemed respected among Aswan’s 
activist circles, and probably comes from a well-known and connected family that has 
been able, so far, to protect him from security forces’ crackdown. He explained that, 
despite its initial apolitical stance, ḍidd al-tayyar had to intervene and support Hamdeen 
Sabbahi to express its opposition to the military state, call for a civilian state and protect 
the “revolution”. Indeed, Haytham goes on, the “revolution” was then in the doldrums. 
While the most powerful ball the “revolutionary” youth used to have was the mīdān, they 
were increasingly losing it. “People in the streets started to hate you”304, Haytham 
deplored. Ḍidd al-tayyar’s other claimed purposes are to improve ordinary people’s 
political awareness and improved participation, the achievement of the goals of the 
“revolution” (bread, freedom and social justice), and justice for its “martyrs”. For 
                                                          
299 http://www.masress.com/ona/1435532. 
300 Informal conversation with Hani and Shazli, Aswan, January 2014. 
301 Ibid. 
302 https://www.facebook.com/HrktlshankYabldy. 
303 https://www.facebook.com/dedeltyar. 
304 Informal conversation with Haytham, 20, university student, Aswan, April 2014. 
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example, its activists organised campaigns of awareness about the new constitution in late 
2013, to explain its importance to ordinary people. They also participated in welfare 
activities, far from politics. For instance, they distributed clothes and food boxes to the 
poor during Ramadan, without putting any logo or slogan, to avoid potential accusations 
of attempting to exploit people politically305. They also participated in the celebration of 
the orphan day. “We are continuing…until these people take their rights”306, Haytham 
said.  
 
Activists of ḍidd al-tayyar participated in many campaigns and protests, particularly in 
2013 and 2014. In July 2014, they opposed the rise in fuel prices and recurring water cuts. 
In December 2014, they attended a protest against former President Mubarak’s acquittal 
in Aswan’s Station Square. The movement’s Facebook page has also served as a space to 
share news, including during the clashes between the Halayil and Dabudiyya tribes in 
Aswan between April and June 2014. It published news about and pictures of pro-MB 
protests in Aswan in January 2014, of incidents where MB supporters reportedly set on 
fire security vehicles with Molotov cocktails in November and December 2013, of an 
alleged MB supporter who was shot dead in December 2013 and presented as the first of 
this kind in Aswan, of 20 youth who were arrested in Aswan in a protest against the new 
protest law in November 2013, of 30 June 2013 anti-MB protests in Aswan in which 
many women took part. In November 2013, the movement announced its temporary 
suspension due to reasons “against its will”: this likely happened after some of its 
members, including Haytham, were arrested at a demonstration against the new protest 
law. However, the campaign has been largely inactive since December 2014 but kept, as 
of August 2015, releasing news about local cases of corruption.  
 
In the aftermath of President Morsi’s ouster, some activists tried to transcend political, 
communal, and sometimes tribal differences. For example, wahhadūha was an initiative 
by some of the most renowned activists and lawyers of the “revolution” in Aswan, to 
reunify ranks in the context of the deepening polarisation between supporters of the 
military-backed power on the one hand, and those of the Muslim Brotherhood on the 
other. The first who told me about it was Wael R., a lawyer and one of the founders of 
the initiative. Mahdi, another well-known “revolutionary” in Aswan, was also among the 
                                                          
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
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founders. However, the initiative quickly became inactive, probably because the third 
way it proposed could not convince at the time and certainly because of the increasing 
repression of the activists leading it. Haytham, who was also involved in it, explained that 
wahhadūha was a great idea to strengthen revolutionary ranks, but it could not work at a 
time when most people did not want to hear others’ opinions307. Activists behind 
wahhadūha’s Facebook page308 essentially posted news and pictures about topics that 
mattered to them, including protests against police brutality. The same activists were 
often involved in other movements and campaigns gathering Aswan’s “revolutionaries”, 
including ḍidd al-tayyar, Tamarrod, and the Aswan branches of the “Revolution Youth 
Coalition” and Kifaya.  
 
More inclusive, seeking to gather a wider public than Aswan’s “revolutionaries”, Lamm 
al-shaml was another self-proclaimed apolitical initiative aiming at transcending political 
divisions and tribes to provide services, mainly in the health sector. I will attempt to 
demonstrate below through an analysis of the first meetings of Lamm al-shaml campaign 
the challenges faced by such initiatives and their leaders, once they had convened a few 
meetings and created a Facebook page. Indeed, social and political divisions have proved 
hard to transcend, especially in the polarised context that has prevailed since July 2013. 
Many initiators and members of these initiatives renounced their commitments when they 
faced organisational challenges, the identifying of priorities, a certain lack of vision for 
the provision of services, and a visibility and communication concern. Because of the 
impossibility to get organised around a commonly agreed agenda, most of these local 
initiatives quickly vanished or became almost inactive, reporting news on Facebook from 
time to time at the best. 
 
Overall, young activists generally got involved in such campaign actions on an individual 
basis and without systematically displaying the role of the organisation or group they 
belonged to for fear of retaliation or bad reaction in areas where they were poorly known. 
In consequence, revolutionary activists did not often take credit for their possible actions, 
and have appeared powerless in gathering support beyond their traditional predominantly 
young, urban, educated networks. If the participation in local or national campaigns has 
certainly taught them a lot about the political world, about their rights and ways to 
                                                          
307 Informal conversation with Haytham, 20, university student, Aswan, April 2014. 
308 https://www.facebook.com/wa7doha/?fref=nf. 
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promote them, and has enabled them to acquire new connections and widen their 
networks, it has not allowed them to gain a foothold in the local political landscape.  
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, pro-Sisi campaigns that emerged in the wake of the 
3 July ouster of President Morsi did not face such difficulties. National campaigns such 
as Kammil Gamilak and then Mustaqbal Watan, were often carried out by local activists 
who used to be close to the NDP under Mubarak. Still active, Kammil Gamilak in Aswan 
has its own Facebook page309. Now a political party, Mustaqbal Watan has 58 seats in the 
Parliament and an official website310. It claims its support for the 25 January and 30 June 
“revolutions”, and its mainly young membership. In the wake of the 30 June uprising, 
other pro-army campaigns appeared, including in labour circles of Upper Egypt. 
Muhammad, a 45-year-old quality manager at the sugar factory in Armant and a union 
leader, was involved with some of his colleagues in ‛ummāl li-ajl Miṣr lida‛m al-jaysh fi 
ard wujūd al-irhāb (“Workers for Egypt Supporting the Army in the Era of Terror”). This 
nationwide campaign was also present in Minya and Mahalla al-Kubra. 
 
Because of such campaigns’ support for the government, their political affiliation was 
clearly identified and they did not fear hostile reactions. In addition, as nationally 
organised and clearly pro-government campaigns, they benefitted from all the required 
freedom they needed, from local clientelist networks, as well as financial resources. The 
latter’s source remains unclear, but many opposition activists saw in this the contribution 
of former NDP members and/or businessmen close to the army, as well as Mubarak-era 
remnants. In addition, these initiatives were rather successful in mobilising ordinary 
people because their purpose, supporting Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for president, was simple. 
And at the time, the figure of Sisi gathered all kinds of people desiring security and 
stability. Regardless of their diverse political affiliations, in their opinion, he was the 
providential man capable of restoring security and political stability in Egypt. 
 
3.4. Joining political parties 
 
I have emphasised activists and leaders’ attempts to gather support through providing 
services to potential constituencies, including via their involvement in local or national 
                                                          
309 https://www.facebook.com/KamelGmeilak.Aswan. 
310 http://www.m-watan.com/. 
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campaigns. Less frequently, activists and leaders have sought to get involved in national 
political parties either to pursue their political education, become known for actions 
undertaken under the banner of the party, build transregional networks, just out of 
curiosity, or for all these purposes. If most ordinary citizens have not expressed great 
interest in political parties, many opposition, pro-revolution activists, told me they had 
had a phase of “tourism” in political parties, especially the new ones. Some of them 
seriously committed to a party, while many others attended a few meetings and left, 
saying it was a waste of time. Aladdin, for instance, said he had joined the Free Socialists 
Party in order to do something for his province and his people311. 
 
In Luxor, Aswan and probably the rest of Upper Egypt, I have mentioned that political 
parties are generally perceived as useless, when they do not have a bad reputation. With 
the exception of the NDP or its remnants and Islamist networks, parties are not praised 
for the services they provide. More importantly, multipartyism is rather new in Egypt. 
Before the fall of Mubarak, even though some opposition parties were old and well known 
in the region such as the Nasserist Party or the Wafd Party, people were aware of their 
“decorative” function and knew that the NDP would always be the overall winner. 
Mostafa, a resident in Ballana, explained that it was hard to have an opinion about new 
parties, because the only party they used to know was the NDP, which he called the 
“National Destructive Democratic Party”312. Now that dozens of parties have emerged, 
people have shown even more confusion regarding their political intentions, platforms 
and leaders. In addition, ordinary people often have a bad perception of political parties, 
accusing them of appearing only during election time, like Salafists and other religious 
parties reportedly offering incentives in exchange for votes before the 2012 presidential 
elections. Yet, since 2011, most ordinary citizens have exercised their right to vote, 
offering a new opportunity for political parties and activists to conquer supporters. Or, at 
least, this is the way some activists envisaged it when deciding to join political parties.   
 
Finally, political parties are often perceived as decrepit and full of old people unable to 
think about new ideas, innovations and changes, by young activists seeing them as 
unsuitable for their creativity. This explains that available political parties have attracted 
only a small minority of young “revolutionary” activists, and an even smaller one since 
                                                          
311 Interview with Aladdin, 36, owner of a printing house, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
312 Interview with Mostafa, 36, heavy equipment technician, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
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30 June 2013 and now that they perceive the political scene to be closed in the same way 
it was under President Mubarak. National movements that claim their leaderless and 
networked organisation have generally attracted young people more interested in politics 
than parties. The most emblematic of these groups is the April 6 Youth Movement, whose 
members generally insisted on the youth component of the group.   
 
Eventually, activists often combined various or went from one to another of these 
different strategies and tools to get known, gather support, educate themselves and others 
politically. Young revolutionaries had often attended meetings by different political 
parties before choosing one or rejecting them altogether to the benefit of more informal 
youth groups better fitted to what they were looking for. Many “revolutionaries” had 
joined the youth groups that formed in the wake of the 2011 uprising such as the 
Revolution Youth Coalition, before integrating a party or more organised group such as 
the April 6 Youth Movement. They participated in many local and national campaigns, 
on top of which Tamarrod enabled the creation of new connections transcending the local 
scale. Other activists clearly got involved in local campaigns to provide services in order 
to become known ahead of their potential candidacy at local elections. This was the case 
of Walid, the initiator of Lamm al-shaml campaign (see below). Equally ambitious, 
Tamer, an engineer at the Water Company branch in Aswan, directly offered to help me 
get contacts for my fieldwork and come with me to many places in order to prepare for 
being a candidate at the election of local councils. He probably got involved in Lamm al-
shaml for the same purpose. The last time I saw him in April 2015, he had joined a 
political party, probably to perfect his candidate calibre. Regardless of their political 
affiliation, for many political activists like Tamer, assistance on the ground is increasingly 
becoming a strategy for becoming known and building a base (Abdalla 2016).  
 
Now that I have detailed activists and leaders’ choices of strategies, showing some of 
their difficulties and dilemmas, I will turn to a case study suggesting why these strategies 
have not enabled them to mobilise more efficiently and be able to transcend the local 
scale. The case of Lamm al-shaml campaign will be used to illustrate the various 
weaknesses of these movements relying on informal networks with an all-inclusive 
purpose, but that lack a clear project. It will ultimately demonstrate the challenges, 
whether related to the repressive context or the common political culture, that have 
prevented activists from organising more efficiently, even if only locally.  
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4. Focusing on the local: Lamm al-shaml initiative in Aswan  
 
On 14 March 2014, I attended the first meeting of a new campaign called Lamm al-shaml, 
meaning “reunite”, “reunify”, or “gather everyone”. The meeting took place at Aswan’s 
Flower Garden, on the Nile Corniche, next to the Summer Theatre. The idea of this 
initiative of Walid, a young Nubian tourist guide and renowned pro-revolution local 
activist, who graduated from Cairo’s Ain Shams University, was indeed to gather people 
from multiple tribes and political currents in order to “do something” for their common 
region. According to Walid, people had to change themselves first before being able to 
change the entire society or country. To this end, he insisted on the need to unify the youth 
and start working in the field, to prioritise social work instead of political activism, to 
participate in local projects and solve concrete problems across the governorate. I will 
show that the initial ambiguity in this new initiative’s purpose, despite its good intentions, 
has limited its success. Indeed, the dispersion of goals, the difficulties in being organised, 
and the relatively too ambitious agenda of this campaign supposed to transcend traditional 
political and tribal cleavages, have made its heterogeneous profiles quickly disperse. The 
main goals of the Lamm al-shaml initiative that were published on its Facebook page on 
22 March 2014 are the following: “Getting rid of tensions and tribalism for the youth of 
Aswan to be one hand”; “for the unity of the sons of Aswan in order to build the future 
of Aswan”; “for a resolution of all problems in Aswan”; “for the provision of 
opportunities to young people from Aswan (Parliament – local councils)”; “expose 
corruption files in Aswan”. Administrators of the page also hoped for a process of national 
reform to begin from the south of the country in order to concretise the slogan “bread, 
freedom, social justice”. These are all noble but rather vague purposes, that were listed 
without a proper strategy to implement them.   
 
Prior to convening this first meeting, Walid exchanged ideas on a new initiative with 
other youth on Facebook. After setting a date, they all contributed to bringing numbers, 
starting from their own acquaintances in Aswan and elsewhere in the governorate since 
the idea was to build a regional initiative. They mainly invited relatively known activists 
in the region, either social workers active in charities, fellows in past protests, or members 
of political parties. The latter then brought more of their acquaintances from their 
organisations, villages or neighbourhoods. Consequently, they all knew someone else 
attending the meeting, without knowing everyone. People came from different areas of 
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Greater Aswan, including al-Cubaniyya, Gharb Aswan, the High Dam area, and more 
remote places such as Edfu, Kom Ombo and Ballana, in Nasr al-Nuba. In total, I counted 
at least 23 participants in this first meeting, including some activists I had already met in 
Aswan. Profiles were varied, but the majority were men, as commonly observed in Upper 
Egypt. There were at least three women though, including Olfat, a well-known local 
Nubian pro-revolution activist, and a social worker. Although there were some very 
young people and elders, the majority was in its thirties and fourties. At this meeting and 
the two others that I had the opportunity to attend as a participant observer, there were 
Nubians, “revolutionaries”, supporters of the ex-NDP and/or of at the time presidential 
candidate Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, members of the Free Socialists Party, the Democratic 
Social Party, Kifaya, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Aswan Youth Coalition, the 
Nubian Union. Some of them also knew each other because they had attended protests 
together or participated in local campaigns such as ‛alashānik ya baladī (see above). 
However, Islamists appeared to be excluded from the initiative, as no one representing 
them was apparently present at these meetings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This image has been removed due to copyright restrictions.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Meeting of the Lamm al-shaml initiative, Aswan, 23 March 2014. 
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The first thing I noticed was the little in the way of organisation as people were stopping 
by the meeting at any time and for some of them up to two or three hours after it had 
begun, forcing Walid and other participants that had arrived early to repeat the same 
things several times. The second thing that became quickly obvious is that even Walid, 
the convenor, had no specific, determined agenda. Some participants, especially the 
youngest, quickly started to complain about the high number of meetings of this kind that 
they had attended in the past without them leading to anything, wondering about the 
concrete purpose of this one. Therefore, participants discussed possible purposes for the 
new initiative, ranging from fighting corruption, improving access to health and housing, 
to drainage issues. Some of them insisted that they did not want to talk about politics, 
which generally divided people. They objected to others who suggested that social work 
could be a way to prepare the youth for the local and parliamentary elections. Others 
complained that the resources of Aswan, a “buried treasure”, often went to Cairo instead 
of benefitting people from the region. They also denounced the lack of industrial activity 
in the region, recalling that apart from the Kima and sugar factories in Kom Ombo and 
Edfu, most plants had closed. A participant suggested focusing on health issues since 
many people had mentioned the bad situation in most hospitals in the region, specifically 
proposing to conduct a survey. However, the pro-revolution activist Olfat said that they 
had done something similar in Daraw313, had gone to the authorities with the results, but 
the latter had done nothing. While the meeting was concluding on the need to prioritise 
the health sector, a recently-arrived government supporter started to argue that the Aswan 
General Hospital was not that bad, which led to an argument with other participants 
saying that they had overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that they had had negative 
experiences, that people had died because of a failure to attend to them. The meeting 
ended in a cacophony, but participants managed to agree on a next one for a week later, 
in the same place. The government supporter left on the table a number of small 
notebooks displaying the logo of the pro-Sisi campaign Mustaqbal Watan. 
 
I had the chance to attend the next two meetings of Lamm al-shaml, the first being on 21 
March of the same year. This time, almost everyone was late, while people were coming 
in groups of two or three. I took advantage of these delays to get to know some of the 
participants, as there were new faces. I had myself brought two activists I knew: Tamer, 
a Water Company executive in his late thirties, who was instantly interested in the 
                                                          
313 7 km south of Kom Ombo and about 35 km north of Aswan, Daraw is known for its camel market. 
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initiative, probably because of his ambition to run at the next local elections as previously 
mentioned; and Sabri from Abul Rish, who told me after the meeting that most 
participants were filūl (i.e. Mubarak remnants), and that he would not attend Lamm al-
shaml again despite his friendship with Walid, whom he knew from previous 
mobilisations. In the presence of a group of Nubians, who left in the middle because they 
had another meeting at the Nubian Union, a discussion on disputes between tribes and 
Nubians follows, with some people insisting on the need to forget differences. It is strange 
now to remember these conversations, which took place only two weeks before the 
deadliest tribal feud in a long time erupted in Aswan314. After a significant group of 
participants had arrived (I counted at least 32 persons, including seven women this time), 
the meeting began in a relatively more organised way as everyone introduced 
herself/himself, saying a few words about her/his expectations. I introduced myself too, 
and two or three participants immediately expressed suspicion and annoyance towards 
my presence since I was a stranger to them: “We don’t know you”, “what’s your jiha 
(side, direction)?”, they asked. I invited them to stay with me after the end of the meeting 
to get to know each other. However, they all quickly left at the end. I would soon be 
informed by Sabri that they had specifically called Walid to ask him to tell me not to 
attend meetings anymore. Walid was too embarrassed to ask me himself, so he asked 
Sabri to talk to me. Of course, I did not insist, my purpose was never to cause problems 
or generate potentially dangerous suspicion.  
 
Participants, this time including two journalists, agreed that the previous meeting had led 
to nothing and that this time they needed to come up with a project. They endorsed Lamm 
al-shaml as the name of the initiative, meaning that they were welcoming everyone. Olfat 
and Tamer proposed to collect data in each location about residents’ problems at health 
units. Other youth got impatient, saying they wanted to work, that they had heard enough 
talking (kifāya kalām). Several participants mentioned common problems of the 
countryside, the lack of sewers, dog bites, insects and bad hygiene, the difficulty to 
cultivate land in desert areas, and so on. They talked about ways to get organised and 
coordinate, about management and leaders for each location, coming up with a decision 
to divide into committees working on different issues, mainly health and agriculture. The 
                                                          
314 Fighting erupted in Aswan between members of the Arab al-Halayil (Bani Hilal) and the Nubian al-
Dabudiyya tribes on 4 April 2014, two days after school students from both sides had exchanged insults 
following the harassment of a girl. It is only the intervention of the army that managed to end the clashes. 
About 30 people were killed in three days.  
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idea of having a different group hosting each meeting was raised. Then they started to 
allocate positions within each committee, already talking about communication issues. 
 
I attended a third meeting three days later, on 24 March, just before being told that a 
number of people were annoyed by my presence. Among the raised topics, there was the 
need to have the governor on their side, although the same people acknowledged that 
many issues were out of the latter’s hands. They talked about youth under 30’s problems 
to obtain public sector jobs, as well as a general sense of depression and fears of vendettas 
between families. Regarding the organisation of the campaign, some people mentioned 
that other meetings had been organised at the same moment and that the timing should be 
changed, which was the reason why there was a fewer number of participants this time. 
However, was a time conflict the real reason, or was it that many people, especially young 
activists, had just been disappointed by previous meetings? 
 
When I returned to Aswan in April 2015, only two persons mentioned Lamm al-shaml. 
Tamer said the initiative had been largely inactive. He had himself joined a new political 
party as head of a youth committee, and seemed busy preparing his local political future. 
Olfat was not involved in it, and said that members remaining active in the campaign had 
been preparing the coming parliamentary elections. I did not hear about the campaign 
again until February 2016, when I saw by chance a post by Walid on Facebook, saying 
they were ready to hand over evidence of incidences of corruption to the governor. The 
initiative may not be very active on the ground, but it still enjoys a virtual life. The 
Facebook page entitled “Lamm al-shaml Initiative in Aswan”315 shared on 11 November 
2015 Walid’s campaign picture, which says “the candidate of Aswan’s youth at the local 
elections…your brother / Walid Adnan…For the youth”. The creator of Lamm al-shaml 
also displayed his intention to run at the next local elections on his personal Facebook 
page316. Others among these young people, as elsewhere in Egypt, have maintained some 
kind of social or political activism in order to become known by the population ahead of 
the next mahalliyyat, the local council elections317. Although a date for the latter has not 
                                                          
315https://www.facebook.com/%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%84-
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-287258934765016/ 
316 https://www.facebook.com/Walid.adnan.3. 
317 For an analysis of young activists’ strategies aiming at winning new constituencies through securing 
seats at the next local elections, see Nadine Abdalla, “Youth movements in the Egyptian transformation: 
strategies and repertoires of political participation”, Mediterranean Politics, 21:1, 2016, 44-63. 
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been scheduled as of mid-2016, Prime Minister Sherif Ismail said in late June that they 
would be organised by the end of 2016. Tamer, Walid and other local activists’ electoral 
ambitions stem from the fact that 25% of seats within local councils are supposed to be 
allocated to the youth, in accordance with the current constitution. I have already 
mentioned how such local campaigns have increasingly constituted for some young 
activists a springboard to create a popular base, a well-assumed strategy within the current 
rules of the game, a self-limited but not less ambitious form of activism. Yet, past local 
councils had a rather bad reputation since they were mainly occupied by NDP, sometimes 
corrupt figures under President Mubarak318. 
 
In addition, recent developments suggest that Walid and a few of his friends have 
remained active as they publicly announced on Facebook that they would hand over to 
the governor of Aswan a set of files denouncing local corruption cases. On 19 February 
2016, Walid posted on his own page, as part of a campaign against corruption in the 
governorate, a new petition naming several governorate officials accused of corruption. 
Addressing his fellow Aswan citizens, who “live in a coma of personal interests”, he 
accuses outsiders (i.e. people who are not originally from Aswan) of stealing the 
belongings of Aswan sons and maintaining a corrupt system. He calls for the beginning 
of a petition campaign against all corrupt people in Aswan, urging: “Sons of Aswan, leave 
personal interests and unite for Aswan governorate”. He calls on his fellow citizens to 
reject the appointment of a new governor since all corrupt officials would remain in place, 
meaning that nothing would change.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: List of alleged corrupt governorate officials posted by Walid on Facebook, 19 February 2016. 
                                                          
318 Interview with Khaled, 43, head of sector at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
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A group of people from Ballana has also remained active in Lamm al-shaml, as suggested 
by a post on 28 March 2015 in which they called for a protest on the same day against the 
detention of three youth (including Amir, a young Nubian activist that I had interviewed 
in Ballana in 2014) for their involvement in an initiative aiming at transferring dangerous 
waste outside the village to preserve the health of their neighbours. The Free Socialists 
Party, of which several residents of Ballana are members, also shared pictures of the 
detained. Residents denounced the fact that Ballana had become the garbage dump of the 
entire governorate319, that garbage was burnt but not buried, that very dangerous toxins 
from medical waste threatened residents’ health. According to them, the governorate has 
failed to solve the problem, while residents were demanding an alternative location to 
move the waste. The protest call that was distributed, and was also shared by the Free 
Socialists Party, mentioned that the problem of the waste was not only the problem of the 
three detained young men but also the problem of all families residing in Ballana. 
Therefore, all residents were standing together to denounce this issue and demand the 
release of the detained activists. The protest call also denounced the corruption of the 
local authorities and threatened to submit lawsuits against all the officials responsible for 
the illegal garbage dumps. Administrators of the Facebook page of Lamm al-shaml have 
also been sharing information about laws on various issues such as the rights of detainees 
and environmental violations, mainly in Ballana. In the first posts, the page mainly 
highlights the purpose to fight corruption in the region. In April 2014, the page shared a 
statement opposing sectarian violence in Aswan. It also endorsed a parliamentary 
candidate for Ballana, Mostafa G., a friend of Walid on Facebook.  
 
In conclusion, the initiative, as others that have flourished since 25 January 2011, has 
alternated periods of activity mainly denouncing corrupt officials at the regional level and 
local issues such as garbage dumping in Ballana online, with times of apparent inactivity. 
Overall, far from coordinating at a larger level, the campaign has proved unable to gather 
people locally beyond differences around precise goals. Yet, it has provided to activists 
with the ambition to participate in local politics with a useful forum of discussion, a space 
to exchange ideas and raise critical issues (related to corruption, health, agriculture, public 
services), pursue their political training, build new connections and perhaps acquire new 
leadership skills. It has remained a tribune for its initiator Walid, who has been using it 
as a platform for his various initiatives and his future candidacy at the local elections. 
                                                          
319 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDywQqpLOUA&feature=youtu.be. 
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Lamm al-shaml also served as a laboratory of activism for several youths from Ballana, 
including Nubians. While activists’ presence seems to be mainly online, such initiatives 
and spaces help activists and potential leaders acquire more political experience, learn to 
deal with others, and find supporters and allies in other localities.  
 
5. Conclusion: Leaders’ limited options 
 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the vicissitudes of leadership are important to 
analyse in order to understand why most protest movements and campaigns failed to 
exceed the local scale, remaining discontinuous, ephemeral and dispersed. I have tried to 
minimise the apparent lack of experience and limited ambitions of leaders, who have 
rarely attempted to export elsewhere, for example, protests against deteriorating public 
services. Indeed, to my knowledge, activists involved in nationwide movements or 
political parties have not really engaged with their fellows based elsewhere in Egypt in 
protest campaigns over common ills that more urgently matter to ordinary citizens, such 
as water shortages or environmental problems. Defined as “the linking of two or more 
previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another 
and/or with yet other sites”320, brokerage usually enables the creation of new connections 
and collective actors, and facilitates the process of diffusion of contention. The popular 
coordination committee created by Abul Rish residents and lawyers of the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Centre in Aswan against the Kima canal was useful at least in giving 
identifiable faces to a movement and an interlocutor for the authorities (see chapter 2). It 
constituted perhaps the beginning of a process of brokerage, as in other similar 
contestations321, but has not gone further.  
 
In the wake of the work of Nadine Abdalla (2016) on youth movements’ evolving 
strategies in adaptation to the political context, this chapter has argued that movement 
activists’ self-restraint, impeding processes of brokerage, mainly came from the 
constraints of the more repressive environment since July 2013, as well as local logics of 
patronage that require leaders to provide services in order to secure support among 
                                                          
320 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
321 In Damietta, for instance, a similar popular committee against a fertiliser factory was formed by 
independent lawyers after an environmental protest that was repressed. See Sharif Elmusa and Jeannie 
Sowers, "Damietta Mobilizes for Its Environment", Middle East Report Online, October 21, 2009. 
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ordinary citizens. Additionally, the case of the Lamm al-shaml campaign illustrates many 
of the attempts of local activists to maintain some political participation despite 
repression, as well as persisting social and political divisions. Leaders’ choices appear to 
be the main factors responsible for the absence of “scale shift”, defined as “a change in 
the number and level of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention 
involving a wider range of actors and bridging their claims and identities”322. However, I 
have demonstrated how leaders’ options to acquire political experience were limited 
because of, on the one hand, risks of repression and, on the other, the difficulty to 
overcome a common political culture hostile to politicians and acknowledging as leaders 
those having the means to provide services. In the next chapter, I show how a set of 
sociocultural factors can also act as impediments to the emergence of wider protest 
movements. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Men watching Bassem Youssef’ satirical show before its banning in a café in Luxor, April 
2014. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
322 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 
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Chapter 5: Sociocultural determinants influencing (de)mobilisation: 
mobilising in Upper Egypt 
 
1. Mobilising as an Upper Egyptian  
 
Upper Egyptians or Sa‛āyda occupy a special place in Egypt’s popular culture. They are 
the almost exclusive naïve victims of Egyptian jokes, and often appear in films and soap 
operas as comic characters unaware of being hilarious. They are made fun of because they 
supposedly are backward peasants who do not understand the “modern” world, have 
exotic traditions such as polygamy, and speak a dialect that sounds funny to Cairene and 
other Lower Egyptians. Many other clichés such as their so-called propensity for violence 
often leading to sectarian or tribal conflicts give a rather bad representation of Upper 
Egyptians and their culture (Hopkins and Saad 2004). How do the natives perceive 
themselves compared to other Egyptians? A couple of years ago, I tried to explain this 
image of the Sa‛īdī in popular culture to two friends visiting from France while on a train 
to Luxor. We were sharing a compartment with three Egyptian men whom I stupidly 
assumed did not understand French, an ethnocentric prejudice on my part. Unfortunately 
for me, one of them, a native of the region of Luxor, was a fair francophone. Upset by 
what I had just said, misinterpreting as disdain my clumsy explanation of what I assumed 
was a reality of Egyptian folklore, he reprimanded me, making me feel quite embarrassed. 
Even though this man may have been particularly susceptible, he seemed to instinctively 
react to what he probably saw as a mockery of his native region by an outsider 
perpetuating clichés. This little misadventure shows that far from being indifferent to 
what others say about them, Upper Egyptians have a “strong sense of regional identity”323, 
of which they are proud and that they are willing to defend.  
 
Indeed, Upper Egypt is widely recognised as a region or a set of regions presenting a 
specific geography, history, culture and identity, which clearly distinguishes it from the 
rest of the country. Nevertheless, as I have already demonstrated in previous chapters, 
Upper Egyptians see themselves as part of Egypt. In addition, they consider that they have 
reclaimed their place as Egyptian citizens, not least through their participation in the 2011 
and 2013 uprisings. Beyond the common stereotypes, which I shall strive to break, several 
                                                          
323 Nicholas Hopkins and Reem Saad, Preface to Upper Egypt, Identity and Change, by Nicholas Hopkins 
and Reem Saad, eds., (Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2004).  
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questions inspire this chapter which addresses what it means to mobilise in Upper Egypt, 
where I carried out my research. It quickly became clear, when I was in the field and 
asked about their political participation or involvement in protests, that ordinary people 
and experienced activists alike often referred to their Sa‛īdī identity. Therefore, this 
relatively high regionalism has to be considered a parameter having potential implications 
for local mobilisation dynamics and processes. Are there any elements related to Upper 
Egyptians’ perception of their regional identity that impact (de)mobilisation? Do the 
provocative stereotyped representations of Sa‛āyda as rural, backward, ignorant, or 
conservative, possibly influence Upper Egyptians’ contentious politics? Are there social 
structures or traditions in Upper Egypt that constrain or, on the contrary, encourage 
mobilisation by the ordinary people? Are there specific Upper Egyptian sociocultural 
features that tend to prevent popular mobilisations from becoming wider?  
 
Bearing in mind that “to account for movement groups’ strategic decisions, scholars must 
pay attention to the cultural beliefs that make some tactical options attractive or 
unattractive regardless of how effective those options are likely to be”324, this chapter 
focuses on the social and cultural factors that may affect regional patterns of mobilisation 
and demobilisation. It argues that sociocultural features or their perception by ordinary 
citizens are as important as political opportunities and threats in driving and shaping 
people’s contentious politics. It assesses the importance of the sociocultural context in 
shaping the course of (de)mobilisation, and emphasises the challenges faced by Upper 
Egyptians. I acknowledge that “either indigenous innovation or external pressures can 
produce change, but that change is filtered through social and cultural processes”325. I 
argue that mobilisation is shaped, constrained, but also sometimes facilitated, by a 
number of conventions, norms, institutions, traditions and practices commonly identified 
as specific to Upper Egyptian culture and society. I identify three kinds of sociocultural 
determinants usually raised, including by the locals, as Upper Egyptian institutions and 
traditions that have the potential to influence (de)mobilisation in the region. Firstly, 
Sa‛āyda’s own perceptions of their regional identity, including matters of masculinity and 
honour, as well as feelings of remoteness and marginalisation, may be strong motivations 
to mobilise, or to stay away from northern decision-makers that have scorned and 
                                                          
324 Francesca Polletta, It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009). 
325 Hopkins and Saad, Preface to Upper Egypt, Identity and Change. 
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neglected the region. Secondly, clanship and tribalism, which generally entail loyalties, 
may standardise the stance of a group, thus driving it towards mobilisation or the contrary. 
Thirdly, a number of patriarchal constraints often hinder or influence young people and 
women’s mobilisation. 
 
Firstly, I will show that feelings of marginalisation and/or contempt by the rest of Egypt 
are important elements in Upper Egyptians’ self-identification, suggesting how their 
perceptions of a different cultural identity potentially affect decisions to participate in 
protests. Secondly, I attempt to explain how clans and tribes can encourage, limit or 
completely deter mobilisation through loyalty mechanisms. I then suggest how 
generational tensions have a mobilising potential, while the young still struggle to impose 
themselves in a society largely controlled by elders. Thirdly, I demonstrate that protests 
in the region have rarely reached significant magnitude also because women are excluded 
from most forms of activism and rarely participate in contentious episodes. I conclude 
that these different components recognised by the locals as constitutive of a specific 
Upper Egyptian culture partly prevent them from identifying with other people suffering 
the same ills elsewhere in Egypt. This is a significant impediment to the emergence of 
large, cross-regional social or protest movements.    
 
2. Being Upper Egyptian  
 
Upper Egyptians, whether from Minya or Aswan, generally display a relatively strong 
attachment to their regional identity, often referring to a set of traditions, values and a 
way of life allegedly distinguishing them from other Egyptians. This sense of belonging 
to a distinct region and culture, and the subsequent “emergence of a collective 
identification”,326 has further developed since the seventies with the migration of 
numerous Upper Egyptians to Cairo and other parts of Lower Egypt, as well as to the 
Gulf States (Miller 2004, el-Aswad 2004). Therefore, the khawāja, the stranger against 
whom this different identity is claimed, can be anyone coming from outside the region, 
whether from Cairo or abroad (Gamblin 2004). Of course, the components of this alleged 
distinct identity vary from a person to another, and Upper Egyptians who have always 
lived in the region have different discourses to those who have temporarily or 
                                                          
326 Catherine Miller, “Between Myth and Reality: The Construction of a Sa‛idi Identity in Cairo”, in 
Hopkins and Saad, eds., Upper Egypt, Identity and Change. 
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permanently left. In addition, according to the locals, the Upper Egyptian identity 
sometimes includes cultural features that can be found in the countryside elsewhere in 
Egypt, while people who live in cities such as Luxor or Aswan do not necessarily have 
the same discourse.  
 
However, the majority of Upper Egyptians express affection for social values that do not 
necessarily appear specific to the region. These often include attachment to the family, 
the respect of elders’ authority, and the commitment to essential traditions or uṣūl, ranging 
from visiting acquaintances to offer condolences, to always filling the plate of a visitor 
even if she/he says she/he is not hungry. In addition, values such as honour, bravery, 
virility and generosity are important. These are all traditions and social institutions that 
can be found among most Egyptians, elsewhere in the Middle East and beyond. Many 
scholars have studied these traditions in the Upper Egyptian context, I will therefore not 
dwell on this. What matters here is how Upper Egyptians’ specific self-identification 
potentially affects their decisions to mobilise.  
 
Nearly all the people I met in the regions of Aswan, Luxor and Qena, referred to their 
Upper Egyptian identity at least once during our meetings. I could not count the cups of 
tea I was offered during my fieldwork, or the number of times I forced myself to eat again 
to be polite, because when I attempted to decline I was told that mayinfa‛sh (it is not 
possible). As a guest, I had to drink and/or eat something because this was part of the 
local uṣūl. When I first arrived in Aswan, each time I mentioned that my mother was 
originally from the city, I was asked from which bayt (home, family) we were. Most 
people highlighted the importance, in the region, of extended families or tribes, although 
the latter was mainly referred to in the countryside. Others insisted on Upper Egyptians’ 
sentimentality or emotionality (‛āṭifiyya), which sometimes incited people to rise against 
an injustice327. How do these expressions of regionalism affect mobilisation dynamics 
and processes? 
 
The usually proud affirmation of being Upper Egyptian contrasted with many natives 
positioning themselves as victims when denouncing their marginalisation from the rest of 
Egypt:  
 
                                                          
327 Interview with Taha, 40, technician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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 “Upper Egypt is out of service.”328 
 
 “They should look a little at the Sa‛id, we are buried, really, we were crushed with 
shoes, no one feels us. […] We are the victim, and we are the ones who pay the price, no 
one else, especially in Upper Egypt”.329 
 
In Kom Ombo, a garbage collector told me that they were forgotten by the rest of Egypt, 
that then Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb did not know where Kom Ombo was on the 
map, and that even though Mubarak and his wife Suzanne used to go to Aswan, they had 
never heard of Kom Ombo330. A potentially powerful motive or justification for 
mobilisation, this exclusion is mainly described as an economic one. Many Upper 
Egyptians I met felt marginalised and even insulted by the central government’s 
investment policies in the region. Indeed, several respondents expressed frustration vis-
à-vis projects that were implemented in the region with little benefit for the local 
populations. For instance, Muhammad, an activist supporting Nubians’ right to return to 
their lands south of Aswan explained: 
 
“When we heard that the state had launched the Toshka Project331 […] instead of 
the investors, I am first […] this is my homeland […] I am not saying he (the non-Upper 
Egyptian investor) should not come, but he comes after me, not before, I am the owner of 
this land”332. 
 
This is a very important and recurrent critique of both the state’s neoliberal policies and 
its recurrent marginalisation of the area’s original residents. Muhammad also gave me the 
example of a 65,000-feddan333 local project in which only five or six participants were 
from Aswan, while all the others were from other governorates. Fawzi, a leading Nubian 
activist, also accused the Mubarak regime of selling lands cheaper to Arab investors that 
to locals. He said Nubians had been encouraged to get involved when their lands were 
                                                          
328 Interview with Moneim, 35, tourist guide, Luxor, April 2014. 
329 Interview with Moemen, 20, university student, Qena, May 2014. 
330 Interview with Khaled, 43, head of sector at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
331 Also called the New Valley Project, the Toshka Project was launched in the late nineties with the purpose 
to develop a new valley in the Western desert thanks to digging canals that would bring water from Lake 
Nasser, south of Aswan. Mostly inactive since 2005 due to important technical difficulties, the project may 
be revived under President Sisi, who announced plans to do so. 
332 Interview with Muhammad, 46, Ministry of Agriculture employee, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
333 A unit of area, one feddan is equivalent to 4200 square metres, 0.42 hectares, or 1.038 acres.  
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sold at cheap prices to external investors334. Nubians were also angry about the lies spread 
by media accusing them of wanting to separate from Egypt335. 
 
The development of the city of Luxor in the last twenty years is a particularly striking 
example of policies implemented by “outsiders” regardless of the local populations’ 
needs and demands. According to Sandrine Gamblin, the management of the city “lies 
entirely in the hands of outsiders, either people from Cairo who are close to the central 
authorities and/or the private sector; or foreigners from international organisations 
(UNESCO, World Bank, UNDP)”336, leading to a feeling of dispossession and exclusion 
among local populations (Gamblin 2004). Outsiders owning hotels, cruise boats, travel 
agencies, similarly exploit and benefit from the revenue generated by tourism much more 
than the locals, who work in maintenance, catering, driving, crafts, and other petty jobs 
(Gamblin 2004). Luxor’s urban division between both Nile banks also reflects a certain 
cultural, elitist vision: “on one side of the river is a world of backward peasants and 
robbers of antiquities; on the other side is a world of urban civility”337.  
 
The tourism crisis since 2011 has highlighted the other side of the coin, behind 
archaeological sites and five-star hotels, with Luxor’s poor population now more visible 
to the scarce tourists visiting the city. If we leave the city for the countryside, just at the 
outskirts of Luxor, we find a totally different world, “an agricultural region in structural 
crisis and where industry is virtually non-existent”338. This is a world where “aid for 
development projects is inadequate and basic social infrastructures (such as health and 
education) are among the most deficient”339. I myself saw this in areas such as Armant 
and Al-Hebeil. In the latter, I spent an afternoon touring very poor neighbourhoods with 
the members of a local association in charge of identifying potential beneficiaries of 
housing renovation projects. Thus, we visited houses where roofs and walls could 
collapse at any moment; where large families cohabited with cattle in no more than two 
sheltered rooms; where hygiene was disastrous. I remember a house that was so infested 
                                                          
334 Interview with Fawzi, 61, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Sandrine Gamblin, “Luxor: A Tale of Two Cities”, chapter in Hopkins and Saad, eds., Upper Egypt, 
Identity and Change. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid. 
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by flies that we could not enter. This is at only a fifteen-minute drive from the five-star 
hotels of downtown Luxor.  
 
Upper Egyptians’ indignation about changes imposed by the central government 
regardless of their needs, including their marginalisation from agricultural or tourism 
development projects, is not new. However, recent changes have likely encouraged 
people to react more. This victimisation somehow endorses the idea of an oppressor from 
the north exploiting a weaker south, as in the “southern question” approach (Gran 2004). 
However, a more positive language of rights often goes along with a victim posture. Most 
people I met claimed they were only seeking to obtain their right through mobilising, 
trying to give their cause an irrefutable legitimacy. In addition to indignation vis-à-vis 
injustices inflicted by often northern outsiders, people were proud of their Upper Egyptian 
identity. Leading activists sometimes used this pride for mobilisation purposes. For 
instance, Khaled mentioned tickling his fellow garbage collectors’ pride to mobilise them, 
arguing that people from the north were not better340. Once again, the invocation of the 
so-called superiority of Lower Egyptians through implying an inability of Upper 
Egyptians to mobilise, is here meant to provoke.  
 
Upper Egyptians’ sensitiveness originating, I suspect, from an aggrieved regional pride 
after decades of actual scorn and mostly ignorance from northern Egyptians, is best 
illustrated by a popular story circulating after the 25 January 2011 “revolution”, which 
several people in Luxor reported to me. According to them, young people from Lower 
Egypt scribbled on trains that travel to Upper Egypt this sentence described by 
respondents as highly provocative: “if you want women, go to Luxor and Aswan”341. 
What was implied by this sentence is that Upper Egypt was not participating in the 
revolution because Upper Egyptians were women, not real brave men. This significantly 
hurt the pride of a number of Upper Egyptians, who maintained that protests were taking 
or had taken place in their provinces just as in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and other northern 
cities. In addition, it demonstrates how the female condition can be assimilated to an insult 
in the Egyptian culture, due to its deemed inferior character. More importantly, this story 
shows the importance of cultural identity in people’s decisions to mobilise, since several 
                                                          
340 Interview with Khaled, 43, head of sector at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
341 “law ‛āyiz neswān, ruh Luxor u Aswan”. In other versions of the same story, it was written “Sohag, Qena 
and Aswan”, with Luxor curiously disappearing.  
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respondents mentioned it as a provocation that justified their participation in protests. It 
is not only regional pride that is at stake here, it is also about defending an insulted 
masculinity342. The latter can be a powerful mobiliser to preserve one’s honour, especially 
when it is insinuated by Lower Egyptians. In Kom Ombo, a garbage collector told me 
that their lives had changed since the 2011 uprising because they had learnt manhood, 
virility (rujūliyya)343. Women also adopted this discourse glorifying virility despite its 
misogynist content, as shown by a blogpost on the train incident, written by a woman 
from Sohag344. This insulted masculinity framed as a cultural trait explains why several 
of my respondents were upset by mockeries of the north when it came to the number of 
participants in protests in Upper Egypt, compared to Cairo and other big cities. The train 
incident was a provocation because it implied that Sa‛āyda had not participated in the 
“revolution”345. Others said that after 30 June 2013, it was no longer possible to say this 
about Upper Egyptians because, this time, they had allegedly massively mobilised:  
 
 “Unfortunately, the Cairene thought that Upper Egypt was not interested in 
politics… despite having participated. On 30 June, they (the Upper Egyptians) wanted to 
show that if they want to participate, they participate.”346 
 
Upper Egyptians are sometimes the first to spread or nourish the typical clichés about the 
Sa‛āyda, including those living in Cairo, who “tended to provide a stereotypical 
description of their home region”347. In the political field, parties were commonly seen as 
baseless or completely failing in Upper Egypt348, as if they were succeeding elsewhere. 
Even some more or less experienced political activists were convinced of the region’s 
lack of contentious politics: 
 
 “I live in Upper Egypt, where there is no organised operation for protests”.349 
                                                          
342 Or “humiliated masculinity”. See Salwa Ismail, “The Egyptian revolution against the police”, Social 
Research 79, no.2, 2012, 435-464; and Marie Duboc, “Where are the Men? Here are the Men and the 
Women! Surveillance, Gender, and Strikes in Egyptian Textile Factories”, Journal of Middle East Women's 
Studies, Volume 9, Number 3, Fall 2013, pp. 28-53. 
343 Interview with Muhammad, 32, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
344 http://fashion.azyya.com/212961.html. Apart from this blogpost, in which a woman from Sohag 
expresses her outrage at what she describes as an insult by people from the north, I have not found any track 
of this story in Egyptian media or elsewhere.  
345 Interview with Haggag, 24, journalist, Luxor, April 2014. 
346 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
347 Miller, “Between Myth and Reality: The Construction of a Sa‛idi Identity in Cairo”. 
348 Interview with Shazli, 23, student, Aswan, February 2014. 
349 Interview with Hala, 50, public sector employee, Qena, May 2014. 
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One reason to this is that many Upper Egyptians were simply not aware that 
demonstrations were taking place not that far from their home, especially during the 25 
January 2011 uprising. Indeed, many of my informants, especially in the countryside, said 
that they had not heard about the important numbers of protesters who gathered in the 
main squares of Aswan and Luxor during the “revolution”, and that they thought events 
were mainly taking place in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Overall, remoteness did not encourage 
ordinary people to stage protests: 
 
 “There are no protests here. When there are demands for the village, we raise 
them to the local units and the local units raise them to the governor. And even if we 
protested here, there is no media, no way to communicate the protest.”350 
 
I have suggested above some characteristics of people’s perceptions of their Upper 
Egyptian identity, mainly defined in opposition to Cairene and other Lower Egyptians, 
which have a mobilising potential. These include the denunciation of outsiders’ 
marginalisation and exploitation of Upper Egypt through a victimisation discourse 
increasingly combined with a language praising natives’ rights. The exasperation vis-à-
vis an insulted masculinity and regional pride also seems to encourage mobilisation. I will 
now consider the potential impact on mobilisation of three key patriarchal components of 
this claimed Upper Egyptian identity: clanship and subsequent loyalties; the implications 
of generational divisions; and women’s marginalisation from contentious politics. 
 
3. Loyalty to the clan and tribal solidarities 
 
An essentially rural region, Upper Egypt still has many features of a traditional patriarchal 
society. Tribal and clan affiliations351 govern important aspects of social relations, 
especially in southern Upper Egypt’s countryside. Extended families are the norm; each 
member has duties towards its bayt, family or tribe, and loyalty is fundamental. Kirsten 
H. Bach noted the ambiguous and porous definitions of the terms tribe, clan and kin in 
the Upper Egyptian context. She noted that villagers sometimes referred to big kin groups 
as qabā’il, a term usually translated as “tribes”: “In most literature qabīla is translated as 
                                                          
350 Interview with Mona, 45, kindergarten director, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
351 Tribes in southern Upper Egypt include the Ja‛afra, the Ba‛abda, the Aswanliyya, the Ansar, the 
Abbaseyin, the Bishariyya, the Halayil, and so on. A distinct ethnic and cultural minority, the Nubians are 
also divided between several tribes or families such as the Kunuz, Fadikiyya and Dabudiyya.  
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‘tribe’ but as with other concepts such as usra (household) I have noticed an ambiguity 
in the use of the word. Villagers use it both for small kinship groups and for larger ones 
such as the whole Ja‛afra tribe, including thousands of people as well as other large kin 
groups of Arab descent […]”352. Bach described these links as the strongest social 
institution in Upper Egypt: “Kinship appeared as the most durable institution in the 
village; it entailed the most binding and extensive obligations and expectations for 
support among its members. Networks of friendship, neighbourhood, and even Sufi 
orders appeared to vary over time.”353 
 
Local politics reflect this social reality in many ways. Inside each tribe or clan, families 
display a high solidarity, especially when it comes to competing with rival tribes or clans 
on elected or unelected political positions, or when a conflict arises354. Feuds are not 
uncommon in Upper Egypt. One of the most recent and worst tribal feuds took place 
while I was in Aswan in early April 2014, and left nearly 30 people dead. Tribes and clans 
play an important role in the prevention and resolution of crises of this kind. A Nubian 
activist explained that tribal leaders and elders guided people, who usually all followed 
the same direction after agreeing on something specific355. He said people listened to 
elders, even if at polls everyone had the opportunity to express her/his own opinion. 
Elders explained why people should support a local candidate in the interest of the village, 
insisting on the importance of local stakes356. Gamblin (1997) showed how in Luxor, 
tribes or extended families enjoying a central socioeconomic position had a major role in 
local politics. The authority and moral influence of clan leaders is generally associated 
with their economic position, as well as their connections and ability to mobilise interest 
or family networks357. Al-Teri, a parliamentary candidate in 2015 in Al-Hebeil, also 
invoked the tribal factor during elections: 
 
                                                          
352 Kirsten H. Bach, “Changing Family and Marriage Patterns in an Aswan Village”, in Hopkins and Saad, 
eds., Upper Egypt, Identity and Change. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Saad and Hopkins (2004) identified two political functions for tribes: “providing leadership including 
members of the national Parliament as well as village leaders”, implying to support members in elections; 
and supporting fellow members when conflicts arise with others. 
355 Interview with Muhammad, 46, Agriculture Ministry employee, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
356 Ibid. 
357 See Sandrine Gamblin, « Familles, pouvoir et territoires : les élections législatives de 1995 dans une 
circonscription de Haute-Égypte », in Sandrine Gamblin, eds., Contours et détours du politique en Égypte. 
Les élections législatives de 1995, (Paris: L’Harmattan/Cedej, 1997). 
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“The situation during the elections here in the village is different, the tribal society 
we live in is different…the citizen sees who is close to him…who has a social participation 
with me…in weddings, funerals, who serves me, if there is an issue, who supports me, 
who provides me services, who serves my interests”.358 
 
Clan and tribal solidarities often affect contentious politics in a manner similar to 
elections. When a group participates in a protest, especially over an issue of concern for 
the entire community, the main members of the group are expected to stand together. For 
instance, Nubians started to protest to demand the right to return to their lands in 2011 in 
Aswan. Mainly organised around cultural and welfare organisations such as Aswan’s 
General Nubian Union, members of the community engaged in a not-so-common public 
show of solidarity. In Nagaa Abdel Qader (see chapter 3), I suggested that clan solidarities 
combined with village elders’ apparent loyalty to local government officials had 
prevented water protests from escalating to a higher scale. In the first case, clans 
mobilised together for an issue transcending their differences. An example of this is 
Nubian leading activist Muhammad S.’ participation in the Nubian sit-in at Aswan 
governorate building. Yet, he lives in Suheil Island, a relatively prosperous Nubian area 
in Aswan. His community was not affected by Nubians’ relocation in the sixties, since 
their island is located north of the High Dam. However, he explained that many Nubians 
who, like him, are natives of the regions situated north of the High Dam, mobilised in 
solidarity with their brothers who were relocated in the sixties in the Nasr al-Nuba area, 
near Kom Ombo, due to the flooding of their lands resulting from the construction of the 
dam359. Therefore, in this case, ethnical and cultural Nubian solidarity is more important 
than differences between families and clans. At the same time, belonging to a Nubian 
family was a necessary condition for the participation in pro-Nubian demonstrations. 
Non-Nubians were not allowed to camp at the governorate building, to avoid a potential 
confusion over protesters’ demands360. Overall, clans played a positive role in the 
mobilisation of the Nubian minority.  
 
On the contrary, in the case of Nagaa Abdel Qader, loyalty to the clan appeared to have 
played a demobilising role, since it impeded villagers within the same clan from 
                                                          
358 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
359 Interview with Muhammad S., 45, Electricity Company employee, Aswan, April 2015. 
360 Informal conversation with Fawzi, 61, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Aswan, April 2015. 
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questioning the authority of elders reluctant to confront the local authorities in wider 
protest actions. This reluctance appeared to come from a certain co-optation of village 
leaders by the authorities providing them services in exchange for their support and 
loyalty. Relying on these local clan and tribal divisions to exert its power in Upper Egypt, 
the Mubarak-era NDP used to choose people to represent large families and tribes361. I 
argue that clans’ key position in patronage networks led by the authorities potentially 
limit ordinary people’s contentious mobilisations through the entailed loyalties. Gran 
proposed to analyse Upper Egypt as a “southern question”, an interesting approach 
suggesting “a certain kind of capitalist nation-state hegemony”362, a national domination 
of the North over the South, of the centre over the periphery, in sum a model emphasising 
regional imbalances363. If one follows this reasoning, a particular vision of regionalism 
considering Upper Egyptian citizens as inferior to Cairene and other northern populations 
appears behind policies neglecting Upper Egypt. Indeed, the North has been the main 
beneficiary of the central government’s development policies at least since the seventies, 
while using southern migrants as cheap labour (Gran 2004). This exploitation of the 
popular classes and other resources of the south by Northern elites is partly facilitated by 
Southern elites, mainly heads of clans and leaders of villages, who accept benefits in 
exchange for their cooperation and loyalty364.  
 
This interpretation has the merit to shed light on the contribution of largely co-opted 
Upper Egyptian elites, including numerous leaders of tribes and clans, to the perpetuation 
of this national system of domination, marginalisation and neglect of southern provinces. 
Traditional Upper Egyptian elites have continued to tap into government resources 
(through NDP and now pro-Sisi networks) to maintain their authority over large families 
and tribes through patron-client relationships. In other words, tribes and clans are largely 
imbricated into the pro-government clientelist networks. This system of delivery of 
services maintains the exploitation, the consent or, at least, the loyalty of the poor 
populations of the south, and is a strong impediment for people to mobilise on larger 
scales.  
                                                          
361 Interview with Hamdi, 33, school teacher, Kom Ombo (Aswan), March 2014.  
362 Peter Gran, “Upper Egypt in Modern History: A ‘Southern Question’?”, in Hopkins and Saad, eds., 
Upper Egypt, Identity and Change. 
363 Largely borrowing from Gramsci’s analysis of the Italian case, Gran defined the “southern question” 
approach against “oriental despotism”. The latter model viewed provinces and the countryside as “areas 
where a simplified traditional life carries on rather statically while change and movement occur in the larger 
cities”. 
364 See Gran, “Upper Egypt in Modern History: A ‘Southern Question’?”. 
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While loyalty to the tribe and/or clan potentially encourages, restrains or limits 
contentious mobilisations, depending on their context, it also has implications for the 
course of protests. For example, many informants said that the repression of protests 
tended to be less deadly in the Sa‛id than in Cairo and other big cities of Lower Egypt. 
The scarcity of figures about protests since 2011, including death tolls, has prevented me 
from conclusively verifying this claim. According to Wikithawra, a website that has been 
gathering various statistics since the 2011 uprising, casualties including all categories of 
populations (protesters, members of security forces, journalists, doctors…) during the 18 
days of the “revolution” stood at nine in Qena province, three in Aswan and none in 
Luxor, against 406 in Cairo and 132 in Alexandria365. Under the rule of the SCAF, three 
people were killed in Qena province, two in Aswan and two in Luxor. The website reports 
a slightly higher number of casualties, both civilian and security, in political violence 
between 3 July 2013 and 31 January 2014, which reached ten in Qena, nine in Aswan and 
five in Luxor, but this time compared to 1667 in Cairo, 382 in Giza and123 in Minya. 
 
However, protests have remained underreported in Upper Egypt. In consequence, even 
though the few figures we can find seem to attribute a higher number of protest casualties 
in Cairo, Alexandria and other northern cities, this may well come from lacking news and 
facts about demonstrations and clashes in Upper Egyptian cities. In addition, we may well 
find a correlation between a lower number of casualties and a lower number of protesters, 
compared with Cairo for example. Regardless of statistics, which are lacking, the fact 
remains that many of my respondents believed that there was a lower level of violence in 
protests in their region. They explained this alleged difference with the fact that 
participants often knew each other or at least had the possibility to easily identify others’ 
family, bayt or tribe. This applies to members of security forces, as well as potential 
outsiders who may attempt to sow discord within a protest. Any evidence of violence 
targeting a person within a protest could result in a revenge feud if the identified assailant, 
whether a civilian or a member of security forces, belonged to another clan. The 
awareness of this risk of deadly vendettas apparently encourages most people, whether in 
the ranks of protesters or security forces, to exercise self-restraint. They generally think 
twice before using violence against rival protesters or members of security forces. The 
avoidance of violence due to the fear of retaliation therefore often discourages security 
forces from using live ammunition. When the latter became systematic to end pro-MB 
                                                          
365 https://wikithawra.wordpress.com/2013/10/23/25jan18dayscasualities/. 
 
195 
 
protests in Cairo and elsewhere in the country in 2013, tear gas remained much more 
common in Upper Egypt, as reported by several informants in Aswan.  
 
Referring to such risks of conflicts between clans, Moemen, a young activist from Qena, 
claimed members of security forces tried to discourage people from their own clans from 
participating in protests, fearing an escalation into a tribal crisis, which “used to influence 
us (them) at each step”366. The risk of violence and deadly clashes similarly affected 
protest organisers’ strategies. Thus, in 2013, supporters of President Morsi usually 
demonstrated in different locations than opponents to the Muslim Brotherhood, especially 
when protests occurred at the same time, mainly on Friday afternoons and evenings (see 
chapter 1). In Qena and Luxor, pro and anti-MB protesters usually marched to different 
public squares. This does not mean that clashes did not occur. However, participants and 
security forces’ relative self-restraint due to the fear of tribal or sectarian feud probably 
made them less frequent and less deadly than in Cairo.  
 
4. Youth and Elders’ respective roles 
 
Hopkins and Saad (2004) noted that features self-identified by Upper Egyptians as 
differentiating them from others reverberated “as a form of social control – of elders over 
youth, of men over women”367. In Upper Egypt, the young are supposed to manifest an 
unconditional respect for elders. In turn, the latter try to maintain full authority and control 
over young people, whom they raise to become the future protectors of the tribe or the 
clan’s values. As elsewhere, generational divides imply political differences. In the 
aftermath of the 2013 coup, it was common to see many young people who were still 
supporting the “revolution”, or were sceptical of the transition, while elders were 
frequently supporters of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the providential man who would restore 
stability and security. Some families that I met typically reflected this divide, just like the 
owners of a café in Luxor’s Abul-Jud neighbourhood: while the father resolutely 
supported Sisi, both his sons were Ultras football fans supporting the “revolution”368. It 
is true that many younger people (i.e. below 45-50 years old) are politically committed to 
                                                          
366 Interview with Moemen, 20, university student, Qena, May 2014. 
367 Hopkins and Saad, “The Region of Upper Egypt: Identity and Change”, introduction to Upper Egypt, 
Identity and Change, by Hopkins and Saad, eds. 
368 Interviews with Ahmed, 20, vocational student; Islam, 24, unemployed (Bachelor in tourism and hotels); 
and Ashraf (Ahmed and Islam’s father), 53, public sector employee and owner of a café. Luxor, April 2014. 
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Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for various reasons, but this was not necessarily an anti-revolutionary 
orientation. At the time, and to some extent until now, Sisi incarnated a nationalist hope 
that appealed to part of the youth, and was not always seen as a contradiction of the goals 
of the 25 January “revolution”.  
 
Even though young people’s challenges to elders are not new, tensions between 
generations were particularly palpable at the time of my stay in southern Upper Egypt. 
Often perceived as backward, elders have had their authority questioned by young 
activists, at least verbally. Many young people lamented being ruled by old, conservative 
people preventing the youth from introducing changes that would benefit the entire 
society. Confessing their wide frustrations, many others regretted than current rulers did 
not listen to the youth, challenging this perceived marginalisation of young people only 
because of their age and supposed lack of experience. Activists widely denounced this 
excess of power retained by elders: 
 
  “After the revolution, these elders are not suitable.”369 
 
Whether young pro-revolution activists like Haytham in Aswan, or NDP-affiliated and 
pro-government activists like Hamdi in Kom Ombo, both similarly expressed ambitions 
for the youth in an era that would see them being granted more prerogatives. Haytham 
explained that Sisi supporters were “a few old people sitting in their headquarters and 
concerned about their interests”370. In addition, as analysed in the previous chapter, many 
activists from across the political spectrum intended to press the authorities to implement 
the constitutional clause reserving 25% of seats in elected local councils to the young. 
Others claimed that they were running under the banners of a pro-government party in 
order to be able to obtain some resources to act within their community371. Indeed, many 
young people joined pro-Sisi movements and parties for the exact same purpose that they 
had/would have joined the ruling NDP under President Mubarak: joining a pro-
government organisation gave access to resources and networks of influence that helped 
improve social status through the provision of services, and greatly supported electoral 
candidates (see chapter 4).  
                                                          
369 Interview with Hesham, 39, school teacher, Aswan, March 2014. 
370 Informal conversation with Haytham, 20, university student, Aswan, April 2014. 
371 Interview with Al-Teri, 39, owner of several shops and bazars, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
 
197 
 
The difficulties to openly oppose elders made many young people think of strategies to 
discretely evade their control. Some of them admitted that they had participated in 
protests without asking for their parents’ authorisation. In particular, online social media 
such as Facebook have provided a relatively free space for young people to exchange and 
interact on a wide range of issues, including political matters. With 3G connected mobile 
phones becoming less expensive, even in the countryside, many young people are now 
connected. This relative emancipation due to increased Internet access may also change 
the youth vote. Al-Teri insisted on the generational gap. He explained that elders still 
voted within their tribes, while the youth increasingly reviewed platforms before choosing 
candidates: 
 
 “Elders make a tribal choice, 100%...my cousin, neighbour, a native of the 
village… Youth are different, they squeeze the candidate like this, look what his election 
platform is, sit with him once or twice, comment on him…choose a thinking and not a 
tribal prejudice”372. 
 
For Al-Teri, the state was responsible for the traditional way of thinking and voting: 
 
 “The state has a role in which it did not educate the people during this time…And 
there was the patronage system (niẓām al-mahsūbiyya) before the revolution. For 
example, a person who had someone close to his family (in a state administration), he 
used to serve him. So people got used to this. […] The choice is for the close (person), 
and if there are two (people) close, I think about who… I look at his election platform… 
This is for young people. But elders got used to something specific…youth now look for 
who is behind thinking.”373 
 
Security forces also abide by the traditional authority of elders over youth, often 
approaching parents before considering arresting their adult sons. For instance, Ashraf, 
an Aswan student, told me that his father had received a phone call from a security officer 
warning him against his son’s political activism374.  
 
                                                          
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid.  
374 Informal conversation with Ashraf, 20, university student, Aswan, April 2014. 
 
198 
 
5. Gender divisions and women’s activism 
 
In Upper Egypt, gender divisions matter for the study of mobilisation since women rarely 
participate in protests and are excluded from most forms of public activism. Particularly 
true in the countryside, this exclusion stems from a mix of practical, cultural and 
patriarchal justifications. In a male-dominated world, it is not easy for a woman to invest 
the public sphere, and even less the presumably dangerous world of contentious politics. 
How do the idealised gender roles in the Upper Egyptian context affect local processes 
and dynamics of mobilisation? 
 
In Upper Egypt, scenes of entire families going to demonstrations on Fridays as if it was 
a weekly recreation, as it occurred in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, were not so common. Groups 
of male friends and acquaintances dominated protests in numbers. Men rarely took to the 
streets with their female relatives and children, officially for fear to involve them in 
potentially dangerous situations. Young men and women attending protests usually did 
so with their friends and fellows, not with their families, sometimes fearing their elders’ 
disapproval and hiding from them. The primary reason accounting for women’s rare 
participation in public protests is therefore their family’s reticence, especially 
disapproving male relatives for both reasons of security and mores. It is normally required 
for women to request the permission of their male relatives for every move, sometimes 
simply to go out. When they mentioned their female relatives’ participation, men usually 
said they had “brought them” as Salim, who implied that his wife’s participation 
depended on his will or authorisation: “No, I didn’t make her participate”375. In addition 
to fearing for the security of women, who are considered vulnerable and unable to defend 
themselves against sexual harassment and in clashes, many fathers and husbands thought 
it was not socially acceptable to leave women open to promiscuity within mainly male 
crowds. A Kom Ombo garbage collector said: 
 
 “Sorry, I saw women in demonstrations. The individual who takes his wife to 
demonstrations is not a good man… I am an Egyptian man. How can I put my wife in the 
middle of men?”376 
 
                                                          
375 Interview with Salim, 40, employee at the Water Company and microbus driver, Aswan, February 2014. 
376 Interview with Muhammad, 32, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
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50 year-old Hala, a former public sector employee and a Coptic Christian from Qena, said 
she was kicked out from a demonstration in Qena on 11 February 2011 by Islamists 
opposing the presence of women in protests377. She was also accused of being an 
American spy. Most of my male respondents confirmed that they feared for women being 
harassed, assaulted, maltreated or worse if they were arrested by the police. These risks 
actually deterred many women from participating in protests. One notable exception were 
the female MB supporters, still very present in marches at the time of my stay, including 
in Aswan: 
 
 “Women… No, it’s not a minority (in pro-MB protests), on the contrary, there are 
many women, many. Actually, here in Aswan, people’s number diminished, men, however 
women still go. They still take to the streets and are determined to do so, but the kids, the 
exams, etc., make them a little busy. But they participate and insist on participating, they 
don’t care about the arrests or about anything.”378 
 
In addition, women were usually authorised to take part in public celebrations such as the 
one that followed the army’s removal of President Morsi on 3 July 2013, as in Al-
Hajindiyya379 and Esna380: 
 
 “We were happy, we wanted to express our feeling and go to the streets. Of course, 
we are a rural society, it is hard for a woman to go to celebrations in urban centres, but 
we celebrated here by the houses… On 3 July, we went to the streets to support the army, 
we felt there was freedom”.381 
 
On the other hand, women who could attend protests were almost always banned from 
staying overnight, due to the same risks mentioned previously. An exception would be if 
their families participated in an overnight sit-in. However, in Upper Egypt, this is quite 
unusual. It is generally groups of relatively young men who camp overnight. Some 
respondents as Amani, a feminist activist in the Aswan-based Free Southern initiative, 
complained about a sexist division in protests, according to which women were usually 
                                                          
377 Interview with Hala, 50, public sector employee, Qena, May 2014. 
378 Interview with Khadija, 43, school teacher, Abul Rish (Aswan), April 2014. 
379 Meeting with several residents, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
380 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
381 Interview with Intissar, 39, social worker, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
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standing behind men, so that they could be protected from possible violence382. Zaineb 
had a more positive vision of these gender divisions and remembered that on 30 June 
2013, girls distributed bottles of water to young men during protests, while the latter 
formed human chains to protect them383.   
 
A second reason possibly limiting women’s attendance in protests is their sometimes-
remote place of residence. Enjoying less freedom of movement than their male relatives, 
women cannot stay out late at night if they are on their own. In Upper Egypt, protests 
usually take place in big cities, usually the capitals of governorates. Therefore, 
participants residing out of the city have to commute:  
 
“Here if girls want to participate, they can’t go, it’s difficult, the woman has no 
freedom. Here the man takes all freedom. And the man does not participate because here 
you have the crops […] he does not go. The distance is far, two hours to go to Aswan and 
two hours to come back… it’s far. If it was here, in the street, everyone would go. But we 
have nothing here in the street.”384 
 
“Here protests are in Aswan. We (women) don’t go to Aswan […] the youth are 
those who go to demonstrations”.385 
 
Consequently, commuting is more complicated for women. Let us take the example of a 
protest taking place in the city after sunset, which is often the case most of the year due 
to high temperatures during the day. A woman or a group of women living in a village 
whose distance from the city requires significant time in public transports would generally 
not be able to attend. If they participated in a protest starting earlier in the day, they would 
have to leave at a reasonable time, therefore potentially missing important developments 
during the event, such as, for example, the setting of a date for a next demonstration. 
Zaineb attended 30 June 2013 protests in Luxor, however, she had to leave early to reach 
the last train to Esna, her hometown, scheduled at 9pm386.  
 
                                                          
382 Informal conversation with Amani, social worker, Aswan, January 2014.  
383 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
384 Interview with Aisha, 52, pensioner (primary education), Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
385 Interview with Hoda, 54, housewife (middle degree in business studies), Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
386 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
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In addition to restrictions on their movements outside their home, women also have less 
freedom of speech than men. Here again, this was particularly the case in the countryside, 
where it was hard for women to express themselves in public, and therefore take a stance 
in political or social debates. I remember walking around Al-Hebeil village, where 
poverty is sometimes striking, and talking to a number of women who all said they were 
not complaining about anything in particular, except unemployment, on which they were 
sensitive since it overwhelmingly affected their sons. A woman told me that they were 
fine at home, contrary to men who had problems at work for instance. Despite being a 
woman myself, I was usually received by male respondents while the women of the house 
were confined to another room. When I interviewed women, I often joined them in this 
separate room since they would not speak in front of a male audience. Privacy was a 
condition for women to speak relatively freely. The situation was different in cities, 
especially with young girls who were generally well educated and enjoyed more freedom 
of movement. In addition, even though women sometimes complained about their lack of 
freedom and inequality with men, they usually did so in an indirect way. As their male 
counterparts, they often talked about oppression and violated rights, without necessarily 
referring to the condition of women, which they rarely questioned.  
 
Women are similarly banned from many public places exclusively frequented by men, 
such as popular cafés, which have proved to be important mobilisation sites (Schielke 
2013, Allal and Cooper 2012). Young men, including activists, assiduously frequent these 
places, where they have their habits and acquaintances, often because they are cheap. I 
had to conduct many interviews in such cafés in Aswan, Luxor and Qena. As almost 
always the only woman present in the entire place, I was an object of curiosity, including, 
I suppose, for the security informants rumoured to go to these cafés. When they go out, 
women more usually frequent outdoor places such as public gardens and private 
(professional) clubs, and some more expensive, allegedly more elegant and respectable 
cafés, for those who can afford it. As in Cairo, with the exception of some Upper class 
rebels, Muslim Upper Egyptian women never smoke in public and wear the Islamic veil. 
Women who do not wear the veil are generally identified as Coptic Christians.  
 
Thirdly, women’s participation in protests as in other public events is constrained by their 
duties at home, especially when they have young children whom they cannot leave. These 
responsibilities make their daily schedules often less flexible than men’s. Husbands and 
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fathers assumed that women had to fulfil their domestic duties, especially in their absence. 
Salim said his wife had to stay home and take care of their young children, rather than 
going to demonstrations387.  
 
Fourthly, Upper Egyptian women have an obligation of discretion and modesty 
conditioning their respectability, and therefore risk their reputation and honourability 
when they attend protests. Zaineb was told by her father that going to a demonstration 
was not a respectable attitude for a young woman. Yet, she participated in several protests, 
including the one against the al-Jama‛a al-Islamiyya governor in Luxor in June 2013 and 
on 30 June. She explained that in Esna, her hometown, women who simply go out may 
have a bad reputation. In addition, she reported that MB supporters used to spread the 
rumour, during the 30 June uprising, that women attending anti-MB demonstrations were 
not decent women. Zaineb explained why she was banned by her family from going out 
after someone from the State Security had called her father: 
 
 “When the State Security calls a girl in the Sa‛id, from any family, it is a 
catastrophe, a problem […] if a girl is summoned in an investigation, her reputation is 
ruined. […] My family banned me from going out for three months…I had to forget about 
Luxor388. But I insisted, I could not leave what I had built, it was not easy for me.”389 
 
 “I told him (her father), I am a girl. I saw something wrong and wanted to talk 
about it. I am a citizen; I want to do something. Father, when you see the country working 
with wasta390, your son has finished university, he has a business diploma and works in 
electricity… but he does not work […] I was prevented from going out, and I was also 
grown up, I used to raise my brother, tell him this is wrong, this is right, so I told him 
(her father), if I am prevented to go, I won’t be able to continue raising by brothers. How 
will I tell what’s wrong and right if I did right and was punished for it as if it was 
wrong?”391 
 
                                                          
387 Interview with Salim, 40, employee at the Water Company and microbus driver, Aswan, February 2014. 
388 Although she works and has most of her social circles in Luxor, Zaineb lives in the town of Esna, about 
58 km south of Luxor. 
389 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
390 Wasta refers to connections and influence that help acquire interests and social positions. 
391 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
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Zaineb’s mother died when she was 15 and, as the elder, she largely raised her younger 
brothers and sisters. She grew up by Esna temple, and when she was a child, she used to 
take tourists to several places, showing them for a few dollars, for example, women 
making bread.  
 
In rather conservative Upper Egypt, we have seen that women’s participation in public 
mobilisations remained limited. Political and social activism is similarly often the 
privilege of a few women, as Amani, coming from rather well-educated and socially 
elevated backgrounds. The female activists I met in Aswan and Luxor regions faced 
different dilemmas and constraints. Particularly in the countryside, women are often 
excluded from most forms of activism, even in some welfare associations. An employee 
at Al-Hebeil’s health unit told me that women had not been invited to join the family 
association advocating the football field issue where we had met392. Women seem to be 
often deliberately kept away. For instance, Khaled, a leading activist in the movement 
against the Kima Canal, admitted that even though some women had attended the 
meetings of the coordination committee, the latter did not include any female member. 
He acknowledged that this constituted a weakness for the movement393. In addition, 
women engaging in social or political activism are often constrained to a limited number 
of roles, usually involving women, children, education and health issues. Whether in 
associations or parties, they provide services and trainings mainly to a female public. In 
addition, women are no safer than their male fellows are, from the risks of co-optation or 
instrumentalisation by some political parties or movements.  
 
Overall, Upper Egyptian women struggle to be taken seriously. For example, Tariq from 
Abul Rish talked about women’s activism with amusement, joking about Nahed (see 
chapter 2), whom he called a “problem”. At the same time, he denounced some traditions 
which discriminate against women that persist in Upper Egypt despite contradicting the 
Qur’an, such as preventing them from inheriting. Quoting Prophet Muhammad and the 
Qur’an, which did not ban women’s activism, Tariq claimed he supported the latter, while 
proudly insisting on the strength of their women: 
 
                                                          
392 Informal conversation with Suad, health unit employee, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
393 Interview with Khaled, accountant, Aswan, April 2015. 
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“One day, the water was cut, broken, and was going to flood everything. They 
called the company, […] but no one asked about them. What did the women do? They 
brought rocks and closed the street. No one would pass. They stood up.”394  
 
As for participating in protests, restrictions to their freedoms of movement and speech, 
their concern for preserving their social reputation, as well as many men’s reticence vis-
à-vis women devoting too much time to professional or outdoor activities, can also 
restrain their activism, even in welfare organisations. This is often even harder to justify 
for women engaged in political movements. Intissar, a 40-year-old social activist, lives in 
Al-Hajindiyya, a small village between Silwa and Edfu, in the province of Aswan. She 
has a degree in business studies and is the executive director of the Association for 
Development in Al-Hajindiyya. Most of her activities involve regular trips to Aswan, the 
capital city of the governorate, about two hours in microbus from home. As a result, and 
because she is a woman travelling alone, she has to leave very early in the morning and 
come back in the afternoon before sunset. This makes her miss many events that take 
place at night in the city. For instance, when I told her about Lamm al-shaml initiative 
(see chapter 4), she was interested but said she would not be able to attend their meetings 
since they often took place after sunset. Furthermore, because of her well-known 
activism, she confessed difficulties to find a husband. She had been engaged several 
times, but nothing had worked out. She even told me that one of her candidates for 
marriage had asked her to renounce her social work. She chose her activism instead, and 
remained unmarried at above 40, a heavy social burden in such a village. 
 
Overall, these restrictions to women’s activism limit the number of participants in 
protests, contributing to constraining them to a small, local scale. Women themselves 
contribute to perpetuating these patriarchal traditions and “idealised gender roles” (Khater 
1996) excluding them from swathes of public life for the alleged purpose of their 
protection. As for young adults, women are often under the yoke of an almighty 
paternalistic authority. However, this seemed to be slowly changing. Some young men as 
Shazli saw some shifting attitudes towards women’s contentious politics thanks to the 25 
January “revolution”, arguing that even Islamists used to take women to protests395. Even 
in the deep Sa‛id, girls increasingly enjoy a higher level of education, and studies, work 
                                                          
394 Interview with Tariq, 45, High Dam administration employee, Aswan, April 2015. 
395 Interview with Shazli, 23, student, Aswan, February 2014. 
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or marriage, often send them away from their rural hometowns to bigger cities. This was 
the case of Zaineb, who grew up in Esna, but had been commuting to Luxor for work:   
 
“I used to be like everyone in a simple village…principles, traditions and tribalism 
to some extent rule. […] Among the laws of this city or village, the girl should not go out, 
should not talk to someone, should not walk on her own, there are specific times when 
she can go out. I was like any girl, whose dream is to get married, become a woman after 
graduating, and stay home. But I had a dream, I used to see people talking about politics 
on TV programmes, and there were girls who were political activists, got detained, and 
they had a cause and I felt they were proud… Why shouldn’t I be like this girl? Why 
shouldn’t I be on the small screen of the TV, which is seen by everyone? I don’t have to 
be a political activist or talk about politics, but at least I should have something people 
would listen to, which would matter to them. So at the time, I decided to continue my 
dream and look for a job, a craft. Here, there is no girl who has a craft, a girl who works 
in fabrication. So I left Esna for Luxor… the city of tourism, a different city…even if it’s 
the same governorate, we were very different…”396 
 
Commuting to cities therefore gave women more opportunities to escape parental or 
marital authority. Women as Zaineb described their commitment to a form of social or 
political activism as a means of emancipation. Indeed, probably more than Facebook397, 
the association, the youth movement, the campaign or the party, and even the 
workplace398, have tended to provide a relatively free space for women to evade domestic 
patriarchal authority. This has allowed them to assert themselves as individuals with 
opinions and ideas. In other words, despite often reproducing the traditional gender 
divisions, diverse forms of social and political activism offer women some possibilities 
of emancipation. They contribute to shaking up the traditional boundaries between the 
private and public spheres and the limits of the permissible399 (Ghannam 2002). This was 
particularly the case for women from the countryside who studied or worked in a city. 
                                                          
396 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
397 Many young girls and activists also used Facebook for political purposes though.  
398 See, for example, Akram Fouad Khater, “"House" to "Goddess of the House": Gender, Class, and Silk 
in 19th-Century Mount Lebanon”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, Aug. 1996, 
pp. 325-348. 
399 These definitions are central to the reproduction of power relationships and gender inequalities. See 
Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern. Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo, 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2002). 
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Zaineb remembers her first steps in the world of political activism, after she started to 
work in Luxor: 
 
 “The world started to widen, I learnt how as a woman I have an existence, I have 
a right in life at least, it’s not just about eating, drinking and sleeping.”400 
 
6. Conclusion: studying contentious politics in distinct sociocultural contexts 
 
In conclusion, in this chapter I have striven to demonstrate how the social and cultural 
context matters when studying mobilisation dynamics and processes. Taking the example 
of southern Upper Egypt, where I undertook the research on which this thesis is largely 
based, I have shed light on cultural and identity issues that often constrain, but also 
sometimes encourage, ordinary people and more experienced activists to mobilise. In the 
same way as political opportunities and threats, the sociocultural environment also shapes 
the course of and forms taken by mobilisation, simply because it sets the range of options 
that are available to people. This chapter has thus emphasised, on the one hand, the weight 
of traditions and usages and, on the other hand, the identity perceptions, that seem to be 
important to ordinary people considering mobilising on all kinds of issues. A too often 
despised regional pride has pushed some people to engage in various forms of activism, 
while an insulted masculinity has provoked some Upper Egyptian men (and women), 
likely encouraging them to more actively engage in nationwide protests, at least until the 
30 June 2013 uprising. I have suggested through various examples in this chapter and the 
previous ones how mechanisms of co-optation relying on patriarchal institutions and 
traditions, including tribes and clans involved in pro-government clientelist networks, 
persistently impeded most attempts by more progressive, often younger people, to 
coordinate protests at a wider scale. Clans and tribes have sometimes stood together to 
defend a common cause, as the Nubian community in Aswan since 2011. The fear of 
tribal feud has encouraged self-restraint both by contentious actors and security forces. 
Young people in general, and women in particular, who have been facing challenges to 
overcome the patriarchal authority, have found in various forms of activism a degree of 
emancipation.        
 
                                                          
400 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
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Whether generational and gender divisions, clan logics or the attachment to the homeland, 
most of the sociocultural features analysed here are not that specific to Upper Egypt. 
Many of them can be found elsewhere in Egypt, for instance in the countryside in Delta 
provinces. Reem Saad and Nicholas Hopkins (2004) noted a decade ago that statistical 
differences between Lower and Upper Egypt were not that important. Sholkamy argues 
that “what some may project as specificities or eccentricities of an Upper Egyptian 
identity are products of the physical, social, material, and moral conditions that prevail in 
many villages of the Sa‛id”401. In addition, a number of these characteristics, especially 
patriarchal traditions, exist in most Middle Eastern societies. If Upper Egypt is not that 
exceptional, what does the analysis of these sociocultural traits bring to our study of 
popular mobilisations, especially those that remain locally contained?   
 
Using the case of Upper Egypt, this chapter has argued that the social and cultural 
traditions and institutions of a given location affected ordinary people’s contentious 
politics as much as their perceptions of political opportunities and threats. It has suggested 
that the constant nurturing of this Upper Egyptian identity in the exchanges between the 
North and the South combined with mechanisms of loyalty often based on the belonging 
to possibly co-opted clans or tribes, potentially prevent people from imagining ways to 
ally with other populations suffering from similar ills elsewhere. Generational and gender 
divisions resulting from patriarchal traditions have similarly influenced (de)mobilisation. 
In addition, my intuition is that Upper Egypt has been suffering, since the seventies, from 
an exile of some of its best-educated and affluent populations, remaining stuck with less 
progressive leaders. Further empirical research would be required to demonstrate this. 
Eventually, the dominant “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) was often the Upper 
Egyptian identity, defined by informants as distinct from other Egyptians. I less 
frequently heard people mention the sha‛b than the Sa‛id. Perhaps this impedes them from 
mobilising more significantly on a national scale, since they tend to see themselves as 
bearing specific grievances. I have also demonstrated that people resorted to a language 
of rights to reclaim their belonging to the national polity, meaning that far from being a 
fatality, their exclusion is increasingly contested. I now turn to the last chapter of this 
thesis, which explains why, apart from the exception of Tamarrod, most Upper Egyptians 
have not adhered to the currently available nationwide protest campaigns.  
                                                          
401 Hania Sholkamy, “Constructing the Feminine…and the Masculine: Child Rearing and Identity”, in 
Hopkins and Saad, eds., Upper Egypt, Identity and Change. 
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Chapter 6: Large protest movements’ failure to gather  
new constituencies 
 
1. Introduction: the decline of street politics and opposition campaigns 
 
On the eve of the 30 June uprising, street politics were flourishing. At the time, the nature 
of the political polarisation seemed clear. On the one hand, supporters of President Morsi 
were determined to defend their ruler across Egyptian squares. On the other hand, the 
very heterogeneous opponents to the Muslim Brotherhood, including “revolutionaries” 
and filūl, were equally determined to depose the president. On 30 June, they took to the 
streets, partly answering a call by the Tamarrod petition campaign. Indeed, the success 
of the 30 June uprising against the Muslim Brotherhood owes a lot to the efficiency of 
the nationwide Tamarrod campaign. However, in the weeks that followed the coup, many 
people who had protested to demand President Morsi’s withdrawal, especially the 
supporters of the 25 January “revolution”, distanced themselves from a transition 
roadmap towards which they increasingly felt uncomfortable. By the time I started my 
fieldwork, in early 2014, the post-coup regime’s multiform repression had started to pay 
off. Street politics were declining, and opposition movements were in retreat. In chapter 
3, we saw how the political and economic conditions that have prevailed in Egypt since 
the July 2013 military coup have discouraged most ordinary people, especially “not-so-
committed” activists (Fillieule 2015), from engaging in contentious politics, while 
encouraging those who do still take to the streets to adopt less transgressive strategies. 
 
Despite the fierce repression since the coup, three sectors for dissent have persisted. Yet, 
ordinary citizens have largely failed to join these three campaigns. On the one hand, 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters, including many Salafists that had voted for Muhammad 
Morsi and opposed the coup, members of radical al-Jama‛a al-Islamiyya and more 
moderate Islamist parties such as al-Wasat Party, have been engaged in a protest 
movement. Three years after the coup, the movement has largely demobilised as a 
consequence of the mass killing and detention of most of its leaders, including not only 
Brotherhood executives but also many preachers and university students who used to 
organise protests. While a small number of MB supporters may have joined the ranks of 
violent militant groups such as the Islamic State in Sinai, the remaining supporters have 
been increasingly constrained to short marches and human chains that are easier to 
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disperse, and which are confined to the backstreets. This trend has been observed in Upper 
Egypt, where the number of pro-MB protests has gradually diminished. But has 
repression really been the main reason behind the weakening of the pro-MB protest 
movement? Or has it been a matter of public support? On the other hand, those remaining 
loyal to the 25 January “revolution” have progressively withdrawn from the streets, often 
retreating into online reporting of violations and local initiatives focusing on social work 
(see chapter 4). Here again, exacerbated repression has undeniably played an important 
role, but is it the only reason of the so-called revolutionaries’ essential withdrawal from 
the political scene?  
 
Finally, labour protests have persisted despite repression. Both the working class and 
white-collar workers, including industrial workers, temporary employees, doctors and 
lawyers, have continued to mobilise to demand their rights and dues. The year following 
the 30 June uprising witnessed several labour protests, including in southern Upper Egypt, 
where garbage collectors, postal workers, and others went on strike. The Democracy 
Meter, an Egyptian NGO, reported across Egypt 493 labour protests in the first four 
months of 2016402, and a total of 1,117 labour protests in 2015403. The also Egyptian 
Mahrousa Centre for Socioeconomic Development had reported 2,274 labour protests in 
2014404, including 1,651 in the first half alone. This decline between 2014 and 2015 is 
most likely due to the regime’s efforts to silence protests. However, it may be temporary 
as shown by the numerous labour protests that took place in the first half of 2016. Yet, 
such protests have failed, so far, to unite. Why, despite a gradual deterioration of the 
situation in the country, have remaining protest movements failed to gather more popular 
support? Why has the wide majority of Upper Egyptians stayed distant from the main 
instances of mobilisations since the aftermath of the 30 June uprising?  
 
This chapter begins by analysing the rare example of successful national coordination 
provided by the Tamarrod campaign. It then explains why the three largest available 
protest or social movements in Egypt – the “revolution”, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood 
protest movement, and the labour movement – have remained largely unattractive to a 
majority of ordinary Egyptians, who have come to associate protest with instability. I 
                                                          
402 http://arabtradeunion.org/content/egypt-labour-protests-are-increasing. 
403 http://demometer.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/1117-2015.html. 
404 http://elmahrousacenter.org/english/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/The-Annual-Report-Brief-on-Labor-
Movement-in-Egypt1.pdf. 
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suggest that repression and fatigue towards the “revolution” do not fully explain the 
persisting demobilisation of the majority of the Egyptian population, especially while 
various protest movements are still available. Their unattractiveness stems, the chapter 
argues, from the three dissent trends’ failure, until now, to articulate clear, credible, long-
term alternative political projects addressing the everyday aspirations and grievances of 
all the components of the Egyptian society, and particularly of the poor. This inability 
partly comes from the internal divisions that have plagued the opposition to the new 
authoritarian regime, impeding the emergence of true, cohesive, ambitious social 
movements that could constitute political actors able to shake the balance of power. 
Additionally, such campaigns have suffered from their perceived exclusionary character, 
their failure to transcend social divisions and challenge the marginalisation of the poor. 
Focusing on ordinary people’s perceptions of these movements, the chapter gives 
examples of common views, opposing them to the testimonies of some participants in 
these movements.  
 
In the first section, I argue that the Tamarrod campaign was successful in mobilising large 
numbers ahead of the 30 June uprising because, firstly, it transcended the traditional 
divisions around a simple goal and, secondly, it benefited from the nationwide 
involvement of activist networks, and the support of security forces, the media, and other 
actors who were able to exploit growing popular discontent. In the following sections of 
the chapter, I will show that such conditions were never recreated, whether in favour of 
the “revolution”, the labour movement, or the protests supporting the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In the second section, I attempt to demonstrate that, since June 2013, there 
has been no significant mobilisation in support for the 25 January “revolution” because 
the popular adhesion to the uprising has remained marginal, especially in provinces and 
the countryside. 25 January is unpopular because it is perceived as having brought 
instability to the country (see chapter 3). Its leaders have been unable to articulate a 
credible alternative vision addressing the needs of the wide public and particularly the 
poor. I outlined in chapter 4 several factors that have prevented them from reaching wider 
constituencies. In the third section, I suggest that workers’ protests pursue only very 
specific workplace demands that do not mobilise broader constituencies. In particular, 
people seeing themselves as part of popular classes have criticised protests by perceivably 
less needy populations such as industrial workers, doctors, or teachers. The latter, in turn, 
have not really attempted to mobilise support beyond their profession or sector. In the 
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fourth section, I show that the Muslim Brotherhood has also failed to present a 
comprehensive alternative political project, while being perceived as sectarian and 
exclusionary. Although it has been able to call on the support of many Salafists and other 
radical Islamists, it could not grow beyond that constituency. 
 
2. The only exception: explaining the success of the nationwide Tamarrod 
campaign 
 
Tamarrod or “rebellion” was a grassroots petition campaign demanding President 
Morsi’s resignation followed by the organisation of early presidential elections. 
Tamarrod was born from the mounting discontent of supporters of 25 January seeing their 
“revolution” being stolen by a new authoritarian regime. While many revolutionaries had 
voted for Morsi in 2012 to avoid a potential return of the Mubarak regime, the point of 
no return was likely reached when protesters were violently repressed outside al-
Ittihadiya presidential palace in Cairo in December 2012, after the president granted 
himself immense powers in a constitutional declaration. Launched in May 2013 and 
organised throughout the weeks that preceded the mass demonstrations which led to 
Morsi’s ouster by the army on 3 July 2013, Tamarrod mobilised many activists of diverse 
political backgrounds, who collected signatures of citizens across the country. Led by 
Mahmud Badr, Muhammad Abdel Aziz and Hassan Shahin, three young 
“revolutionaries” and middle-class journalists who met in the ranks of Kifaya in the 
2000s, the purpose of the petition campaign was to collect 15 million signatures, above 
the 13 million of people who voted for Morsi in 2012, in an attempt to pressure the 
president to resign. The petition, which turned into a protest movement, also affirmed a 
commitment to the goals of the “revolution”. As a result of the crowds of Egyptians who 
went to the streets from 30 June 2013, the campaign reached at least one of its aims when 
President Morsi was deposed by the army on 3 July. How can we explain this success? 
 
Firstly, the campaign’ success is explained by the nationwide involvement of multiple 
activist networks. Indeed, Tamarrod exemplifies a rare case of nationwide coordination 
of local activists, who were able to successfully mobilise in a protest movement. Distinct 
from the role of local activists in popular mobilisations against deteriorating public 
services, Tamarrod sheds light on the way activist networks operate at the local level as 
part of a major national campaign. In Upper Egypt as elsewhere, supporters of the 
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“revolution” and other activists played a key role in gathering signatures from residents 
of villages and remote areas, where Internet access was less available and MB influence 
sometimes stronger. In other words, local activists enabled Tamarrod to penetrate places 
that national coordinators of the campaign would have never been able to reach. By giving 
the campaign access to multiple local networks thanks to a decentralised organisation that 
proved very efficient, activists significantly contributed to the success of the Tamarrod 
campaign. The petition was widely circulated online, including on social media. Any 
activist or ordinary citizen could print the form, sign it, and hand it over to local activist 
groups or political parties. Activists coordinating the campaign at the national level then 
toured Egyptian provinces and collected those signatures. Activists encouraged ordinary 
people, including residents of the most remote villages, to sign the petition demanding 
President Morsi’s resignation and the organisation of early elections. Most of the non-
Islamist political activists I met in Aswan and Luxor participated in the Tamarrod 
campaign. Some ordinary citizens, devoid of previous activist experience, also did. 
 
In Aswan, those who most actively engaged in the campaign were already experienced 
political activists. Mahdi, a 33-year-old travel agent, was a leading revolutionary activist 
in Aswan. A member of the Wafd Party since 2000, he was active in Kifaya, then in 
Muhammad al-Baradei’s National Association for Change (NAC), before calling for 
protests on 25 January 2011 in Aswan in leaflets and events on Facebook. He then joined 
the Revolution Youth Coalition. He was very active in Tamarrod in Aswan: not only was 
he among the administrators of the official page of the campaign in Aswan, he also 
gathered signatures in the field. He explained the campaign was an idea by (former) 
Kifaya members, which came up as soon as October 2012 after President Morsi’s 
completion of his first 100 days in power. Tamarrod quickly grew with the accumulation 
of signatures. Campaigning included the use of vehicles with loud speakers, the 
distribution of tasks in small groups, the broadcasting in public places of videos about 
President Morsi’s mistakes, the cooperation with many political parties, amongst other 
strategies to rally against the Muslim Brotherhood405. Still according to Mahdi, the 
petition was a very powerful mobilising strategy since it made people feel responsible 
and pushed them to participate in anti-MB protests to show their commitment406. As 
pointed by Caroline Barbary and Maria Adib Doss, “the strength of the petition has thus 
                                                          
405 Informal conversation with Mahdi, 33, travel agent, Aswan, January 2014. 
406 Ibid. 
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consisted in a personal involvement of the signatories, therefore creating a civic 
commitment available to everyone”407. 
 
Nabil, the coordinator of the April 6 Youth Movement in Luxor and most of southern 
Upper Egypt, recalled his participation in his province of Luxor. He was very active in 
gathering signatures for the Tamarrod campaign in his region, while remaining sceptical:  
 
 “There is an information no one knows, I was the last one to sign Tamarrod … I 
wasn’t convinced, I wasn’t reassured by it… I was making people sign, but I wasn’t 
signing. On the day when I signed, my friends celebrated.”408 
 
He remembers that not everyone in 6 April was in favour of Tamarrod and explained that 
if large numbers of April 6 members had participated in the campaign, they had done it 
on an individual basis, as the movement had not taken a firm stance for it: “Whoever 
signed Tamarrod did it privately…far from the organisation”.409 
 
However, despite obvious doubts, Nabil deployed considerable efforts to gather 
signatures, even in very remote villages. He said it was the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
“stupidity” that made him eventually sign. He meant both the stupidity of MB leaders 
ruling the country and the stupidity of many ordinary MB supporters he had met while 
campaigning for Tamarrod. Activists such as Nabil often toured villages with a 
trustworthy local, who introduced them to other residents. They went door to door to 
collect signatures, distributing copies to residents willing to make other copies and repeat 
the same process. They were sometimes warmly welcomed, and sometimes rejected by 
mistrustful people or MB supporters. For example, Nabil was rejected on several 
occasions by Islamist supporters saying that they would not sign the petition because they 
had made their ablution (for prayers). While this reference to their religious duties was a 
way to translate their hostility or fierce opposition to the campaign, it was taken as a 
further provocation by activists of Tamarrod who also happened to be practicing Muslims 
as Nabil, fostering them to pursue their anti-MB activism. In addition, a sectarian rhetoric 
                                                          
407 « La force de la pétition a donc consisté en une implication personnelle des signataires, créant ainsi un 
engagement citoyen à portée de tous ». Caroline Barbary and Maria Adib Doss, « Tamarrod (« rébellion ») 
: une autre lecture de l'action politique dans le processus révolutionnaire égyptien », Confluences 
Méditerranée, N° 88, 2014/1, p. 155-169. 
408 Interview with Nabil, 36, unemployed (Bachelor in business studies), Luxor, March 2015. 
409 Ibid. 
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was also sometimes used by MB supporters, who said they believed that the people behind 
Tamarrod were Christians410. Arguments sometimes erupted, and activists were 
threatened, insulted, even beaten, and forced to leave the area where they were trying to 
campaign. People sometimes defaced the petition, by spitting on them411. 
 
Secondly, Tamarrod benefited from the support of security forces, the media, political 
parties, and other elites who were able to inflate and exploit popular discontent aimed at 
President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, local activists’ contribution to the 
mobilisation of the populace ahead of the 30 June protests cannot be understood without 
apprehending the context in which the Tamarrod campaign developed. According to 
Nabil, most people who signed the petition did not need convincing. President Morsi was 
blamed for his inability to reach beyond the membership structure of his movement and 
be the president of all Egyptians. More importantly, the MB in power had caused 
widespread discontent with its policies. In rural areas, people were particularly suffering 
from recurrent electricity cuts and fuel shortages, which affected their work and daily 
lives. In Luxor, where many people depend on tourism, a persisting crisis in the sector 
was blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood’s inability to restore security and stability in the 
country. In addition, President Morsi’s decision in June 2013 to appoint a figure of al-
Jama‛a al-Islamiyya as the new governor of Luxor further angered residents, who even 
took it as an insult, since the latter was suspected of involvement in the 1997 massacre at 
Deir al-Bahari temple, a catastrophe for the tourism sector and the city. Ordinary people 
of Hizb al-canapa (the “Sofa Party”) took to the streets mainly for the defence of tourism 
after this last provocation, according to Nabil412. 
 
However, it is only when the Tamarrod campaign appeared potentially successful that 
supporters of the former regime really became interested in exploiting it politically 
(Barbary and Adib Doss 2014). Increasing popular discontent, including as a result of 
fuel, power and water shortages, was further excited by most media’s incitement against 
President Morsi and the MB. The Tamarrod campaign became quickly known thanks to 
its expansive media coverage. It benefitted from the support of the mainstream media, as 
well as private TV channels owned by businessmen, which offered its leaders extensive 
                                                          
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid. 
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publicity. Political parties were also actively engaged in the campaign, including in 
provinces. Businessman Naguib Sawiris’ Free Egyptians Party offered the campaign its 
main HQ in Cairo’s Heliopolis neighbourhood. The tycoon also provided coverage 
through his media empire. 
 
In particular, it now appears obvious that the success of Tamarrod would have been 
incomplete without the endorsement of the security apparatus and its business allies, the 
real winners, if not the main architects, of the 30 June 2013 uprising against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The security apparatus actively strived to mobilise the populace against the 
MB. The army and the police alike had made public not only that they would not disperse 
anti-MB demonstrations (Ketchley 2016), but that they would protect protesters from 
potential intrusions by supporters of President Morsi. This reassured ordinary people, 
who felt they could safely mobilise on 30 June. Several activists acknowledged that 
people had participated en masse in the 30 June protests because they knew the army and 
the police were on their side, which limited fears413. Salman, a member in Hamdeen 
Sabbahi’s Popular Current, explained that he was not afraid, mainly because the police 
was against the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore on protesters’ side414. Activists 
involved in Tamarrod also knew that they had the endorsement of the security apparatus. 
Mahdi described the resistance by MB supporters as the only obstacle to their fieldwork 
since security forces let them campaign freely415.   
 
In conclusion, the Tamarrod campaign was successful in rallying wide numbers across 
Egypt ahead of the 30 June uprising because it mobilised across the traditional political 
and socioeconomic divisions around a simple goal, President Morsi’s departure. The 
campaign indeed succeeded thanks to its appropriation by many ordinary people from 
different social categories (Barbary and Adib Doss 2014), and its transcending of political 
affiliations apart, of course, from its anti-MB stance. While the 30 June uprising was 
certainly an occurrence of “elite-facilitated contention” (Ketchley 2016), it was 
nevertheless reliant on local activists’ involvement in the Tamarrod campaign across 
Egypt. As such, it constitutes an example of successful brokerage that helped contention 
spread and led to a scale shift. The case of Tamarrod shows that popular grievances can 
                                                          
413 Interview with Nabil, 36, unemployed (Bachelor in business studies), Luxor, March 2015. 
414 Interview with Salman, 39, entrepreneur, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
415 Informal conversation with Mahdi, 33, travel agent, Aswan, January 2014. 
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be exploited and redeployed by powerful political actors. However, Tamarrod and the 30 
June uprising only gathered momentum because of the conjunction of most political 
actors in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. When a popular opposition figure for 
most “revolutionaries” such as Muhammad al-Baradei resigned from the position of vice 
president following the deadly dispersal of pro-MB sit-ins in Cairo in August 2014, the 
previous consensus definitively ended. And the success of Tamarrod in the streets was 
quickly diverted by the officers and their allies.  
 
Indeed, the proposed alternative to Morsi’s presidency had a fundamental weakness: it 
was rather vague, and did not propose any timeline for the organisation of presidential 
elections. The officers would then use this flaw to impose their own transitional roadmap. 
The similarity with the outcome of the 25 January uprising is striking. In both cases, the 
army took advantage of mass uprisings to overthrow presidents. And in both cases, most 
people went home once it was done. In July 2013, when the first signs of repression of 
opponents appeared, it was already too late. Once again, it seems that most political 
activists had exclusively focused on the purpose of forcing the ouster of a president. 
Whilst campaigning to this end, they did not expose a vision for the aftermath. Nor did 
they take credit for the success of the 30 June uprising among the populace, who generally 
welcomed the return of the army and rapidly forgot the activists, especially the 
“revolutionaries”. Once again, political activists appeared divided and insufficiently 
organised. Tamarrod itself did not survive very long after 30 June. Divisions quickly 
appeared between those who firmly kept the ideals of the “revolution”, and those who got 
closer to the army and endorsed military rule, including some leaders of Tamarrod. Others 
estimated that, the movement having accomplished its original mission, it had to be 
dissolved.  
 
Once activists supporting the “revolution” realised that they should not have believed that 
the army would organise new free and fair presidential elections, naïvely repeating the 
February 2011 mistake of leaving the country’s future into the hands of the officers, it 
was already too late. Many “revolutionary” activists expressed regrets vis-à-vis the 30 
June 2013 protests and the success of a campaign they actively contributed to. According 
to Nabil, 30 June was not a revolution. On the contrary, it made appear those who were 
the true revolutionaries, who had stayed loyal to their principles, in opposition to the large 
crowds from Hizb al-canapa who mobilised for other reasons. Many activists 
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retrospectively denounced a conspiracy orchestrated by the security apparatus. According 
to Nabil, the 30 June uprising succeeded because it was well planned by the intelligence 
services, the army and former members of Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party. 
For Tariq, an Abul Rish activist, Tamarrod was also a plot orchestrated by the intelligence 
services416. Ahmed D., a Kifaya member in Aswan, said Tamarrod had been infiltrated 
by security forces417. Today, Mahdi is one of the numerous repentant activists opposing 
the current regime. In April 2016, he was arrested for defying the November 2013 protest 
law when he participated in a demonstration in Aswan against the transfer of Red Sea 
islands Sanafir and Tiran to Saudi Arabia. 
 
It is easy to understand why Tamarrod and the popular discontent under Muhammad 
Morsi’s presidency constituted an obvious windfall for all the nostalgic of the Mubarak 
era, and an opportunity for security forces and old regime figures to resolutely come back. 
However, the rally to the anti-Muslim Brotherhood movement of a wide number of 
“revolutionary” or pro-democracy activists, especially those who had claimed their 
opposition to military rule under the SCAF, is less understandable. Why did they 
participate en masse? Was it for naïveté, inexperience, personal ambition or something 
else? Despite facing multiple difficulties, as previously described, many activists 
deployed considerable efforts to gather signatures and mobilise for the 30 June protests. 
Were they expecting rewards for their efforts? Or did they really believe that the 
campaign had the potential to force President Morsi to step down and organise early 
elections? Did they truly ignore the role of the army and remnants of the Mubarak regime 
in the whole mobilisation process ahead of 30 June? Or did they really imagine that a 
potential intervention of the army had the ability to revive the transition to democracy?  
 
The truth is that even though Tamarrod participants’ decisions now seem shortsighted 
and misinformed, it was then difficult to predict the harsh repression that would hit 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters and all opponents to the authoritarian regime in the 
aftermath of President Morsi’s ouster by the army. No one anticipated that such a regress 
could so rapidly happen. Without a clear vision for the future, many activists sank in the 
blindness of their hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood, becoming a crucial tool in the hands 
of Mubarak remnants preparing their comeback after more than two years of dishonour 
                                                          
416 Interview with Tariq, 45, employee at the High Dam administration, Aswan, April 2015. 
417 Informal conversation with Ahmed D., Aswan, January 2014. 
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and humiliation. More importantly, many supporters of the 25 January “revolution” 
simply “saw Tamarrod and the 30 June protests as a means of reigniting a revolutionary 
process that had stalled under Morsi’s presidency”418, as a way to fight the MB’s 
perceived tyranny and prevent its durable installation. And the only thing they had 
experience in, the only thing they thought they could do, the only answer, was street 
politics.  
 
3. The disgrace of the 25 January “revolution” and its activists’ marginalisation  
 
After the 30 June uprising, no other protest movement would be able to reach the 
magnitude of the popular mobilisation to which Tamarrod highly contributed. In 
particular, the 25 January “revolution” would suffer a massive setback. After 3 July, most 
ordinary Egyptians simply turned away from the “revolution”, now hoping for a return to 
stability, even at the price of the installation of a new military dictatorship. This section 
aims to give an understanding of the somehow unpopularity of the 2011 uprising among 
many ordinary residents in the provinces of Aswan and Luxor. Why has the “revolution” 
essentially failed to conquer these populations?  
 
Soon after starting my research in Aswan in January 2014, I realised that apart from a few 
young activists, many people had a rather bad image of the 25 January “revolution”. Of 
course, the new rulers’ propaganda had played its part in tarnishing the image of the 
uprising and its leaders (see chapter 3), but it was not the only reason of this unpopularity. 
The “revolution” was disliked because it was seen as the starting point of an era of 
instability characterised by a real deterioration of people’s living conditions. According 
to many interviewed Upper Egyptians, the 2011 uprising had brought insecurity, 
including mounting delinquency and terrorism. Importantly, it had worsened economic 
conditions, including price hikes and a crisis in the tourism sector. It had also generated 
shortages of essential goods, including fuel. Even those who had benefitted from 
decisions resulting in a direct improvement in their lives, for instance public sector 
workers who had their salaries increased or obtained permanent positions, did not always 
attribute these achievements to the “revolution”. The difficulties of the everyday life 
explain why many people have openly expressed regrets of the Mubarak era, when at 
                                                          
418 Neil Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution. Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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least they had their landmarks and felt safe. This was the case of Mona, a 45-year-old 
kindergarten volunteer director in Al-Hajindiyya, a village in the governorate of Aswan: 
 
 “I didn’t participate in protests. Honestly, when Mubarak was removed from his 
post, we cried. Because it is sufficient to say that we used to live in safety, what we hear 
today did not use to happen. Yes, there were many things left out, neglected, but the safety 
that we were living in was enough for us […] We are affected by the events we see on TV, 
by our kids that die. Yes, in our village there is nothing, but we are affected by the others, 
we are upset about them, about what happens in Sinai”419. 
 
Intissar, a female activist from the same village, explained that in the Mubarak era, 
women used to take public transports and go to other cities even after nightfall because it 
was safe, whereas they now had to avoid to go out after sunset420. For many people as Al-
Hajindiyya residents, security was associated with an era when the ruler was feared. “We 
used to be scared to say Mubarak’s name”, Mona said. On the contrary, her friend Aisha, 
a 52-year-old unemployed divorced mother with a primary education, said: 
 
“Now no one is afraid of a soldier. The soldier is beaten… but in the Mubarak 
era, people were afraid… the soldier used to patrol in the street. Any problem, he was 
present. You used to find security rapidly, at any time […] After he (Morsi) left, we felt a 
little safe from Sisi”421. 
 
Adel, a 42-year-old farmer and carpenter based in Armant, near Luxor, had a similar view 
and estimated that it was in the Arab nature to disrespect a too nice leader, which is why 
a feared one was necessary422. Mubarak was often described as a good man, and 
differentiated from his sons, his wife, and NDP leaders, generally seen as corrupt. Many 
people also talked about the deterioration of living conditions since Mubarak’s 
withdrawal, as Aisha from Al-Hajindiyya: 
 
 “Life was cheaper, gas was working, there were no problems […] now is a very 
bad time, and we have Sisi… then what?... we don’t know what there will be after the 
                                                          
419 Interview with Mona, 45, kindergarten director, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
420 Interview with Intissar, 39, social worker, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
421 Interview with Aisha, 52, pensioner (primary education), Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
422 Interview with Adel, 42, farmer and carpenter, Armant (Luxor), May 2014. 
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elections, it is possible that he crushes us after the elections, we don’t know, we can 
guarantee nothing… What are our needs now? We need cooking gas pipes, this is the 
most important thing… (people need better wages) to buy medicines for diabetes, blood 
pressure… you enter a pharmacy with EGP100, you leave it without it… where are we 
going to find (money)? Our sole income is pension. The most important thing we want 
them to look after is pensions […] they give us the pension here and increase prices of 
things there […] We would have liked Mubarak to have a second chance to show us what 
he could do […] he was going to reform the country, but the people did not give him his 
chance”423. 
 
Evidence also suggests that if the 2011 uprising has such a bad image, it is because it is 
relatively poorly known in the first place. Let us remind that demonstrations in Upper 
Egyptian provinces essentially took place in big cities and gathered small numbers, 
mainly experienced activists. The wide majority could watch protests in Cairo on satellite 
TV channels but, however, was not always aware of protests taking place closer to them 
because of their very limited coverage and an almost exclusive attention to Tahrir Square, 
Alexandria and a few other big cities mainly in Lower Egypt. In addition, many ordinary 
participants in the 2011 uprising had mobilised against the police, for “bread, freedom 
and social justice”, and not necessarily against President Mubarak himself. As a matter 
of fact, the origins, protagonists, circumstances and main steps of the uprising were not 
very well known. Equally important, its main front-runners and the role of leading 
organisations such as the April 6 Youth Movement and the National Association for 
Change were almost unknown. Politicians were often described as looking for their own 
interests and remaining far from people. This sometimes included “revolutionaries” such 
Ahmed Maher, the founding leader of the April 6 Youth Movement, and Alaa Abdel 
Fattah, an anti-military rule activist424. In Al-Hajindiyya, most people referred to the 30 
June 2013 uprising when they mentioned the “revolution”. 25 January had little echo there 
and was definitely not a “revolution” for Intissar. 
 
The countryside and farmers seemed particularly distant from the largely urban-based 25 
January “revolution”. Have the “revolutionaries” ever mentioned peasants and the 
countryside? Have they sketched responses to their problems? In Al-Hebeil village, near 
                                                          
423 Interview with Aisha, 52, pensioner (primary education), Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
424 Interview with Mahmud Z., 25, lawyer, Qena, May 2014. 
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Luxor, I interviewed in March 2015 a group of 13 farmers aged between 31 and 62. Nabil, 
the head of the April 6 Youth Movement in Luxor, joined me in this informal discussion 
that would prove quite useful to understand why farmers did not frequently mobilise. 
Most of the members of the group did not own the land they were cultivating. Only one 
among them exclusively lived from cultivating a land. All the others had a second 
occupation, whether in the public (two were employed in a health unit, one at a police 
station, two at Supply Ministry institutions, one at the Education Directorate, one at 
Luxor’s city council), or the private sector (two were drivers, for example). Accordingly, 
the typical day of these farmers started early in the morning. Employees usually went to 
work until 1400. They then had lunch and rested, before farming for about four hours. 
While the majority had a vocational degree, some of them had a primary school certificate 
or had not finished school, two of the elders had not gone to school at all but had learnt 
to read and write, and one had a mājistīr.  
 
As farmers, they all suffered the same difficulties. Firstly, the surfaces of land they were 
cultivating were too small to ensure a living for a whole household. According to them, 
current land parcels did not “open homes”. This is not new, and comes from previous 
legislations, as well as the division of inherited land between sons in each house. The 
growth of the population also put pressure on farmland. At the same time, farmers said 
the state had not given them the means to develop lands in the desert, giving those lands 
to investors instead, while lands along the Nile have been the same. They said they were 
too poor to form investment companies to develop agriculture in the desert. Youth needed 
resources for that, and only the government could give them the means to expand in the 
desert. They cited the example of the Toshka project. 
 
Weather conditions and other problems made it difficult to cultivate commodities other 
than sugarcane, which constituted about 90% of the crops. Wheat, parsley and other 
aromatic plants were some of the other cultivated items. Sugarcane has some 
disadvantages, including its heavy consumption of water and chemicals. It is costly in 
terms of resources and manpower. However, according to farmers, it is also convenient 
because once the harvest season, typically from January to May, is over, and their crops 
sold to the government sugar factories of the region, they are done until the following 
year. Rising prices of electricity, fuel and, more importantly, fertilisers, constituted small 
farmers’ main difficulties. A lack of subsidised fertilisers forced them to spend high 
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amounts to purchase them from the black market. Farmers said they were waiting for the 
government to act, saying that the latter was not subsidising fertilisers enough, letting 
prices considerably increase at the beginning of 2015. High prices on the black market 
were decreasing their income. Ali Omar, a farmer whose voice had been louder than 
others since the beginning of the meeting, explained that the quantity of subsidised 
fertilisers allocated to the faddan was lower than the quantity needed by the faddan. This 
is what enabled the black market to expand. A former member of President Mubarak’s 
ruling NDP, a mājistīr holder and supply inspector, Ali Omar admitted farmers’ 
complaints were not necessarily arriving to a high level. They would typically warn the 
local agriculture superintendent about problems, relying on the directorate to submit 
complaints to the Ministry.  
 
Apart from requesting local government officials’ mediation, farmers denounced the 
inefficiency of their syndicate, saying it had no activism. Only their private, informal, 
associations were helpful. The agriculture cooperative associations’ only task was to 
distribute subsidised fertilisers. After farmers said that no one, no organisation, 
association or syndicate, was really supporting them, I attempted to initiate a discussion 
about the 25 January “revolution”. I first asked if there were farmers who had participated 
in the “revolution”, to which a general “yes” answered, prompting Nabil to ask which 
“revolution”. Unsurprisingly, Ali Omar responded the 30 June “revolution”. But I heard 
another farmer saying that others had participated in 25 January. A confused discussion 
followed, during which several names were raised. They did not all agree, but a number 
of farmers of the village, who did not identify themselves, had apparently participated in 
the 25 January “revolution”. Others had gone to the governorate building in Luxor to 
protest against the Muslim Brotherhood’s government on 30 June.  
 
I then asked if those who had participated in the 25 January “revolution” could raise their 
hands, and almost no one did. Perhaps some of them were embarrassed by the presence 
among them of a former NDP member, which impeded them to talk. Or they may have 
mixed between protests against the regime in 2011, and protests that took place in support 
for President Mubarak. Or they may have been a little mistrustful of my question, 
unrelated to agricultural issues, or of Nabil’s presence. They looked sincerely intrigued 
when they found that he was a member of the April 6 Youth Movement. Someone said 
they had participated in the 30 June “revolution” instead. Ali Omar said that on 25 
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January, they had taken part in Asfīn ya rais (“we are sorry president”) demonstrations in 
support for President Mubarak. Another one said no, they had not participated in the 25 
January “revolution”. While some group members started to shout teslam al-ayādi425 
(“many thanks”), Ali Omar said: “We are sorry president until now. We haven’t see 
anything good since he (Mubarak) left, even in Sisi”. He added that in the village everyone 
had signed the Tamarrod petition, even at funerals. He said Morsi’s year as president 
“was the blackest year in Egypt’s history”, and claimed that everyone had gone to 30 June 
protests. Others confirmed that it was a hard year of deteriorating security, shortages of 
cooking gas, and so on. They said not every problem had been solved two years after 
Morsi’s ouster, but that the situation was better: employees earned higher wages, pensions 
were also higher, the price of the tonne of sugarcane had been raised, social security had 
improved, a normal access to butane gas was back and security was better since popular 
committees were no longer needed for protection. 
 
I asked for the last time, to be sure, if no one had supported 25 January “revolutionaries”, 
and this time the answer was a clear “no”. Metwalli, the convener of the meeting, 
explained that 25 January had taken place in Tahrir Square, not in governorates. I then let 
Nabil, at his request, explain that demonstrations mainly against the Interior Ministry had 
actually taken place in governorates, including in Luxor. I also asked them what they 
thought of the April 6 Youth Movement. Metwalli said the group had no activism in Al-
Hebeil, to which Nabil responded that it was present in some villages, inviting them to 
attend meetings. Nabil then started to explain how and why some activists had received 
training in Serbia, a topic that had been widely used by pro-government journalists and 
TV presenters to make members of the April 6 Youth movements and other pro-
revolution groups appear as conspirators trained by foreign agents to destabilise Egypt. 
They asked Nabil about other political topics, including Egypt’s intervention in Yemen.  
 
Farmers said there were some political parties in the area, including the Free Egyptians 
Party, al-Wafd Party, Masr al-Haditha Party (“Modern Egypt Party”), the Nasserist 
Party… However, Ali Omar again spoke louder than his fellows, saying that he regretted 
the NDP: “at the time of the NDP, personal relationships were working”. He explained 
                                                          
425 Meaning “many thanks”, teslam al-ayādi was directed to then Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, 
who quickly became popular after allegedly responding to the will of the people protesting in the streets by 
withdrawing President Morsi. In the aftermath of the 30 June 2013 uprising, teslam al-ayādi became a 
slogan of support for Sisi and was even turned into a campaign song.  
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that active party members like him used to be able to mediate and end problems more 
easily. He claimed that those who were implementing projects in the health and education 
sectors for instance used to be from the NDP, and that they were missed for that. I finally 
asked farmers about what they expected for the future of the Egyptian agriculture. They 
said again that they hoped the government would help the youth to develop desert lands. 
This would decrease unemployment. They said they did not want investors to come and 
youth to work for them, because lands should be allocated to the local youth.  
 
Another day, also with Nabil, I had a conversation with a farmer in another area in Al-
Hebeil. Gamal had a bachelor degree in education and trade, and was also a teacher of 
computer science. He similarly complained about shortages of fertilisers, now becoming 
very expensive. He mentioned farmers’ obsolete equipment while, a few metres from 
where we were sitting, an old irrigation machine was generating a thick black smoke 
which made me cough more than 24 hours after that. He also denounced: “the state does 
not help us in acquiring modern technologies”426, arguing that equipment was expensive. 
Gamal was surprised to learn that Nabil was a member of the April 6 Youth Movement: 
“6 April scares, honestly”427.  
 
I reproduced here the main points of my discussions with small farmers in an attempt to 
show why the 25 January “revolution” had not succeeded in inspiring them. Overall, 
farmers wanted the state to intervene to improve their lives through providing them with 
affordable fertilisers and resources to exploit desert lands. They continued, to some 
extent, to rely on the “old regime”, mainly through local former NDP members and 
government officials, to trace complaints to higher authorities. These people had 
apparently proved themselves relatively efficient as service providers in the past. 
Exchanges between the farmers and Nabil confirmed the first’s lack of knowledge of the 
25 January uprising’s circumstances and main actors. Perhaps the “revolution” still had 
to appropriate in a yet-to-come revolutionary project countrymen’s concerns, and 
particularly those of peasants and farmers, which include expensive fertilisers, fuel and 
electricity, and the lack of farmland. It seemed, while listening to these farmers, that the 
“revolution” had not completely entered the countryside, and that young, “revolutionary” 
activists had not engaged with the main concerns of rural residents.  
                                                          
426 Interview with Gamal, 48, teacher and farmer, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), March 2015. 
427 Ibid. 
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Yet, there were exceptions. As mentioned in chapter 1, some farmers had participated in 
protests between the 2011 and 2013 uprisings. However, they did not always attend 
protests as farmers. For instance, Adel went to various protests in Armant and Luxor in 
2011, a few weeks after the “revolution”. He said he had not participated in the 2011 
uprising, watching it on national TV instead. He felt the government was controlling 
national TV channels. He confirmed the NDP was still present in the area and that it 
distributed gas tubes to residents. He participated in peaceful demonstrations in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprising because of the bad situation, because policemen were 
above the law, because the police and government employees used to treat people as 
slaves. However, he quickly stopped going to protests and did not intend to attend any in 
the future because he was disappointed about the “revolution”.   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Farmers coming from the fields with sugarcane, Al-Hajindiyya, February 2014. 
 
The “revolutionaries” had essentially failed in building popular constituencies. While the 
“bread, freedom, social justice” slogan continued to resonate in the most remote 
countryside, the leaders of the 2011 uprising had failed to tackle the daily needs of the 
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poor, at least in a coherent, long-term vision for their country. No real recognition of the 
25 January uprising or “certification”428 of the revolutionaries had taken place. Most 
people showed no real sense of ownership of this “revolution”429, generally situated 
themselves outside the events of January-February 2011, and felt no responsibility or role 
to play towards the uprising. According to Alia Mossalam, “Nasser as a person embodied 
a collective dream, […] articulating it and translating it into projects that provided the 
opportunity for people to build a new nation”430. Indeed, “revolutions then long remain 
"open" to the constantly renewed reading that people project on them”431. My evidence 
does not support such a sense of ownership of the “revolution”. With hardly identified 
leaders and an unclear political vision, the 2011 uprising has largely failed to incarnate 
such a dream for the wide majority of Egyptians. Worse, increased economic and political 
instability, deteriorating public services and living conditions, rising insecurity, made 
many people think that, on the contrary, the “revolution” was the beginning of a 
nightmare.  
 
In Upper Egypt as elsewhere, for the majority, there was no radical change of perception 
(Allal and Cooper 2012). On the contrary, most of my respondents expressed a feeling of 
remoteness and even of being forgotten by the rest of Egypt. They perceived that their 
daily local reality as Upper Egyptians was radically different from what had been 
happening in Cairo and Lower Egypt. The “explosion of the poor”432 had not happened 
at such a great scale in their remote provinces. Additionally, Alaa explained that “the 
period of the rule of the MB made many people hate the revolution”433, sadly admitting 
that his father, once a “revolutionary”, now supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Without 
necessarily rejecting the “revolution”, many people denounced that the poor had not 
benefited from it, and quite the contrary because living conditions had been deteriorating. 
                                                          
428 Certification has to do with the recognition, the legitimation of a new political actor. See Doug McAdam, 
Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
429 For an explanation of how President Nasser’ speeches made all kinds of people, including popular 
classes and Upper Egyptians, feel involved in the revolution, with responsibilities and duties towards it, see 
Alia Mossallam, Hikayat Sha‘b – Stories of Peoplehood: Nasserism, Popular Politics and Songs in Egypt, 
1956-1973, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. She explains that this 
sense of ownership persisted long after Nasser’s death and despite following disenchantments.  
430 Ibid. 
431 « Les révolutions restent ensuite longtemps « ouvertes » aux lectures constamment renouvelées que 
projettent sur elles les populations », in Guillaume Mazeau and Giedre Sabaseviciute, « Archéologies 
révolutionnaires. Regards croisés sur la Tunisie et l’Égypte (2011-2013) », L’Année du Maghreb, X, 2014. 
432 John Chalcraft, “Egypt’s 25 January Uprising, Hegemonic Contestation, and the Explosion of the Poor”, 
in Fawaz Gerges, eds., The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 155-179.  
433 Interview with Alaa, 21, university student, Luxor, March 2015. 
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For Fatma, a 44-year-old accountant in an agricultural family association, the same 
oppression persisted: “I don’t see that the revolution succeeded, honestly…the same 
negative issues remain...there is nothing new”434. Many of my respondents also said they 
did not like the 2011 uprising because it had brought the worst in Egyptians. This 
generally meant indiscipline and disrespect in their daily lives (in their way of driving for 
instance), the increasing resort to delinquency (then on the rise), and so on. For Adel, 
Upper Egyptians had seen nothing from the revolution, except that it had added bad 
things. He said his life had changed a lot. Before the revolution, he used to work well. 
Now, there is no work, prices of fertilisers have risen, which subsequently increased the 
sugarcane’s cost of production435. 
 
4. The weak solidarity with labour protests 
 
When I asked the Upper Egyptians I met what they thought about labour protests, my first 
finding was the confirmation that an overwhelming majority, whether in cities or in the 
countryside, was unaware of most of them. This is unlikely to be an Upper Egyptian 
specificity. Labour protests and strikes across Egypt have traditionally received little 
media attention, and their coverage has been squarely discouraged as many other 
politically sensitive topics since 30 June 2013. For instance, one of my respondents said 
he had not heard about local garbage collectors’ strike436.  
 
The relatively scarce information getting to ordinary citizens about workers’ protests is 
often framed in a pejorative way. According to the official narrative that has prevailed 
since July 2013 and even before, labour protests disrupt the wheel of production and, as 
such, threaten national security. Their purpose is to secure special, factional interests 
(fa’awiyya), and not a general interest. Therefore, in addition to a lacking support, or even 
clear opposition to the “revolution”, labour protests have enjoyed a generally weak 
support in the aftermath of the coup. In line with the official discourse blaming protests 
for the persisting instability, labour strikes were often accused of contributing to Egypt’s 
general turmoil. But some labour protests resisted the repressive climate and the anti-
dissent, “special interests” rhetoric. The months preceding the election as president of 
                                                          
434 Interview with Fatma, 44, accountant, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
435 Interview with Adel, 42, farmer and carpenter, Armant (Luxor), May 2014. 
436 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian and shop owner, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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Abdel Fattah al-Sisi saw various workers, mainly in the public sector, rise for the 
minimum wage, permanent contracts and better working conditions. The most visible of 
these movements was perhaps doctors’ mobilisation, which lasted several months. In 
Luxor and Aswan regions, many workers also went on strike, including garbage collectors 
and postal workers. 
 
Even when they recognised workers’ legitimacy to mobilise for their rights, many 
ordinary people whom I interviewed in early 2014 considered that the timing was not 
appropriate for three reasons. Firstly, the country was in a political transition, which 
meant that no significant decision may be taken before the election of a president. 
Secondly, the country needed stability, and it was thus better to wait until after the 
elections. Thirdly, the economy was in crisis, which made many workers’ costly demands 
appear unrealistic at the time.  
 
More importantly, many of my respondents opposed labour protests because they viewed 
them as illegitimate, primarily for economic reasons. Indeed, many ordinary people 
seeing themselves as part of popular classes have criticised protests by populations that 
they perceived as less needy, first of all because they have stable jobs and a regular 
income. These included industrial workers with permanent positions, doctors, teachers, 
and other civil servants. This criticism suggests a lack of solidarity between different 
factions of rather low-income populations: the working class benefitting from some job 
security on the one hand, and those who survive thanks to more precarious, temporary 
positions in the formal or informal economy, or are unemployed on the other. Many of 
my respondents, whether farmers, young unemployed, drivers, petty merchants, or public 
sector temporary workers, viewed themselves as the poorest segment of society because 
of their low level of education, lower social status or professional precariousness. 
Therefore, they could not support the claims for better wages or improved working 
conditions of people they saw much better off, including doctors, lawyers, teachers, other 
civil servants, and sometimes industrial workers. The latter, at least, had a job. In these 
people’s eyes, the priority is to provide bread and jobs to the poor. Higher classes’ claims 
should wait. Better off, Haggag, a 24-year-old journalist holding a bachelor in Islamic 
studies from Cairo’s al-Azhar University, had a similar view: 
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 “When the doctor opposes his salary, when the engineer doesn’t like his salary, 
the nurse, the airline staff, where is the poor who is not working at all? Why when he 
goes to the street, because he has no union to protect him, he is hit in the foot? […] We 
should give to others, open others’ homes, we have 40% under the poverty line Yasmine. 
If someone fair decreased this to at least 30%, he would have done something. It was 20, 
under Nasser, then 30, then maybe 60 under Mubarak, but the majority says it is 40. […] 
Are these people (those who protest for wages) the only ones to live? … I know people 
who live the entire day with EGP5. With EGP5, I can take a bus for example. Can you 
imagine, with four kids, the entire day with EGP5? […] So how can you raise a “special 
interest” demand while there are people who have nothing?”437. 
 
Fatma also considered that doctors or postal workers had no right to stage protests at the 
time because they had already obtained their rights and had a good financial situation. 
Some people, who are “underground” (taht al-ard), should come first and protest438. 
Mahmud, a 64-year-old retired veterinarian, believed that those protesting were not the 
poorest workers: 
 
“What strikes me is that those who organised demonstrations and strikes, and 
won, are those who were originally taking a lot of money from the state… electricity, 
health, education, oil workers…”439. 
 
Mahmud said postal workers, doctors, hotel employees, teachers, nurses, all had good 
wages, bonuses, retirement packages. At the opposite, farmers, employees at the factories 
of the village council or the local unit were poor: “The day when he (the poor) holds a 
demonstration, they will dismiss him from work”440. Labour protests in specific sectors 
were also often seen as potentially destructive or harmful to users. This was the case of 
doctors, who were constantly needed.  
 
Eventually, I found no evidence of attempts by contentious workers to mobilise support 
beyond their profession or sector, to gather more ordinary citizens around health or 
                                                          
437 Interview with Haggag, 24, journalist, Luxor, April 2014. 
438 Interview with Fatma, 44, accountant, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
439 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian and shop owner, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
440 Ibid. 
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education issues441. This constitutes a serious limit to the labour movement in Egypt in 
general, which has so far failed to really exceed the scale of the factory or the profession 
to rally other workers and beyond around a common purpose (Beinin and Vairel 2013). 
 
5. The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to attract sympathy beyond its core base 
 
Three years after the coup, the pro-MB protest movement remains, despite its 
considerable weakening, a significant opposition threat to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s 
administration. However, the Muslim Brotherhood has not really attracted additional 
supporters. Its original supporters have been the first victims of the current regime’s brutal 
repression of opponents. Yet, outside the ranks of its supporters, popular compassion vis-
à-vis the MB has been weak. It was shocking but not uncommon, in the months that 
followed the coup, to hear Egyptians praise the killing, arrest, torture, imprisonment and 
prosecution of thousands of MB supporters. How can we explain this incommensurable 
hatred for the MB? Why has the pro-MB movement failed to generate larger sympathy?    
 
5.1. Anti-coup protests 
 
The months that followed the coup in 2013 witnessed numerous pro-MB protests in Luxor 
and Aswan’s city centres. These gradually diminished in terms of frequency and numbers 
of participants throughout 2014 and beyond. Protests were still relatively frequent during 
my first stay in Aswan (January-April 2014), although I did not attend any for obvious 
safety reasons. According to the few people who confessed having participated in some 
of these marches, despite their peaceful character (MB supporters never admitted the 
contrary), said they were often met with tear gas and beating. However, it seems that pro-
MB protests generally experienced less violence in southern Upper Egypt, in comparison 
with those taking place in Cairo, Giza, Alexandria and some cities of the Delta. As an 
explanation, locals often cited the tribal or sectarian factor: since people knew each other, 
they would generally refrain from using violence for fear of retaliation. Indeed, any 
incident had the potential to lead to a dispute between families or clans, potentially 
escalating into a tribal feud (see chapter 5). This self-restraint may be behind a lower 
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number of casualties resulting from security forces’ repression of pro-MB protests in the 
region. Still, people feared to be beaten, tear-gassed or arrested amid protests.  
 
In the provinces of southern Upper Egypt, where the MB’s presence is more limited, the 
post-coup movement greatly benefitted from the rally of many Salafists who turned 
against the Salafi parties that supported the coup. As elsewhere, Salafi groups often 
originating from outside the region have expanded throughout the past 15 years. Indeed, 
many Upper Egyptians have returned from the conservative Gulf States and Salafi 
strongholds in Lower Egypt442. While many hard-line Salafists had voted for the Nour 
Party, which came second at the 2012 parliamentary elections, the party lost numerous 
supporters when it decided to back the coup. Many Salafists then joined the ranks of the 
anti-coup movement, in support for the MB and what they called the “legitimacy”. This 
was the case of the relatives who hosted me between January and April 2014 in Aswan. 
Most of the brothers, sisters and sisters-in-law of my aunt’s husband, who is himself a 
supporter of the “revolution”, claim their support for Salafism. They joined, with varying 
degrees of commitment, the anti-coup movement.    
 
Khadija, 43, is a schoolteacher and a mother who wears the niqāb, the full black veil. She 
is the younger sister of my aunt’s husband. Back to school time, she used to go to dance 
with my aunts. She endorsed a more conservative practice of Islam later, after getting 
married and having her kids. Most of her brothers and sisters living in Aswan have 
gradually “converted” to a more or less radical form of Salafism, especially throughout 
the 2000s. Khadija was a regular participant in the weekly pro-MB marches in Aswan 
during the first year that followed President Morsi’s ouster. She used to go by herself, and 
despite her husband’s warning against it. As many protesters of the time, she had no 
previous experience of political activism. She went to the streets for the first time in pro-
MB protests that took place before the coup. She said that, before the coup, they felt a 
conspiracy would take place: 
 
 “Before the coup, we had gone to the streets. Because there was apparently 
something wrong. And it appeared from the media, the TV, bizarre decisions, comments, 
and I don’t know what, it appeared that there was a strong attack on him (Morsi) and it 
was obvious that no one was giving him a chance, and it was obvious, you know, you see, 
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that they were pitting him numerous obstacles. We just wanted them to give him a chance. 
To give him a chance. His right, he had to take his right, he didn’t take his right. He was 
oppressed. Even though he would have been bad, or had committed mistakes, done the 
good or not good, he should have had his four years. And if he had not been good, he 
would have been removed through the elections. It was not necessary (to oust him). It is 
obvious that it was a conspiracy, a big conspiracy, a conspiracy to make him fail. 
Everything is apparent, everything is clear now. Even the one who was lying to himself 
at the beginning and was telling you al-ikhwan, al-ikhwan, al-ikhwan, now it’s over, 
everything appeared, everything appeared, a plan. A plan from the intelligence services, 
a plan from the State Security […]”443. 
 
According to Khadija, the 30 June uprising was the result of the conspiratorial efforts of 
Hamdeen Sabbahi, Amr Moussa and Muhammad al-Baradei, in cooperation with security 
services and the army. Leaders of the Salafi Nour Party were traitors, and Khadija bitterly 
regretted voting for them in 2012. After the coup, Khadija used to attend protests three to 
four times a week, and later at a lesser frequency due to health reasons. She explained 
that she was usually informed about the marches by someone she knew, typically by 
telephone in the hours, sometimes the minutes preceding the protests:  
 
“I know the people, there is a long experience, long months. […] At the beginning, 
there were particular days on which we used to protest. There were three days in the 
week, Sunday, Tuesday and Friday. […] Sometimes we used to protest four days a week, 
Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday we used to form a human chain on the Corniche, and on 
Friday a march. And sometimes there was a change in the days, for example Saturday 
and Monday, and Wednesday. And there were days when we used to protest every day 
during an entire week. At the moment, it’s approximately three or four days, but they 
change the days.”444  
 
She explained that for fear to be caught, the location was often a last-minute decision, and 
was sometimes changed to fool the police. The mobilising role of preachers had almost 
disappeared as many got arrested, and mosques were under scrutiny. Meetings no longer 
took place before protests, for safety reasons. At the same time, TV and online statements 
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by the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy gave an outline calendar. Khadija was 
not an Internet user, but she said the youth organising the protests had a Facebook group 
called Midan Aswan445 (“Aswan’ square”).  
  
“It’s usually the coalition (the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy) that 
makes the march go out, so the march goes out, and actually the coalition calls on TV, so 
we know that today people will go out so we go out. With the long experience, months 
and more, people got to know each other. So they call each other and go out. But you 
know, there are no meetings, there is no organisation, there are no public calls, or 
orders.”446 
 
When I asked if she was afraid, Khadija said the youth protected female participants: 
 
“I participated I swear, it is something strange, I was still on my way and I was 
scared, fear came to me, as soon as I saw them, everything was gone, I swear, as soon as 
I saw them, everything was gone, so you see, whoever is sitting far, as long as he is far, 
he hears from TV, he sees the people who were beaten, the people who were arrested, the 
people who were tortured. And whoever hears this talking, no, don’t take to the streets, it 
is dangerous, it is I don’t know what, and how come women participate, how come girls 
participate, so people scare each other like this. But all these people who participate, fear 
disappeared from them.”447 
 
Regarding the demands, she recognised that President Morsi had made mistakes, while 
arguing that he was not left any chance to really do something, despite being elected for 
four years: 
 
 “I see someone that they oppress, they oppressed him (Morsi). I went to the streets 
and voted for him. I didn’t choose him for a year or a few months, but for him to take his 
time, to take his four years. He should take four years. They did not give him a chance. 
And honestly, unfortunately, he has his own mistakes. Among his mistakes is his 
exaggerated goodness, his forgiving nature… He wanted to reform. […] Revolutionary 
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trials should have taken place, he should have removed these people, all the people that 
were not good. He should have sued the TV channels that were, day and night, insulting 
him, it was necessary. But unfortunately, this was among his mistakes, he was too 
forgiving, with disrespectable people, unfortunately. […] My participation, it is not about 
Morsi at all. For me, it is a story of oppression, only.”448 
 
In a language insisting on oppression, she went on saying it would be either freedom or 
death, and that she was doing this for the future of her children. As for herself, martyrdom 
would be better than being wounded or arrested: 
 
 “Either you kill me, or you give me my right. There is no turning back. We are not 
against negotiating, dialogue, but they refuse dialogue. They want to implement the coup 
at any case and that’s it. They have weapons, they have the TV, they have judges, they 
have the police, they have a corrupt army, they have everything. But we have our will. 
[…] We have God. There is a wisdom. The delay in victory has its wisdom. We go to the 
streets, and we don’t expect victory, we go to the streets to do what we have to do, and 
the rest is on God, that’s it. We go to the streets and do not wait for the result. The result 
will go to our children, the children of our children, but more importantly… They threw 
our votes to the dustbin, […] and they indeed threw us to the dustbin. And they killed the 
youth, beat the youth, torched the youth, and indeed threw people to the dustbin. It’s like 
that. Either freedom or death. Freedom has a price.”449  
 
Khadija also denounced the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood: 
 
“If there are fair judges, when there is a girl carrying a balloon on which Rabaa 
is written, and she takes 7 years?! Why, what did she do? Is it halal (lawful) or haram 
(forbidden)? And a student who said ‘down, down with military rule’, he takes 21 years? 
[…] they raised the wages of policemen, a policeman now takes EGP4,000 and I don’t 
know how much, who else at government positions takes such an amount? At the same 
level? Why do you give him so much? And the officers in the army and the police, why do 
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you give them so much money? So that they don’t think about anything other than money? 
Are you giving them so much money so that they kill people?”450 
 
Khadija also regretted the attitude of some opponents to the Muslim Brotherhood:  
 
“I can disagree with you politically, but I don’t wish that someone kills you, I don’t 
hope anything bad for you, I don’t hope evil for you… I saw people whom I didn’t expect 
to be with the legitimacy, and unfortunately I saw people telling you it’s the best, let them 
kill them, let us get rid of them, let the country be cleaned”.451 
 
Regarding Salafists’ relations with the MB, she said:  
 
“I am not MB. But I swear, I had a very bad idea about them, but now I hope I 
could be from the MB, but I am not MB, unfortunately. […] They are not for violence at 
all, they like music […] For us, the niqāb is a requirement, for them it is sunna (tradition). 
You see, there are many things we disagree on, but no, it is not because I disagree with 
you that I leave you being killed, oppressed, crushed, tortured, insulted”.452 
 
For Khadija, the country had decisively changed: 
 
 “At the beginning, the world was taking us. The political topic was not that 
important. We didn’t watch a lot. Yes, we knew that the country was destroyed and that 
there were oppression and bribes, and that there was no justice, judges were not normal 
[…] There are no good hospitals, no good medical facilities, we didn’t get our dues from 
the salaries, there are no good transports, there is nothing good. We were living with this, 
we used to see oppression, the way the police treated us, it had been very bad for a long 
time, it is not a new thing. We used to see all of this, but with time we got used to it, I 
don’t know how to explain to you… That’s it, we are alive and that’s it. But after the 
revolution, no. Why am I silent? Why should I shut up? Why do I tolerate that the officer 
treats me bad? He is a human, like me, he is an employee, like me, he takes his salary like 
me from the state or the government, why? And why he does not treat me with humanity, 
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in a respectable manner? Why? […] Why should I be scared, why when his behaviour is 
wrong I don’t complain about him? And take my right, why? This was not the case before 
the revolution, but after the revolution no. Before the revolution, I did not use to vote, 
honestly, because we knew that the elections were rigged. All of them. We did not bother 
ourselves. We were leaving them alone, whoever was rigging rigged. But after the 
revolution we said no, my vote is important, I must participate, but unfortunately the 
situation came back as it used to be. And even worse.”453 
 
Yet, Khadija was optimistic, because “to every oppressor there is an end”454. This may 
be a solution: 
 
 “People thrown in prisons should be freed. And compensated. And those who 
mistreated them in prison should be tried. And after that, negotiations are possible. But 
also among the conditions to negotiate, the army must go away from politics, leave us 
and go to the borders. And it should not ever again participate in politics. Never 
again.”455 
 
I here reproduced much of Khadija’s testimony because she was the only regular pro-MB 
protester that I could properly and freely interview at the time. She felt relatively safe 
talking to me because, having family connections, we already knew each other. But 
Khadija is hardly an isolated case. Numerous people were, and are still, supporting the 
Muslim Brotherhood and/or opposing the military coup. More than President Morsi 
himself, MB supporters were defending the legitimacy of their votes. They were fighting 
for what they considered their violated right. And as repression took the life of many of 
them, as a greater number was arrested and imprisoned, a majority stopped attending risky 
protests, while a small minority seemed increasingly tempted to escalate the movement 
into more radical actions.  
 
The other MB supporters of Khadija’s family had essentially stopped going to protests 
since the days that followed the deadly dispersal of pro-MB sit-ins in Cairo. I collectively 
interviewed three women of the house hosting me: Heba, a sister of Khadija and my aunt’s 
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husband, aged 53, holding a high school certificate and employed by the Electricity 
Company; and two sisters from Mansoura, married to two brothers of Heba and Khadija, 
Malika and Basma. Aged 43 and 41, respectively, they both have vocational degrees in 
business and do not work. They are both very religious Salafists who wear the niqāb. 
Also claiming her support for the Salafi current, Heba wears the hijab, but not the niqāb. 
All three had never attended a protest before the 2011 uprising. Heba is the only one who 
attended a few protests against military rule under the SCAF after the “revolution” in 
Aswan. All three went to several pro-MB demonstrations after the coup, mainly in 
Aswan. Heba also went to protests in Cairo during summer 2013. Malika went to two 
demonstrations and to a human chain in Aswan. Basma went to a bigger number of 
protests before stopping because of repression, which made her husband, who used to 
participate on a regular basis, worry about her. Basma explained that her husband used to 
call people who knew where marches would start, but the usual location to meet was the 
court in Aswan. Now they had to be discrete about places of gathering because each time 
they announced specific locations the police was there waiting for them. A number of TV 
channels, especially Qatar’s al-Jazeera, called for protests, according to them. In the 
demonstrations, they used to meet relatives, friends, fellows, acquaintances. The three 
women participated in protests because “all our votes were thrown to the dustbin”456. 
Additionally, Basma explained: 
 
 “I went out because religion was attacked […] They used to attack mosques and 
attack people in mosques […] They were beating the munaqqabat (women wearing the 
niqāb) in the streets”.457 
 
Malika explained that she had gone to the streets for democracy because, even though 
“the MB are not angels, they fail, they made many mistakes”458, only the ballot box should 
have removed President Morsi. It was the principle, not the person, that mattered. Heba 
included herself in the “revolutionaries”. She was disappointed because, after reaching 
50 years old, she had voted for the first time in her life, first at the referendum under the 
rule of the SCAF, then at the parliamentary and presidential elections, after which “they” 
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erased, simply cancelled everything459. In addition, Heba denounced that all state 
institutions, including the police, the army and judges, were against President Morsi. 
Malika, Basma and Heba denounced police violence against protesters, especially after 
the dispersal of pro-MB sit-ins in Cairo. “They (the police forces) don’t treat you as a 
human”460, using tear gas and gunfire. “The police should be at the service of the people, 
not killing the people”461, Heba said. Malika said that as munaqqabat they were identified 
as MB supporters and targeted. Basma’s husband was no longer letting her participate 
because of the way policemen treated women. Yet, they explained that it was less 
dangerous to attend protests in Aswan than in Lower Egypt. On summer holidays in 
Mansoura, where protests were very violent, Malika waited to be back in Aswan to go to 
a demonstration. None of them had joined a political party or any other political 
movement. They were not Internet or Facebook users, and used to be informed by and go 
to protests with relatives and acquaintances. Basma explained that they knew they were 
monitored and used false statements when talking over the phone to mislead the police. 
For instance, they used to say “we are going to a wedding” to say they were going to a 
protest462.  
 
The three women denounced the attitudes of the secular “revolutionaries” since the coup, 
while vowing to reunite against the current regime and be one hand, according to Malika. 
Basma said that on 25 January 2014, “revolutionaries” had quickly left, whereas pro-MB 
protests continued despite the torture and killing of many people. Heba admitted that MB 
supporters had left the “revolutionaries” in Muhammad Mahmud for instance, but that in 
turn, the latter had left them in Rabaa al-Adawiyya and had been watching the violence 
targeting them throughout the following months. Yet, Heba believed problems and 
disagreements should be put aside by both sides, which should unite as during the 2011 
uprising. All three denounced their opponents’ attempts to tarnish their image through 
arguing that their religious practice was oppressive. They explained that contrary to what 
is said about them, religion teaches them to treat Christians well and give them their 
rights, that the Islamic shari‛a had improved women’s condition, that they would never 
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force anyone to wear the veil, that cutting a hand is the last means to punish a thief, and 
so on. 
 
Apart from Khadija and her family, only a handful of my informants confessed a 
sympathy for the MB. A fewer number told me that they had participated in pro-MB 
protests. In Aswan, I met Salim, a 40-year-old microbus driver and employee at the local 
branch of the national Water Company. He had taken part in a number of pro-MB protests 
from before the coup and until the violent dispersal of sit-ins in Cairo in August 2013. He 
also had some protest experience as an employee at the Water Company, where they 
mobilised for permanent contracts after the 2011 uprising, a demand that was successfully 
met. Salim confirmed that the news and typical locations for pro-MB protests were 
usually known. At the time of his participation, indeed, MB supporters still used to gather 
mainly after Friday prayers in a few usual protest places such as Midan al-Mahatta (the 
square where the train station is located). Salim also claimed that there was no violence 
in pro-MB protests in Aswan at the time. He said protests were already organised and that 
you only had to show up. He compared the coup with a film whose scenario was written 
in advance by rulers: “Whatever the government, the strongest want, is what will 
happen”463.  
 
Another example of MB supporter is Omar, a 35-year-old owner of a small dry-cleaning 
and ironing shop in central Luxor, who has a Bachelor in media studies. A Salafist who 
used to be a member of the Nour Party464, Omar has supported the MB since President 
Morsi’s fall, arguing he was on the side of justice and martyrs, who had not taken their 
right. He said the MB and President Morsi were stupid but were not thieves. They had 
failed to win the people, and should have shared power with young revolutionaries. Omar 
was angry: “If I go to jail, I will destroy everything when I go out”465. He went to pro-MB 
demonstrations before and after the coup, including at least twice after the dispersal of 
pro-MB sit-ins in Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiyya, before stopping. Repression had also 
forced him to reduce his activism, and Omar was one of the rare informants to ask me not 
to publish his real name. He also used to hear about planned protests from acquaintances, 
through phone calls or on the Internet. He claimed he had convinced several friends and 
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customers to join protests. He used to protest against corruption, nepotism, differences 
between social classes, for social justice, jobs, and so on. He was convinced that there 
would be no other election after Abdel Fattah al-Sisi becomes president, and that the next 
revolution would be more violent. Long politicised, Omar is also a member in a welfare 
association that distributes clothes, amongst other activities. He displayed some support 
for youth movements and showed respect for Nabil, the coordinator of the April 6 Youth 
Movement in Luxor, who took me to him. 
 
I also found interesting the case of Moneim, a 35-year-old tourist guide in Luxor. He 
constituted a rare example of protester employed in the tourism sector. A supporter of the 
MB, he participated in a demonstration in support for President Morsi’s constitution. 
Between Morsi’s ouster and the Rabaa dispersal, he went to at least two anti-coup 
marches. These often started in Luxor’s al-Mahatta Street (the main street between the 
train station and the temple of Luxor). MB supporters usually marched two days a week 
at the time, deciding on the next protest at the end of each march, according to Moneim466. 
He said there was no longer hope after 30 June 2013. 
 
Aged 29, Murad is a health inspector working in Luxor and living in Armant. He 
participated in pro-MB protests on 30 June 2013, after which he stopped going to protests 
due to repression. A number of his relatives were arrested amid a pro-MB protest on 6 
October 2013. Murad was never involved in a formal political movement, but used to 
support the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party. He had participated in a few other protests 
before 30 June, including a protest against presidential candidate Ahmed Shafiq and on 
28 January 2011 in Luxor’s Midan Abul Hajjaj. He had also taken part in strikes at work, 
and admitted his standard of living had improved since the 2011 uprising because his 
wage had increased. He said that Muhammad Morsi should have continued until the end 
of his mandate since he was elected, regardless of being a bad or a good president. 
According to Murad, it was unacceptable to designate the MB as terrorists and to exclude 
them from the political arena. 
 
Overall, supporters of the “legitimacy” in the regions of Aswan and Luxor were often not 
MB members themselves. Mainly from the Salafi current that opposed the Nour Party’s 
support for the coup, they got involved in the pro-MB protest movement because they 
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had voted for Morsi for president and could not accept his removal after the completion 
of only one year out of four in power. They sometimes acknowledged the Brotherhood’s 
mistakes, but were fighting for a principle: the respect of their votes. This is somehow 
reminiscent of the “Where is my vote?” slogan of the post-electoral protests in Iran in 
2009. The movement has increasingly faced difficulties to get organised. At the 
beginning, protesters used to gather in big squares. They would typically talk about the 
next gathering during the protest itself. As repression increased, communication became 
more difficult, forcing participants to often get organised at the last minute. Gathering in 
one place also became a challenge, since it facilitated the work of security services. To 
avoid this, protesters multiplied marches coming from different locations to gather in 
bigger streets. Smaller side-streets would then make it easier for protesters to run when 
security forces fired tear gas, birdshots or live bullets. Finally, the fierce repression 
appears to have weakened the unity of the pro-MB protest movement. While several 
groups left the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy or Anti-Coup Alliance467, the 
coalition of Islamist groups supporting President Morsi which used to call for protests 
and was banned in October 2014, the MB has increasingly been plagued by internal 
divisions between its old guard and its younger supporters. Worse, it seems that an 
increased number of radicalised MB supporters has joined the ranks of violent groups. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Rabaa signs and the slogan “Leave Sisi”, Aswan, 2014. 
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Figure 6.3: “Sisi murderer” written on the floor, Aswan, 2014. 
 
5.2. Hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood  
 
Khadija claimed that the majority of people was supporting the MB, and that MB 
supporters were much more numerous than one could imagine: 
 
 “I swear, the people I know are with the legitimacy, but the old ones are scared, 
so no, I could not convince them at all, my colleagues at work for example, these people 
are with the legitimacy in their hearts, but, because they are women, to participate, and 
expose themselves to the police, they see it as a bahdala (“hassle”) that is too big for 
them.”468 
 
“I swear, I don’t want to lie to you, all the people I know, even the youth I know, 
are with the legitimacy, but they are afraid to take to the streets, they are afraid of being 
arrested or shot.”469 
 
However, beyond circles of MB supporters, my evidence shows that anti-coup protests 
enjoyed little sympathy, either from long opponents to political Islam or from a 
brainwashed audience seeing them as destabilising for the country. Apart from the few 
people whose testimonies are referred to above, the majority of my respondents, whether 
in Aswan or Luxor, usually expressed distrust towards the MB, if not a fierce opposition. 
This was yet only a year after Morsi’s constitution had gathered a majority of supports in 
the same regions. As mentioned by Khadija, many people supported the transitional 
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government’s harsh repression of MB supporters, believing they deserved it for having 
been conspiring against Egypt. All sorts of rumours circulated about the Brotherhood. 
Aged 23, Muhammad M. is a student in hotels and tourism from Luxor. An Ultras Ahlawy 
football fan, he is close to secular “revolutionaries”, including the April 6 Youth 
Movement. He displayed a fierce hatred of the MB, whom he accused of all evils. He 
claimed male MB supporters dressed up as munaqqabat in order to hide their weapons in 
demonstrations, that everyone was armed at Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiyya, that on the day 
of the dispersal corpses were moving. He even said that MB supporters shot at each other 
in protests to make the Interior Ministry look very bad, which explained the big number 
of casualties. Muhammad used to watch al-Kahera wal nas TV channel, expert in 
conspiracy theories. He described fights during 30 June protests in Luxor. According to 
him, the MB did in one year what President Mubarak did in 30 years470. 
 
In line with the official propaganda labelling the MB a militant group, some people 
believed there were links between the Brotherhood and terrorists: 
 
 “He (Morsi) was going to bring Ansar Beit al-Maqdis471 here”.472 
 
In addition, many ordinary people saw pro-MB protests as violent. This is, for instance, 
what Mahmud said without naming the MB: 
 
“What we see now is a demonstration where there are weapons, people who die… 
We can never accept this… because this gave an opportunity to foreign entities… without 
naming them… […] I give the possibility to kill my people with other people…”473. 
 
In a similar way that they largely ignored the occurrence of labour protests, some people 
were unaware of most pro-MB protests because of the latter’s lack of coverage, especially 
in the mainstream media. In addition, many people who had participated in protests in the 
past vividly sought to differentiate their mobilisations from the then ongoing protests, 
deemed violent, of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Fawzi, a leading Nubian, 
pro-revolution activist from Ballanah, said he refrained from participating in any anti-
                                                          
470 Interview with Muhammad M., 23, university student, Luxor, April 2014. 
471 Now called the Islamic State in Sinai. 
472 Interview with Khaled, 43, head of sector at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
473 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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government protests, fearing that this might benefit the MB, who could say that people 
were in the streets to support them474. He considered that the MB should accept their 
failure as Mubarak and the NDP had, saying they had no right to protest because their 
president had failed475. 
 
Ordinary people, including many who had voted for Muhammad Morsi in 2012, 
expressed disappointment towards the MB, denouncing their incompetence and alleged 
lies. People also commonly mentioned all that was missing under Morsi, as opposed to 
what they had under Mubarak. For instance, Aisha, from Al-Hajindiyya, mentioned 
cooking gas shortages and long queues under Morsi’s presidency, as well as prices of 
basic items’ rise, meat for example. The lack of support for the pro-MB post-coup protest 
movement is also explained by their perceived religious fanaticism and their 
instrumentalisation of religion for political purposes. Most people denounced the MB’s 
attempts to gather supports through providing goods, bussing people to demonstrations, 
threatening those supporting the transitional authorities, and so on.  
 
In Al-Hajindiyya, the women I interviewed expressed hostility towards the MB and their 
supporters. Intissar, a prominent activist in the village, said she had seen people being 
bussed by the MB during election times. A colleague also told her she was offered money 
to vote for them. She said that the MB scared them even before they arrived in power. In 
Al-Hajindiyya, supporters of the Salafist leader Hazem Abu Ismail threatened them, 
saying that women should not work. So when the MB left, Intissar said it was a relief. 
She called them liars, accusing them of removing subsidised bread and insulting the army. 
Indeed, for Intissar as for many people, the army was a red line that could not be crossed. 
Insulting the army was like insulting all Egyptians. This is why people hated the term 
‛askar, employed by opponents to military rule, then MB supporters in their majority:  
 
 “I got upset at insults targeting the army, the word ‛askar… the Egyptian army is 
a strong army… they released lands in 1973, it is not possible for the MB to call them 
‛askar, this is an army cited in the generous Qur’an”476. 
 
                                                          
474 Interview with Fawzi, 61, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
475 Ibid. 
476 Interview with Intissar, 39, social worker, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
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Coptic Christians were particularly afraid of the MB and relieved since President Morsi’s 
ouster. Aged 19, Girgis was abducted on 3 July 2013 by MB supporters who, during three 
days, threatened to kill him if he refused to say the shahāda, the Islamic creed declaring 
belief in God’s oneness and Muhammad as his Prophet477. He lives in Aswan’s Sheikh 
Haroun area, where MB supporters and several Coptic families reside. 
 
Not everyone seemed conditioned by media assumptions about the violent character of 
pro-MB protests. Some people were simply disappointed at Morsi’s year as president, 
and many people who had voted for him confessed that they had since then turned against 
him. People denounced President Morsi’s mistakes. Aisha summarised it this way: “We 
celebrated Morsi’s victory, then we went to the streets again to celebrate his ouster”478. 
Supposed tunnels in Sinai, renewed terrorism, the crisis regarding Ethiopia’s Renaissance 
Dam, were all attributed to President Morsi’s incompetence. For Gamee, 62, a retired 
driver living in Nagaa Abdel Qader, the MB fooled the people when they said they were 
Muslim and would reform the country. President Morsi should have been everyone’s 
president, not just the MB’s. They had divided the country, released terrorists from 
prisons and brought them to Sinai479. Some people explained that they had voted for Morsi 
because he was the least bad choice and was supposed to care about religion: “After 
Mubarak, we were put in a situation when we had to choose between two bad people […] 
I chose religion”480. For Haggag, a graduate from Cairo’s al-Azhar University, Mubarak 
was much smarter than Morsi: 
 
 “I was against 30 June. Why? I was seeing that Morsi had to take his chance, not 
because he is good, unfortunately he was politically stupid. He did not have the power to 
rule, he used to make decisions and then reverse them, and he used to make decisions at 
the bad time, for example he increased taxes while people were demanding money, so he 
did not have political wisdom like Mubarak’s wisdom. Mubarak used to take money from 
us but with politeness. So he used to say ‘I increased pensions by 30% or 15%’, ok? You 
calculate these 15% on EGP1,000, they are like EGP100, good. But at the same time I 
increase the price of sugar from EGP3.5 to 6. We are a weak people; we won’t understand 
this. But he was a conscious man. He fooled us, but on the contrary, he succeeded and 
                                                          
477 Interview with Girgis, 19, student (vocational), Aswan, April 2014. 
478 Interview with Aisha, 52, pensioner, Al-Hajindiyya (Aswan), February 2014. 
479 Interview with Gamee, 62, former driver, Nagaa Abdel Qader (Qena), May 2014. 
480 Interview with Mahmud, 64, retired veterinarian, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
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took 30 years. It is his son who was stupid, who wanted to eat everything at once, he could 
have stayed until being 90, he could have also made his son inherit. What happened is 
that… his wife and his son wanted to eat once”481. 
 
The MB’s use of religion to either mobilise or threaten was also decried by many 
Egyptians seeing themselves as highly pious, who had difficulty accepting these sermons. 
Stability was another important argument often raised by sometimes former supporters of 
the MB that had switched sides. By supporting the army-backed transitional authorities, 
they expressed a hope for a return of stability, just like they did when they chose to support 
the MB’s constitution a year earlier. This is particularly true in Luxor and Aswan, where 
political stability and restored security were seen as the preconditions for the return of 
foreign tourists, so essential for the local economy.  
 
People who dared to publicly defend the MB were less common. A few people recognised 
their right to protest as Fatma, who thought that violence also came from the police and 
that the MB was oppressed. She believed the MB would not destroy Egypt because they 
had a religion482. Youssef, from Al-Hebeil, deplored that people had lost their sense of 
humour since the coup: 
 
 “I have colleagues on the Internet… Once I said something, a joke… If I had an 
accident and lost one of my fingers, will I become Rab‛awi483? They told me to raise my 
son and daughter, and avoid this talking… We got to the point that we can no longer 
joke… Even under Mubarak, we joked”484. 
 
In April 2014, I met Rawya, the sister of the owner of the hotel in which I was staying in 
Luxor. A mother in her fifties, Rawya introduced herself as a political and women rights 
activist. From an influent family in Luxor of the Banu Hilal tribe, Rawya regularly 
participated in informal reconciliation meetings. A former member in the Free Socialists 
Party, she was now in al-Sadat’s Party despite disagreements since the coup. She was a 
candidate in the Shura Council elections in 2004, as well as the 2010 elections, after which 
                                                          
481 Interview with Haggag, 24, journalist, Luxor, April 2014. 
482 Interview with Fatma, 44, accountant, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
483 An opponent to security forces’ massacre of pro-MB protesters in Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiyya on 14 
August 2013, and thus a supporter of the MB. 
484 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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she denounced fraud and went on a three-day hunger strike with other women. She 
regularly writes on Facebook and elsewhere, mainly about women issues, and has 
published two books. Aladdin, in his thirties, is the manager of the hotel and Rawya’s 
younger brother. He participated in the 2011 uprising in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. He seemed 
to be completely jaded, and was considering to join his girlfriend in Holland in order to 
live a more comfortable life.  
 
Rawya had participated in the 30 June protests against the MB, before realising it was a 
coup orchestrated by the army and the intelligence services. She then participated in two 
or three demonstrations and human chains against the Rabaa dispersal and military rule 
with other women. Therefore, Rawya’ stance towards the MB had switched from 
opposition to the direct denunciation, in the streets, of the state violence targeting them. 
However, Rawya denied being a MB supporter, and explained her uncommon stance as 
something natural since the MB were her neighbours. Because of that, she thought she 
was part of a “black list” despite the fact that she used to know many people in the State 
Security, and the governor himself. She claimed her son was detained during six days in 
November 2013 for being a bearded man, despite the fact that he was not involved in any 
political activities.  
 
Ultimately, the pro-MB protest movement could not keep the same strength in the long 
term, because of the intense repression described by MB supporters on the one hand, and, 
increasingly, the lack of popular support on the other. This lack of support is partly 
explained by the official propaganda associating the MB with terrorism, the 
Brotherhood’s perceived religious fanaticism, President Morsi’s alleged mistakes while 
in power, and the MB’s relatively limited presence in southern Upper Egypt. Although 
the post-coup movement greatly benefitted from the rally of many Salafists, it could not 
grow beyond its initial constituency. Framing their cause in the language of “legitimacy” 
instead, perhaps, of rights and/or the rule of law, likely prevented the pro-MB protest 
movement from gaining more support. This interpretation of “legitimacy” was unable to 
compete with the one of the thousands485 that went to the streets against President Morsi 
in June and July 2013. More than repression, which was not as strong in southern Upper 
                                                          
485 According to several researchers such as Neil Ketchley, the very high numbers mentioned by the 
Egyptian media are highly disputable. 
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Egypt as in Cairo and elsewhere in Lower Egypt, the lack of support of the wide 
population has likely contributed to the gradual fatigue of the pro-MB protest movement. 
 
6. Conclusion: endorsing a perceived safety rather than adventurous 
alternatives 
 
Eventually, most ordinary Egyptians expressed a clear exhaustion after years of economic 
and political instability they associated with the “revolution” that had toppled President 
Mubarak. They largely opposed those who still dared to stage street protests, including 
“revolutionaries”, MB supporters and workers alike, whom they accused of maintaining 
the prevailing instability. They showed reluctance towards perceived adventurous 
projects which kept failing to present real political alternatives addressing ordinary 
people’s everyday needs. As elsewhere, a well-known authoritarian system appeared 
safer than the unknown outcome of a perpetual revolution. More importantly, this chapter 
sheds light on the persisting importance of socioeconomic, and sometimes cultural, 
divisions in current Egyptian politics. Differences of social statuses are also behind the 
non-adherence to the 25 January “revolution” of numerous Upper Egyptians who have 
felt apart, distant, abandoned and poor. Such divisions also separate employees 
mobilising for higher wages and better working conditions, from more precarious workers 
or unemployed, poor people.  
 
Eventually and perhaps more importantly, for the essentially marginalised (or self-
perceived as such) populations of the southern provinces and the countryside, the three 
nationwide campaigns are not attractive because they do not propose any political and 
economic project presenting a real alternative to the current exclusionary order. None of 
the labour movement, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, or the “revolutionaries”, have 
convincingly articulated a project reintegrating the subalterns in the national polity. For 
Ray Bush, marginality and exclusion are systematically found in capitalist societies, in 
which “poverty is the result of people being actively dispossessed rather than being 
simply left on the margins or being excluded from the creation of wealth”486. In Egypt as 
in other countries, many people are deliberately excluded from development. Informants 
                                                          
486 Ray Bush, “Marginality or abjection? The political economy of poverty production in Egypt”, in Ray 
Bush and Habib Ayeb, eds., Marginality and Exclusion in Egypt, (London and New York: Zed Books, 
2012). 
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sometimes complained that no one among the political elites cared about ordinary people, 
especially the poor, arguing that when someone was arrested in Cairo there was publicity. 
At the opposite, when an ordinary citizen was arrested in Upper Egypt, no one stood with 
him487. Additionally, many ordinary and poor citizens simply felt better away from 
politics, claiming they were not competent enough to understand it: 
 
 “I don’t know about politics… I am illiterate... I am not educated to know…”488 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
487 Interviews with Moemen, 20, university student, and Mahmud Z., 25, lawyer, Qena, May 2014. 
488 Interview with Ayman, 30, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
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Conclusion: the legacy of the 25 January uprising 
 
Who does the people want? 
Don’t tell me Morsi or Sisi 
A fair president, if God wills, will be my president 
His own decision, out of doubt 
No subservience to the Americans or the Muslim Brothers 
Don’t worry about these words 
A human, a good man who knows God 
Cleaning agent at Amun Temple, or seller of lemons 
He sells with honesty, does not cheat,  
while saying he does not care about the number of lemons 
Thus he will be a perfect president 
We only want peace for everyone 
Especially for the poor and the wretched 
The one who sits on the steps, his hand under his cheek, and laments his bad luck 
Because there is not a piece of bread at home 
And because his children need to eat, drink, school fees, books and private lessons  
But from where? 
The need for money has made everything impossible. 
 
Both destroyed it, Morsi and Sisi,  
They caused the division 
Enemy brothers at home 
Revenge princes at work 
Shameless thugs in the street 
May God curse you, we are in Egypt with no security. 
To the power and money owners, we demand 
A look of tenderness 
At every area in the republic 
And particularly at Luxor 
Because the cart owner forgets himself while thinking about his horse’s food 
The Peugeot (taxi) owner waits for any person (client) 
I fear this person is a thief or a thug who steals his Peugeot 
And throws him in the most remote place 
The bazar owner is in debt and on the verge of bankruptcy 
Everyone in Luxor relies on tourism 
Even the civil servant relies on tourism 
To obtain an income that provides for the bare necessities 
But where is tourism? 
A look at the past, at the temple of my ancestors, 
At the Temple of Hatshepsut, in Deir al-Bahari 
To those who committed this crime489 
Who do not belong to any of the divine religions 
And this event did not have durable consequences on tourism 
Except for two or three months, after which tourism reappeared. 
                                                          
489 The massacre of tourists in 1997. 
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To the officials assuming high positions, please 
Let us be hand in hand 
To build Egypt and live in safety 
And relive the past with its joys and not its sorrows 
Let us show the entire world that Egypt is the country of safety 
In acts, and not words 
To have a positive image of our country abroad 
To resurrect the glory of our ancestors 
And finally a question: 
Do truth and justice have the human being’s attention? 
No, and a thousand times no 
But oppression and corruption are widespread at the time 
By His majesty and generosity, oppression and darkness will disappear 
everywhere in the world and in Egypt 
Because Egypt is cited in the Qur’an.490 
 
This oral poem recited by an ordinary woman in Luxor in 2014491 I believe reasonably 
reflects the mind-set of most common Egyptians after years of political and economic 
instability. It describes the sense of injustice and the frustrations that most of my 
informants have expressed, and that I have conveyed throughout this thesis. As I conclude 
this study, the situation in Egypt appears more tragic than it was on the eve of the 25 
January 2011 uprising. It looks as if the regime was precipitating its own fall. President 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s administration has failed in restoring security, as shown by the 
almost daily killing of security personnel. It has unsuccessfully crushed a Jihadist 
insurrection in Sinai. It has failed in re-establishing stability, increasingly threatened by 
its own security forces. Indeed, the security state has multiplied the worst excesses to 
silence critics amid growing paranoia and obsession with its own survival. This has 
gradually triggered what the regime fears most, namely popular protests and instability.  
 
On 3 February 2016, fellow PhD student Giulio Regeni, undertaking research about 
independent trade unions in Egypt, was found dead in Cairo’s outskirts after being 
savagely tortured. His murder has deeply shocked and shaken all of us. Giulio’s 
mysterious vanishing on 25 January, the 5th anniversary of the 2011 uprising, was highly 
reminiscent of numerous other cases of ‘forced disappearances’. This term was coined to 
reflect security forces’ kidnapping of individuals without formally arresting them. 
                                                          
490 Audio recording of a woman provided by an informant in Luxor, April 2014. Translated from Colloquial 
Arabic by author. 
491 She said they were poor people who supported neither the MB nor Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 
 
252 
 
Various foreign media such as the New York Times on 12 February492, accused Egypt’s 
Interior Ministry and security agencies. They quote witnesses who confirmed that 
plainclothes security agents had arrested Giulio before he disappeared. The Egyptian 
authorities have been handling the case in a clumsy, to not say incompetent manner, 
which recalls their response to the Russian plane crash in Sinai, and the killing of Mexican 
tourists and their Egyptian guides in the western desert in 2015. In addition to hundreds 
of cases of arbitrary detention, ‘forced disappearance’, torture and/or killing of alleged 
political opponents, many recent incidents involving policemen have been contributing 
to rising popular discontent.  In early 2016, several cases of police assaults in hospitals 
pushed doctors to demonstrate against police brutality. Discontent culminated on 18 
February, when a policeman shot a driver dead in Cairo’s Darb al-Ahmar area, prompting 
hundreds to protest outside the Cairo Security Directorate. This is highly reminiscent of 
the discontent at police brutality that culminated after Khaled Said was tortured to death 
by policemen in 2010, just a few months before the start of the uprising. 
 
In addition to such security breaches, a number of recent negligent economic decisions 
have further endangered deteriorating living conditions since the 2011 uprising. The 
current government has failed to solve the economic crisis, demonstrated by ongoing 
labour protests, dollar shortages, and persisting high unemployment and inflation rates. It 
has also failed to improve public services, as shown for instance by recurring electricity 
and water shortages. In particular, drinking water cuts prompted ordinary people to stage 
numerous protests during the Islamic month of Ramadan in 2016. Ordinary citizens are 
increasingly suffering from shortages of subsidised food items such as rice and cooking 
oil, due in part to increasing tariffs on imports and dollar shortages that have raised prices. 
Furthermore, the tourism industry, which is the source of income for thousands of 
Egyptians, has been deteriorating as a result of persisting insecurity and apparent 
instability. Labour protests have also erupted on a regular basis, sparked by unpaid wages 
and other allowances, as well as arbitrary dismissals. Additionally, the existence of laws 
such as the Civil Service Law that threaten workers’ rights, the failure to grant permanent 
positions to long-term temporary workers, corruption and nepotism within public sector 
entities, have also contributed to the raise in protests. For these reasons, ordinary 
Egyptians’ disappointment towards the government is growing, while the latter has 
largely responded with short-sighted decisions to buy more time. During this time, 
                                                          
492 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/13/world/middleeast/giulio-regeni-egypt-killing.html?_r=0. 
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President Sisi has been increasingly criticised by elites, whether media figures or 
politicians, including his own supporters. The rest of his reign will most likely be 
troublesome.  
 
This research project aimed to understand and explain, through various case studies of 
contentious politics in southern Upper Egypt, why most popular mobilisations did not 
exceed the local scale; why they remained ephemeral, discontinuous and dispersed; and 
why activists and leaders rarely coordinated their struggles with others based elsewhere. 
The project also attempted to elucidate the disinterest and lack of support towards wider 
protest campaigns currently existing in Egypt. In conclusion to the thesis, I propose to 
elaborate on one such available protest movement, namely the “revolution”. Like many 
analysts of Egyptian politics, I have struggled to explain the immense setback that 
occurred in July 2013, whereas Egypt had appeared to be on an interesting, albeit 
challenging path towards reform. Additionally, all Arab uprisings have so far failed to 
reach their initial goal, instead giving way to more violence and suffering, except for 
certain positive developments in Tunisia. As part of this thesis, I strove to provide some 
answers to the persisting failure of contentious politics in Egypt, as well as in other 
Middle Eastern countries, in generating positive revolutionary change.  
 
In the first section of this conclusion, I summarise the main arguments of this thesis, 
supported by evidence provided by the case studies. In the second section, I discuss some 
wider implications of this research, that also span issues that go beyond the Egyptian case. 
I also suggest tracks for future research, prior to providing prospects for Egyptian politics 
and contentious politics in the coming years. I argue that the relative unpopularity of the 
concept of revolution does not mean that change is not taking place.  
 
1. Explaining discontinuous, dispersed and ephemeral forms of activism 
 
Throughout the six chapters of this thesis, I have attempted to shed light on factors other 
than state repression that interact in preventing local collective action from expanding. I 
have demonstrated that, beyond the usual authoritarian constraints that only provide a 
partial explanation, most popular mobilisations are constrained by the vicissitudes of 
leadership on the one hand, and by a set of local sociocultural constructions, beliefs and 
practices on the other. I have also provided a potential explanation as to why the 
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beginning of a revolution was quickly swept away by a harsher authoritarian regime. 
Indeed, I established that current national campaigns, mainly revolutionary change, 
labour protests and the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protest movement, do not appeal to the 
majority due to their lack of alternative political projects and perceived exclusionary 
character.  
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that, in the history of contemporary Egypt before the 2011 
uprising, authoritarian constraints have essentially curbed the advent of large and lengthy 
protest movements, without preventing the emergence of various forms of contentious 
politics. By exploring the trajectories and patterns of Egyptians’ contentious politics since 
President Nasser’s time, the chapter explained how authoritarian conditions, combined 
with lacking support organisations and dispersed contentious agents, have essentially 
limited the expansion of yet recurrent popular mobilisations. These protests were mainly 
directed towards changing economic policies since 1967. Initially students and workers 
were leading the resistance against the questioning of the changes consolidated under 
Nasserism. Political Islam soon began to play an increasing role, thereby becoming a 
haven for many disillusioned populations, including in Upper Egypt. However, most 
instances of ordinary people’s contentious politics remained local and discrete, thereby 
avoiding direct confrontations with the authorities. A renewed, louder contestation took 
place in the turn of the century. This time, it was mainly led by secular, pro-democracy 
activists and workers. Then the 25 January 2011 uprising gave the opportunity to an 
increased segment of the population to embark on direct collective action. Renewing 
ordinary Egyptians’ interest in politics and reducing their fear of repression, the uprising 
was indeed perceived by many ordinary people as an opportunity to relatively safely raise 
demands. My evidence shows that this trend has not spared the provinces of southern 
Upper Egypt, where multiple protests took place in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. 
Even though it may appear too soon to qualify the uprising as a point of no return, I have 
argued that it was an important moment in the long history of contentious politics in 
contemporary Egypt, simply because it widened ordinary citizens’ horizon and sense of 
possibility. The 2011 uprising may appear as a hiatus now that state repression has 
resumed and intensified since the army deposed elected President Morsi in July 2013, 
making opportunities for mobilisation less obvious. However, popular protests have 
remained numerous, while the 2011 uprising and its enduring consequences have 
dramatically affected ordinary citizens’ daily lives and, to some extent, the popular 
 
255 
 
political culture. This finding constituted the starting point of the rest of the study, which 
sought to explain the persistence of discontinuous, ephemeral and dispersed forms of 
activism. 
 
Chapter 2 analysed two cases of such small local popular mobilisations characterised by 
their intermittence, brevity and isolation, which erupted in the wake of the 2011 uprising. 
In al-Hebeil, near Luxor, residents perceived an opportunity to raise their demand for the 
legal use of a local football field in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising. As authorities 
became less tolerant to street protests, protest leaders nonetheless continued to move 
things forward by pursuing official steps and publicising their cause, putting pressure on 
authorities as a result. In Abul Rish, near Aswan, it was also the 2011 uprising that 
encouraged local residents and activists to stage protests against the Kima Canal, which 
has contaminated drinking water for a long time. Here again, protests stopped after the 
2013 uprising and coup, while the leaders of the contestation continued to apply pressure 
and negotiate with the authorities. Both cases illustrated how local coordination is 
generally achieved and how ordinary protesters mobilise at the heart of their village or 
neighbourhood. The chapter introduced some of the patterns of mobilisation that I more 
deeply and systematically analyse in chapters 3, 4 and 5. In Abul Rish and al-Hebeil alike, 
the chapter established that local activists and available support networks had played a 
key role in mobilising ordinary people. Movement leaders have adapted their modes of 
organisation and mobilisation strategies to the changing political contexts, evolving from 
public protests during the favourable period between the 2011 and 2013 uprisings, to less 
transgressive attempts to secure gains such as media publicity and legal steps when 
repression resumed. They sometimes have access to resources and connections exceeding 
the local scale. In addition, local sociocultural features, including neighbourhood or 
village solidarities and Upper Egyptians’ sense of marginalisation, have motivated and 
shaped these mobilisations against deteriorating public services. Eventually, the chapter 
showed that people were also mobilised by the memory of a strong state and, to some 
extent, of an old moral economy. 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated the relative efficiency of several state strategies other than or 
along with the direct repression of protests and political opponents, in limiting popular 
mobilisations since July 2013 in Egypt. In particular, post-coup official propaganda 
mainly spread by the media successfully turned many Egyptians away from and even 
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against protesters and opponents. As a result, my evidence shows that many ordinary 
people developed resentment towards the “revolution”, perceived as the main source of a 
lasting political and economic instability. Muslim Brotherhood supporters were similarly 
often described by respondents as violent rioters, if not terrorists. Overall, informants 
estimated that it was no longer the time to stage street protests because, often in line with 
what they heard and read in the media, protests nurtured instability. Co-optation strategies 
at the local level also helped to contain emerging episodes of contestation. The 
intervention of pro-government activists in ending a strike by garbage collectors in Kom 
Ombo is a good example of this. Combined with renewed harsh repression taking many 
different forms, these state strategies discouraged most protest inclinations, without 
suppressing all forms of mobilisation. However, such persisting popular mobilisations 
have displayed a high degree of self-restraint. The case of a limited contestation against 
drinking water shortages in Nagaa Abdel Qader, in Qena governorate, demonstrated this 
self-limitation, as well as the relative efficiency of the previously described state 
strategies of containment. In this village characterised by the high influence of tribalism 
and its subsequent loyalties, elders clearly refused to openly confront the authorities. They 
expressed hostility towards public protests, a means they had, however, used in the past. 
Yet, they did take steps to publicise their cause. They talked to journalists and targeted 
the local branch of the Water Company with lawsuits. However, their apparent concern 
to maintain good relations with local officials appeared to show their refusal to escalate 
their mobilisation, suggesting a possible co-optation.  
 
Chapter 4 inquired into the link between leadership and the scale of popular mobilisations. 
It particularly examined the vicissitudes of leadership potentially preventing a larger 
coordination of protests. Studying the diverse profiles of leaders in southern Upper Egypt, 
I first sought to show how vibrant the local activist community was, especially since the 
2011 uprising. I then demonstrated that leaders’ options of strategies to mobilise and rally 
support among ordinary people were limited, not only because of the dangers and 
constraints of authoritarianism, but also largely due to the requirements of popular 
political culture. To put it simply, the highly repressive environment prevailing since the 
July 2013 coup d’état has largely forced movement leaders to restrain themselves to the 
local level and to a limited number of deemed low-risk forms of activism. These have 
included joining political parties or participating in local or national campaigns focusing 
on the provision of communal services. Many activists also joined pro-government 
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organisations, preferring to work within the system and/or hoping to enter local councils. 
Attending political and human rights trainings and using online social media to report on 
violations, network and exchange ideas, were also common. Moreover, I demonstrated 
that the political culture prevailing in the areas where I conducted fieldwork was 
characterised by a relatively high mistrust and suspicion vis-à-vis politics, politicians and 
political parties alike, as well as clientelism and patronage. This also appeared to limit 
considerably the room for manoeuvre in leaders’ strategies. This is especially the case for 
new entrants and political opponents who have no access to government resources and 
thus struggle to provide services to ordinary citizens. Finally, the case study of the Lamm 
al-shaml initiative illustrated many of these challenges encountered by leaders and 
activists trying to expand their constituencies and pursue a level of political participation 
at least locally, despite the risks of repression and other constraints. These range from the 
struggle to transcend the traditional social, cultural and political divides, to the challenge 
to unify efforts around a common purpose.         
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated how some of the sociocultural characteristics of a given place 
affected (de)mobilisation processes and dynamics, potentially encouraging or 
constraining activism by ordinary people. Examining the characteristics of the Upper 
Egyptian culture and society, it particularly emphasised the implications for mobilisation 
of identity issues, social institutions and cultural traditions. I argued that sociocultural 
features or their perception by ordinary citizens were as important as political 
opportunities and threats in leading people to mobilise or demobilise. I attempted to 
demonstrate that a strong regionalism and ordinary people’s perception of belonging to a 
specific regional cultural identity distinct from the rest of Egypt often affected or shaped 
their participation. A sense of marginalisation combined with a perceived contempt from 
northern elites has sometimes provoked Upper Egyptians, encouraging them to mobilise 
to claim their belonging to the national polity, as well as establishing their rights as 
Egyptian citizens. At the same time, this belief in being dissimilar and having different 
needs carries the potential to impede popular mobilisation on a national scale since 
ordinary Upper Egyptians do not always identify with nationwide struggles. I also 
established the importance of patriarchal institutions and cultural traditions in 
(de)mobilisation, especially clanship and gender divisions. I attempted to demonstrate 
that tribalism and clanship implied solidarities and loyalties that encouraged or 
constrained people to mobilise, while inciting self-restraint to avoid sectarian violence. I 
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suggested that the key position of the clans in patronage networks led by the authorities 
potentially limited ordinary people’s contentious mobilisations through the entailed 
loyalties. I also shed light on the challenges faced by women’s activism due to their status 
and role imposed by local patriarchal traditions. At the same time, I suggested that young 
people and women alike occasionally found some emancipation in various forms of 
activism enabling them to partly circumvent patriarchal authority. I concluded that, just 
as much as political opportunities and threats, social and cultural institutions and 
traditions influenced the contentious politics of ordinary people, often limiting their 
expansion beyond the local scale. 
 
Chapter 6 eventually wondered why, contrary to the exceptional success of the Tamarrod 
campaign that led to the 2013 uprising, the three nationwide protest campaigns currently 
available in Egypt – revolutionary change, labour protests, and Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters’ protest movement – persistently failed to attract wider numbers. The 
argument was made that ordinary people’s lack of support for, and, on occasion, 
reluctance towards such perceived adventurous projects stemmed from these movements’ 
continuous failure to address everyday needs through credible, all-inclusive political 
alternatives to the authoritarian regime. In other words, none of either the labour 
movement, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, or the “revolution”, have convincingly 
articulated a political project reintegrating the subalterns in the national polity. In contrast, 
the Tamarrod campaign successfully appealed to many because it transcended traditional 
divisions. It was built around a simple goal and benefited from the nationwide 
involvement of activist networks, as well as the support of the security forces, the media, 
and other actors who were able to exploit popular discontent. The chapter shed light on 
the socioeconomic and sometimes cultural divisions impeding Egyptians to unite and 
become involved in these movements often perceived as exclusionary. Since June 2013, 
there has been no significant mobilisation to defend the 25 January “revolution” because 
popular support for a little known uprising and its leaders has remained marginal, 
especially in the provinces and the countryside. Workers’ protests have similarly failed 
to attract larger solidarity because they have raised targeted sectorial demands, that do 
not speak to the poorest segments of society. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
essentially appeared sectarian and exclusionary, also failing to represent a credible 
alternative and conquer new constituencies. 
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2. Mafīsh faīda493?  
 
In July 2016, residents of Al-Hebeil, near Luxor, blocked the main road to protest 
persistent water cuts494. Protests against drinking water shortages had erupted throughout 
the month of Ramadan across Egypt, particularly in rural areas in the Upper Egyptian and 
Delta provinces. Often brandishing jerricans, angry ordinary citizens demonstrated 
outside governorate buildings and local headquarters of the Drinking Water and 
Sanitation Company, and sometimes cut major roads and highways. A certain diffusion495 
of water protests took place since these erupted during the same period in many different 
places. However, no nationwide movement has emerged from the hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of ordinary people who have mobilised to demand a standardised supply of 
drinking water. In this case as in many others, no “scale shift” (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001) has taken place, and the multitude of water protests remained isolated from 
each other, occurred sporadically, and did not last very long. The six chapters of this 
thesis have attempted to explain this absence of escalation and scale shift in most 
occurrences of discontinuous, dispersed and ephemeral forms of activism. They have 
confirmed the importance of a favourable context in motivating activists and more 
ordinary citizens to mobilise. However, the study assumed that a predominantly 
authoritarian environment, which is intrinsically unfavourable to contentious politics, 
does not always stop all forms of popular activism.  
 
2.1. Opportunities for scale shift in authoritarian contexts 
 
Through its repression, intimidation, co-optation and divide and rule strategies, it is true 
that authoritarianism accounts for a large part of local protesters’ inability to escalate an 
issue. Strategies of containment implemented by the authoritarian state not only deter 
ordinary people from joining protest movements, but also reduce options for more 
experienced political activists and leaders. Furthermore, the latter have to cope with the 
demanding requirements of a local political culture largely pervaded by clientelism and 
general mistrust of politicians. This has further jeopardised leaders’ inclinations to bring 
                                                          
493 A common idiom in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic meaning “there is no hope”. 
494 http://www.albawabhnews.com/2008913. 
495 With brokerage, diffusion is the other process enabling contention to spread and potentially leading to a 
scale-shift. It usually “involves the transfer of information along established lines of interaction”. Doug 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
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protest movements to a higher level, elsewhere called brokerage attempts. In addition to 
the vicissitudes of leadership and to the authoritarian restrictions to opportunities of 
mobilisation, the thesis has insisted on the importance of the sociocultural environment. 
In particular, it has demonstrated that the local logics of patronage and the occasioned 
loyalties, sometimes entrenched in partly co-opted clans, have often prevented protest 
movements’ escalation. Ultimately, the evidence brought by this research definitively 
discards deterministic explanations of the occurrence of contentious politics, because 
mobilisation and demobilisation are extremely complex processes. They involve the 
interaction of too many factors and mechanisms, whether political, social or cultural in 
nature. This thesis offers insight into some of these intersections between mobilisation 
and other processes and mechanisms, particularly repression, the diffusion of contention 
and the role of leadership. 
 
What does this study’s focus on dispersed, discontinuous and short-lived forms of 
activism bring to the debates on contentious politics? One can legitimately wonder what 
is the purpose of devoting an entire thesis to such popular mobilisations which, contrary 
to the mass uprisings that took place in Egypt in 2011 and 2013, have remained small and 
locally contained. As such, indeed, they have neither really alarmed the authorities, nor 
significantly attracted the attention of students of contentious politics. However, should 
movement leaders implement strategies to connect and ally with others who, in various 
other places, share similar grievances, such protests carry the potential to threaten the 
authorities. They could significantly disturb the economy, state assets, road traffic, 
security forces and other state institutions. Scale shift could originate from below and 
from the provinces if local leaders were to seize sometimes less obvious opportunities or 
were even to create them. After all, authoritarianism does not completely suppress 
opportunities, which are ultimately decided by contentious actors. The popular uprising 
that took place in Tunisia in late 2010 and early 2011 is a case in point since it started in 
the poor in-land provinces to the South of the country (Ayeb 2012). In the Egyptian case, 
competent local activists and leaders are not lacking. They often have access to 
transregional or nationwide networks that put them in touch with others elsewhere in the 
country. Additionally, they sometimes have the advantage of access to a myriad of local 
informal networks, organisations and associations on which they can rely to campaign 
and mobilise. They also have a crucial knowledge of the political culture, as well as of 
local culture and traditions.  
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In consequence, are there opportunities for a significant shift of these local popular 
mobilisations under authoritarian conditions? In light of this thesis’ findings, the answer 
is yes, although these are hard to predict. Such opportunities appear to depend intimately 
on movement leaders’ will to take risks and face a highly repressive authoritarian regime. 
Ultimately, this thesis’ focus on dispersed, discontinuous and ephemeral forms of 
activism has thus shed light on the importance of organisation and mostly leadership to 
understand and to explain political change. It is true that both are constrained by 
repression. However, the outcome of mobilisation mainly depends on movement leaders’ 
resilience, determination and innovation to circumvent state repression and authoritarian 
conditions. Discontinuous, ephemeral and isolated forms of local activism appear 
unimportant until a number of factors and mechanisms, on the top of which is the activism 
of leaders, interact and favour scale shift. According to Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow 
(2001), diffusion and brokerage are the main processes leading to scale shift. These are 
processes that are not incompatible with authoritarian conditions, especially if a culture 
of protest already exists as is the case in Egypt. Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow also noted 
that “contention that spreads primarily through diffusion will almost always remain 
narrower in its geographic and/or institutional scale than contention that spreads through 
brokerage”496. Therefore, for larger social or protest movements to emerge, for instance 
against the deterioration of public services, leadership exercising brokerage appears 
essential. As summarised by Asef Bayat, “revolutionaries are always in a minority; and 
revolutions are always carried out by a minority […] Revolutions are won not because 
the majority of people fight the regimes, but because only a tiny minority remains to 
resist”497. 
     
The focus on ordinary people’s contentious politics inscribed in their local context has 
also shed light on the importance of the sociocultural environment in shaping, fostering 
or constraining popular mobilisations. Indeed, the thesis demonstrates how popular 
mobilisations are partly structured by their local geographical and cultural context, as well 
as how the local level interacts with its national counterpart. It showed that people’s 
motives and paths to mobilisation are so diverse and complex that actual or perceived 
opportunities and/or threats are not sufficient to explain their decisions. I hope to have 
contributed to this debate by encouraging a more thorough analysis of identity issues, 
                                                          
496 McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 
497 Asef Bayat, “The Arab Spring and its Surprises”, Development and Change 44(3), 2013. 
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social and cultural constructions, traditions and beliefs, to better understand contentious 
actors’ options and strategic decisions. Such a sociocultural angle in the study of 
discontinuous, ephemeral and dispersed forms of activism in the marginalised periphery 
will hopefully enable scholars to unravel the puzzle of the relative failure, so far, of the 
Arab uprisings. This thesis also hopes to encourage further research on issues of 
leadership, especially at the local level. While many observers were quick to call the 2011 
uprising a leaderless revolution, we now know that it was rather driven by a multitude of 
front-runners. Local support and organisational networks used for mobilisation and 
campaigning purposes also need further research. More case studies of popular 
mobilisations in the provinces in Egypt and in other Middle Eastern countries, would be 
very useful to broaden our knowledge of all the processes and mechanisms discussed in 
this thesis. While fieldwork in Egypt will remain risky for Egyptian and foreign 
researchers alike at least for a while, hope and interesting avenues for future academic 
research remain.    
 
2.2. Prospects for Egypt  
 
Did a revolution, basically understood as an event triggering a deep process of 
transformation of power and state institutions, happen in Egypt in 2011? I am inclined to 
say that a revolutionary opportunity emerged, but was hit by a decisive setback with the 
2013 military coup, which was partly supported by a separate popular uprising. However, 
can we say that the latter has eliminated all prospects for revolutionary change, or at least 
gradual political reform? This is a thorny issue that only time will definitively resolve. 
However, as reflected throughout the thesis, constituencies for change exist in Egypt. In 
addition, ordinary Egyptians may not have been ready to experiment revolutionary 
change in 2011 or 2013. But this does not discard any prospect of change. Five years on, 
what is left of the 25 January “revolution”? I established that the 2011 uprising has not 
left anyone completely indifferent. However, interviews with ordinary people showed 
that stability and security were often more important than deemed uncertain political 
adventures. This certainly explains part of the infatuation with the army’s takeover in 
2013. More than a rather vague revolutionary project, the demand has been for gradual 
change, for authoritarian regimes to reform themselves, for what was elsewhere called 
“refo-lution” (Bayat 2013). This is understood as “revolutions that aim to push for 
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reforms in, and through, the institutions of the existing regimes”498. Indeed, 
authoritarianism was not necessarily rejected: 
 
 “When there is a right dictator, he acts in the interest of the country.”499 
 
In addition, many ordinary people insisted that they had more important things to do than 
caring about politics or going to protests, often citing poverty as a justification: 
 
 “Someone who works for EGP10 a day…an employee […] Do you think that after 
coming back from work, someone who has 7 or 8 children…will still go out to participate 
in a march? Or go to a demonstration for example?”500 
 
 “We have no time. We want to feed our children. The most important thing for us 
is to provide for the home… We have no time for problems, we want to eat a piece of 
bread”.501 
 
That said, almost everyone talked about the famous slogan of the “revolution”, “bread, 
freedom and social justice”. With bread, social justice seemed particularly important: 
 
“The individual who is standing in the sun in the street, working… And there is 
someone sitting in an office, earning millions, isn’t that a scandal?”502 
 
“In any case, the citizen is oppressed…He can’t talk to you about democracy or 
freedom or bread or social justice. When someone stands for 3-4 hours at the oven in a 
long and large queue for 1 Egyptian pound of bread, while someone standing by his side 
has bread made especially for him […] because he is the son of the prince, and I, the son 
of the black duck, must wait in the queue and take bread full of bolts and dust, and will 
eat it as a grace, a favour from God… The citizen always feels this”.503 
 
                                                          
498 Asef Bayat, “Revolution in bad times”, New Left Review 80, 2013. 
499 Interview with Muhammad H., 39, lawyer, Aniba (Aswan), April 2014. 
500 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
501 Interview with Erkabi, 48, driver at cleaning company, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
502 Interview with Ayman, 30, garbage collector, Kom Ombo (Aswan), April 2014. 
503 Interview with Zaineb, 30, artisan, Luxor, March 2015. 
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A hotel employee in Aswan, Ahmed S. complained that ordinary and poor people were 
treated as less than second class citizens by Egyptian managers, while foreigners were 
more human504. These testimonies and many others reported in this study suggest that the 
2011 uprising has somehow liberated the capacity of the people to speak out. In other 
words, ordinary people now more openly and freely denounce social inequalities, 
discriminations, nepotism and other corrupt practices they have yet always endured. They 
have similarly challenged their marginalisation while at the same time attempting to 
reclaim their place among national citizenship. This thesis is also a story of the exclusion 
of a wide majority from policies affecting their country and their lives, generally because 
they live in remote areas and/or are poor. These challenges to social injustices and 
discriminative policies constitute, I believe, a significant legacy of the 2011 uprising with 
an inherent potential to push for reform.  
 
Moreover, even while stating that they were not particularly interested in politics, most 
ordinary people confessed that they had voted in elections since the 2011 uprising. This 
is in contrast to the tiny minority which used to vote under President Mubarak. The 
uprising undoubtedly renewed ordinary people’s interest in the destiny of their country. 
Politics was not black or white, and people often switched their support. While before the 
“revolution” many young leaders were members of former President Mubarak’s NDP, 
they sometimes enthusiastically participated in the uprising. For instance, Hamdi, who 
was a member in the NDP before the 2011 uprising, voted for Khaled Ali, a leading labour 
activist, in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections. He only chose Ahmed Shafiq, 
the establishment candidate, at the second round. In addition, many respondents who had 
voted for Muhammad Morsi in 2012, sometimes protested against him in 2013, and now 
supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  
 
What is next for Egypt? Despite the fear that currently prevails after more than three years 
of mass killings, arbitrary arrests and harsh prison sentences, nothing can completely 
erase the legacies of the 25 January “revolution” from the minds of the people. Some 
informants are convinced that “a third revolution will happen”505. As I write these 
concluding lines in July 2016, popular discontent and disappointment with President 
Sisi’s regime keeps growing. Small, locally contained protests regularly erupt against 
                                                          
504 Interview with Ahmed S., 39, hotel employee, Aswan, February 2014. 
505 Interview with Fawzi, 61, retired, former worker in Saudi Arabia, Ballana (Aswan), March 2014. 
 
265 
 
drinking water shortages, police brutality, corrupt officials, and many other grievances. 
The prospect of a new uprising, this time mainly driven by socioeconomic concerns, 
cannot be completely excluded. In 2014, an informant had told me: 
 
“The coming revolution will be a bread revolt. Only the working class will 
participate. It will trump 25 January [2011], 30 June [2013], and all the revolutions. No 
one will be able to control it”506. 
 
However, with no organised political opposition to take over power, it is unlikely that a 
new uprising would lead to significant political change. Consequently, Egypt will likely 
experience gradual change over many years, probably a generation or two, during which 
new political players will refine their project and prepare to assume power.  
 
In particular, there is hope that “revolutionaries”, who should be preparing for the future, 
will first learn from past mistakes. They have to transcend their political differences, and 
find ways to work with less revolutionary but still reformist elements. These will need to 
include young supporters of the current regime that are increasingly disillusioned, as well 
as moderate Islamists. Revolutionaries must also systematically take into account 
ordinary and poor Egyptians’ daily needs in order to gradually build constituencies. They 
have to accept that 25 January is an unloved revolution and that most of their compatriots 
cannot afford more instability. By seeking to gradually work from inside the current 
system, as various examples exposed in this thesis have showed, some of them will have 
understood that they are unlikely to win the coming battles in the streets. Change will be 
a long, demanding and painful process, but it will come eventually. People change, 
societies evolve, and regimes revolve. In Egypt, it is only once the revolution has won 
that justice will be able to triumph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
506 Interview with Youssef, 45, electrician, Al-Hebeil (Luxor), April 2014. 
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